Bridewell et al v. Eberle et al
Filing
127
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/27/2012:Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SARA BRIDEWELL, RANDY MANUEL,
and LISA RHODES,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 08 C 4947
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
CITY OF CHICAGO, KEVIN EBERLE,
and BRIAN FORBERG,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion is granted in its
entirety.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following are the facts on which the parties agree, unless
otherwise indicated.
On
the
evening
of
September
3,
2006,
Walter
Chandler
(“Chandler”) drove his sport utility vehicle into Plaintiff Lisa
Rhodes’ (“Rhodes”) Nissan Altima on Chicago’s southeast side.
Chandler fled.
Rhodes, her sister Sara Bridewell (“Bridewell”),
Randy Manuel (“Manuel”) and Anthony Watkins (“Watkins”) got in
Rhodes’ car and gave chase.
Chandler turned into what appeared
to be a dead-end alley and Plaintiffs’ car pulled up behind him,
blocking his attempt to reverse out of the alley.
Bridewell,
Rhodes and Manuel got out of the car and confronted Chandler.
Bridewell approached from the passenger side of the SUV, Manuel
and Rhodes from the driver’s side.
Rhodes reached into the SUV
and took Chandler’s keys out of the ignition.
Bridewell at some
point yelled out that Chandler had a gun and the three ran.
A
shot rang out, followed by Chandler’s head slumping onto his
steering wheel, setting off the horn.
A witness reported that minutes later, two men in white Tshirts approached the SUV.
At least one appeared to have a gun,
and more shots rang out, followed by the men running away.
Police were called and Rhodes and Bridewell approached police
when they arrived. Rhodes told them that the occupant of the SUV
had shot at her and her sister, although she did not mention
there were two other men in her car with her when they followed
the SUV.
Later, Defendant Chicago Police detectives Kevin Eberle
(“Eberle”) and Brian Forberg (“Forberg”) arrived on the scene and
after some investigation ordered Rhodes and Bridewell taken to
Area 2 police headquarters for further questioning.
picked up nearby and also taken to Area 2.
arrested.
Manuel was
Watkins was also
There does not seem to be any dispute that all
Plaintiffs, at least as of their first interrogations at the
police station, were under arrest.
- 2 -
Bridewell was interrogated for 63 hours before being brought
before a judge; she never admitted to shooting Chandler.
Rhodes
was questioned in a windowless room for many hours without a
bathroom break and at one point urinated in the interrogation
room.
Police say they told her she could take bathroom breaks.
Nonetheless, Rhodes told police “for a long time” she never saw
Bridewell shoot Chandler until finally changing her story to say
Bridewell had fired at Chandler.
Pls.’ Ex. AA at 2.
Watkins was
interrogated for 27 hours until he, too, said he saw Bridewell
shoot Chandler.
Manuel invoked his right to counsel.
Bridewell was charged with murder and jailed for three years
while she awaited trial until prosecutors dropped the charges.
Among the problems prosecutors found with the case was the fact
that DNA swabs taken from a gun found in the center console of
the SUV next to Chandler had not been immediately tested, and
when they eventually were tested, yielded no useable results.
Prosecutors
also
found
that
a
lie-detector
technician’s
questioning of Rhodes (during which she broke and changed her
story) was not so much an objective lie-detector test as it was
a “completely biased” interrogation.
Pls.’ Ex. AA, at 2.
The
fact that Bridewell and Rhodes voluntarily approached police when
they arrived also did not necessarily reflect guilt.
All three Plaintiffs and Watkins each tested negative for
gunshot residue some six hours after the shooting, although
- 3 -
police reports indicated Bridewell had, at some point, washed her
hands before testing, possibly removing any gunpowder.
The Cook
County medical examiner was forced to revise his autopsy report
two years after he completed it after Plaintiffs’ autopsy expert
pointed out Chandler’s gunshot entry wound had deposits of soot.
This, the medical examiner conceded, is an indication of close
range firing. That detail is possibly supportive of Bridewell’s
story that Chandler had accidentally or purposely killed himself
after they ran away.
(The sole, fatal wound was, in fact, found
to be inflicted by the gun found in Chandler’s car when police
arrived.)
The medical examiner still believes the shooting is a
homicide, however.
In 2008, Plaintiffs filed this suit. The counts that remain
are each Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the individual Defendants (Counts I, II and III),
Plaintiff
Bridewell’s
state
law
malicious
prosecution claim
against the City and the individual Defendants (Count V) and
Bridewell’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
against the City and the individual Defendants (Count VI).
Cook County prosecutors dropped the murder charge in 2009.
Further facts relevant to specific counts of this suit will be
addressed below.
- 4 -
II.
Summary
judgment
LEGAL STANDARD
is
proper
only
if
the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A fact presents a
genuine issue if it is one on which a reasonable fact finder
could find for the nonmoving party.
434
F.3d
916,
924
(7th
Cir.
Evans v. City of Chicago,
2006) (internal
citations
and
punctuation omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Counts I, II and III
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Fourth Amendment)
Counts I, II and III allege violations of Bridewell’s,
Manuel’s and Rhodes’ Fourth Amendment rights, respectively. Each
count shares a common thread in that each alleges each Plaintiff
was seized without probable cause (false arrest). Bridewell also
appears
to
argue
that
her
seizure
was
also
per
se
constitutionally unreasonable because it extended past 48 hours
without an appearance before a judge.
The Court addresses the
initial seizure of all three Plaintiffs first.
1.
Probable Cause Existed to arrest All Three Plaintiffs
“Probable
cause
is
an
absolute
defense
to
a
claim
of
unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Brooks v.
- 5 -
City of Aurora, 653 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal
punctuation omitted.)
Whether probable cause exists at the time
of an arrest, depends on whether the facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing the
suspect has committed an offense.
Id.
Probable cause is to be
determined in a practical, nontechnical manner. Hughes v. Meyer,
880 F.2d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 1989).
The inquiry raises questions
of probabilities and the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.
Id.
Probable cause requires more than a bare
suspicion, but need not be based on evidence sufficient to
support a conviction, nor even a showing that the officer’s
belief is more likely true than false.
Id.
All parties agree that at the time Defendants (or other
officers not party to the suit) ordered Plaintiffs taken to the
police station for questioning, Defendants knew or believed the
following.
Defendant detectives were called to a shooting scene and on
the way heard a radio report that two men were seen running from
the scene of the shooting, an east-west alley north of 69th
Street. The brick wall of a cemetery is immediately north of the
alley. Chandler, driving a sport utility vehicle, had been in a
car accident with Rhodes’ car.
The detectives saw Rhodes car
- 6 -
immediately behind Chandler’s SUV.
Both were facing east.
The
east end of the alley appeared to detectives to be a dead-end.
(There is actually a turn-off into another north-south alley east
of there that leads to 69th Street, but the sides agree the alley
appeared to be a dead end to detectives.)
Rhodes’ car thus
blocked what detectives surmised Chandler thought was his only
route out of the alley. (Later acquired evidence showed Chandler
tried backing up west down the alley before Rhodes’ car pulled up
behind him.)
The detectives observed Chandler dead in the
driver’s seat with what appeared to be three holes in his head:
one on the left side, one on the right and one in the top center
(it turned out to be just two holes from one bullet that had
traveled from the right side of his head and exited out the left
side; there was no top center hole).
next to Chandler.
A gun rested in the console
There were bullet holes in the car:
the hood and another in the front bumper.
one in
Witness Everett Bonds
(“Bonds”) told the detectives he saw two women and a man get out
of Rhodes’ car and confront Chandler.
Bonds heard one of the
three yell “he’s got a gun,” saw “some of these subjects running
east on 69th Street,” and heard a gunshot followed by a car horn
(caused by Chandler slumping forward).
Pls.’ Ex. D, at 9.
The
parties dispute the exact sequence Bonds gave regarding the
running
and
the
gunshot.
Another
witness,
Shaun
Waight
(“Waight”), told detectives he heard one shot followed by the car
- 7 -
horn.
Two to three minutes later, two males in white T-shirts
approached the SUV from the east, at least one of them holding
what Waight believed was a gun.
Waight heard two gunshots,
followed by the two men running back in the direction from which
they had come.
A third witness, Ferrar Rahman (“Rahman”), told
police that he saw Manuel exchanging words with the victim.
All this, in the Court’s eyes, gave detectives probable
cause to arrest all three Plaintiffs.
They had pursued the dead
man into an ostensibly blind alley and confronted him.
A shot
was fired and at least some Plaintiffs were seen running.
It is
not unreasonable for a detective to believe they were involved,
either as the trigger person or as an accomplice to murder.
Crediting the Plaintiffs’ order of the running and the initial
shot, as it must be on summary judgment, it would not have been
unreasonable for police to believe that Chandler shot at the
three and the two men who returned with guns for retribution were
either Manuel and Watkins, or others sent by the four occupants
of the car.
In either case, probable cause existed to believe
all Plaintiffs were at least accessories to murder.
At that
time, detectives did not know what shot killed Chandler, and it
would not be unreasonable to assume the two men skulking through
the alley shot and killed Chandler, and were accomplices of
Plaintiffs, whose car had just been struck by Chandler.
- 8 -
That
there
are
other
plausible
explanations
Chandler committing suicide) misses the point.
(such
as
Hughes dictates
that a detective’s belief be supported beyond a mere suspicion,
not that it be the most likely explanation.
Plaintiffs argue
Defendants’ belief was unreasonable because Rhodes sought out
police when they arrived, an indication of innocence. While this
does tend to indicate innocence, not every criminal is dumb and
some
are
capable
of
misdirection.
Police
are
allowed,
particularly in this instance, to believe the incriminating
evidence outweighs the favorable. It likely seemed incredible to
police arriving on the scene that a man who fled from pursuers
would kill himself.
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue the evidence shows Defendants’
reports
indicate
they
arrested
Plaintiffs
not
because
they
believed they were involved, but only to reconcile inconsistent
statements by Plaintiffs and others about how the death occurred.
Defendants dispute this, but assuming, arguendo, it to be true,
it does not help Plaintiffs.
Probable cause is an objective
standard, unaffected by even alternative subjective motivations.
See United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 815 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
- 9 -
2. Bridewell’s Claim Regarding
Her Extended Detention is Barred by Res Judicata
Defendants
argue
a
class-action
settlement
involving
detentions by Chicago police without a court appearance within 48
hours of arrest prevents Bridewell’s duration-of-confinement
claim.
See Dunn v. City of Chicago, No. 04-C-6804 (N.D. Ill.)
Plaintiff Bridewell does not dispute the settlement covers the
time period she was in detention, but argues Dunn covered only
those cases where probable cause existed to arrest, and that
Bridewell’s case is therefore different.
This is an implicit
admission that, if there was probable cause, Bridewell’s claim is
barred by res judicata.
As the Court has already determined
summary judgment is proper on the issue of probable cause, the
duration of confinement claim is prevented by res judicata and
summary judgment for Defendants is appropriate.
B.
Count V (State Malicious Prosecution)
To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff
must show (1) the defendant commenced or continued an original
criminal
or
civil
judicial
proceeding;
(2)
the
proceeding
terminated in favor of the plaintiff in a manner indicative of
innocence; (3) there was an absence of probable cause for such
proceeding; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages resulting
to the plaintiff. Hurlbert v. Charles, 938 N.E.2d 507, 512 (Ill.
2010) (citing Swick v. Liautaud, 662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill.
- 10 -
1996)).
The absence of one element precludes a plaintiff from
prevailing.
Logan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 246 F.3d 912, 921 (7th
Cir. 2001).
Defendants
argue
that
the
in-court
nolle
prosequi
of
Bridewell’s murder charge was done as a condition to pleading
guilty on an unrelated drug and gun case and thus Plaintiff has
not borne her burden of showing that the criminal prosecution
concluded in a manner indicative of innocence.
See Swick, 662
N.E.2d at 1243 (“The abandonment of the proceedings is not
indicative
of
the
innocence
of
the
accused
when
the
nolle
prosequi is the result of an agreement or compromise with the
accused.”)
Plaintiff
seems
to
concede
that
the
court
transcript
indicates that the two cases were clearly linked, but she points
to the affidavit of Bridewell’s criminal counsel in that case,
John W. Wyatt (“Wyatt”), which says prosecutors made clear
outside the court proceedings that the murder case was being
dropped on its own lack of merit unrelated to the gun and drug
case.
In Wyatt’s experience, such quid pro quo deals are always
explicitly noted in court as being one element “in exchange for”
the other, and this was not done in Bridewell’s case.
Wyatt
concedes, however, he did not object when the judge announced he
“assumed” the nolle prosequi on the murder case was part and
- 11 -
parcel of the guilty plea in the drug and gun case.
The
transcript of the proceeding shows the state’s attorney present
said
the
judge
was
“correct”
in
this
assumption.
Most
importantly, the judge in the case instructed Bridewell that if
she revoked her guilty plea in the gun and drug case, the murder
charge could be reinstated.
Asked if she understood this,
Bridewell herself replied “Yes.”
Defendants object to Wyatt’s affidavit as a “sham” affidavit
not supported by discovery, but the Court need not rule on this
point. Even if the Court accepts at face value the affidavit, it
does not change the outcome.
Putting aside for the moment that
Wyatt, by not clarifying in court his understanding (even when
asked if he wanted to add something) may have waived Bridewell’s
ability to claim that the two cases were not linked, Wyatt’s
affidavit shows only what Wyatt believed the circumstances were;
he gives no indication of what Bridewell believed, and she is the
one who made the agreement.
The transcript clearly shows that
she acquiesced to the linking of the murder case with the gun and
drug case when she answered that she understood the murder charge
could be reinstated if she revoked her plea on the gun and drug
case. Thus, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that the murder
charge was terminated in a manner indicative of her innocence and
summary judgment on the malicious prosecution count in favor of
Defendants is appropriate.
- 12 -
C.
As
a
Count VI Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress (“IIED”)
preliminary
matter,
the
Court
Bridewell’s IIED claim is time-barred.
must
determine
if
Under the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act, actions against city employees are limited to a
one-year statute of limitations.
745 ILL . COMP . STAT . 10/8-101.
Defendants say the cause of action accrued upon Bridewell’s “last
alleged interaction” with Defendants, which was the day she was
charged, September 5, 2006. The first Complaint in this case was
filed August 29, 2008.
2009.
Criminal charges were dismissed July 22,
Defendants, citing Evans v. City of Chicago, contend the
cause accrued in September 2006 and is therefore untimely.
Evans, 434 F.3d 916, 934 (7th Cir. 2006) (interpreting Illinois
law). Plaintiff cites Walden v. City of Chicago, and claims IIED
charges based on a parallel claim for malicious prosecution
accrue only when state criminal proceedings are terminated,
making this IIED charge timely.
Walden v. City of Chicago, 755
F.Supp.2d 942, 961-962 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
Evans also involved an IIED charge based on malicious
prosecution.
The court there found that imprisonment was not a
continuing injury and thus the cause of action accrued when
officers had arrested and charged the plaintiff, not when the
criminal proceedings terminated.
Evans, 434 F.3d at 935.
Although Walden cited Evans, it did not explain why Evans did not
- 13 -
command a different outcome. Id.
Instead, Walden relied on pre-
Evans district court cases for its conclusion.
compelled to follow the Seventh Circuit.
This Court feels
Because Evans v. City
of Chicago mandates that the IIED charge is time-barred, summary
judgment is entered for Defendants on this count.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment is granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
DATE: 6/27/2012
- 14 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?