Mohil et al v. Glick et al

Filing 118

MEMORANDUM Order Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 7/18/2012:Mailed notice(srn, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RAVIRAJ MOHIL, et al., etc.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JILL GLICK, et al., etc.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No.

07 C 1600

MEMORANDUM ORDER
This Court owes the parties an apology for its extended
further delay in resolving the disputed issue of taxable costs to
be levied against plaintiffs.

Factors beyond this Court’s

control have interfered with resolution of a good many matters
that would long since have been disposed of under ordinary
circumstances.
That said, this memorandum order will address the several
unresolved issues in the same sequence that they were discussed
in Defendants’ Additional Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to
Defendants’ Bill of Costs, filed in response to this Court’s
May 14, 2012 memorandum order.1 (citations to which will take the
form “Reply” followed by defendants’ Roman numeral designations
of sections in that document).
And because defendants have withdrawn their request for
reimbursement of computerized legal research costs amounting to

1

Citations to that filing will take the form “Reply”
followed by defendants’ Roman numeral designation of a section of
that document.

$6,435.86, the starting point for discussion here will be the
$15,416.64 aggregate that remains from defendants’ original
claim.
Reply II deals with the copying expense of records that
defendants subpoenaed “to Verify the Accuracy and Completeness of
Plaintiffs’ Document Production.”

Here plaintiffs’ counsel

complain that they had earlier produced to defense counsel the
medical records and DCFS file, which in turn contained the Police
Department and State’s Attorney records--records that turned out
to have been fully responsive because the subpoenas brought forth
the identical records.

Defense counsel respond reasonably that

they were not required to take plaintiffs’ word for it just
because “records produced by Plaintiffs and the records within
those records turned out to be complete copies.”
That however misses the point--after all, it was of course
defense counsel who shaped the content of the demands made in the
subpoenas in this case.

With substantial sets of documents in

hand having been produced by plaintiffs’ counsel, and with those
photocopied documents having all the indicia of authenticity, it
would have been a simple matter for defense counsel to describe
the documents sought by subpoena in terms of their generic
description except for a listing of the already produced
materials.

If that had been done, the responses to the subpoenas

would have turned up no additional documents, and no photocopying

2

expense would have been incurred to begin with.
In short, there is no reason that plaintiffs should bear the
cost of the manner in which the subpoenas were drafted, resulting
in a total duplication of documents.

That component of the

claimed bill of costs should be eliminated.
Reply III addresses “Copying Expense of Medical Records
Subpoenaed From Persons Identified in Plaintiffs’ Rule 26(a)(1)
Initial Disclosures.”

In that respect defendants argue

persuasively for the taxation of those items, and there is no
need to elaborate on the matter.

No reduction is called for in

that respect.
Reply IV speaks to the “Copying Expense of Materials for
Defendants’ Experts and the Other Witnesses Deposed by
Plaintiffs.”

Here too Defendants’ explanation is entirely

reasonable, and no reduction is called for.
Reply V addresses the “In-House Copying Expense of
Deposition Exhibits.”

Although defense counsel argues

convincingly for the allowability of such expense, the per-page
rate of $0.12 exceeds the $.07 to $.08 figure that this Court has
encountered in Seventh Circuit opinions.

Accordingly the charges

in this category should be reduced by one-third.
Reply VI deals with the “Cost of Deposition Transcripts for
Deponents Identified in Plaintiffs’ Disclosures and in Persons
Plaintiffs Deposed.”

This area of the caselaw on the subject of

3

costs does not second guess prevailing parties by limiting
allowability to depositions actually used or to witnesses other
than persons within that party’s control.

Instead the test is

the perceived reasonable necessity for the deposition when it was
taken.

No deduction should be made for these expenses.

Finally, Reply VII’s caption repeats the caption in
Reply VI, but it covers a catchall set of Plaintiffs’ objections
to remaining deposition costs.

Once again Defendants’ response

is a reasonable one, and no further reduction is called for in
this area either.
Conclusion
What has been said here resolves the differences between the
litigants in each of the previously disputed areas.

Defense

counsel is ordered to quantify the end result in accordance with
this memorandum order, and plaintiffs are ordered to pay the
reduced amount of the bill of costs promptly.

________________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date:

July 18, 2012

4