Cooper et al v. Daley et al

Filing 260

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 5/16/2012:Before the Court are Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions in limine 232 . For the reasons below, Plaintiffs' motions are granted in part and denied in part and Defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part. Mailed notice(tbk, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Robert M. Dow, Jr.

CASE NUMBER

07 C 2144

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

5/16/2012

DATE
Cooper et al. vs. Dailey et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ motions in limine [232]. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs’
motions are granted in part and denied in part and Defendants’ motions are granted in part and denied in part.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
I.

Plaintiffs’ Motions:
1. Motion to bar argument of financial consideration

Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs’ motion to bar argument regarding improper financial
considerations. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 1 is granted.
2. Motion to bar argument of contingency fee arrangement
Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs’ motion to bar argument of the contingency fee arrangement
between Plaintiffs and their counsel. Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 2 therefore is granted.
3. Motion to bar evidence of financial hardship for Defendants
Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 3 is granted without objection.
introducing any evidence of financial hardship.

Defendants are barred from

4. Motion to bar argument of what Chicago Police Officers “do and do not do”
Ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 4 is reserved. While Defendants do not object to this

Page 1 of 9

STATEMENT
motion, the scope of testimony and evidence that might lie within the Plaintiff’s cryptic motion is unclear.
The Court reminds the parties, however, that any evidence or argument that the parties may seek to elicit
concerning what Chicago Police Officers “do” and “do not do” must be consistent with the rest of Court’s
rulings.
5. Motion to call non-party city employees as adverse witnesses
Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 5 is granted. Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs’ calling non-party
city employees as adverse witnesses.
6. Motion to Introduce 404(b) Evidence
Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 6 is granted in part and denied in part. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” It may be admissible, however, to show motive,
opportunity, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. Id. To determine admissibility under
Rule 404(b), the court considers whether “(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue
other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act
is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient
to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d
1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 363-64 (7th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiffs’ first seek to introduce evidence of the findings set forth in the underlying complaint register
(“CR”) in which the police department conducted an internal investigation of the allegations at issue in this
case. Defendants argue that under Seventh Circuit law, CRs relating to the events giving rise to this case are
not admissible because evidence of violations of the general rules and policies is inadmissible. See
Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 453-456 (7th Cir. 2006). The Court agrees with
Defendants—consistent with Thompson, the underlying CRs are inadmissible as evidence of their findings.
The Court also concludes that allowing into evidence the findings of the CR in the underlying incident would
be substantially more prejudicial than probative given the Seventh Circuit’s unequivocal statement that
violations of police regulations are “completely immaterial” to whether a federal constitutional violation has
been committed by the officer in question. See also Section II.7 below. With that said, statements that
Defendants made during the CR investigation pertaining to the incident giving rise to this case are not hearsay
if offered as party opponent admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). See, e.g., Rothwell v.
City of Chicago, 2011 WL 5169419, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2011). Those statements—as well as statements
made by others who may testify at trial—also constitute prior statements that may be used for impeachment if
a witness’s testimony at trial departs from what he or she said during the CR investigation. Id. 1
[FN1] As this Court previously has stated, because the jury “should not hear evidence
that there was an [internal] investigation, the reasons for undertaking the investigation,
or the findings and recommendations of the IPRA,” yet the statements made during
that investigation may be admissible as party opponent admissions or for

Page 2 of 9

STATEMENT
impeachment purposes, the parties must tread carefully in eliciting testimony in this
area. “Any complications that may arise from Plaintiff’s perceived need to reference
prior statements, while keeping all reference to IPRA out of the case, may be averted
by a stipulation – or, absent a stipulation, by carefully framing the questions to the
witness in terms of generic references to prior statements made by the witness that
were transcribed, without reference to the specific context in which the statements
were made.” Bruce v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 3471074, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 29,
2011).

Plaintiffs next seek to introduce evidence of any findings in any relevant CRs that have been produced
or should have been produced. In regard to those CRs that have been produced to date, none involves an
incident that is similar enough to the issues in this case to be relevant or probative of intent, plan, modus
operandi, or absence of mistake and thus admissible under Rule 404(b).
However, as to the CR and pending investigation into Defendant Officer Dailey’s false police call
following his DUI, the Court reserves its ruling at this time. As of the time of the briefing on this motion, it
was not clear whether Defendants had produced the underlying records despite the Court’s prior rulings
granting Plaintiffs’ motions to compel. To the extent that Defendants have not done so on the basis of an
asserted privilege, the best course may be to produce the CR for in camera review by this Court (or by
Magistrate Judge Nolan) for a ruling. If Plaintiffs wish to proceed in that fashion, they may bring an
appropriate motion, which will be given expedited consideration. The Court also notes that regardless of
whether Plaintiffs are permitted to introduce the CR under Rule 404(b), Rule 608(b) may permit Plaintiffs to
question Dailey about the circumstances relating to the alleged false police call for the purpose of attacking
his character for truthfulness. See Bruce v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 3471074, *7 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2011);
see also U.S. v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing the scope of Rule 608(b)). Plaintiffs
may not, however, use extrinsic evidence in connection with such an inquiry. Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). The
Court reserves final ruling on the scope of any possible examination of Officer Dailey in regard to the 911
call pending further discussion of the yet-unproduced CR and the possibility alluded to by defense counsel
that Dailey may invoke a Fifth Amendment privilege in regard to testimony about the pending felony charge
that he faces in connection with that call.
Plaintiffs next seek to introduce previous warrants for which Dailey claims a confidential informant
named “Lamar” allegedly provided information. Insofar as either side seeks to introduce evidence regarding
Lamar or warrants directly related to Lamar, they may do so. Such evidence is directly relevant to a central
issue in dispute between the parties – namely, whether Lamar does or does not exist. These warrants, as well
as other evidence about Lamar, are direct evidence of a disputed issue for trial and thus are admissible under
Rule 401, irrespective of Rule 404(b).2
[FN2] The parties also have mentioned at various court appearances – although not in
their motions in limine – the indictments of Lamar Lewis and Lawrence Tolliver in
federal case numbers 11-cr-682 and 11-cr-683, respectively. At the status hearing set
for 5/17/2012 at 1:30 p.m., the Court will inquire further about Mr. Lewis and Mr.
Tolliver and the pertinence to this case of their indictments and their testimony (if
available).

Page 3 of 9

STATEMENT
Finally, Plaintiffs seek to introduce as evidence additional warrants and an attorney-made summary of
warrant applications and police reports in effort to show a pattern of swearing out false warrants. This
evidence is problematic for several reasons. To begin with, it goes directly to the Monell claim that the
parties agreed to bifurcate [164]. The Court granted the parties’ joint motion on November 8, 2010 [167]. In
that motion, the parties informed the Court (among other things) of Defendants’ concern that “if the Monell
claims were tried alongside with the individual claims, evidence about thousands of warrants other than the
warrant at issue in this case would be represented, along with analyses of the success of those warrants and
expert testimony sharply criticizing CPD officers’ work in obtaining warrants.” [164 at 3]. That is exactly
what Plaintiffs’ current motion attempts to do by seeking to introduce such evidence during the trial of
Plaintiffs’ non-Monell claims.
In addition, the manner in which Plaintiffs have gathered and attempted to present this evidence –
using attorney-created documents and arguments – raises concerns about the attempt to present specialized or
other technical opinion evidence through lay witnesses. Plaintiffs themselves refer to “statistical analysis” in
explaining why they believe the evidence of other warrant applications and the summary document is
inadmissible, but they offer nothing in the way of detailed explanation of the methodology that has been
employed to support whatever conclusions they would like to present for the jury’s consideration. Nor do
they explain any controls that could be used to establish the similarities (or differences) between the
circumstances surrounding the 182 other search warrants and the circumstances at the time that the Officers
sought the search warrant in this case.
If Plaintiffs wished to present this type of evidence – and they still may do so at the Monell stage of
the case – they may be able to present their theories in a manner that would be both sufficiently reliable and
comprehensible to the jury through the testimony of an expert witness who has performed analysis of the data
using an explainable methodology and drawn appropriate conclusions that follow from such analysis. See
Obrycka v. City of Chicago, 2012 WL 601810, at *7 - *8 (N.D. Ill. Fed. 23, 2012) (allowing “code of silence”
evidence presented by expert in statistics and law enforcement administrative, organizational, and
management procedures in support of Monell claim). What we have at this point, however, is sufficiently
attenuated and ill-presented such that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for
confusion of the issues and lack of juror comprehension as to be inadmissible at this (non-Monell) stage of
the case. See, e.g., Carlson v. Bukovic, 2009 WL 1575548, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2009) (“Evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of jury confusion”). Finally, if
Plaintiffs were permitted to present evidence of the pattern that they claim exists as to the 182 warrant
applications that they have studied, the potential for a plethora of “trials within the trial” (see Jones v.
Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1989); Heflin v. City of Chicago, 1996 WL 28238, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 22, 1996)) also militates against allowing the presentation of such evidence under Rule 404(b) in this
instance. For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs may not introduce into evidence the other warrants that are not
directly relevant to the case at hand or the summary of those warrants put together by their counsel.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 6 is granted in part and denied in part in accordance with the
above opinion. This ruling is without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to renew any and all arguments relating
to the alleged pattern during any subsequent Monell-related proceedings in this case.

Page 4 of 9

STATEMENT
7. Motion to Bar Testimony of Connie Kuriata and Any Reopening of Discovery
As previously discussed, Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 7 is granted in part for the reasons stated on
the record at the pre-trial conference on March 21, 2012; however, ruling is reserved as to any potential use
by Defendants of testimony by Ms. Kuriata pending a determination by the Department of Justice in regard to
whether she may have any relevant testimony to present at trial. Should Defendants see a potential use for
Ms. Kuriata’s testimony at trial, they may at that time bring a motion to disclose her as a witness and set forth
the potential testimony that they seek to elicit. In the meantime, the Court is not persuaded that an advisory
opinion would be appropriate.
II.

Defendants’ Motions in Limine
1. Motion to Bar Non-Party Witnesses from the Court Room
Plaintiffs agree with Defendants’ motion in limine No. 1, which therefore is granted.
2. Motion to Bar Argument that the Jury should Send the City a Message with a Verdict
Plaintiffs have no objection to Defendants’ motion in limine No. 2, which therefore is granted.
3. Motion to Bar reference to lawsuits, criminal investigations, scandals or politics involving the city
or its employees

The Court reserves ruling on Defendants’ motion in limine No. 3 To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to
reference or introduce evidence concerning other lawsuits, criminal investigations, scandals, or politics
involving the City or its employees and those subjects are not addressed elsewhere in this opinion, Plaintiffs
must raise the issue with the Court and opposing counsel with specificity outside the presence of the jury and
with sufficient advance notice to permit argument and an opportunity for the Court to make a reasoned
determination on the matter.
4. Motion to Bar Comments of the City’s Failure to Call Witnesses or produce Evidence
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 4 is granted in part. It would be improper for Plaintiffs to insinuate
without evidentiary support that Defendants are purposefully attempting to hide evidence or a witness,
particularly since Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving their case. However, the Court is not barring Plaintiffs
from arguing that there are deficiencies in Defendants’ case due to the absence of testimony by certain
individuals or the absence of certain evidence. Rather, it is merely improper for Plaintiffs to insinuate that
Defendants are purposefully hiding evidence. The Court will instruct the jury as to the Plaintiffs’ burden of
proof. See Bruce v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 3471074, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 29, 2011).
5. Motion to Bar Reference to Settlement Negotiations
Plaintiffs have no objection to this motion and thus Defendants’ motion in limine No. 5 is granted.

Page 5 of 9

STATEMENT
6. Motion to Bar Argument of Police Cover Up and “Code of Silence”
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 6 is granted in part. Defendants argue that such evidence is akin to
prior bad acts evidence and would violate Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403. However, “[p]roof
of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically
been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony.”
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). Indeed, “[a] party’s and a witness’s common group
membership is probative of bias * * *.” Townsend v. Benya, 287 F. Supp. 2d 868, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff focuses on the officers and incidents involved in this case, Plaintiff may
explore the possibility that the defense witnesses in this case are biased because of loyalty to one another.
See, e.g., Saunders v. City of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Galvan v. Norberg, 2006
WL 1343680, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2006) (denying motion in limine seeking to bar “code of silence”
evidence since “evidence or argument of this type can go to the issue of the bias or motivation of witnesses”).
In addition, because Plaintiffs have claimed that Defendants were involved in a conspiracy with other nonDefendant members of their police team or unit, Plaintiffs are not prohibited from arguing that non-Defendant
members of the team might be subject to the same “group membership” bias referenced above. Nevertheless,
the Court agrees with Defendants that generalized allegations of police misconduct by officers other than the
named Defendants (and their alleged co-conspirator team members) would be akin to impermissible
propensity evidence. Maldonado v. Stinar, 2010 WL 3075680, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010) (allowing
evidence of bias among the particular officers involved in the incident at issue there, while excluding
generalized evidence of a “code of silence” or “blue wall” (citing Christmas v. City of Chicago, 691 F. Supp.
2d 811, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (same), and Moore v. City of Chicago, 2008 WL 4549137, at *6 (Apr. 15, 2008)
(same))); see also Betts v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 1837805, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2011); Caldwell v.
City of Chicago, 2010 WL 380696, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (barring plaintiff from presenting evidence showing
police generally protect or cover up for each other and that there is a code of silence in the CPD). Plaintiffs
have not presented expert testimony in support of any “code of silence” theory, at least at this stage of the
case. Compare Obrycka, 2012 WL 601810, at *7. Defendants’ sixth motion in limine is granted in part and
denied in part as follows: (1) Plaintiff may present evidence and elicit testimony to probe whether the
Defendant Officers (and any alleged co-conspirator team members) are biased in their testimony concerning
the incidents at issue in this case out of loyalty to one another; (2) Plaintiff may not use the term “code of
silence” as this term is unduly prejudicial and no supported by sufficient analysis (see Obrycka); and (3)
Plaintiff may not introduce evidence that law enforcement officers typically adhere to a “code of silence” or
seek to cover up misconduct in order to protect fellow officers.
7. Motion to Bar Reference to Violations of Police Department Rules, Policies and Regulations
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 7 is granted in part. In Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444,
455 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit held that the “violation of police regulations or even a state law is
completely immaterial as to the question of whether a violation of the federal constitution has been
established.” Under Thompson, any attempt to elicit testimony concerning violations of general orders, rules
or polices of the CPD as evidence of a federal constitutional violation appears to be forbidden under Rule
401. All of Plaintiffs’ claims for trial are federal claims that arise under Section 1983, and thus are controlled
by the rule articulated in Thompson. Seventh Circuit pattern jury instruction 7.04, referenced by Plaintiffs,

Page 6 of 9

STATEMENT
was adopted long before Thompson became the law of this circuit. However, the Court repeats that
statements that Defendants previously have made about the incident giving rise to this case may be admissible
if offered as party opponent admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). See, e.g., Rothwell v.
City of Chicago, 2011 WL 5169419, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2011). Those statements—as well as statements
made by others who may testify at trial—may be used for impeachment if a witness’s testimony at trial
departs from what he or she previously stated. Id.
8. Motion to Bar Inference and Argument that the Affidavit and Complaint for the Search Warrant
was Invalid or Void at the Time of Issuance
Defendants’ motion in limine 8 is denied in part. Pursuant to Seventh Circuit precedent, Plaintiff is
permitted to introduce evidence to prove that a “reasonably well-trained officer in the position of the
defendant would have known that the action lacks probable cause and that he should not have applied for the
warrant.” Neiman v. Keane, 232 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Simmons v. Pryor, 26 F.3d 650, 653
(7th Cir. 1993)); see also Horne v. Wheeler, 2005 WL 2171151, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2005) (“The Seventh
Circuit has extended the Franks standard to civil actions for damages, like the case at hand, in which a
plaintiff alleges that a police officer deliberately misrepresented facts in a warrant application”). In civil
cases—as in criminal cases—Plaintiffs’ may introduce evidence designed to overcome the “presumption that
the warrant affidavit was valid” by making a “substantial preliminary showing that [the Defendant] made
false statements in the warrant affidavit in knowing or reckless disregard for the truth.” Perlman v. City of
Chicago, 801 F.2d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)). For
example, in Olsen v. Tyler, the Seventh Circuit further explained that evidence that the officer purposely or
recklessly withheld facts that could “negate probable cause” is “relevant” because the officer may be liable
for violating the victim’s civil rights. 825 F.2d 1116, 1118 (7th Cir. 1987).3 Under the cases cited above,
Plaintiffs’ are permitted to introduce evidence in support of their contention that one or more Defendants
made false statements in the warrant affidavit in knowing or reckless disregard for the truth in support of a
Fourth Amendment claim, and Plaintiffs’ claim is governed by the same standard established by Franks in the
criminal context. See Perlman, 801 F.2d at 264. Having set forth in this opinion a recitation of the pertinent
Seventh Circuit case law, the Court will inquire of Plaintiffs at the 5/17/2012 status conference more
specifically how they propose to introduce admissible evidence at trial in support of this claim and reserves
ruling on the admissibility of any specific line of inquiry. Cf. Horne, 2005 WL 2171151, at *3-*5 (discussing
in detail evidence presented at summary judgment stage in civil Franks claim).
[FN3] The Court draws to the attention of the parties the discussion of jury
instructions, including a special verdict interrogatory, in Olson, 825 F.2d at 1118-19,
in anticipation of the jury instruction conference that will be held at some point during
trial.

9. Motion to Bar Evidence of Complaints, Lawsuits, Disciplinary Proceedings against Defendant
Officers
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 9 is granted in part and denied in part, in accordance with the
Court’s rulings in Plaintiffs’ motion in limine No. 6.

Page 7 of 9

STATEMENT
10. Motion to Bar Testimony or Imply that Officers are Being Paid by the City to Appear in Court
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 10 is granted without objection.
11. Motion to Par Plaintiffs Counsel from Creating Adverse Trial Publicity
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 11 also is granted without objection.
12. Motion to Bar Testimony and Evidence that Defendants are Indemnified by the City
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 12 is granted. The City of Chicago is responsible for indemnifying
compensatory damage awards that Plaintiffs may receive against Defendants because it is undisputed that
Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the incident that gave rise to this
action. Defendants seek to exclude any references to the City of Chicago’s indemnification obligations on the
ground that such obligations are irrelevant to the issues of liability that are at issue in this case. Defendants
further contend that they would suffer prejudice if the jury were apprised of the City’s indemnity obligations,
because jurors may be more likely to find for Plaintiff on liability or inflate a compensatory damages award if
they knew that Defendants themselves would not be on the hook financially.
The Seventh Circuit has sided with Defendants on this issue to a point, holding that “[i]n the general
case courts exclude evidence of indemnification out of a fear that it will encourage a jury to inflate its
damages award because it knows the government – not the individual defendants – is footing the bill.”
Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 379 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 37 (7th Cir.
1996) (“When the defendant is to be fully indemnified, such evidence, far from being required, is
inadmissible”). However, when defendants who benefit from a right to indemnification nevertheless claim an
inability to pay damages, such defendants are deemed to have “opened the door” to evidence of the statutory
entitlement to indemnification. Thus, evidence of indemnification is inadmissible unless defendants open the
door by injecting their personal financial circumstances into the case. Additionally, if Defendants choose to
“apprise the jury of the fact that the individual officers will have to bear [punitive] damages out of their own
pockets,” then “fairness would dictate that the jury also be informed of the true situation (indemnification) as
to compensatory damages” (Galvan, 2006 WL 1343680, at *2), subject to an appropriate limiting instruction
that “Defendants’ finances address punitive damages only.” Townsend, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
13. Motion to Bar Evidence of Plaintiffs’ “Good” Character4
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 13 is granted in part. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be
barred from presenting evidence of their good character, such as personal and professional accomplishments.
See Fed. R. Evid. 404 (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion * * *”). Plaintiffs contend that
character is relevant to both credibility and to damages. While Defendants are correct that under Rule 404,
evidence of person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith, it is admissible if Defendants try to attack Plaintiffs character. See Fed. R. Evid. 608
(allowing the use of certain character evidence or opinion of character to impeach a witness’ credibility); see

Page 8 of 9

STATEMENT
also Fed. R. Evid. 405.
[FN4] Defendants labeled two Motions in Limine as “12.” The Court addressed the
first one as 12 and will adjust the numbering of the second “12” and “13” to Motion in
Limine “13” and “14” for the purpose of this Order.

14. Motion to Bar Plaintiff From Testifying as to any Emotional or Medical Issues
Defendants’ motion in limine No. 14 is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs, as lay persons,
may not testify as to any diagnosis or condition. See Mehta v. Council for Jewish Elderly, No. 95 C 1156,
1996 WL 272520, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1996) But Plaintiffs may relate to the jury their condition
following the incident based on their recollections and subject to cross-examination. See Ellis v. Country
Club Hills, 2011 WL 6001148, at * 7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2011).

Page 9 of 9