Davis v. Winnetka Police Dept. et al

Filing 70

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 3/31/2009.Mailed notice(tbk, )

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION MARK DAVIS Plaint iff, v. B. O'ONNELL, STAR # 420 C Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO. 07-cv-6015 Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Current ly pending before the Court is Defendant, police officer Brian O'onnell' C s (" 'onnell" motion for summary judgment [26]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant' OC ) s motion is granted. I. Procedural Background Plaint iff, Mark Davis (" avis" filed his complaint [1,6] on October 24, 2007, asserting a D ) claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The complaint named both O'onnell and the Winnetka C Police Department,1 and the case initially was assigned to Judge Manning. The co mplaint alleges that O'onnell pulled over the car that Davis was driving despite the absence of probable C 2 cause. Davis'complaint further states that he "iolated no traffic laws at the time of the stop" s v and that O'onnell "nconstitutionally stopped [Davis], and detained him in violation of his C u constitutional rights."Compl. at 5-6. O'onnell'answer [21] states that he had probable cause C s 1 On November 20, 2007, the complaint was dismissed with respect to Winnetka Police Department [5] because police departments are not properly suable entities under Section 1983. See also Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698, 698 n.* (7th Cir. 2009) (" ] police department is not a suable entity under [A 1983" ). 2 Plaintiff' Statement of Additional Facts [61] now concedes that Plaintiff was driving without a valid s driver'license when he was stopped. See Pl. SOAF 12. s to arrest plaintiff and submits that Davis is collaterally estopped from pursuing his Section 1983 action due to Davis'underlying convictions stemming from the stop. s II. Facts The Court takes the relevant facts primarily from the parties' respective Local Rule (".R." 56.1 statements: Defendant' Statement of Facts (" ef. SOF" [32], Plaintiff' L ) s D ) s Response to Defendant'Statement of Facts ("l. Resp. Def. SOF" [59], Plaintiff'Statement of s P ) s Additional Facts ("l. SOAF" [61], and Defendant' Response to Plaintiff' Statement of P ) s s Additional Facts ("l. Resp. Def. SOAF" [63].3 P ) Brian O'onnell is a Village of Winnetka police officer. At the time of the facts that C gave rise to this dispute, O'onnell was serving as a school resource officer at New Trier High C School. Def. SOF 2-3. On September 4, 2007, Deanna Sutter ("utter" a staff member of S ), the high school'music department, reported to O'onnell that two credit cards and forty dollars s C were missing from her purse. Def. SOF 10, 12, 15-16. Sutter learned that her credit cards had been used, and she passed along to O'onnell both (i) the information related to those purchases C and (ii) her account numbers. Def. SOF 19-24. 3 L.R. 56.1 requires that statements of fact contain allegations of material fact, and that the factual allegations be supported by admissible record evidence. See L.R. 56.1; Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. at 583-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000). The Seventh Circuit teaches that a district court has broad discretion to require strict compliance with L.R. 56.1. See, e.g., Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004); Curran v. Kwon, 153 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases)). Where a party has offered a legal conclusion or a statement of fact without offering proper evidentiary support, the Court will not consider the statement. See, e.g., Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 583. Additionally, where a party improperly denies a statement of fact by failing to provide adequate or proper record support for the denial, the Court deems admitted that statement of fact. See L.R. 56.1(a), (b)(3)(B); see also Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 584. The requirements for a response under Local Rule 56.1 are "ot satisfied by evasive denials that do not fairly n meet the substance of the material facts asserted."Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2000). In addition, the Court disregards any additional statements of fact contained in a party'response brief but not in its L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B) statement of additional facts. See, s e.g., Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 584 (citing Midwest Imports, 71 F.3d at 1317). 2 O'onnell and Detective Karl Larson, also a member of the Winnetka Police C Department, began to investigate. Def. SOF 7, 25. They went to two Jewel Food Stores in Evanston where they viewed security footage; O'onnell obtained and watched a VHS security C tape from a third location.4 Def. SOF 25-31. O'onnell also viewed surveillance video from C New Trier High School. Def. SOF 32-33. All of the video tapes contained " e same th individual, an African American male wearing a light-colored short sleeved shirt, light colored long pants, tinted glasses, a watch on his left wrist, and white gym shoes with dark soles." O'onnell Aff. at 19; Larson Aff. at 10.5 One of the videos showed the individual exiting a C white, four-door vehicle. Def. SOF 35. The video was used to capture images of the individual, which were put into a police bulletin and sent to several local police departments, including the Evanston Police Department. Def. SOF 36-38. Evanston had received reports of incidents similar to the Sutter theft at several of its local schools. Def. SOF 39. A detective with the Evanston Police Department 4 Plaintiff disputes whether O'onnell viewed the VHS tape from the third location, a food mart. C However, the denial fails to cite supportive record evidence. The evidence to which Plaintiff cites states merely that O'onnell did not view the VHS tape at the food mart (O'onnell Dep. at 28), which is C C consistent with the record evidence stating that the VHS tape was supplied to Officer O'onnell and was C viewed later (O'onnell Dep. at 43; O'onnell Aff. at 18). C C 5 Plaintiff denies the fact statement that corresponds with the quoted affidavits (See Pl. Resp. Def. SOF 34), but the denial is improper for three reasons. First, Plaintiff agrees with subsequent fact statements which presuppose that the subject of all the videos was the same. Second, the record evidence that Plaintiff cites in disputing the fact statement is consistent with Defendant' and Larson' affidavits s s which were sworn to prior to their depositions. During Detective Larson' deposition, the basis for s Plaintiff'denial, Larson stated that the person in the video was " ]ale, black, bald sunglasses. That'as s [m s much as I can describe off the top of my head." Larson Dep. at 13. This is consistent with, if less fulsome than, the other record evidence, but the testimony hardly undermines the fact statement. See Larson Aff. at 10, 30-31; O'onnell. Aff. at 19. Third, Defendant' summary judgment materials C s included a CD-R with surveillance footage, which Defendant represents was provided to Plaintiff (See [26] at 7 n.1; [27], Ex. A.). Plaintiff neither contests that he received the footage nor does he base his denial of Defendant'fact statement on the footage that was provided to him. s 3 reported to Detective Larson on September 7, 2007, that he had spoken with several individuals and that the individual depicted in the images was the Plaintiff, Mark Davis. Def. SOF 43, 44. Events moved fairly rapidly from there. Larson worked with the Evanston detective to obtain a prior arrest photo of Mark Davis and observed that the person in the video surveillance appeared to be Davis. Def. SOF 45-46. A look at prior arrest reports revealed that Davis had been driving a white 2005 Chrysler four-door with Illinois license plate number 979 0923 during an arrest earlier in 2007. Def. SOF 48. The report also indicated an address for Davis at an apartment building in Skokie, IL. Id. And a diffe rent report, this one obtained from the Illinois Secretary of State'office, showed that Davis had an expired driver'license. Def. SOF 49s s 50. On September 13, 2007, Davis was arrested. After notifying the Skokie Police Department, O'onnell and Larson drove to the address in Skokie that was listed on one of C Davis'arrest report. Def. SOF 48; [27], Ex. D-1; Pl. SOAF 6.6 While there, O'onnell and s C Larson observed Davis enter a white four-door Chrysler Sebring with Illinois license plate number 979 0923. According to Detective Larson, when they observed Davis walk toward the car, "oth Officer O'onnell and I recognized him as the spitting image of the subject in the b C video, and we were sure it was him." Larson Dep. at 34. Officer O'onnell likewise stated in C his deposition that the person they observed " oked like the person in the video and the lo 7 8 bulletin" and "ad the same physical description as from the arrest report of Mr. Davis." h 6 They also drove to at least one other possible address for Davis in Evanston. See, e.g., O'onnell Dep. C at 40. 7 Plaintiff' Statement of Additional Facts states that Officer O'onnell believed that the person he s C observed entering the vehicle was Mark Davis because he " atched the description of the person they m observed in the video from Jewel." Pl. SOAF 8 (emphasis added). Defendant' response admits the s truth of the statement but denies that this was the only basis for Officer O'onnell'belief. Def. Resp. Pl. C s SOAF 8. 4 O'onnell Dep. at 46. Davis drove away, was pulled over by O'onnell and Larson, and C C arrested after he failed to produce a valid driver' license. Def. SOF 53-54, 57-58. Prior to s the traffic stop, Mr. Davis "io lated no traffic laws other than driving with an expired license." v Pl. SOAF 12. Davis was charged with driving without a valid driver' license and with s unlawful use of a credit card. Def. SOF 60-63. In October 2005, a grand jury indicted Davis with two counts of unlawful use of a credit card and two counts of forgery (for signing the credit card receipts, it seems). Def. SOF 65. As part of a plea deal, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful use of a credit card, two counts of forgery, and one count of driving without a valid driver'license. Def. SOF 67s 72; see also [28], Ex. N at 5-7. Davis was sentenced to three years in prison and one year of supervised release, and he received time served for the driver'license violation. Def. SOF 73; s [28], Ex. N at 14. III. Legal Standard on Summary Judgment Summary judgment is proper where " e pleadings, depositions, answers to th interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a The wording of Plaintiff' statement of additional fact, which was also used in eliciting deposition s testimony, appears confusing because it could be read to imply that the officers based their identification of Davis based not on their viewings of the security video but based on the description of the video. Yet, Plaintiff has already admitted that the officers actually watched the surveillance videos and that, after viewing arrest photos of Davis, Detective Larson concluded that the subject of both the videos and the arrest photos "ppeared to be the same." See Pl. Resp. Def. SOF 25-31, 33, 35, 46. Plaintiff does not a seem to contend, therefore, that the description of Davis was the only or even primary basis that the officers had for concluding that the person entering the vehicle was Mark Davis. And in any event, as explained below, even had the officers based their initial stop on the description of Davis that they had, they still would have been justified in conducting a Terry stop and escalating that stop into a full-blown arrest. 8 There were two arrest reports for Davis, together (and mostly harmoniously) describing Davis as a black male, age 40, 5'1," 1 with either brown hair or bald, a medium complexion, a medium or large build, and a weight of 210 to 220 pounds. [27], Ex. D-1; id. at Ex. D-2. 5 matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of fact, the Court " ust construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable m to the nonmoving party."Foley v. City of Lafayette, 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004). To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must go beyond the pleadings and "et s forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists if " e evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the th nonmoving party." Id. at 248. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is proper against " party who fails to make a a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party'case, and on s which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."Id. at 322. The non-moving party " ust m do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In other words, a " ere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant' position will m s] be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmo vant]."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. IV. Analysis A. The Probable Cause Standard Probable cause is an absolute defense for a police officer to a Section 1983 action for wrongful arrest. Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). Probable cause " eans m facts and circumstances within the officer' knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent s person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect 6 has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). The Supreme Court has explained that " ]he rule of probable cause is a [t practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating * * * often opposing interests [of preventing unfounded charges and ensuring community protection]. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). In making the determination of whether probable cause existed at the time of an arrest, " e court steps into the shoes of a reasonable person in the position of the officer." Wheeler, th 539 F.3d at 634. The inquiry centers on how the information that the police had " ould have w appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer." Id. (quoting Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998). That is, the inquiry is objective rather than subjective: " e fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons th which provide the legal justification for the officer'action does not invalidate the action taken s so long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (citation omitted). In the context of violations of traffic laws, probable cause "xists when an officer reasonably believes that a driver committed a traffic offense." e United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2006). "o lice can stop an automobile P when they have probable cause to believe that the driver violated even a minor traffic law."Id. If police have probable cause, they generally do not need an arrest warrant to make an arrest. Outside of a routine felony arrest occurring in a suspect'home, the general rule is well s established that, so long as police have probable cause, a supporting warrant is not required to 7 make an arrest. Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 618 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating the general rule); Russell v. Harms, 397 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing arrests in the home). Although it may often be the "etter practice" law enforcement to obtain a warrant, particularly where b for time is not of the essence, the police need not do so in the vast majority of cases. See, e.g., Forman v. Richmond Police Dept., 104 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 1997). Of particular importance to the instant matter, " ]robable cause is an absolute defense to [p a claim of wrongful arrest asserted under section 1983 against police officers." Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634. The absolute defense applies even if the announced reasons for the arrest are "ot n `osely related'to the offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest." cl Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 155 (condemning the "lo sely related offense" c rule that some courts had adopted). Determining whether probable cause existed is not always appropriate for judicial resolution on summary judgment: the determination " ust be made by a jury if there is room for m a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences drawn from them." Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 634 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 1996). However, if the facts upon which the probable cause determination by police was made are undisputed, the Court may decide the issue. Ward, 94 F.3d at 1058; Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993). B. Officer O' onnell Had Probable Cause to Stop, Detain, and Arrest Plaintiff C On the undisputed facts, the Court concludes that Officer O'onnell had probable cause C to arrest Plaintiff. Officer O'onnell and Detective Larson viewed several videos from the C locations where Ms. Sutter' credit card had been used. Detective Larson was able to use the s video to capture still photographs and send a bulletin to several police departments. Def. SOF 36-37. A detective from the Evanston Police Department informed Detective Larson that the 8 person in the Bulletin was Mark Davis. Def. SOF 44. And at that point Detective Larson procured a photograph and "bserved that the individual depicted in the photograph appeared to o be the same individual shown in the video."Def. SOF 46. When Larson looked at prior arrest reports for Davis, he observed that Davis had been driving a white 2005 Chrysler four-door with Illinois license place 979 0923. Def. SOF 48. And Larson learned from the office of the Illinois Secretary of State that Mark Davis'driver' s s license had expired. Def. SOF 49-51. Larson and O'onnell then went to the vicinity of an C apartment building that was listed as Davis' home address.9 While at that address, Larson and s O'onnell observed Davis enter a white Chrysler four-door vehicle and drive away. Def. SOF C 53. Both Larson and O'onnell stated in their depositions that they recognized Davis. Plaintiff C denies that the officers noted the plate number when Davis entered the vehicle. Pl. Resp. Def. SOF 53. And while the record does not make clear the point at which the officers noted that the license plate of the vehicle that Davis was driving matched the license plate of the vehicle in which Davis previously had been arrested, the officers already had plenty of corroborating information to support probable cause: specifically, Larson and O'onnell were at an address C that had been listed on one of Davis' arrest reports, and observed a person they identified as s Davis entering a white four-door automobile matching the description of the vehicle that the 9 Plaintiff improperly disputes this statement of fact. Plaintiff'response disputes the statement inasmuch s as it listed Plaintiff'proper address. See Pl. Resp. Def. SOF 48. Defendant'fact statement says that s s " etective Larson observed that the April 11, 2007 [police] report indicated at the time of his arrest, Mark D Davis was driving a white 2005 Chrysler four-door vehicle with Illinois license plate 979 0923, and gave his residence address 4845 Conrad, Apt. 2, Skokie, Illinois." Def. SOF 48. Defendant cites to the police report ([27], Ex. D-1) which indeed supports the fact statement. Plaintiff disputes the fact statement based on deposition testimony in which Larson testified that his "esearch" r showed that Davis had another address in Evanston. Larson Dep. at 21-23. The record reveals that Davis had two listed addresses (See, e.g., [27], Ex. D-2) and that Larson was aware of this (See, e.g., Larson Dep. at 25). 9 officers were looking for.10 See United States v. Springs, 17 F.3d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1994) (police had probable cause to arrest based on an anonymous tip, evidence about a vehicle' s model, "nd, most importantly [a detective' recognition of [the defendant' face from * * * a s] s] surveillance photographs"; United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1503 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989) ) (officer identification based on surveillance video alone sufficient to furnish probable cause), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Larson and Detective O'onnell had probable cause to arrest Davis C both for unlawful use of a credit card and for driving without a valid driver'license. s Even had the officers based their identification of Davis only from the "escription of the d person they observed in the [surveillance] video" SOAF 8), that "escript ion" (Pl. d included at a minimum that the subject was a black male between 30 and 40 years old with a goatee ([27, Ex. B]). The combination of the description, the similarity of the automobile to the one in the surveillance footage and prior arrest report, and the location of the automobile at a prior known address of Davis, also would have given the officers probable cause to arrest Davis. Cf. United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2004) (police had probable cause to arrest bank robbery accomplice based on suspect' description even where principal' credibility was s s unknown to police); United States v. Carpenter, 342 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2003) (probable cause to arrest based on height and weight descriptions of defendants where there was other circumstantial corroborating evidence of identity). 10 Plaintiff does not dispute that the officers observed that the description of the vehicle jibed with Larson and O'onnell' observation of the video surveillance footage and with the prior arrest report. See Def. C s SOF 48; Larson Dep. at 28 (stating that as the officers drove passed Davis' Skokie address " e s w observed the white Sebring that * * * Davis had been driving previously" O'onnell Dep. at 28, 42-44 ); C (indicating that O'onnell and Larson were looking for the vehicle at Davis' addresses on the day that C s they arrested him). 10 And if nothing else, a mere description of Davis combined with the other information at hand furnished the officers with a sufficient, reasonably articulable suspicion to justify a brief investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio (392 U.S. 1 (1968)) and its progeny. As part of that stop, the officers were entitled to ask for identification from Davis, which could have quickly dispelled any notion that the driver was either (i) Mark Davis and/or (ii) driving without a valid driver'license. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, et al., s 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (request for identification is permissible when " asonably related in scope re to the circumstances which justified the stop" (citations omitted); United States v. Sokolow, 490 ) U.S. 1, 5, 11 (1989) (holding that a stop at an airport, during which the suspect was asked to produce identification and a plane ticket, was valid under Terry); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-817 (1985) (even fingerprinting could be conducted during a Terry stop " there [were] if reasonable suspicion that the suspect [had] committed a criminal act, if there [were] a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting [would] establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime, and if the procedure [were] carried out with dispatch." United States v. Riley, 493 ); F.3d 803, 808-810 (7th Cir. 2007) (characterizing as a Terry stop a stop in which the suspect was asked to produce a driver' license); United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 716 (7th s Cir. 1994) (same), vacated on other grounds by Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that, as a general matter, determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed by appellate courts de novo). When Davis failed to produce a valid driver'license in response to Larson'request, the officers would then have had probable cause s s to arrest Davis. 11 C. Other Arguments Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment based on Davis' subsequent s guilty plea to driving without a valid license, unlawful use of a credit card, and forgery. Because Davis was convicted in Illinois State Court, the preclusive effect of his guilty plea, if any, is determined with respect to Illinois preclusion law. Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 762-63 (7th Cir. 2007). The Illinois Supreme Court teaches that the application of collateral estoppel with respect to a guilty plea should be used "paringly" s and must be determined on a case-bycase basis "nly when equity requires."Talarico v. Dunlap, 685 N.E.2d 325, 331-32 (Ill. 1997). o One of the key factors used by Illinois courts is incentive to litigate. Id. at 332. Although Davis had presented a motion challenging the basis for the automobile stop, Davis'incentive to argue s that motion (which was withdrawn) was surely reduced when the State offered Davis a plea deal. Among other things, that deal gave Mr. Davis time served for the charge of driving without a license. See [28], Ex. N at 2-3. And in any event, there is insufficient undisputed record evidence on the question of claim preclusion for the Court to determine what preclusive effects, if any, should attach to Davis'guilty plea. s Defendant also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity for any constitutional violation. Yet, because the Court concludes that O'onnell did not commit any constitutional C violations, the Court need not inquire further. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (where the allegations, if established, do not amount to a constitutional violation " ere is no th necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity" Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. ); 808, 818, 821 (2009) (noting that the Saucier sequence is "ften appropriate" o although holding that courts may start and end their analyses by considering qualified immunity). 12 Plaint iff, on the other hand, argues that probable cause arguably was absent, and/or that Plaintiff' rights were violated, because Defendant made the arrest outside of his primary s jurisdiction. It is true that a blatant disregard for jurisdiction may bear on the reasonableness determination with respect to an arrest. See Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 525-26 (7th Cir. 2001). However, an officer does not commit a per se constitutional violation even when the officer violates state law. See id. at 526 & n.3. More important, O'onnell and Larson were acting within their jurisdictional bounds. Illinois law allows officers C to question and arrest subjects outside of their primary jurisdiction if the offense that they are investigating is "n offense that occurred in the officer'primary jurisdiction."725 ILCS 5/107a s 4(a-3). While conducting such an investigation, the police officer can make arrests for violations of state law if he or she "eco mes aware of the immediate commission of a felony or b misdemeanor violation" state law. Id. These provisions provided the state law authority for of Defendant to arrest Plaintiff for the felony charges and the misdemeanor charge of driving without a valid driver'license. s V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendant'motion for summary judgment [26] is granted. s Dated: March 31, 2009 ____________________________________ Robert M. Dow, Jr. United States District Judge 13

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