Murphy et al v. Village of Plainfield et al

Filing 166

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan H. Lefkow on 1/16/2013. (et, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARK E. MURPHY and
PAMELA S. MURPHY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VILLAGE OF PLAINFIELD, a municipal
corporation, PLAINFIELD TOWNSHIP,
Defendants.

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No. 08 CV 3293
Judge Joan H. Lefkow

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this § 1983 civil rights action, plaintiffs, Mark E. Murphy and Pamela S. Murphy (“the
Murphys”), claim that the Village of Plainfield (“the Village”) and Plainfield Township (“the
Township”) took their property in violation of the takings clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution (Count V). The Murphys also claim that the
Village deprived them of equal protection of the laws based on a class-of-one theory of selective
prosecution. (Count VII ). Am. Compl. at 16. They also assert against the Village municipal
liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978) (Count VIII).1 The remainder of the claims rely on
Illinois law: Count I is a claim against the Village and the Township for negligent trespass.
Count II is a claim against the Village for willful and wanton conduct. Count III is a claim
against the Village and the Township for intentional trespass. Count IV alleges violation of the

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This court has subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1343 and over the state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §
1391.

takings clause of the Constitution of Illinois, art. 1, sec. 15.2 The Village has moved for
summary judgment with respect to all claims against it (counts I, II, III, IV, V, VII, and VIII).
Likewise, the Township seeks summary judgment on all claims against it (counts I, III, IV, and
V). [Dkts. 123, 126]. The court will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on
Counts VII and VIII. The remainder of the case must be remanded to the Twelfth Judicial
Circuit Court, Will County, Illinois.
BACKGROUND3
I.

The Murphys’ Flooding Issues
In 1990, the Murphys purchased 16141 South Farmingdale Drive in unincorporated

Plainfield Township for $145,000. The Murphys’ property is surrounded by subdivisions and
developments annexed by and located within the Village. Shortly after the Murphys moved into
their home, the Village annexed and began developing three subdivisions surrounding their
property, Spangler Farms, Vintage Harvest, and Arbor Place. In 1993, during the development
of the Vintage Harvest subdivision, the Murphys noticed standing water in their backyard. Their
property continued to flood as and after the Village developed additional subdivisions. The
Murphys believed that the additional subdivisions were the cause of their flooding issues. In
2006, water seeped into the eastern portion of their basement. Additionally, in 2006, the
Murphys removed their pool and decking material from their backyard because the structures

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On March 31, 2009, this court granted, in part, defendants’ motions to dismiss, dismissing (1)
counts I, II, and III to the extent that they were predicated on the Village’s or Township’s authorization of
subdivision developments; (2) count VI as to the Village, the Park District, and Meyers; and (3) count VII
and VIII as to Meyers. [Dkt. 60]. On November 2, 2010, pursuant to a stipulation to dismiss [dkt. 88],
the court dismissed the Park District and Botts with prejudice. [Dkt. 104].
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The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the Murphys and are taken from the parties’
statements of facts and supporting documents pursuant to Local Rule 56.1.

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began to buckle. As a result of the problems with flooding, the Township’s tax assessor reduced
the Murphys’ home assessment value by 75 percent.
II.

The Village’s Maintenance of Stormwater Systems and Detention Ponds
The Village’s Department of Public Works maintained the stormwater systems within the

Village. Before approving the construction of new subdivisions, the Village required
subdivision developers to submit a proposal to its Planning Committee, which would consult
with Village engineers about the proposed development. A Village Plan Commission would
then review the plans and recommend to the Village President and Board of Trustees whether to
approve the subdivision. If questions arose at any time during the review process, the Village
would return the plan to the developer to address the Village’s concerns. The Spangler Farms,
Vintage Harvest, and Arbor Place subdivisions all passed the Village’s review process before
their annexation.
These subdivisions each included at least one pre-engineered stormwater detention pond.
Periodically, the Department of Public Works, pursuant to the Village’s Drainage and Detention
Ordinance, drained the detention ponds. The ordinance permitted pumping the detention ponds
when “draining by gravity [was] not feasible.” (Village L.R. 56.1, Ex. 4; § 713) Allen Persons,
the Village Director of Public Works, testified that pumping the detention ponds alleviated the
effects of flooding resulting from excess stormwater in the surrounding subdivisions. The
Village pumped water from the detention ponds onto land and the water then seeped into the
ground. The Township played no role in developing or maintaining the subdivisions or the
detention ponds contained therein.
III.

The 2007 Remediation Project

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Sam Reichert, the Township’s Highway Commissioner, learned about the full extent of
the Murphys’ flooding issues. Reichert testified that the Township provided the Murphys with a
gas-powered pump to remove water from the area behind their home and an adjacent bike path
that ran on an easement maintained by ComEd. The standing water behind their property caused
underground septic fluids to rise to the ground. Reichert believed that this contaminated water
was hazardous for other Township residents. Although the Murphys did not live within the
Village boundaries, Allen Persons was concerned about contaminated water on the bike path
behind the Murphys’ home.
In 2007, the Township and the Village implemented a plan to alleviate the flooding
issues at the Murphys’ property. The Murphys allowed the Township and the Village to install
tile and piping infrastructure on their property, which would dispose of the water collecting at
the rear of the property. In total, the Township spent $40,000 on the project. The installation of
the stormwater infrastructure reduced the standing water at the rear of the Murphys’ property;
however, the Murphys began experiencing water seepage into the north section of their basement
after the remediation project.
IV.

The Village’s Prosecution of the Murphys
In June 2006, Officer Koch, a Village police officer, ticketed the Murphys for riding their

all-terrain vehicles on the Com Ed easement behind their home. While Officer Koch
acknowledged that there had been numerous complaints about ATV-riding on that easement, he
issued a ticket only to the Murphys. Officer Koch testified that he believed that the Village had
jurisdiction over the easement after speaking with Joan Meyers (the Village’s attorney), who
informed Officer Koch that the Murphys did not have permission to ride ATVs on Com Ed

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property. Com Ed, however, had granted the Murphys permission to operate ATVs on the Com
Ed easement and made this fact known to Meyers during the pendency of the prosecution.
Meyers ultimately decided to drop the charge against the Murphys.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 (a). To determine whether any genuine fact exists, the court must pierce the pleadings and
assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) & advisory committee notes (1963
amend.). While the court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986), where a claim or defense is
factually unsupported, it should be disposed of on summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The party seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323.
In response, the non-moving party cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must use evidentiary
tools listed above to designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Id.; Insolia v. Phillip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
I.

The Village and Township’s Motions to Strike
The Village and the Township both filed motions to strike portions of the Murphys’

statement of facts for violating Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. The Township and
the Village contend that the Murphys violated Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) by failing to provide record
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cites for their factual assertions in response to the Township and Village’s Rule 56.1 statements
of facts. Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) provides that the non-movant’s response to the movant’s
statement of facts must include “in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon.” N.D. L.R.
56.1(b)(3)(B). “An answer that does not deny the allegations in the numbered paragraph with
citations to supporting evidence in the record constitutes an admission.” Michas v. Health Cost
Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting McGuire v. United Parcel Serv.,
152 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Murphys dispute the Village’s and Township’s
statements of facts in paragraphs 18, 20, 25, 29, 33, 39, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 65, and
70, but did not provide any citations in support of their factual assertions. Accordingly, the
unsupported factual references in these responses is stricken and those paragraphs are deemed
admitted.
II.

The Federal Takings Claim (Count V)
The Murphys claim that the Village and the Township are liable for unconstitutional

takings under article 1, section 15 of the Illinois Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution because of the permanent nature of the damage
caused by the flooding at their property. Ill. Const. art. I, § 15; U.S. Const. amend. V. Although
the provisions both guard against unlawful takings, this court will address only the federal
constitutional claim.4 The federal takings clause provides that “private property [shall not] be

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The takings clause in the Illinois Constitution is broader than its federal counterpart because it
also protects against damage to property. See Int’l Coll. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356,
363 (7th Cir. 1998) (“The greater protection provided by the Illinois Takings Clause stems from the fact
that the clause not only guards against a governmental taking of private property but also guards against
governmental ‘damage’ to private property.”) (quoting Ill. Const. art. I, § 15).

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taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The Takings Clause
is designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Ark. Game & Fish Cmm’n v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A taking occurs
when the government uses its property in such a way that destroys private property. Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fl. Dept. of Env. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184
(2010). Government action that results in a permanent physical occupation5 of private land
constitutes a per se taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428,
102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982).
The Village and the Township rely on in Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149,
44 S. Ct. 264, 68 L. Ed. 608 (1924), for the proposition that a taking resulting from flooding
must be “an actual, permanent invasion of the land.” In Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 (2012), however, the Supreme Court held that “governmentinduced flooding of limited duration may be compensable.” Id. at 519. The Court reasoned that
“[f]looding cases, like other takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the particular
circumstances of each case, and not by resorting to blanket exclusionary rules.” Id. at 521
(internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors in this inquiry include (1) the time of the
temporary physical invasion, (2) whether the invasion is intended or the foreseeable result of
authorized government action, (3) the property owner’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations regarding the land’s use, and (4) the severity of the interference. Id. at 522–23.
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Regulations that have the effect of permanently depriving a property owner of all beneficial use
of his or her land also constitutes a taking. See Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 518 (citing Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992)). The Murphys focus
on the physical intrusion onto their land to substantiate their takings claim.

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At the threshold, however, the court must determine whether the claim is ripe.6 In
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson County, 473
U.S. 172, 186, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985), the Supreme Court created a special
ripeness doctrine for claims arising under the takings clause. The Court held that a plaintiff
property owner must first seek and have been denied compensation under state court procedures
before seeking redress under the federal takings clause. Id. at 190–191, 194– 195.7 The
Murphys allege in their amended complaint that they made a demand on the various defendants
before filing the lawsuit. Making a demand, however, is not the same as an adverse judicial
decision and does not satisfy the Williamson County exhaustion requirement. See Rockstead v.
City of Crystal Lake, 486 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[U]nless and until the state courts turn
[the plaintiff] down, [the plaintiff’s] right to just compensation has not been infringed.”). The
Village and the Township argue that the Murphys sought compensation in state court by bringing
a state law takings claim. The fact remains, however, that an Illinois state court never denied the
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The court requested additional briefing to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the
Murphy’s federal takings claim. The Village and the Township submitted additional briefs arguing that
this claim is ripe for the court’s review. They argue that Williamson County is a ripeness doctrine that is a
prudential hurdle but not a constitutional limitation on the court’s jurisdiction. See Stop the Beach, 130 S.
Ct. at 2610; Suitum v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733–34, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 137 L. Ed.
2d 980 (1997). Although ripeness “is drawn from both Article III limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction[,]” Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43,
57 n.18, 113 S. Ct. 2485, 125 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1993), the prudential nature of the test does not give “the
lower federal courts license to disregard” it. Peters v. Vill. of Clifton, 498 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2007).
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As explained by the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court in Williamson County articulated a
two-part test for analyzing whether a takings claim is ripe. First, the plaintiff must receive a final decision
from the relevant governmental entity. Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 372 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186–87). Second, the plaintiff must show that he or she exhausted
state remedies seeking just compensation before filing suit. Id. (citing Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at
194). Takings that involve “physical invasions” (as alleged here) constitute a “final decision” and satisfy
the first prong of the test. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Macklin, 361 F.3d 934, 958 (7th Cir. 2004). The court
thus focuses its analysis on the second prong of that test, whether the Murphys exhausted their remedies
under state law.

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Murphys just compensation and their federal takings claim is thus unripe under the rationale of
Williamson County.8
The Village and the Township additionally contend that they waived any right to
challenge the ripeness of the Murphys’ federal takings claim by removing this case to federal
court. They rely on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Key Outdoor Incorporated v. City of
Galesberg, 327 F.3d 549, 550 (7th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that a defendant “surrendered
the benefit of Williamson” when removing a matter containing a takings claim from state court to
federal court.
In Key Outdoor, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging, inter alia, federal and state
takings claims after the defendant enacted an ordinance banning outdoor signs. Key Outdoor,
327 F.3d at 549. The defendant argued that its decision to defer enactment of the ordinance
allowed the plaintiffs to profit from their signs in the interim (a theory of recovery called
amortization), which constituted just compensation. Id. The defendant removed the case to
federal court and filed a motion to dismiss that the district court granted with prejudice. Id. at
550. The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and instructed the district court to
remand the matter to state court because the outright dismissal left the plaintiffs’ takings claims
unadjudicated. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that “[w]hen the City removed the suit to federal

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The Court in Williamson County articulated an exception to this exhaustion requirement. A
plaintiff landowner need not seek relief through a state court proceeding if such procedures were
“unavailable or inadequate.” Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 197. Such is not the case here because
Illinois law provides the mechanism for an aggrieved property owner to receive just compensation. 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/10-5-5. Under Illinois law, a landowner can institute an inverse condemnation
proceeding to recover compensation for government action resulting in a taking of their property. Lamar
Whiteco Outdoor Corp. v. City of W. Chicago, 823 N.E. 2d 610, 622, 355 Ill. App. 3d 352, 291 Ill. Dec.
318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). The purpose of an inverse condemnation proceeding is to determine whether a
taking occurred, and if so, to fix the amount of just compensation. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/10-5-5.

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court, and frustrated plaintiffs’ effort to invoke state remedies, it logically either surrendered the
benefit of Williamson or consented in advance to the remand of state-law theories, so that the
process required by Williamson could run its course.” Id. at 550 (emphasis added). Only state
law theories remained regarding whether there was a taking and, if so, whether amortization
constituted just compensation. Id. at 550–51. The state court’s resolution of those issues would
render the takings claim ripe for resolution thus satisfying Williamson County. Id. at 551.
Under Key Outdoor, this court may consider whether the Murphys’ federal takings claim
is ripe notwithstanding the Village and the Township’s alleged waiver. In Key Outdoor, the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a defendant may waive its Williamson County argument
when removing a case to federal court, but the court must still conduct its own Williamson
County inquiry. Key Outdoor, 327 F.3d at 550; accord Koscielski v. City of Minneapolis, 435
F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[The plaintiff] suggests because the case was removed, the City
should be required to waive its ripeness challenge. [The plaintiffs’] argument, however, would
require the Court to refuse to consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case
and is therefore untenable.”); Sandy Creek Investors, Ltd. v. City of Jonestown, 325 F.3d 623,
626 (5th Cir. 2003) (the federal takings claim was not ripe when the case was removed to federal
court warranting remand to the state court). Courts within this circuit have also remanded
federal takings claims to state court based on Williamson County even though those cases were
initially filed in state court and removed to federal court. See Gardner v. City of Chicago, No.
11 C 7792, 2012 WL 716926, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2012); Del-Prairie Stock Farm, Inc. v.
Cnty. of Walworth, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1034 (E.D. Wis. 2008); Lomnicki Family LLC v. City

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of Elmhurst, No. 04 C 6582, 2006 WL 250700, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2006); Vigilante v. Vill.
of Wilmette, 88 F. Supp. 2d 888, 890 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
The effect of Williamson County is that it forces parties to exhaust all avenues of relief in
a state forum before bringing a takings claim in a federal court. Courts have acknowledged that
this requirement is draconian. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Until Williamson County is reconsidered, litigants will have to press most of their judicial
takings claims before state courts, which are presumptively competent . . . to adjudicate claims
arising under the laws of the United States.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); San Remo
Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323, 352, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 162 L.
Ed. 2d 315 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“I joined the opinion of the Court in Williamson
County. But further reflection and experience lead me to think that the justifications for its statelitigation requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is dramatic. . . . In an
appropriate case, I believe the Court should reconsider whether plaintiffs asserting a Fifth
Amendment takings claim based on the final decision of a state or local government entity must
first seek compensation in state courts.”). This court, however, must adhere to Williamson
County as it remains good law. The court concludes that the Murphys’ federal takings claim is
premature because they have not been denied just compensation by an Illinois state court. Count
V is thus dismissed without prejudice.
III.

The § 1983 Claim (Count VII)
The Murphys argue that the Village is liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for depriving them

of their “inalienable right to be free from government harassment and intimidation.” Am.
Compl. 16. This count stems from the Village’s decision to prosecute the Murphys for operating

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their ATVs allegedly as retribution for complaining to the Village about their flooding issues.
The Village responds that the Murphys’ § 1983 claim seeks redress for malicious prosecution.
The Murphys cannot bring a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 because state law
provides this remedy. See Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
existence of a tort claim under state law knocks out any constitutional theory of malicious
prosecution.”). The Murphys, however, contend that they premised their § 1983 claim on a
class-of-one equal protection violation. They argue that the Village targeted them in bringing
the prosecution and that no other residents received ordinance violations for operating ATVs on
the Com Ed easement.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects “‘the right to be free
from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity.’”
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
322, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 65 L. Ed 2d 784 (1980)). A plaintiff may bring suit under § 1983 “[w]hen
a state actor turns a blind eye to the Clause’s command.” Id. To succeed on a class-of-one
claim, the Murphys must show that they were “(1) intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for that treatment, or (2) that the government
is treating similarly situated individuals differently because of a totally illegitimate animus for
the plaintiff.” Aida Food & Liquor, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 439 F.3d 397, 402–03 (7th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 899
(7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (4-1-5 split decision) (Posner, J., leading opinion) (“The plaintiff must
plead and prove both the absence of a rational basis for the defendant’s actions and some

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improper personal motive (which need not be hostility, but could be, for example, corruption) for
the differential treatment.”) (emphasis in original).
Under the rational basis test, a non-invidiously-based classification does not violate the
equal protection clause if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–320, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993). Prosecutors have wide
discretion in bringing criminal charges and a person challenging that discretion bears a heavy
burden in showing that the decision was irrational. United States v. Moore, 543 F.3d 891,
899–900 (7th Cir. 2008); Del Marcelle, 680 F.3d at 916 (“Critically for present purposes, even
irrationality is not a ground on which prosecutorial discretion may be challenged . . . there is no
place for a class-of-one equal protection theory directed against prosecutorial decisionmaking.”)
(Wood, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
The Murphys’ claim boils down to a challenge to prosecutorial discretion. Meyers’s
discretion to bring charges (misguided as it may have been in hindsight) served a government
interest by enforcing local law. The rational basis test thus dooms the Murphys’ class-of-one
claim. See Avila v. Pappas, 591 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[C]lass-of-one claims cannot
rest on governmental activity that is discretionary by design, a good description of prosecutorial
selectivity in criminal law.”) (citation omitted); Moore, 543 F.3d at 900 (“[B]ecause a norational-basis challenge to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is doomed to failure, [the
defendant’s] class-of-one argument is foreclosed for this reason as well.”). The Village’s motion
for summary judgment on count VII is granted.9

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The Murphys’ policy claim against the Village under Monell rests on allegations that they were
wrongly prosecuted in violation of the equal protection clause. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-53. The failure of that
claim dooms the Monell claim.

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IV.

The Illinois State Law Claims: (Counts I, II, III, and IV)
The Murphys’ remaining claims are common law claims of intentional trespass, willful

and wanton conduct, and negligent trespass. Where, as here, this case must be remanded for
adjudication of the Illinois constitutional claim, the remaining common law claims must go with
it. The court, in its discretion, declines to exercise jurisdiction over counts I, II, III and IV. See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Village’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 123] with respect to counts VII and
VIII is granted. The court lacks jurisdiction to decide the federal takings claim (Count V) based
on lack of ripeness and therefore remands the case (Counts I-IV) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).

Dated:

January 16, 2013

Enter: _____________________________
JOAN HUMPHREY LEFKOW
United States District Judge

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