Yano v. City Colleges of Chicago et al

Filing 240

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Andrea R. Wood on 9/23/2015. Mailed notice(ef, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SAYURI YANO,
Plaintiff,
v.
MOHAMED EL-MAAZAWI and
PRISCILLA LANCKI,
Defendants.

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No. 08-cv-04492
Judge Andrea R. Wood

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Sayuri Yano (“Plaintiff”) claims to have suffered intentional infliction of emotional
distress at the hands of Priscilla Lancki and Mohamed El-Maazawi (“Defendants”), who were her
professors at Harry S. Truman College. A jury heard Plaintiff’s claim in January 2015 and
returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 (“Motion”) (Dkt. No. 230). For the reasons
stated below, the Motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Sayuri Yano was born on June 19, 1996. She began attending Harry S. Truman College
(“Truman”), a member institution of the City Colleges of Chicago, in 2006 when she was just 10
years old. Her mother, Kyung Hye Yano, filed this lawsuit in 2008, individually and on Sayuri
Yano’s behalf as her parent and guardian, against the City Colleges of Chicago and various
affiliated institutions and individuals in response to extreme hostility, harassment, unequal

treatment, and discrimination that both Sayuri Yano and Kyung Hye Yano claim to have suffered
while Sayuri Yano was attending classes at Truman.1
The original complaint asserted a multitude of federal and state law claims, including
discrimination based on gender, national origin, and age; violations of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution; unequal treatment and retaliation; breach of contract;
assault; defamation and libel; civil conspiracy; fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation; failure
to train, supervise, intervene, and discipline; negligence; promissory estoppel; negligent infliction
of emotional distress; and, of course, intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Dkt. No. 1.)
Following a mostly successful motion to dismiss by Defendants,2 all that remained were claims
for gender and national origin discrimination, violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses, unequal treatment and retaliation, and assault.3 (See Dkt. No. 29.) And after the Court
ruled on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the case was narrowed only to Sayuri
Yano’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Lancki and El-Maazawi.
(Dkt. No. 155.) Meanwhile, shortly before trial, Sayuri reached the age of 18 and was thus able to
proceed with her claims on her own behalf. (See Dkt. No. 202.) After a five-day trial, a jury
ultimately found in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiff’s surviving claims for intentional infliction of
emotion distress.
In advance of the trial, the parties filed various motions in limine. Two are at issue here.
The first is Defendants’ motion in limine to exclude evidence regarding the discipline Truman

1
As used in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, “Plaintiff” refers to Sayuri Yano only. Although her
mother, Kyung Hye Yano, also brought claims on her own behalf, Kyung Hye Yano’s individual claims
did not survive summary judgment and are not the subject of this Motion.
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Sayuri Yano and Kyung Hye Yano acquiesced in the dismissal of several of their claims.

3

 After the original defamation claim was dismissed, the Court granted leave to amend the complaint to add
a new defamation claim. The new claim did not survive summary judgement. 

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imposed on Lancki for referring to Plaintiff as a “little girl” in front of her biology class. (Dkt.
No. 184.) The Court granted the motion—citing Federal Rule of Evidence 407—to the extent
Plaintiff sought to introduce evidence that Lancki was punished by Truman or that Truman made
or considered changes to its practices, policies, or procedures as a result of the investigation
regarding the allegations. (Dkt. No. 221 at 11-13.) The Court reserved ruling, however, regarding
whether the evidence could be admitted to demonstrate investigative findings. (Id.) In addition,
the Court stated that, “Plaintiff will be permitted to use information from the investigation to
impeach Defendant Lancki or other witnesses.” (Id. at 13.)
The second based for Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is the Court’s ruling on Defendants’
motion in limine to exclude references to an alleged tailgating incident involving Plaintiff, her
mother, and Dr. Gabriel Hose, who at the time was El-Maazawi’s colleague and officemate. (Dkt.
No. 185.) The Court granted the motion, finding the evidence irrelevant because Plaintiff could
not “offer an evidentiary basis beyond mere speculation from which a jury might find that Hose
acted at the direction or instigation of Defendant El-Maazawi.” (Dkt. No. 221 at 13-15.)
In seeking a new trial under Rule 59, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he court’s not admitting this
evidence was erroneous and caused a violation of [her] substantial rights.” (Pl. Mot. ¶ 4, Dkt. No.
230.) She further asserts that “[t]he trial essentially came down to a swearing match between
[herself], on the one hand, and Drs. El-Maazawi and Lancki, on the other hand,” and that “[b]y
not hearing the excluded evidence, the jury was denied critically important information that would
have provided more weight to [her] testimony . . . . [and] would have caused the jury to more
probably believe [her] rather than the defendants.” (Id. ¶¶ 5, 16.)

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DISCUSSION
Under Rule 59, “[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues .
. . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at
law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. “A court may only order a new trial if the jury’s verdict
is against the manifest weight of the evidence, . . . . or if for other reasons the trial was not fair to
the moving party.” Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826, 836 (7th Cir. 2012) (omission in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] court will set aside a verdict as contrary to
the manifest weight of the evidence only if no rational jury could have rendered the verdict.”
Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 444 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). With respect to an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, “[a] new
trial is warranted only if the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the
determination of a jury and the result is inconsistent with substantial justice.” Id. at 440.
I.

Evidence Regarding the Discipline that Truman Imposed on Lancki
Plaintiff argues that although evidence regarding the discipline that Truman imposed on

Lancki for referring to Plaintiff as a “little girl” in class was excluded pursuant to Defendants’
motion in limine, “the door was opened to allow such evidence during Dr. Lancki’s case-inchief,” yet “the court denied [Plaintiff’s] request to cross examine the doctor or any other witness
on her punishment.” (Pl. Mot. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 230.) Specifically, according to Plaintiff, the door was
opened when Elizabeth Roeger, Dean of Instruction at Truman during the time of the incidents
alleged, testified that Lancki had the right to teach her class in the manner she saw fit under
principles of academic freedom. Plaintiff contends that Roeger’s testimony was introduced to
suggest to the jury that Lancki had acted appropriately in her classroom at all times, a suggestion

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belied by the disciplinary action taken against Lancki by Truman.4 Plaintiff further argues that
“the evidence of the disciplinary action would not only have rebutted Ms. Roeger’s testimony but
also would have further buttressed Ms. Yano’s testimony about Professor’s [sic] Lancki’s
misconduct.” (Pl. Reply at 2, Dkt. No. 236.)
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s argument that the evidence would have “further buttressed”
her own testimony about Lancki’s alleged misconduct—i.e., that the evidence would have
allowed the jury to infer that Lancki’s actions were wrong—is exactly what is prohibited by
Federal Rule of Evidence 407.5 Fed. R. Evid. 407 (“When measures are taken that would have
made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove . . . culpable conduct.”). The evidence would not have been admissible for
that purpose.
With respect to Plaintiff’s contention that the evidence would have “rebutted” Roeger’s
testimony, Plaintiff appears to argue that the evidence should have been allowed as impeachment
evidence. But such use was not prohibited by the Court’s motion in limine ruling, as Plaintiff was
explicitly given permission to use the evidence for impeachment. (Dkt. No. 221 at 13.) In any
case, evidence regarding the disciplinary actions against Lancki would not have been proper
impeachment of Roeger’s testimony. Although Plaintiff asserts that Roeger testified that academic
freedom allowed Lancki to teach the class however she saw fit and that the “testimony obviously
was introduced to lead the jury to believe that the Professor had acted appropriately in her
classroom at all times” (Pl. Reply at 2, Dkt. No. 236), Roeger said no such thing. Instead, Roeger

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Plaintiff does not cite any portion of the trial transcript to support her argument. The Court is thus left to
guess which testimony and argument Plaintiff finds problematic. The Court need not do so, as “perfunctory
and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.”
United States v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000).
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As stated in the Court’s ruling on the parties’ motions in limine, disciplining an employee qualifies as a
subsequent remedial measure. (Dkt. No. 221 at 12.)

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testified as follows regarding the general concept of academic freedom during her direct
examination:

(Roeger Test., Trial Tr. at 343:13-344:1.) She later elaborated on the limits of academic freedom
on cross examination:

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(Id. at 389:17-390:14.)
It is clear from her testimony that Roeger was simply explaining that academic freedom
applies to a professor’s ability to choose how to teach material. It is also clear that Roeger
believes academic freedom only goes so far—for example, although a professor may choose how
to teach material, the choice of what material to teach is out of the professor’s hands (at least at
Truman). A person could not reasonably infer from Roeger’s testimony that academic freedom
would exonerate a professor who engaged in inappropriate classroom behavior or interactions
with students. In fact, with regard to the allegations of inappropriate conduct by Lancki, Roeger
testified explicitly that such behavior would not be something that a professor would be entitled to
do based on principles of academic freedom:

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(Id. at 390:21-391:14.)
In short, it cannot be said that the exclusion of evidence regarding Lancki’s discipline was
in error or, even if it were, that the exclusion “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
on the determination of a jury and the result is inconsistent with substantial justice.” Lewis, 590 at
440. Plaintiff’s request for a new trial on this ground is denied.
II.

Evidence Regarding the Alleged Tailgating Incident
Plaintiff also argues that the Court should not have excluded evidence of an incident

where Hose allegedly tailgated Plaintiff and her family. She asserts that the evidence would have
shown that Hose began following Plaintiff and her family in “an area in which he could not have
been expected to be” and that his “tactics while driving behind the Yano’s [sic] car . . .
undoubtedly could be construed only as tailgating.” (Pl. Mot. ¶ 13, Dkt. No. 230.) Plaintiff argues
that had the jury heard that evidence, “it would have been convinced that Dr. El-Maazawi put his
co-professor up to engage in such conduct . . . . Thus, the jury would have more probably believed
Ms. Yano’s testimony.” (Id.)

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As the Court explained in its ruling on the parties’ motions in limine, however, the purpose
of the trial was to determine whether Plaintiff suffered emotional harm as a result of Defendants’
conduct towards her—even assuming that Hose did tailgate Plaintiff and her family, the evidence
would not be relevant (and thus would not be admissible) unless Plaintiff could offer an
evidentiary basis beyond mere speculation from which a jury might find that Hose acted at the
direction or instigation of El-Maazawi. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402; Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604,
609 (7th Cir. 1994) (evidence properly excluded where admitting evidence would merely have
invited the jury to speculate ). Plaintiff was not able to offer any such evidentiary basis before trial
nor did she introduce any such evidentiary basis at trial. The most she offers now is that Hose was
El-Maazawi’s officemate and colleague, and that the alleged tailgating occurred soon after
Plaintiff complained about El-Maazawi’s alleged misconduct. To conclude from those facts that
El-Maazawi directed Hose to tailgate Plaintiff and her family requires immense speculation. This
is insufficient to establish admissibility. Accordingly, the exclusion of evidence regarding the
alleged tailgating was not in error. Even if it were in error, excluding the evidence still would not
have had such a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s determination that it
would warrant a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is denied.

ENTERED:

Dated: September 23, 2015

__________________________
Andrea R. Wood
United States District Judge

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