Almaguer v. Cook County et al
Filing
196
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 1/31/2013:Mailed notice(rth, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KRYSTAL ALMAGUER,
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
v.
COOK COUNTY,
Defendant.
Case No. 08-cv-587
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On January 25, 2008, plaintiff Krystal Almaguer (“Almaguer”) filed a complaint against
defendant Cook County alleging sexual and gender discrimination, violations of her equal
protection and due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous state law claims.
On December 16, 2011, Cook County filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 27,
2012, this Court issued an order granting Cook County’s motion as to all claims except
Almaguer’s Section 1983 due process and equal protection claims. Presently before the Court is
Cook County’s motion to reconsider its September 27, 2012 judgment, which may be found at
Almaguer v. Cook County, No. 08 C 587, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140661 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27,
2012). Cook County’s motion to reconsider is granted and Almaguer’s Section 1983 due
process and equal protection claims are dismissed.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a court to grant a motion to reconsider a
prior ruling when that ruling was made on a manifest error of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
A motion to reconsider serves the limited function to correct manifest errors of law or fact, to
present newly discovered evidence, or where there has been an intervening and substantial
change in the controlling law since the submission of the issues to the court. Sperling & Slater,
P.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 12 C 761, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181944,at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 27, 2012). The decision to grant a Rule 59(e) motion lies in the sound discretion of this
Court, and its ruling is reviewed deferentially and will only be disturbed upon a showing that the
Court abused that discretion. Id. at *7.
1
Discussion
As an initial matter, Cook County argues that this Court should not have inferred that it
employed Vanaria at the Adult Probation Department and, accordingly, that Almaguer’s Section
1983 equal protection and due process claims should have been dismissed. This Court finds
somewhat incredulous the claims of ignorance by Cook County of hiring decisions by the Cook
County Adult Probation Department in regards to an employee who served in various positions
in the county system. Nonetheless, probation officers assigned to court services technically are
state, not county, employees. Jefferson v. Winnebago County, No. 94 C 50151, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2425, at *23-24 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 1995). As such, their conduct cannot be attributable to
the county under Section 1983. Id. Accordingly, the incidents of sexual harassment by Vanaria
which led to his eventual termination from the Adult Probation Department can not serve as a
basis upon which Vanaria holds Cook County accountable for Vanaria’s actions.
1. Section 1983 Equal Protection Claim
Almaguer alleges violations of her equal protection right to be free from sexual
harassment and gender discrimination. Under § 1983, “actions of a state entity’s employees are
attributed to the state entity itself if those actions are in furtherance of the entity’s ‘policy or
custom.’” See Bohen v. East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1188 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 870 (7th Cir. 1983)).
“Unconstitutional policies or customs can take three forms: (1) an express policy that, when
enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not
authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional
injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” See Valentine v. City of
Chicago, 452 F.3d 670, 684 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Rasche v. Vill. of Beecher, 336 F.3d 588, 597
(7th Cir. 2003)). A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs
a tortfeasor. See Bohen v. East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1986).
Almaguer attempts to establish the second form of unconstitutional polices or customs,
i.e. a widespread practice that, although not authorized by express municipal policy, is so
permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law. Without the
inference that Cook County employed Vanaria while he was a probation officer, Almaguer fails
2
to demonstrate such a widespread policy. While a plaintiff is not foreclosed from pursuing
Section 1983 claims where she can demonstrate that repeated actions directed at her truly evince
the existence of a widespread policy, “it is not enough to demonstrate that policymakers could,
or even should, have been aware of the unlawful activity because it occurred more than once.
The plaintiff must introduce evidence demonstrating that the unlawful practice was so pervasive
that acquiescence on the part of policymakers was apparent and amounted to a policy decision.”
Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 788-790 (7th Cir. Ill. 2006). Almaguer fails to provide
evidence of such a pervasive acquiescence on the part of Cook County. Accordingly,
Almaguer’s Section 1983 equal protection claim is dismissed.
2. Section 1983 Due Process Claim
To establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has
led an employee to violate her rights, Almaguer must demonstrate that the municipal action was
taken with “deliberate indifference” as to its known or obvious consequences. Bd. of the County
Comm’Rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406-407 (1997). A showing of simple or even heightened
negligence will not suffice. Id. “Deliberate indifference is a strict standard; the constitutional
violation must have been the plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision and courts must
carefully test the link between the . . . decision and the particular injury alleged.” Doe v. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, No. 11 C 02764, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43197, at *29 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,
2012)(internal quotations omitted). Almaguer argues that Cook County was deliberately
indifferent in its inadequate background check of Vanaria because of prior sexual harassment
incidents and complaints at the Adult Probation Department. Cook County argues that Vanaria’s
exchange of sexual favors for false employment was not a plainly obvious consequence of its
hiring decision.
3
A showing of one instance of inadequate screening is not enough to establish deliberate
indifference. Brown, 520 U.S. at 411. Accordingly, here, where Almaguer can only point to one
instance of inadequate screening, Almaguer fails to establish the requisite deliberate
indifference. Cook County’s motion to reconsider is granted and Alamaguer’s Section 1983 due
process claim is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 31, 2013
____________________________
Sharon Johnson Coleman
United States District Judge
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?