Doe v. Lansal, Inc. et al

Filing 88

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 3/5/2012:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No 08 C 5983
LANSAL, INC., d/b/a HOT MAMA’S
FOODS, and CHRIS SINENI,
Individually,

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

Defendants.

MONICA CRUZ,
Intervenor.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Monica Cruz, Intervenor (hereinafter, “Intervenor”) in this
case,

is

simultaneously

engaged

in

another

lawsuit

against

Defendant in the Northern District of Illinois (Case No. 10-5653,
the “Judge Lefkow case”). Intervenor asks this Court to modify its
protective order so that she may access discovery in this case for
use in the Judge Lefkow case.

Defendant seeks reconsideration of

this Court’s implicit finding of standing for Intervenor and argues
she has none. Alternatively, Defendant argues the protective order
should not be modified. For the following reasons, the Court finds
Intervenor
Reconsider.

does

have

standing

and

so

denies

the

Motion

to

The Court also grants Intervenor’s Motion to Modify

Protective Order, but with specific limitations.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Doe”) filed suit in October 2008 against
Defendants Lansal, Inc., (“Lansal”) and Chris Sineni (“Sineni”).
Doe started work in late 2003 at Lansal’s Illinois production
facility as a line production worker; Sineni was the Operations
Director for the facility.

Doe alleged that Sineni, between 2005

and 2008, forced her to engage in oral sex and other acts upon
threat of firing and deportation.

(Doe, at that time, was an

illegal alien.)
In gaining employment with Lansal, Doe used a fake name. When
Doe received, in January of 2008, documentation allowing her to
work in the U.S. legally, she revealed her real name to Lansal
supervisors.

Doe quit on May 8, 2008.

In the course of discovery, Doe, Lansal and Sineni agreed to
a protective order which Judge David Coar approved on May 29, 2009.
Defendants and Plaintiff settled February 12, 2010.
The protective order provided that any document, deposition,
interrogatory or information designated as “confidential” by the
parties would be subject to the protective order.

However, it

provided that only items containing the following could be, in good
faith, marked “confidential”:
(I)

Information which may be used to identify
Plaintiff, including her actual name, social
security
number,
or
other
personally
identifying information;

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(ii)

Information relating to the financial history
and status of either party;

(iii)

Medical information; or

(iv)

Information of a
sensitive nature.

personal

nature

and/or

Doe v. Lansal et al., Protective Order, Case No. 08-5983 DKT
No. 73, Page ID 995.

The order went on to provide that neither

party was prohibited from using discovery for litigation in this
case, but that “if any confidential documents will be introduced to
the public record, they must be redacted to omit identifying
information about the Plaintiff.”
order

allowed

documents.

for

the

filing

of

Id. at 995, 997.
both

restricted

Judge Coar’s
and

sealed

Lastly, the order provides that discovery may be used

“for no other purpose whatsoever” besides the litigation at issue
(id. at 994) and it provides that “either party, or an interested
member of the public, can challenge the secreting of particular
documents pursuant to this Protective Order by filing a motion with
the court.”

Id. at 996.

On

28,

August

2009,

Defendants

filed

an

exhibit

(fully

accessible by anyone with a PACER account or using a public
terminal at this courthouse) that identified the Plaintiff by the
pseudonym she used to obtain her job.

Dkt. No. 51-1.

Other

exhibits filed by Defendant listed her real home address (Dkt. 532), the full, real name of Plaintiff’s sister (Dkt. 53, Page

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ID 317), and referred to Plaintiff by her real first name (Dkt. 538, Page ID 361, line 14).
On September 23, 2009, Plaintiffs filed exhibits listing the
last four numbers of Plaintiff’s Social Security Number (Dkt. 58-2,
Page ID 420, line 12), a partial real address matching that filed
by Defendants (Dkt. 58-2, Page ID 420, lines 2-6), and the fake
name by which she obtained her job.

Id. at lines 22-24.

publicly

on

accessible

deposition

goes

to

give

The

Plaintiff’s

husband’s real first two names (Id. at Page ID 424), the real first
names and birth dates of all her children (Id. at Page ID 426-427),
the real first names of Plaintiff’s parents (Id. at 428), and
numerous other personal identifiers including places of employment,
siblings real first names and sometimes real full names.

See

generally, Dkt. 58.
Most revealing, the deposition lists Plaintiff’s real last
name in two locations.

Dkt. 58-2, Page ID 446, line 2, Dkt. 58-3,

Page ID 542, line 9.
In
revealing

that

same

numerous

deposition,
sexual

there

encounters

is

graphic

between

information

Plaintiff

and

Defendant Sineni, including allegations of forced sexual encounters
by Sineni upon Plaintiff, and allegations that Sineni had similar
interactions with Plaintiff’s sister, another Lansal employee. The
transcript and other documents also reveal that after the last
encounter between the Plaintiff and Defendant Sineni, Plaintiff
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saved the semen on her shirt, allowing her later to conclusively
prove

Sineni

lied

when

he

denied

ever

having

a

one-on-one

conversation with her, let alone a sexual encounter.
To the Court’s knowledge, neither party ever objected to the
other party’s publication of this information.
On November 3, 2011, Intervenor entered the case, seeking to
use this case’s discovery in her separate lawsuit against Defendant
and its employee, Ramon Acosta.

Judge Coar having retired, the

case was reassigned to this Court.
depositions

of

Mr.

Acosta,

Mr.

Intervenor seeks access to the
Sineni,

several

other

Lansal

employees and an expert witness regarding the Defendant’s culture
of

sexual

harassment.

Intervenor

argues

the

information

is

relevant, will promote judicial economy and will prevent the redeposing of some employees.
Plaintiff’s attorney does not object to the Intervenor in this
case being given access to discovery, provided Plaintiff’s name
remains secret.
Defendant objects that allowing parties access to discovery
would vitiate the parties’ protective agreement and cause unfair
prejudice to the company and Mr. Sineni, whose whereabouts are
currently unknown by Defendant. Defendant’s attorney represents he
never would have settled the case had there not been a protective
order, that the two cases do not stem from the exact same time
frame and that Mr. Sineni’s deposition is irrelevant.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Granting of a Motion to Reconsider is appropriate only where
there is manifest error by the Court or new evidence has come to
light. Mitchell v. JCG Indus., No. 10-C-6847, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12846 *5 (N.D. Ill. February 2, 2012).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24 and 26 give this Court
broad discretion in discovery matters and motions to intervene.
However, other factors do put limitations on that discretion, as
will be discussed below.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS
Standing

Article III standing requires an injury-in-fact capable of
being redressed by a favorable decision of the court.
Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1072-1073 (7th Cir. 2009).

Bond v.

In Bond, at the

request of a journalist third-party intervenor, the District Court
modified a protective order.
585 F.3d 1061 (2009).

The

The Seventh Circuit reversed.

Bond,

reporter, the Seventh Circuit found,

had no standing.
Bond was a new twist in a substantial line of cases that
granted intervenors’ motions to amend protective orders.

See,

e.g., Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854 (7th
Cir. 1994) (citing numerous other cases with similar outcomes).
Bond pointed out that many of those cases had not dealt with the
fundamental issue of standing, something that must come first.
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It

also highlighted the fact that, in cases that have already settled,
there

is

no

active

plaintiff

with

standing

upon

which

the

intervenor can piggyback. The Bond court found no standing for the
reporter based on a First Amendment right to receive speech,
because such a right requires a willing speaker, and neither of the
Bond parties wanted their discovery revealed.

Id. at 1078.

Bond also emphasized that discovery that has not been filed
with the court (unlike filed discovery) enjoys no presumption of
public access, and thus no right was being violated.

Id.

With no

right being violated, the reporter in Bond had no injury, and no
standing.
The Seventh Circuit differentiated Bond from a Third Circuit
case, Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (1994).

In

Pansy, the Third Circuit found standing for media organizations
seeking access to a settlement agreement.

The media in Pansy had

been unsuccessful in obtaining the requested settlement through a
separate state court Freedom of Information action because of the
federal court protective order.

Bond at 1076, n.10.

The Seventh

Circuit differentiated Pansy from Bond, noting that the intervenor
in Pansy did have some claim of right on the information, and the
protective order was interfering with that claim. “The state court
action had stalled because of the federal-court protective order;
this was enough to establish an injury-in-fact.”

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Id.

This Court finds the distinction between Pansy and Bond
instructive.

In Pansy, there was standing because there was a

claim of right, and the protective order had interfered with
attempts in another court action to exercise that right.
Likewise, here, Intervenor here has attempted to obtain the
discovery in another court case (the Lefkow case), and she alleges
she has a right (under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) to
discovery in that case. Like Pansy, efforts to exercise that right
in the other court have stalled because of this Court’s protective
order.

Intervenor has demonstrated such “stalling,” as defined by

Bond, by attaching exchanges between Intervenor and Defendant in
the Judge

Lefkow

case where

Defendant has

refused

to

answer

requests for admissions and inspections because the information
sought

“is

covered

by

a

protective

order”

in

this

case.

Intervenor’s Reply, 5-6.
Because the protective order in this case has stalled an
asserted right to discovery in another case, there is an injury-infact

as

there

was

in

Pansy

and

as

recognized

by

Bond.

Additionally, a favorable decision of this Court is capable of
redressing that injury. Therefore, the Intervenor has standing and
the

Defendant’s

Motion

to

Reconsider

Intervention is denied.

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the

Order

Granting

B.

Modification of Protective Order

Where discovery in a previous case will lighten the discovery
load in a related case, the Seventh Circuit has approved the
modification of protective orders.
Where an appropriate modification of a protective
order can place private litigants in a position they
would otherwise reach only after repetition of another's
discovery, such modification can be denied only where it
would tangibly prejudice substantial rights of the party
opposing modification.
Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980)
(allowing access to discovery by a third-party intervenor who was
suing defendant in another case in another jurisdiction.)
Just such prejudice was found in Griffith v. University
Hospital, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2001).

There, the court

denied

have

modification

because

to

do

so

would

prejudiced

plaintiffs significantly in their class action lawsuit because all
class action members had been notified of a proposed settlement
that

explicitly

included

terms

of

the

protective

order.

A

significant modification of the protective order threatened to
upend the settlement altogether. Id. at 663. Griffith reconfirmed
Wilk’s examination of whether the party opposing modification (1)
has any substantial right at stake and (2) whether modifying the
agreement would “tangibly prejudice” that right.

Id.

Recognizing that protective orders must always be grounded in
good cause, a number of cases have found modification proper when

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the parties themselves step outside the boundaries of that order.
See Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854 (7th Cir
1994) (allowing modification of a discovery order after a deponent
had made comments on the same topic in a public forum).
Where parties fail to file protected materials under seal, or
display

protected

materials

in

hearings

without

closing

the

courtroom, they can also waive their confidentiality interest. See
Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., No. 97-8311, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76203, *16-18 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2006);

see also Binney &

Smith Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., No. 94-6882 *6, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3151 (N.D. Ill. March 13, 1995) (quoting Littlejohn v. Bic
Corporation, 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988).
In the case before this Court, both parties have demonstrated
broad abandonment of their protective agreement. This Court, using
the information publicly filed by both parties, was able to find
the full name and address of the party supposedly protected by the
order.

Moreover, “sensitive” and “personal” information that the

order was supposed to protect was laid out for all the world to see
in filings for summary judgment and fact admissions filed by both
parties.
The Court does not lightly discount the substantial reliance
parties place on protective orders.

Such orders are often a

vehicle to full and effective discovery.

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However, where the

parties themselves disregard the order, it is a strong indication
that there is no longer good cause for that order.
The Court also appreciates the argument that Mr. Sineni cannot
be reached, and that Lansal would not have settled but for the
protective

order.

However,

counsel

for

Lansal

adequately

represented Mr. Sineni in opposing this motion, and to the extent
Defendant argues for Lansal’s and Mr. Sineni’s rights in protecting
“sensitive”

and

“personal”

information,

this

argument

is

unpersuasive given the ad nauseam public listing of Sineni’s sexual
exploits at the facility.

That cat is not only already out of the

bag, but it has left the building, boarded a train that has left
the station and connected with a sailed ship.
The wholesale violation of the agreement, by both parties, and
their failure to object to such violations for more than two years
and counting has already modified the agreement.
The Court is also persuaded by Intervenor’s argument that
much, if not all, of what she seeks has been filed with this court
and not as private exchanges between the parties.

As Bond noted,

that weighs in favor of access.
Wilk

further

weighs

in

favor

of

modification

because

Intervenor has averred that, at least in some cases, access to
discovery will avoid duplicating depositions and a waste of both
litigants’ and judicial resources. While we doubt the defendant in
the Judge Lefkow case, Mr. Acosta, will not be redeposed, that

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seems a distinct possibility with the three other employees and the
expert witness named.
The Court is also not persuaded that some items sought, such
as Sineni’s deposition, have no relevance. Although the two cases’
time frames are not exactly equivalent, Intervenor has averred that
Sineni was the plant manager during her employment.

It would seem

that Sineni’s testimony, as the supervisor of the entire plant,
would be relevant, even if only from a culture-of-the-facility
standpoint.

Moreover,

Sineni’s

professed

unavailability

only

further weighs in favor of allowing access to such discovery.
However,

because

Intervenor’s

standing

in

this

case

is

grounded in her right to discovery in the Judge Lefkow case, it is
up to that court to decide relevance matters.

Thus, this Court

orders no immediate production of discovery items.

Rather, it

orders the protective order in this case modified to the extent
that Judge Lefkow should consider it no bar whatsoever to orders of
discovery in her case.

Any discovery Judge Lefkow may order in

that case concerning this case’s discovery items may be carried out
without the parties having to return to this court.
IV.
Because

the

Court

CONCLUSION

finds

Intervenor

has

standing,

the

Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider is denied.
Because both Plaintiff and Defendants have already violated
their own protective order without complaint for more than two

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years, the Court finds that confidentiality interests held by them
were waived, and as such will not be substantially prejudiced by
granting access to Intervenor. The Motion to Modify the Protective
Order is granted to the extent that Judge Lefkow should not view
the order as any bar whatsoever to discovery in her case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
DATE: 3/5/2012

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