Huffman v. MQ Construction Company et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 11/12/2009.Mailed notice(sct, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT N O R T H E R N DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS E A ST E R N DIVISION L IN D A J. HUFFMAN, P l a i n t i f f, v s. M Q CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and MICHAEL A. QUARANTA, individu ally and as agent for M Q CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, D e fe n d a n t s . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

08 C 3679

M E M O R A N D U M OPINION C H A R L E S P. KOCORAS, District Judge: T his matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants MQ C on st ru c ti on Company and Michael Quaranta ("Defendants") for partial summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is denied. BACKGROUND L inda Huffman ("Huffman") first began working as a secretary for MQ C onstruction Company ("MQ") in February 1989. MQ is owned by Michael Quaranta ("Q uaranta"), who served as secretary-treasurer and Huffman's direct supervisor. As se cre ta ry for MQ, Huffman worked closely with Quaranta in MQ's offices. Huffman co ntinue d to work for MQ until November 2005 when she left to pursue a job apart from the construction business. After working nearly a year for a beauty products

c om pa ny , Huffman returned to MQ in October 2006 with the same compensation level and job responsibilities as she enjoyed during her previous term of employment. Q uaranta's behavior toward Huffman became increasingly sexualized upon H u ffm an 's return to MQ. Quaranta explicitly requested that Huffman engage in oral sex more than twenty times. Quaranta also told Huffman that if she refused his advances she w o u ld never work for another construction company. Huffman nevertheless declined Q uaranta's advances and asked him "what's wrong with you?" and "why are you acting th is way?" Quaranta also rubbed Huffman's shoulders and then tried to reach into her bra on several occasions; each time Huffman told him to stop. In fall 2007 Quaranta attempted to lift up Huffman's skirt. He also told Huffman that "he could be the rabbit and [Huffman] could be the carrot". Though Huffman found Quaranta's behavior upsetting, she testified that it did not affect her ability to do her job. Huffman complained about Quaranta's behavior to MQ's attorney, Bruce Jackson, and a co-worker at MQ, Joseph Guerra. Huffman quit her job at MQ in N ovember 2007. On her last day, Huffman told Quaranta and MQ's president, Vito Q uaranta, that her departure was the result of Quaranta's conduct. O n June 27, 2008, Huffman filed suit against MQ and Quaranta alleging em ploy me nt discrimination under Title VII as well as state law claims for retaliatory discharge, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We dismissed the

-2-

re ta lia to ry discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on October 15, 2008. Defendants now move for partial summary judgment as to the Title VII claim. L E G A L STANDARD Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ju dg me nt as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. B u sc ag lia v. United States, 25 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 1994). The movant in a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by specific citation to the record; if the party succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In considering motions for summary judgment, a court construes all facts and draw s all inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. L ib erty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). W ith these principles in mind, we turn to Defendants' motion. D IS C U S S IO N T itle VII prohibits discrimination with respect to an individual's "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex[.]" 42 -3-

U .S.C . § 2000e-2(a)(2). Plaintiffs may establish a Title VII violation by showing their employer required them to work in a hostile or abusive environment. Harris v. Forklift S ys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To prevail on her hostile work environment claim, H uffman must show: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for se xu al favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct w a s severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; (3) the conduct w as directed at her because of her sex; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Q u a nto ck v. Shared Mktg. Servs., Inc., 312 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2002). Defendants' motion only addresses the hostile work environment requirement, so we will limit our discussion to that element. T o satisfy the hostile work environment element, Huffman must demonstrate she suffered from sexual harassment severe or pervasive enough to create "an environment th at a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive[.]" Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. When assessing whether a work environment could be objectively described as hostile, courts look to a number of factors, including, but not limited to, "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, o r a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an e mployee 's work performance." Id. at 23. In analyzing whether a situation is objectively hostile, courts distinguish "uninvited sexual solicitations [and] obscene language or

-4-

g estu re s" that would render an environment objectively hostile from "occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers" that would not give rise to Title VII liability. Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 807 (7th Cir. 20 00 ). D efendants contend that no reasonable jury could find that Huffman worked in a n objectively hostile environment. Huffman testified that Quaranta propositioned her fo r oral sex on more than twenty occasions while the two worked closely together at M Q 's offices. Moreover, he made these unwanted advances while exercising su pe rv iso ry authority over her. Quaranta did not engage in mere "vulgar banter, tinged w ith sexual innuendo" but rather made several unwanted solicitations using sexually explicit language. Hostetler, 218 F.3d at 807. This conduct is severe enough to create a triable issue regarding whether Huffman worked in an objectively hostile environment. See Quantock, 312 F.3d at 904(finding triable issue based solely on fact th at the defendant "made repeated requests for sex directly to [plaintiff,]" enjoyed a po sition of authority over plaintiff, and worked in close quarters with her). D efendants point to another part of Huffman's testimony as evidence that no re aso na ble juror could conclude she worked in an objectively hostile setting. Huffman stated that Quaranta's behavior did not affect her ability to do her job at MQ, though it did upset her. Defendants highlight this statement to suggest that because Huffman's

-5-

w o rk performance did not suffer a reasonable person in her position would not feel that h er environment was actionably hostile. But the proper inquiry "is not whether work has be en impaired" but whether a reasonable juror could conclude that Huffman's work conditions were discriminatorily altered. Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). "T he absence of a noticeable decline in job productivity should therefore not be unduly e mp ha siz ed where there is ample evidence showing that a campaign of harassment had a n impact on its target and made it more difficult for her to do her job." Dey v. Colt C onstr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1455 (7th Cir. 1994). A reasonable juror could find th at Defendants' conduct affected Huffman and made the completion of her re sp o n sib ilitie s more arduous even though she was still able to do her job. Huffman testified that Quaranta's conduct upset her and that she ultimately left MQ because of his conduct. The portion of Huffman's testimony upon which Defendants rely should n ot be viewed in isolation; other parts of her testimony regarding Quaranta's conduct w o u ld , if believed, be sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Defendants subjected H uffman to an objectively hostile work environment.. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Huffman, therefore, we hold that D e fe nd an ts have not demonstrated that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Huffman's Title VII claim.

-6-

C O N C L U S IO N Fo r the foregoing reasons, we deny Defendants' motion for partial summary ju d g m e n t.

Charles P. Kocoras U nited States District Judge D ated: November 12, 2009

-7-