Padilla v. City Of Chicago et al

Filing 82

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Mailed notice(drw, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MISAEL PADILLA,
Plaintiff,
No. 07 CV 5253
Judge James B. Zagel

v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Misael Padilla (“Padilla” or “Plaintiff”) originally sued Defendants, Frank R.
Villareal (“Villareal”), Guadalupe Salinas (“Salinas”), and the City of Chicago (“City”) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights to due process by fabricating evidence
against him and maliciously prosecuting him. Plaintiff also alleged a Monell claim and several
state law claims.
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on August 24, 2011, I granted Defendants’
motion to dismiss Count III. I denied the motion to dismiss the remaining state law counts.
With regard to the § 1983 due process claim, I denied the motion to dismiss the claim
outright, but confined the allegation to a Brady claim for Defendants’ alleged failures to disclose
potentially impeaching evidence about the arresting officers. I did so, however, on the
assumption that Plaintiff had been prosecuted up to and including trial.
That assumption has not been borne out, as Defendants have now produced evidence that
the charges were nolle prossed before Defendant ever faced trial. Having confirmed this
important fact, Defendants now move for summary judgment on Counts I, arguing that no § 1983

liability can attach on a Brady theory when a criminal defendant does not face trial. Defendants
also seek summary judgment on Count II (the Monell claim) on the basis that Monell liability is
automatically extinguished when the underlying constitutional violation falls away. Finally,
Defendant argues that the remaining state law claims be dismissed without prejudice, as there
would be no remaining federal claims.
Plaintiff’s response deadline on the motion has come and gone, therefore his opportunity
to respond to the arguments put forth by Defendants is forfeited.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant’s motion is granted in all parts.
Count I - Due Process/Brady Violation
As to Count I, the motion is granted because, under the law of this circuit, I find that no
Brady violation can occur when the underlying criminal charges are nolle prossed.1 In Carvajal
v. Dominguez, the Seventh Circuit expressed doubts that a Brady claim could arise when a
defendant is brought to trial but acquitted. 542 F.3d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 2008). The court did not
explicitly rule on that basis, and instead analyzed whether “the decision to go to trial would have
been altered by the desired disclosure.” Id. at 569. In the follow-on case of Bielanski v. County
of Kane, the court stated that “Brady requires that the government disclose material evidence in
time for the defendant to make effective use of it at trial . . . . Even late disclosure does not
constitute a Brady violation unless the defendant is unable to make effective use of the evidence.
550 F.3d 632, 645 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).

1

A Brady violation refers generally to the concept of suppressing evidence favorable to an
accused. The seminal case is Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2

The combined effect of Carvajal and Bielanski is a clear focus on a criminal defendant’s
accessibility to exculpatory or impeaching evidence at trial. Thus, it appears that no Brady due
process claim can lie when, as here, the criminal case is nolle prossed before the defendant ever
stands trial. See generally id., see also Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 971-72 (7th Cir.
1994) (no due process claim available when charges are nolle prossed.) Summary judgment on
Count I - the Due Process/Brady claim - is therefore granted for Defendants.
Count II - Monell Claim
The plaintiff also pursues a § 1983 claim for municipal liability under Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging that the de
facto policies maintained with deliberate indifference by the City caused the underlying
constitutional violation. But “it is well established . . . that a municipality's liability for a
constitutional injury requires a finding that the individual officer [is] liable on the underlying
substantive claim.” Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 2000). Because the sole
underlying constitutional claim has failed, the Monell claim must fail as well. Summary
judgment is granted for Defendants on Count II.
Remaining State Law Claims
With summary judgment granted on all federal claims, the only remaining claims are state
law tort and indemnity claims. Under the relevant jurisdictional statute, a district court “may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over pendent state law claims if the court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The general
rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish
jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on the merits. Kennedy v.
3

Schoenberg, 140 F.3d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1998). Seeing no reasons to depart from this general
rule, I dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants on
Counts I and II. Counts IV through VII are dismissed without prejudice.

ENTER:

James B. Zagel
United States District Judge

DATE: June 5, 2012

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