Adams v. Walker et al

Filing 149

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 5/24/2011:Mailed notice(keg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

DELANDIS ADAMS, B69320,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEIRDRE BATTAGLIA, RODNEY
BRADY, and LARRY STIGLER,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 07 C 4897
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
Magistrate Judge Jeffrey Cole

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Delandis Adams (APlaintiff@ or AAdams@) filed this action against defendants
Deirdre Battaglia, Rodney Brady, and Larry Stigler (collectively ADefendants@) alleging
violation of Adams= Eighth Amendment rights arising from a routine shakedown at Stateville
Correctional Center (AStateville@) on September 1, 2005, during which Adams was handcuffed
for over five hours in restraints that Adams claims were too tight. Defendants move for
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 arguing that the undisputed facts entitle them to
judgment as a matter of law [131]. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
Background
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise specified. Plaintiff Delandis Adams,
B69320, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Dee Battaglia, Rodney Brady,
and Larry Stigler alleging cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
(Pl. First Amend. Compl.) Plaintiff is serving an eighty-year sentence for murder and
aggravated kidnapping. At all relevant times, plaintiff was incarcerated at Stateville
Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois. On September 1, 2005, Dee Battaglia was the Warden of

Stateville, Rodney Brady was the Northern SORT Commander for the Illinois Department of
Corrections and was in command of the tactical operations, and Larry Stigler was a Sergeant
correctional officer.
On September 1, 2005, a facility-wide “mass” shakedown was performed at Stateville to
search for illegal drugs and contraband. During a mass shakedown, such as this, the prison is
placed on the most restrictive level of security, known as a level one lockdown. Prisoners are
not handcuffed during normal operating procedures. Mass shakedowns and level one lockdowns
are not normal operating procedures. During a mass shakedown, inmates are handcuffed for
purposes of security, custody, and control. To fit different sized people, handcuffs have a
ratcheting system that makes them adjustable.
Plaintiff alleges that because of his size (six feet tall and over 300 pounds), and because
of medical problems with his wrists, he needed either a double set of handcuffs or an extra large
set of handcuffs. Plaintiff alleges that during the September 1, 2005, mass shakedown he was
placed in a single-set of regular handcuffs that were too tight and cut into his wrists. Plaintiff
does not know whether he had a current valid medical permit specifying that he should be
handcuffed differently. Plaintiff’s handcuffs were removed when he was returned to his cell at
the end of the shakedown.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he complained to approximately twenty
correctional officers that his handcuffs were too tight and they were hurting his wrists.
Defendant Stigler’s responsibilities during the shakedown included monitoring the gymnasium
and the yard where the inmates were held and ensuring that the staff assigned to him carried out
their duties. Defendant Stigler offered and tried to loosen plaintiff’s handcuffs after plaintiff
complained they were too tight. At his deposition, defendant Brady testified that if, during a

mass shakedown, he learns that an inmate’s handcuffs are too tight for him given his size, he
would put the inmate in two pairs of handcuffs instead of one pair. None of the defendants
recalled having a conversation with plaintiff.
Plaintiff was examined at the health care unit on September 9, 2005. Plaintiff testified
that the nurse and doctor that examined him observed that his wrist was lacerated, swollen and
numb. Dr. Aguinaldo saw plaintiff on September 15, 2005, for complaints of numbness in his
left wrist that had lasted for two weeks. Dr. Aguinaldo did not find swelling or tenderness in
plaintiff’s left wrist. Dr. Aguilnaldo testified at his deposition that handcuffs can cause
compression injuries and possible nerve damage, but he could not give any opinion as to what
caused plaintiff’s wrist pain. Dr. Aguinaldo saw plaintiff for a follow-up examination on
September 29, 2005. Plaintiff still complained of numbness. Dr. Powers, the medical director at
Tamms Supermax Facility, saw plaintiff on September 15, 2006, for complaints of a numb left
wrist. To rule out a nerve injury, Dr. Powers will do a grip test, use a neurological pinwheel,
inspect the area for swelling and bruising and do range of motion tests. A “neurological
pinwheel” is a wheel of pins on the end of a six-inch handle that is rolled over the surface of a
patient’s skin to determine the location of reduced sensation. If Dr. Powers suspects a nerve
injury, he would refer the patient to a specialist. On February 9, 2007, Adams saw Dr.
Aguinaldo again for numbness in his left wrist. Dr. Aguilnaldo performed a grip test and found
weakness in Adams’ left hand, which he attributed to “post-traumatic” pain. Dr. Zhang saw
plaintiff on December 29, 2009, June 1, 2009, and April 27, 2010, for his wrist pain, but could
not give an opinion as to what was causing plaintiff’s wrist pain. Plaintiff was also seen by Dr.
Ngu at Stateville for complaints related to his wrist. On April 16, 2010, Dr. Gosh issued plaintiff
a six month medical permit for front handcuffing based on chronic wrist pain.

There are three main nerves in the wrist. Damage to these nerves can result in symptoms
of decreased sensation, numbness, tingling, and diminished grip. A compression injuring can
occur to the wrist nerves if a person is forced to wear handcuffs that are too tight for an extended
period of time. Removing the handcuffs shortly after symptoms begin can prevent a
compression injury to one of the nerves in the wrist.
Legal Standard
A party is entitled to summary judgment if all of Athe pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials of file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F. 3d 763, 773
(7th Cir. 2005). The party who bears the burden of proof on an issue may not rest on the
pleadings or mere speculation, but must affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
material fact that requires a trial to resolve. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 324 (1986).
Discussion
Plaintiff filed this cause of action claiming that during a facility-wide shakedown at
Stateville on September 1, 2005, defendants failed to remove plaintiff=s handcuffs and replace
them with either two handcuffs or another type of restraint for five hours causing injuries to his
left wrist that persist to this day. Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that Adams=
alleged deprivation was not sufficiently serious, defendants did not act with deliberate
indifference, and Adams has not shown that he suffered an injury.

The Eighth Amendment=s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prisoners
from the Aunnecessary and wanton infliction of pain@ that is Atotally without penological
justification.@ Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (internal citations omitted). Only
conduct that is Acalculated harassment@ or Amaliciously motivated@ and unrelated to institutional
security is considered unconstitutional. Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004).
Evaluation of Eighth Amendment claims is a two step process with both an objective and a
subjective inquiry. Id. AThe objective prong asks whether the alleged deprivation or condition of
confinement is >sufficiently serious= so that >a prison official=s act or omission results in the
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life=s necessities.=@ Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). If the conditions of confinement meet the objective test, then the
court must determine whether the prison official subjectively knew that the inmate faced a
substantial risk of serious harm and the prison official disregarded that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to prevent the harm. Id. The Seventh Circuit has rejected claims of Eighth
Amendment violations where conditions are temporary, affect few inmates, and cause no
concrete harm. Harris v. Fleming, 839 F. 2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988).
Under the objective test, deprivations to inmates must be Aextreme@ and mere discomfort
is not sufficient to sustain an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992). Here, plaintiff=s alleged deprivation, that he was confined in
handcuffs that were too tight due to his physical size for five hours during a facility-wide
shakedown, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Although certainly unpleasant,
as in Cunningham v. Eyman, where the plaintiff spent 16 hours in shackles and four to five hours
in soiled clothing, these hardships were temporary and not sufficiently severe to implicate the
Eighth Amendment. See Cunningham v. Eyman, 17 Fed. Appx. 449, 454 (7th Cir. 2001). The

court in Key v. McKinney, found no constitutional violation where a prisoner was restrained in
handcuffs for 24 hours, making it more difficult for him to relieve himself. See Key v.
McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 1999). Moreover, in this case, there is ample unrefuted
testimony from Rodney Brady and Larry Stigler that handcuffing of inmates for the duration of a
facility-wide shakedown is necessary to maintain institutional order and security. Thus, Adams’
handcuffing was not without penological justification. Accordingly, this Court finds that Adams
has not put forth sufficient facts demonstrating that a constitutional deprivation.
Similarly, in three other cases arising from the September 1, 2005, shakedown at
Stateville, members of this district court have also found the conditions of confinement during
that incident did not implicate the Eighth Amendment. In Cruiel v. Larry Stigler and Rodney
Brady, No. 06 C 5880, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32518 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2008), Judge Zagel
concluded that the deprivations experienced by the inmates were not severe enough to survive
summary judgment. In Ames v. Larry Stigler and Rodney Barry, No. 07 C 430, slip. op. at 6
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2009), Judge Gettleman also granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants, stating that A[a]lthough the conditions during the shakedown seem unnecessarily
severe, the court notes that this was a single occasion, a special shakedown requiring the entire
cell block to be shut down for a thorough drug search because of drug problems in the cell
block.@ In Hernandez v. Dee Battaglia, Judge Bucklo also granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants, finding that the defendants had Aput forward evidence that, for safety
purposes, the inmates [were] handcuffed during prison shakedowns.@ Thus, despite the plaintiff
in that case claiming that his wrists were swollen for three days and he sustained pain in his right
shoulder and wrists from being handcuffed with his hands behind his back for eight to nine

hours, the court found no actionable deprivation under the Eighth Amendment. See Hernandez v.
Dee Battaglia, 673 F. Supp. 2d 673, 675-677 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Even though this Court finds the deprivation alleged to be insufficiently serious to violate
the Eighth Amendment, this Court will nevertheless address the subjective prong of the analysis.
This Court turns to the subjective test to determine whether defendants Battaglia, Brady and
Stigler had the requisite subjective knowledge that Adams faced a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregarded that risk. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. At a minimum, an inmate must put
forth evidence to support an inference that the defendants had “actual knowledge of impending
harm easily preventable.@ See Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis in original).
Here, there is no evidence that defendants had actual knowledge that Adams would suffer
the harm that he has alleged. There is also nothing in the record to indicate that any of the
defendants knew that plaintiff had problems with his wrist. Defendants testified that inmates are
handcuffed during shakedowns, but other types of restraints may be used such as leather
restraints for people on dialysis or large handcuffs or leg irons if regular handcuffs do not fit or if
the inmate has a medical permit. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he did not know
whether he had a valid medical permit allowing him to have different restraints.
Adams also testified that he complained to approximately twenty officers that he had
problems with his wrist and the handcuffs were causing pain. However, none of the defendants
recall having such a conversation with plaintiff. In fact, plaintiff admits that defendant Stigler
offered and tried to loosen his handcuffs after plaintiff complained about his handcuffs being too
tight. Defendant Battaglia, as warden and administrator oversees the facility and staff. Aside
from plaintiff=s own testimony that he Ahollered out to him, Commander Brady, can I talk to you,

I have a problem, I need two cuffs, et cetera, et cetera,@ and that defendant Brady Alooked him
off,@ there is in the nothing in the record to suggest that either Battaglia or Brady had direct
interactions with inmates during the shakedown. Moreover, plaintiff has not put forth any
evidence to show that just because other forms of restraints can be used, that it is cruel and
unusual punishment not to use two handcuffs based on an inmate’s complaints. Even if this
Court found defendants were negligent, mere negligence does not satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599,
603 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, there is nothing in the record to show that defendants had
actual knowledge of an impending serious harm and acted with deliberate indifference.
Additionally, there is nothing in the record that plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulted from
the handcuffing. Although there is ample testimony regarding plaintiff’s complaints of wrist pain
and numbness, no medical testimony is offered giving an opinion as to the cause of the pain and
numbness. Dr. Aguilnaldo testifies only that it is possible that five hours in too tight handcuffs
can possibly cause nerve injury from compression. Dr. Aguinaldo did not opine that plaintiff’s
wrist pain and numbness was a nerve injury or that it was caused by the handcuffing. No doctor
testified that plaintiff had a nerve injury or even that they even suspected nerve damage. There
is no medical testimony in the record stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the
manner in which plaintiff was handcuffed on September 1, 2005, caused an injury to plaintiff.
Summary judgment is the point in a lawsuit “when a party must show what evidence it has that
would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.” Moss v. Ameritech Servs., Inc.,
166 Fed. Appx. 849, 851 (7th Cir. 2006). Mere speculation or conjecture is insufficient to create
a genuine issue of material fact and survive summary judgment. See, e.g., Delapaz v.
Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2011).

Conclusion
Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, based on the
foregoing there is no genuine issue of material fact to support plaintiff’s claim that defendants
either acted with deliberate indifference, that he suffered a serious deprivation or that he suffered
any injury as a result of defendants’ actions. Therefore, defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. Plaintiff’s complaint is
dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 24, 2011.

Entered:_____________________________
Sharon Johnson Coleman