Cooper et al v. Daley et al

Filing 344

MOTION by Defendants M. Bonstetter, S. Daley, F Mack, S. Reina, D Ross for judgment for Defendants as Matter of Law Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ. P. 50 (Mitchell, Gregory)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARKEE COOPER, SR., ZION COOPER
AND MARKEE COOPER, JR., by and
through their Parents and guardians MARKEE
COOPER, SR. and SHENITA COOPER,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
Chicago Police Officers S. DAILEY, No. 10890,
)
M. BONNSTETTER, No. 15963, F. MACK, No. )
198404, S. REINA, No. 2622, D. ROSS, No. 177, )
and The CITY OF CHICAGO
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case, No.: 07 CV 2144

Hon. Robert W. Dow, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Nolan

DEFENDANTS DAILEY, BONNSTETTER, ROSS, REINA AND MACK’S
CONSOLIDATED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT
TO RULE 50(A) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Now comes Defendants S. Dailey, No. 10890, M. Bonnstetter, No. 15963, F. Mack No.
198404, S. Reina, No. 2622 and D. Ross, No. 177, by and through their attorney Gregory T.
Mitchell, Law Office of Gregory T. Mitchell, P.C. respectfully moves for judgment as a matter
of law. In support of this motion that following is submitted:
I.

The Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law
A.

Fed.R.Civ. P. Rule 50 – Judgment as Matter of Law - Standard of Review

Pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “if a party has been fully
heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (a) resolve
the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the

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party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only
with a favorable finding on that issue.
1. Officer Sean Dailey is Entitled to Judgment in his Favor on the Search Warrant
Claims
As to the issuance of a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant be
supported by probable cause and particularly describe the place to be searched. Jones v.
Wilhelm, 425 F.3d 455, 462 (7th Cir. 2005). Before an officer may undertake a search, the Fourth
Amendment “requires the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance
of the warrant.” Id. (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 90 S.Ct. 1975, 261 L.Ed.2d
419 (1970)). In addition, “the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits
the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.” Id. (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct.
1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987)).

Affidavits and complaints supporting warrants are presumed

valid. United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2009) and the validity of the warrant
is assessed on the basis of the information that the officer disclosed, or had a duty to discover
and to disclose to the issuing Magistrate. Guzman v. City of Chicago, 565 F.3d 393396 (7th Cir.
2009). Information that emerges after the warrant is issued has no bearing on this analysis. Id.
In denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court relied on three
(3) disputed facts: (1) “that plaintiffs argue that the confidential informant Lamar did not exist”;
(2) “there is a dispute over whether Dailey crosschecked any information that he learned from
the supposed informant; and (3) whether Dailey lied about any crosschecks that he performed.”
R. 218. The district court further denied Officer Dailey’s defense on the basis of qualified
immunity solely because of the disputed fact whether Dailey “knowingly included false
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information in the warrant,” (i.e. the very existence of the C/I) citing Lawson v. Veruchi, 637
F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2011).
Now that the plaintiff has had a full opportunity to present its evidence, it is undisputed
that the confidential informant relied on by Officer Daily did in fact exist and that his name is
“Lamar Lewis.” Not only did Officer Bonnstetter identify Lamar Lewis as the confidential
informant during his trial testimony, Officer Bonnstetter further testified that he knew as
“Lamar” on February 16, 2007, and that “Lamar Lewis” was the confidential that provided
information to Officer Dailey initially on February 10, 2007, again on February 15-16, 2007, and
was the same person who positively identified 1015 North Laramie as the building to be
searched for illegal drugs and Lawrence Tolliver and “Guy”. Officer Bonnstetter further testified
that on February 10, 2007, Officer Dailey identified Lamar Lewis as the same confidential
informant that had provided the reliable information which lead to the arrest and the seizure of
illegal drugs from Carlton Toliver in January 2006.
It is well settled, that as a matter of law, when challenging the validity of a search warrant
it is not enough to show that an informant lied to the government officer, who then included
those lies in the complaint to defeat the protection of qualified immunity for a search warrant that
was valid when issued by a judge. Instead the evidence must establish that the officer
submitting the complaint for search warrant, [Officer Sean Dailey] perjured himself or acted
recklessly because he seriously doubted or had obvious reasons to doubt the truth of the
allegations in the search warrant. United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted). Because plaintiffs have abandoned any claim that Officer Dailey fabricated
the existence of “Lamar” and has made no claim that “Lamar” did not provide the very detailed
information relied on by the judge to support the probable cause finding for the issuance of the
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search warrant, the only issue which remains for the jury to decide is whether plaintiffs have
made a substantial showing that Officer Dailey acted recklessly because he failed to crosscheck
the information provided by the confidential informant -Lamar. This issue is not proper because
the “crosschecking” that plaintiffs have alleged defendant Dailey could have completed would
not have caused him to seriously doubt or provide obvious reasons to doubt the truth of the
allegations in the search warrant.
Defendant further submits that Officer Dailey’s failure to “crosscheck” the detailed
information about 1015 North Laramie was not reckless because nothing about the detailed,
specific and timely information supplied by Lamar caused Officer Dailey to seriously doubt the
veracity of the information provided. Not only had Lamar’s reliability been well-established
over a 24-monthg period in regard to illegal drug dealing in that general area, there was nothing
“obvious” about the information provided by Lamar – either the type of drugs involved, the
quantity of drugs involved, how they had been stored, the location of the subjects and/or the
names of the suspected targets that would cause an experienced officer such as Officer Dailey to
seriously doubt or question the information provided by Lamar, given their prior, long-term
relationship.
In Jones v. Wilhelm, 325 F.3d 455, 462 (7th Cir. 2005) the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district courts finding that the search warrant was valid when it was issued despite the lack of
diligence displayed by the police force in failing to ensure target’s name and apartment number
appeared on the warrant and despite the fact that the scope of the warrant turned out to be
ambiguous. While reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the named police
officer on qualified immunity grounds concerning the execution of the search warrant, the
Seventh Circuit nonetheless ruled that the search warrant was valid when issued even though the
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officer omitted the name of the known target of the search warrant [“Jody Gruenwald-Anderson
and her apartment number] from the search warrant and where the warrant only described the
placed to be searched as, “the upstairs apartment on the right at 220 W. Burnett Avenue”. Citing
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85-86, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) and United
States v. White, 416 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005). See also United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d
481, 485-486 (7th Cir. 2008) (search warrant was validly issued where police officer used “fillin-the blanks” form, even though printed form “leads to errors and omissions” recognizing but
not endorsing the language in the affidavit which is ambiguous about certain facts related to the
probable cause determination.); United States v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 895 (7th Cir.
1984)(holding that as a matter of law, the identity of the suspect need not be material to the
finding of probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant, explaining that it is the description
of the criminal activities, the inclusion of the name of the suspected target that was determinative
of probable cause.)
In this case, plaintiffs have offered testimony about what additional computer inquiries
that could have been made to identify the owner of the 1015 North Laramie property as Markee
Cooper and either target “Lawrence Tolliver” or a person know as only as “Guy”. However, as
every witnessed testified, none of the computer inquires would have provided any relevant
information to either to support or raise a serious question that the occupant of the basement
apartment was not Lawrence Tolliver or that the occupant of the second floor apartment was not
a person known as “Guy”. Unlike the facts in Olsen v. Tyler, 825 F.2d 1116 (7thCir. 1987),
there is no claim that on February 15-16, 2007, Officer Dailey or any officer knew or should
have known that “Lawrence Tolliver” was either in police custody or residing somewhere other
than at 1015 North Laramie in the basement apartment. Additionally, there is no allegation or
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claim that Officer Dailey obtained any portion of the information described in the affidavit for
search warrant from anyone other than the confidential informant named Lamar. In United States
v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2009) the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the
plaintiff’s claim that the officer’s failure to corroborate the informant’s story constituted a
reckless disregard for the truth – finding, that “where a police officer has received a detailed tip
from a reliable informant, his failure to further corroborate the tip does not constitute
recklessness.” In this case, Lamar was also a reliable informant, provided detailed information
about purchasing and using the illegal drugs at issue and Lawrence Tolliver was a known drug
dealer target in the area identified. Clearly, the overwhelming evidence presented at trial
established that several officers of reasonable competence, even Officer Cooper himself,
unquestionably agree that the complaint for search warrant contained sufficient details and
allegations to establish probable cause for the search of 1015 North Laramie and therefore
immunity should be recognized in this instance.
In sum, considering the evidence presented by plaintiffs, defendant Dailey submits that as
a matter of law, there is no evidence to suggest that on February 16, 2007, when he obtained the
search warrant from Circuit Court Judge Nickolas Ford that it would be clear to any reasonable
officer that his conduct, in obtaining the search warrant for 1015 North Laramie was unlawful
under these circumstances. Accordingly, Officer Dailey is entitled to judgment in his favor on
the merits on the search warrant claim.
2. Defendant Ross is Entitled to Judgment in his Favor on the Seizure Claim
The undisputed evidence has established that Lieutenant Ross was the supervisor of the
search warrant execution team after the search warrant had been properly reviewed, approved

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and issued by a Cook County Judge. As part of execution team, neither Lieutenant Ross nor any
named defendant, violated plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights simply by being an assigned
member of the search warrant execution team.
In regards to the subsequent alleged seizure pending the arrival of the canine unit,
plaintiffs have offered no evidence that Officer Ross directly ordered, implicitly by a show of
superior rank or authority, that anyone in the Cooper family was not free to leave during this
waiting period. In fact, Lieutenant Ross testified that after Officer Cooper informed him that his
family was planning to go out to dinner to celebrate his birthday, Cooper was specifically
advised that all family members were free to leave because the canine sniff search only required
that Officer Cooper remain with the residence for a short time.
Acknowledging this, plaintiff Cooper offered the testimony of Sergeant Boyle, who
testified that he “ordered” Officer Cooper to cooperate and that Cooper as a police officer, was
obligated to cooperate in the investigation when “ordered” to do so. Plaintiff Cooper also
testified that he consented to the canine search and cooperation with the search team because he
was ordered to do so by his direct supervisor, Sergeant Boyle. Plaintiff Cooper also testified that
he knew that Lieutenant Ross was the senior Chicago Police Officer on the scene, thereby by his
conduct, Lieutenant Ross implicitly ordered Officer Cooper to involuntarily remain inside his
residence until a canine sniff search for possible illegal drugs could be completed. Under these
circumstances, plaintiff Cooper seeks to have the jury find that he and family were illegally
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment because he did not consent to the canine search.
A seizure has been defined as “a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied.” Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400 F.3d 1070, 1089 (7th Cir. 2005)

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(quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989)
(emphasis in original). A person is seized “only if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person [in the subject’s position] would have believed that
he was not free to leave.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct.
1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). As well, for a seizure to have taken place, “the subject [must]
actually yield to a show of authority from the police or be physically touched by the police.” Id.
(quoting Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added).
Additionally, whether or not “consent” was provided voluntarily or resulting from duress,
coercion, or acquiescence to authority” is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of
circumstances.” United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d 624, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustemonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). Factors
bearing on this inquiry include: (1) the person’s age, intelligence, and education; (2) whether he
was advised of his constitutional rights; (3) how long he was detained before he gave his
consent, (4) whether his consent was immediate or prompted; (5) whether any physical coercion
was used, and (6) whether the individual was in police custody when he gave his consent. Id. A
claim of police authority is merely a factor that must be weighed along with the other factors in
the totality- of- the-circumstances” analysis. Id., at 630, (citing United States v. Nafzger, 965
F.2d 213, 216 (7thCir. 1992).
In this case, there was no evidence presented by plaintiff to establish there was a
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied by any
member of the search warrant execution team or Lieutenant Ross. Moreover, the evidence
presented established that Officer Cooper is a highly educated and experienced tactical police
officer, former investigator for the City of Chicago Inspector General’s Office and a career
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military police officer who unquestionably understood his constitutional rights and his right to
refuse any request for a search of his private residence without a valid search warrant. Officer
Cooper also knew that an order given by a superior officer in violation of his constitutional rights
was patently invalid and illegal. It is also undisputed that Officer Cooper was also permitted to
review the complaint for search warrants, to call his supervisor and discuss whether he should
cooperate with the requested search, and that after this brief discussion he informed Lieutenant
Ross that he was fine with the plan to call in the canine unit and stated, “go ahead, you can,
search, I have nothing to hide.” The evidence is also undisputed that Officer Cooper was never
placed under arrest, was never threatened, nor promised anything if he agreed to cooperate. In
fact, there is no indication from any testimony that Officer Cooper was under duress of any kind.
Significantly, Officer Cooper gave his consent to the canine sniff of both units within a few
minutes of being asked by Lieutenant Ross and immediately after talking with his supervisor,
Sergeant Boyle via his cell phone. Lastly, the evidence presented at trial established that the
interaction between Lieutenant Ross and Officer Cooper was at all times calm and fully
cooperative throughout. See United States v. Santiago, 428 F.3d 699, 705 (7thCir. 2005)
(affirming that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite claim by defendant that consent
was given only because defendant was rightfully concerned for the welfare of his family, where
“rightful concern” did not amount to psychological pressure, and where the entire incident took
only twenty minutes, and where encounter was devoid of any badgering or harassment.); see
also United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding consent voluntary despite
defendant being hand-cuffed and placed under arrest, where defendant presented testimony
indicating he was “an articulate adult with a tenth grade education, a substantial employment
history and an intimate familiarity of the criminal justice system.”); United States v. McGraw,

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571 F.3d. 624, 629 (7thCir. 2009)(affirming district court finding of voluntary consent despite
implied right to search apartment communicated by police officers, where the “the tone of the
interaction between McGraw [the defendant] and the officers at all times remained calm and
cooperative.”). The fact that defendant Cooper was not provided a “Consent to Search Form”
which would have arguably foreclosed any consent issue in this case is not determinative for “the
Constitution does not require proof of knowledge of the right to refuse as the sine qua non of an
effective consent to search.” United States v. Swanson, 677 F.Supp. 2d 1030, 1039, (N.D. Ill.
2009) (quoting, United States v. Mendehall, 446 U.S. 544, 588, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497
(1980)).

Importantly, the evidence presented at trial also established that at no time did Officer

Cooper indicate or communicate to Lieutenant Ross that his consent to the canine search was
involuntarily or that his consent was provided under duress or pursuant to a direct order from
Sergeant Boyle. Finally, the evidence presented does not establish that it was Lieutenant Ross
who ordered Officer Cooper to allow the search to go forward; rather, it was Sergeant Boyle who
did so. If this was, in fact, a seizure, it was Sergeant Boyle who caused the seizure, not
Lieutenant Ross.
In sum, considering the evidence presented to the jury, defendant Ross submits that as a
matter of law, there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that on February
16, 2007, the period where the plaintiffs were inside their residence waiting for the canine unit to
arrive, and during the canine sniff search of the basement and second floor apartments
constituted a period of illegal seizure of plaintiffs and a violation of Officer Cooper’s Fourth
Amendment rights. The evidence presented to the jury clearly indicates that the canine sniff
search was ordered by Lieutenant Ross after Cooper voluntarily consented and no reasonable
officer in Lieutenant Ross’ position would believe that his conduct in waiting for the canine unit
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to arrive and the subsequent execution of the canine sniff search under these circumstances was
unlawful in anyway. Accordingly, defendant Ross is entitled to judgment in his favor on the
illegal seizure claim.
3. Defendants Dailey, Reina, Bonnstetter and Mack are Entitled to Judgment on the
Illegal Seizure Claim.
Because an officer’s personal liability under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 is
premised on the alleged wrongdoers personal responsibility, defendant Dailey, Reina,
Bonnstetter and Mack are entitled to judgment in their favor for serving as a member of the
search warrant execution team during the canine sniff search. Kuhn v. Goodlow, Slip Op. 111762 (7th Cir. 2012). The evidence presented at trial failed to provide any evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that either defendants Dailey, Reina, Bonnstetter and/or Mack caused or
participated in the alleged illegal seizure of Markee Cooper or any member of the Cooper family
during the execution of the canine sniff search.
4. Defendants Dailey, Reina, Bonnstetter and Mack are Entitled to Judgment on the
Illegal Search Claim.
Because an officer’s personal liability under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 is
premised on the alleged wrongdoers personal responsibility, defendant Dailey, Reina,
Bonnstetter and Mack are entitled to judgment in their favor for serving as a member of the
search warrant execution team during the canine sniff search. . Kuhn v. Goodlow, Slip Op. 111762 (7th Cir. 2012). The evidence presented at trial failed to provide any evidence for a
reasonable jury to find that either defendants Dailey, Reina, Bonnstetter and/or Mack caused or
participated in the alleged canine sniff search of the basement and second floor apartments.
Lastly, to the extent that plaintiffs allege that the initial “protective sweep” of the
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apartment was an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment; this claim must be
summarily dismissed as matter of law. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct.
1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) (explaining that a protective sweep has been defined as a quick
and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police
officers and others … and narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in
which a person might be hiding. As the Seventh Circuit commented in Leaf v. Shelnutt, 400
Fe,3d at 1086, “A protective sweep, limited to “looking in closets and other spaces immediately
adjoining the place of arrest,” is justified “incident to an arrest … as a precautionary matter and
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334,
110 S.CT. 1093.)
5. All Defendants are Entitled to Judgment on the Canine Sniff Search Claim.
As this court previously acknowledged in denying plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment (R. 142), the courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have concluded that “a canine sniff
test that is used to detect the presence of contraband is not a Fourth Amendment search.” United
States v. Vasquez, 909 F.2d 235, 238 (7thCir. 1990)(canine sniff of garage from public alley was
not a warrantless search); see also United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692, 696-97 (7thCir. 2005)
(canine sniff outside plaintiff’s locked bedroom door did not constitute Fourth Amendment
search); Peals v. Terre Haute Police Dept., 535 F.3d 621, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2008) (presence of
canine units did not make search of plaintiff’s garage unreasonable.) This court further
explained, that courts have relied on the fact that the police had the authority to be present at the
location where the sniff took place. R. 142. (citations omitted).

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The evidence presented at trial is undisputed that the execution of the search warrant at
the moment the officers entered 1015 North Laramie, the basement apartment and the second
floor unit, they were legally and properly inside each location pursuant to valid respective search
warrants properly issued by a Cook County Judge. It is also undisputed that Markee Cooper
consented to the continued search of the basement apartment and the second floor apartment
after it became clear that he was not the target named “Guy” on the second floor, and that the
target “Lawrence Tolliver” was not residing in the basement apartment, even though it appeared
that the basement unit was being used as storage unit and not as an apartment on February 16,
2007. The evidence is also undisputed that plaintiff Cooper’s consent to conduct a canine sniff
search for both apartments was requested and given only after Lieutenant Ross learned from
plaintiff Cooper additional information linking the target, “Lawrence Tolliver” to either the
second or basement floor apartment, and possibly both.
In sum, considering the evidence presented by plaintiffs, defendants submit, that as a
matter of law, there is no evidence to suggest that on February 16, 2007, the canine sniff search
was conducted without the consent of plaintiff Markee Cooper and that the officer conducting
the canine sniff search was legally and properly inside the 1015 North Laramie residence.
Accordingly, all defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor on the claim concerning the
alleged illegal canine sniff search.
B.

The Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment Based on Qualified Immunity
1. The doctrine of Qualified Immunity for Government Officials
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials against suits arising out

of their exercise of discretionary functions “as long as their actions could reasonably have been

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thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d
455, 460 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97
L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001),
the Supreme Court set out a two-part test for qualified immunity. First, a court must decide
whether the facts, when viewed in light most favorable to the plaintiff, indicate that the officer’s
conduct violated some constitutional right of the plaintiff. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
Second, if the answer to the first question is “yes” then the court must determine whether the
constitutional right violated was “clearly established” at the time the alleged violation. Id. The
officer will enjoy qualified immunity unless the court affirmatively answers both questions. Id.
As the Seventh Circuit further explained, in Saucier, the Supreme Court clearly stated that “the
relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted.”
Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d at 461, (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, accord
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2003). Recently the Judge Lefkow recently
explained, the “shield of immunity” confirmed by a facially valid arrest [search] warrant will be
lost where the warrant was ‘based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Thomas v. City of Joliet, Slip Op.
2012 WL 1030470 (N.D. Ill.) (quoting Messerschmidt v. Millendrer, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct.
1235, 1244, ___ L.Ed.2d___ (2012) “Only if officers of reasonable competence could disagree
on this issue should immunity be recognized.” Id. quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341,
106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)
2.

Defendant Dailey is Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Search Warrant
Claim

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There is no authority in the Seventh Circuit which clearly establishes that failure to
corroborate details of a confidential informant’s evidence through various public databases
constitutes a reckless disregard for the truth, thus putting the warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. This is particularly so in light of the authority of Jones v. Wilhelm, 325 F.3d 455,
462 (7th Cir. 2005). Dailey is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor based on qualified
immunity on the claim that he wrongly obtained the search warrant.
3.

Defendant Ross is Entitled to Qualified Immunity on the Seizure Claim

There is no authority which clearly establishes that the conduct of Defendant Ross
constituted a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, either as to Cooper, who
indisputably knew he could not be required to allow the dog search, or as to the other plaintiffs,
who indisputably were told they were free to go, but chose to stay.
Police officers executing search warrants are entitled to qualified immunity if a
reasonable officer would have believed that the execution of the warrant did not violate any
established law. Early v. Bruno, 2020 WL 1821669 *4 (N.D.Ill) (granting summary judgment for
officer executing the search warrant because said officer had no reason to believe the warrant
was invalid or otherwise suspect.) citing, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct.
3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).
Ross is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor based on qualified immunity for the
seizure claim.
4.

Defendants Dailey, Reina, Bonnstetter and Mack are Entitled to Qualified
Immunity on the Search Claim

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There is no authority which clearly establishes that Dailey, Reina, Bonnstetter or Mack’s
actions in serving as a member of the search team was such that their conduct caused any of the
plaintiffs to be searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Dailey, Reina, Bonnstetter and
Mack are therefore entitled to judgment in their favor based on qualified immunity on the seizure
claim.
5.

All Defendants are Entitled to Qualified Immunity for the Canine Sniff
Search Claim

There is no authority which clearly establishes the canine sniff search under the
circumstances in which it was performed was a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the
plaintiffs. The defendants are therefore entitled to judgment in their favor based on qualified
immunity.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Gregory T. Mitchell
Gregory T. Mitchell
Law Office of Gregory T. Mitchell, P.C.
18141 Dixie Highway, Suite 100
Homewood, Illinois 60430
[phone]
Email: Mitchlaw00 @comcast.net
Attorney for Individually Named Officers

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Gregory T, Mitchell, an attorney, certify that I caused copies of
DEFENDANTS DAILEY, BONNSTETTER, ROSS, REINA AND MACK’S
CONSOLIDATED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW PURSUANT
TO RULE 50(A) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
to be served upon the person(s) below electronically pursuant to the local rules governing
electronic filing.
Brendan Shiller
Shiller Preyer Law Offices
1100 West Cermak, Suite B401
Chicago, Illinois 60608
[phone]

/s/ Gregory T. Mitchell
Gregory T. Mitchell

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