Cavin v. The City of Chicago, Illinois et al

Filing 125

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 6/13/2011: The Court denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration [# 122] for the reasons stated below. Plaintiff's response to defendants' bill of costs is to be filed by 6/28/11; defendant's reply to plaintiff's response is to be filed by 7/8/11. [For further details see written opinion.] Mailed notice (ber, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Matthew F. Kennelly

CASE NUMBER

08 C 3501

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

6/13/2011

Jones vs. City of Chicago

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

The Court denies plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration [# 122] for the reasons stated below. Plaintiff’s
response to defendants’ bill of costs is to be filed by 6/28/11; defendant’s reply to plaintiff’s response is to be
filed by 7/8/11.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff Alana Jones has moved the Court to reconsider its decision granting summary judgment in
favor of the City of Chicago and Chicago police officers Richard Wiser, Luke Kelly, Edward Wodnicki, Vito
Ferro, and Barrett Moran, Jr. Jones argues that the Court misconstrued two of her responses to defendants’
Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts when it determined that these responses admitted key facts.
First, Jones disputes the Court’s reading of one of her LR 56.1 responses regarding the testimony of
Jeff Johnson, a security guard who responded to the report of a robbery at the Navy Pier McDonald’s.
Johnson testified that he saw a person running around inside the restaurant and asked the person if everything
was alright and where the manager was. According to Johnson, the person did not ask for help and
responded that everything was fine and the manager was in the back. Jones denied the truth of Johnson’s
testimony but admitted that he gave it during his deposition. Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Local Rule 56.1(A)(3)
Stmt. of Facts ¶ 14. More importantly, she also admitted that Johnson relayed the substance of the
conversation to the responding police officers. Id. ¶ 42 (“Admit that security guard Johnson talked to the
responding detectives and told them about his conversation and questions with Cavin regarding whether
Cavin needed any help, if there was anything wrong inside the restaurant, and where the manager was. Deny
that Johnson also told the detectives that Cavin was running around inside the restaurant.”). The Court relied
in part on this admission in concluding that there was probable cause to arrest and charge Cavin with armed
robbery, reasoning that after learning of Cavin’s dismissive response to Johnson’s questions, a prudent
person having that and the other information the officers had would suspect that Cavin was trying to divert
attention from the robbery.
Jones offers no valid basis for withdrawing her admission in paragraph 42, nor is she correct that the
Court misunderstood it. Jones admitted that Johnson told the responding officers about his conversation with
Cavin, and as noted above, she also admitted the details of that conversation. It is too late now for Jones to
withdraw these admissions. Though Jones denied that Johnson told the police that Cavin was running around
inside the restaurant, the Court did not rely upon that in reaching its decision. Rather, the Court only
08C3501 Jones vs. City of Chicago

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STATEMENT
considered Johnson’s undisputed comments regarding whether everything was alright and where the manager
was. Jones argues that Cavin’s responses to these questions are not inculpatory. The Court disagrees, for the
reasons stated in its decision and repeated above.
Second, Jones challenges her admission relating to Assistant State’s Attorney Sabra Ebersole, who
charged Cavin with armed robbery. In response to defendants’ LR 56.1 statement, Jones admitted that “ASA
Ebersole interviewed Cavin after she interviewed Thorne and Clark.” Id. ¶ 57 (emphasis added). The Court
relied in part on this admission in concluding that even if the officers misled Ebersole, there was probable
cause to arrest and charge Cavin with armed robbery. Jones correctly points out that elsewhere in her
response, she denied that Ebersole interviewed Thorne and Clark. See, e.g., id. ¶ 56. This does not change
the fact that she made an admission to the contrary in paragraph 57. She cannot withdraw this admission via
a motion to reconsider.
Even if the Court were to disregard this admission, there still would be no genuine issue of material
fact on the question of whether there was probable cause for Cavin’s arrest and charging. There is no dispute
that Thorne and Clark provided the responding officers with information strongly suggesting that Cavin was
involved in the robbery. See, e.g., id. ¶ 29 (“Admit that after talking with Thorne and Clark, the victims of
the armed robbery, [Officer] Wiser was under the impression that the gunmen entered immediately after
Cavin; that Thorne was not expecting Cavin to be at the McDonald’s; that Cavin was allowed to stay in the
restaurant while the two girls were taken back into the office at gunpoint.”). And as noted above, Johnson
provided the officers with additional information indicative of Cavin’s involvement. Finally, Jones admitted
that Ebersole testified that she believed she interviewed Thorne and Clark and that she believed their
comments were similar to the contents of Officer Wiser’s general offense case report. Id. ¶ 56. Based on
these undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that there was not evidence “lead[ing] a person of
ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and sound suspicion that” Cavin was an
accomplice to the robbery. Fabiano v. City of Palos Hills, 336 Ill. App. 3d 635, 642, 784 N.E.2d 258, 266
(2002). Accordingly, the Court denies Jones’s motion to reconsider.

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