DeBartolo v. United Union of Laborers

Filing 131

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 1/24/2012. Mailed notice(yp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DR. HANSEL M. DeBARTOLO,
Plaintiff,
v.
HEALTH AND WELFARE
DEPARTMENT OF THE
CONSTRUCTION AND GENERAL
LABORERS’ DISTRICT COUNCIL
OF CHICAGO AND VICINITY,
Defendant.

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09 CV 0039
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Supplemental Attorney’s Fees and
Costs [Doc. No. 121]. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United
States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons stated
below, Defendant’s Motion is granted.

BACKGROUND
Previously this Court awarded fees to Defendant based on the work its
attorneys performed in the case up until August 23, 2010 and explained that there
was “no doubt that the Defendant achieved ‘some degree of success on the merits’1as
[summary judgment was decided] in the Defendant’s favor on all of the Plaintiff’s
claims.” Mem. Op. & Order [Doc. No. 90, p. 2]. Additionally, this Court determined
that an award of attorney’s fees was warranted because Plaintiff’s lawsuit was not
substantially justified.2 [Id. pp. 7-10]. This analysis remains sound. Defendant’s
instant motion seeks fees based upon work performed in the case after August 23,
2010. The work includes time spent complying with Local Rule 54.3, compelling the
production of various settlement agreements, preparing the initial fee petition and
corresponding memoranda, preparing a revised billing statement, moving to amend
the Court’s April 18, 2011 order, enforcing the initial fee award, responding to

Under Section 502(g) of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act
(ERISA) in an action by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary, "the court in its discretion
may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C.§ 1132
(g)(1). In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the Supreme Court recently
interpreted ERISA’s fee shifting provision, holding that a court may award fees to an
ERISA litigant if they have achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” Hardt v.
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2157-2158 (2010).
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As explained in this Court’s March 28, 2011 order, this circuit has recognized two
tests for analyzing whether attorney fees should be awarded to a party in an ERISA case.
Mem. Op. & Order [Doc. No. 90, pp. 2-5]; Lowe v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 361 F.3d 335, 339 (7th
Cir. 2004). “In any event, both tests essentially ask the same question: ‘was the losing
party’s position substantially justified and taken in good faith, or was that party simply out
to harass its opponent?’” Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 161 F.3d 472, 478 (7th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Hooper v. Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287, 294 (7th Cir. 1994)), quoted in Kolbe
& Kolbe Health & Welfare Benefit Plan v. Medical Coll. of Wis., Inc., 657 F.3d 496, 506 (7th
Cir. 2011).
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Plaintiff’s motion to quash, responding to Plaintiff’s motion to bar the instant
motion, and preparing the instant motion.
DISCUSSION
The district court has considerable discretion in determining the appropriate
amount of a fee award. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Spegon
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1999). The fee applicant
has the burden to demonstrate to the Court that their attorneys’ hourly rates and
time expenditures are reasonable. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. “In determining the
reasonable number of hours, [a] court should exclude hours that are ‘excessive,
redundant or otherwise unnecessary.’” Small v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments
Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434) quoted in
Brown v. Patelco Credit Union, No. 09 C 5393, 2011 WL 4375865, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 20, 2011). A court “may adjust the fee award upward or downward, depending
on a variety of factors,” Brown, 2011 WL 4375865, at *2, including the time and
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the legal skill required,
reputation of the attorneys, and awards in similar cases. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at
430 n.3.
“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.”
Id. at 437. However, in awarding fees, courts will not exclude fees incurred by a
party in negotiating and litigating their claim to attorney’s fees. Holmstrom v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 07 C 6044, 2011 WL 2149353, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 31,
2011). “The basic public policy underlying § 1132(g) of the Act, as expressed by the
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Senate Labor Committee, is to ‘discourage delinquencies and simplify delinquency
collection’ with the intent of ‘promoting the prompt payment of contributions and
assisting plans in recovering the costs incurred in connection with delinquencies.’
Iron Workers Mid-America Pension Fund v. Imperial Glass Structures, Inc., No. 92
C 6380, 1993 WL 372203, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 1993) (quoting Staff of Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. S. 1076, the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments of 1980, Summary and Analysis of
Consideration (Comm. Print 1980) at pp. 43-44). Thus, “an award of attorney’s fees
incurred in litigating fees would only promote the underlying public policy and
intent of § 1132(g) of the Act.” Id. In non-ERISA actions, fees incurred in time spent
litigating claims to fees have commonly been granted as well. See, e.g., Bond v.
Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1980) (awarding fees incurred in time spent
litigating fees in an action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
Here, Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s hourly rates, and therefore the
Court is primarily concerned with the amount of time that Defendant claims it
spent on each billable task to determine the reasonableness of the hours reported.
Defendant maintains that the supplemental fees sought are reasonable and fully
compensable; Plaintiff argues that the hours submitted by Defendant are untimely
sought, based on claims upon which Defendant did not prevail, based upon activity
upon which Plaintiff had no control, and/or excessive.

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A.

Timeliness
Plaintiff argues that a substantial portion of the fees that Defendant is

currently seeking–including the hours Defendant spent preparing its initial fee
petition (and accompanying memoranda), and complying with Local Rule
54.3–could have been, but was not, sought in Defendant’s initial fee petition filed on
December 27, 2010 or Defendant’s revised billing statement filed on April 8, 2011.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s failure to include the hours in the initial fee
petition or revised billing statement yields the conclusion that fees for those hours
should be denied.
Local Rule 54.3 defines “fee motion” as “a motion, complaint or any other
pleading seeking only an award of attorney’s fees and related nontaxable expenses.”
L.R. 54.3(a)(1). In terms of timing, the rule states that “[u]nless the court’s order
includes a different schedule for such filing, the [fee] motion shall be filed in
accordance with the provisions of this rule and shall be filed and served no later
than 91 days after the entry of the judgment or settlement agreement on which the
motion is founded.” L.R. 54.3(b). Additionally, the rule provides that “[t]he movant
shall provide the respondent with [time and work records] within 21 days of the
judgment or settlement agreement upon which the motion is based.” L.R. 54.3(d)(4).
In its first motion for attorney’s fees [Doc. No. 73], Defendant treated the Court’s
entry of summary judgment as the triggering event or the “entry of the judgment . .
. on which the motion is founded.” This is understandable, but it required that the
motion establishing that Defendant was entitled to fees and the motion explaining
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precisely what fees were due be one and the same.
Ideally, in cases like this one where the “judgment” does not automatically
entitle one party to fees, the party seeking such fees should move to establish that it
is entitled to them after the entry of the relevant judgment. Then, the order
granting that motion serves as the triggering event upon which the “fee motion”
contemplated by Local Rule 54.3 is based. Had Defendant taken this approach, the
content of its fee motion would have been more clerical than substantive, the length
of its memoranda quite short and the work taken to prepare it quite limited.
Furthermore, it would have been simple for Defendant to include the hours spent
on the motion establishing that it was entitled to fees (and the motion’s
accompanying memoranda) in the materials Defendant provided to Plaintiff during
the negotiations required by Local Rule 54.3(d). As it happened, however,
Defendant’s conflation of the two motions resulted in a rather lengthy and
substantive motion that required a significant number of hours of work and
Defendant’s arguably hypertechnical compliance with Local Rule 54.3(d) kept
Defendant from submitting hours that it had incurred after August 23, 2010.3
Even if one followed the “ideal” route, a party could determine that strict
compliance with Local Rule 54.3(d) prevents the submission of hours spent preparing the
fee motion. However if the fee motion is a typical fee motion, the time required to prepare it
should be minimal. See Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting that “1.6 hours billed to the preparation for an award of attorney’s fees was
reasonable in light of the approximately 140 hours of time the attorneys spent litigating the
merits of the case.”). Accordingly, in their Local Rule 54.3 negotiations, reasonable parties
should be able to account for this time even if it includes work that takes place after the
judgment on which the motion is founded. If the parties are not so reasonable, they may
seek instruction from the Court. It is worth nothing that, for the most part, the
requirements of Local Rule 54.3(d) did not apply to the instant motion as the Court waived
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Defendant’s approach, followed to its logical end, all but guarantees that
“litigation will be like a nest of Chinese boxes.” Muscare v. Quinn, 680 F.2d 42, 44
(7th Cir. 1982). “The outside box is the litigation of the [merits]. Within it is the
litigation over the fees incurred in the litigation over the merits. . . . Within the
initial fee litigation will be another litigation . . . over the attorneys’ fees incurred by
[the party] in the initial fee litigation. And so on without necessary end.” Id. That
being said, the Muscare court did not hold that requests such as Defendant’s are per
se improper; the court merely explained that “the district court had discretion to
deny the plaintiff’s second fee request.” Id. at 45. In these situations, the court’s
attention should be directed “to the question of the reasonableness of a second
award in light of all the circumstances of the case.” Id. at 44. Plaintiff provides no
compelling reason as to why Defendant’s approach was especially harmful in this
case, and Defendant was forthright about its approach from the time it filed its first
motion for fees: “Defendant also seeks an additional award of attorney’s fees and
costs incurred after August 23, 2010 on the motion for fees and Rule 11 motion,
support for which will be submitted in a supplemental motion if the Court grants
Defendant’s motions.” (Def.’s Mot. Atty’s Fees & Costs, p. 2.) Plaintiff made no
objection, and the Court followed Defendant’s lead as well.
Additionally, Defendant has made clear that it does not intend to seek
additional fees for the amount of time it spent replying to Plaintiff’s response to the

compliance with Local Rule 54.3(d) in its July 12, 2011 order.

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instant motion; such a stance indicates to the Court that Defendant is drawing a
reasonable line in the sand and is attempting to arrest the “Chinese box” problem at
its present iteration. Finally, while Defendant’s approach might present a unique
harm in many cases–i.e., the needless extension of litigation–that is not the case
here. Even had its approach mirrored the Court’s suggested route, Defendant could
still have justifiably moved for fees based upon the hours it incurred enforcing the
initial fee award. The claim for fees would be lower (though the earlier fee award
might have been higher), but a version of the instant motion would be before the
Court nonetheless. The Defendant’s segmented approach to fees in this case is
certainly awkward, but denial of Defendant’s motion on grounds of timeliness is
improper.
B.

Success on Claims
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s supplemental fee petition seeks attorney’s

fees on claims on which Defendant did not prevail. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains
that the instant motion seeks fees for 94.73 hours of work associated with
Defendant’s unsuccessful motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and Rule 37.
Plaintiff is mistaken. Defendant is correct in pointing out that Plaintiff is relying on
the billing statements Defendant sent to him on May 31, 2011 as part of the Local
Rule 54.3 process and not the billing statements that Defendant filed for purposes
of this motion. The “operational” billing statements differ from the May 31, 2011
billing statements in two ways: (1) they add fees incurred after May 31, 2011; and
(2) they remove $29,146.25 in fees Defendant incurred litigating its unsuccessful
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Rule 11 and failure to comply motions.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant did not prevail in its motion to amend
[Doc. No. 96]. Plaintiff is mistaken. The Court’s April 18, 2011 order held that the
Court would “not entertain a second fee petition at this late stage.” (April 18, 2011
minute order.) Defendant then moved to amend the Court’s order. [Doc. No. 96.]
The Court granted Defendant’s motion and held that it would allow the Defendant
to seek supplemental fees. [Doc. No. 98.] The supplemental fee petition does not
include any fees incurred litigating issues on which Defendant did not prevail.
C.

Responsibility
Plaintiff claims that he should not be responsible for fees Defendant incurred

litigating issues over which he had no control or that were due to Defendant’s
neglect. Defendant maintains that it is not required to show that Plaintiff directly
caused Defendant to incur fees to receive compensation for those fees. Both parties’
arguments have some merit, but it is easier to evaluate the parties’ positions in
context.
1.

Defendant’s motion to amend

As is mentioned above, the Court’s April 18, 2011 order held that the Court
would “not entertain a second fee petition at this late stage.” (April 18, 2011 minute
order.) Defendant then filed a motion to amend that order, [Doc. No. 96] and was
successful. [Doc. No. 98.] Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit that lacked substantial
justification. As is the case in all lawsuits, it was very likely that Defendant would
perform some work in response to an adverse holding of the Court. Plaintiff cannot
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avoid all responsibility for the fees incurred performing such work simply because
he was not the direct cause of it. At some point, of course, the substance or amount
of a party’s work in response to a Court order may become unreasonable, but the
substance of Defendant’s motion to amend was not unreasonable, and the amount of
time Defendant spent working on it will be evaluated in Section D, infra.
2.

responding to Plaintiff’s motion to quash citation

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s motion to amend the court’s April 18, 2011
order left Plaintiff no choice but to file a motion challenging the finality of that
order. This argument lacks merit. Even though Defendant used the wrong vehicle to
move for reconsideration of the Court’s order, the Court’s granting of Defendant’s
motion to amend did not affect the finality of the order. Plaintiff was not forced to
move to quash the citation, and is responsible for the reasonable fees Defendant
incurred in responding to Plaintiff’s motion to quash.
3.

responding to Plaintiff’s motion to bar

Plaintiff argues that since Defendant did not purchase and send him a
transcript of the May 10, 2011 hearing to demonstrate that the Local Rule 54.3
process had been reset, then Plaintiff is not responsible for the time Defendant
spent responding to Plaintiff’s motion. As Defendant explains, it is not responsible
for ensuring the accuracy of the facts underlying Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff could
have accepted the word of Defendant’s attorney who told him about what had
happened during the May 10, 2011 hearing, and Plaintiff could have purchased a

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transcript of the hearing himself. Instead, Plaintiff litigated the matter with
incomplete information and lost. Plaintiff is now responsible for the reasonable fees
Defendant incurred responding to Plaintiff’s motion to bar.
4.

Defendant’s revised billing statement

The Court’s March 28, 2011 order commanded Defendant to file a revised
billing statement. Mem. Op. & Order [Doc. No. 90, p. 31]. Defendant now seeks fees
based on the time it spent preparing the revised billing statement. Plaintiff argues
that the only reason Defendant was ordered to prepare a revised billing statement
was because it overreached in the first place. The Court agrees. Although Plaintiff
need not have been the direct cause of the incursion of fees for Defendant to receive
compensation for them, it is not the case that any of the work performed by
Defendant is compensable. Here, the revision was ordered because of the
excessiveness of Defendant’s initial fee request. It cannot be that Defendant may
recoup fees it incurred preparing a fee petition that overreached and preparing the
billing statement that repaired the overreaching.4 In cutting Defendant’s excessive
and duplicative fees, the Court did not intend to provide Defendant with an avenue
to more fees. Plaintiff is not responsible for the fees Defendant incurred revising its
billing statement.
Defendant’s logic might actually reward the preparation of invalid billing
statements or fee requests in some circumstances. Imagine a scenario where the court
dutifully evaluates a party’s billing statement and finds that 4.25 hours of work (billed at
$300 per hour) are duplicative. The court orders a revised billing statement and the party
requests 6 hours in fees at $300 per hour based on its work revising the billing statement.
If the fees are rewarded, it is as if the party has made $525 by including duplicative entries
in its initial billing statement, an unacceptable result.
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D.

Excessiveness
Plaintiff argues that the supplemental petition should be denied in its

entirety based upon outrageous unreasonability; alternatively, Plaintiff argues that
the amount of time Defendant spent on most of its tasks is excessive. Plaintiff’s lead
argument is not compelling. The “[t]otal denial of requested fees . . . is a stringent
sanction, to be reserved for only the most severe of situations, and appropriately
invoked only in very limited circumstances.” Jordan v. United States Dept. of
Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1982) quoted in Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co.,
789 F.2d 540, 550 (7th Cir. 1986). The refusal of a fee award “is an appropriate
sanction for requesting an award that is not merely excessive, but so exorbitant as
to constitute an abuse of the process of the court asked to make the award.” Budget
Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Consol. Equity LLC, 428 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 2005).
This is not a case where Defendant’s request constitutes an abuse of the process of
this Court, and Plaintiff fails to explain how any of the individual requests
Defendant has made are outrageously excessive given the work that has been
performed.
Plaintiff’s argument in the alternative is more persuasive. After determining
a reasonable rate, “a court must then look to the reasonableness of the hours
expended on the litigation.” Torgerson v. Arrow Fin. Serv., No. 06 C 6032, 2007 WL
1941752, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 2007). While the Court had some trouble arriving
at the same figures as Defendant, the Court finds that the hours claimed by
Defendant in the instant motion are accurate in that they reasonably reflect the
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hours recorded in Defendant’s billing statements. That being said, some of the
hours are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary and will be excluded. See
Small, 264 F.3d at 708.
1.

the first fee petition

The Court recognizes Defendant’s efforts in complying with Local Rule 54.3,
compelling the production of settlement documents, drafting its motion for fees and
its accompanying memoranda and understands that Plaintiff’s obstinance likely
increased the number of hours Defendant spent working on these tasks; however,
159.55 hours5 is unreasonable. Defendant explains that the Local Rule 54.3 process
involved assembling and revising bills, trying to work with opposing counsel to
identify objections, and responding to opposing counsel’s objections. The assembly
and revision of bills was required for Defendant’s fee petition; the hours spent
preparing the billing statements should not be counted twice.6 Similarly, the work
done in order to respond to opposing counsel’s objections and prepare the joint
statement was, to a significant extent, required for the preparation of Defendant’s

This number includes 33.9 hours complying with Local Rule 54.3 for Defendant’s
initial fee petition, 8.6 hours spent attempting to secure Plaintiff’s compliance with the
Court’s orders concerning the production of settlement agreements, 73.4 hours spent
assembling the initial fee petition, and 43.65 hours spent replying to Plaintiff’s response to
the initial fee petition.
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The Court is not suggesting that Defendant did double these hours; instead the
point is that the Defendant’s explanation for the number of hours spent on various tasks
does not justify the number of hours claimed.
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memorandum of law in support of its first motion for fees. Additionally, the billing
statements suggest that the time spent actually working with opposing counsel was
very limited. As such, the Court finds that Defendant’s could have reasonably spent
no more than eight hours complying with Local Rule 54.3 for its first fee petition.
Defendant explains that the Court should award attorney’s fees for time
spent attempting to secure Plaintiff’s compliance with the Court’s orders concerning
the production of settlement agreements. According to Defendant’s motion, this
work included asking Plaintiff to provide the agreements on four occasions, and
filing a motion to compel. The time spent asking Plaintiff to produce the agreements
could not reasonably amount to more than one hour’s worth of time. The motion to
compel also served as a motion for instructions and was partially denied. The
content of the motion amounted to three pages and merely explained to the Court
that Defendant had asked Plaintiff to produce the settlement agreements; in other
words, the motion was very short, very simple and could not have reasonably taken
Defendant more than two hours.
The assembly of Defendant’s fee petition obviously required a significant
amount of work, but 73.4 hours is excessive. Presumably, drafting the
memorandum of law in support of the motion for fees is where the bulk of this time
was spent. The memorandum is of moderate length, but the content is not at all
complex: the issues in it are neither unique nor novel. A reasonable amount of time
for the assembly of the first fee petition is twenty hours.
Defendant requests fees for the 43.65 hours it spent replying to Plaintiff’s
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response to the first motion for fees. This amount is excessive as well. The reply
repeats much of the information laid out in Defendant’s initial memorandum in
support of its motion for fees, it is shorter in length, and while some of the issues
are arguably new, they are straightforward and relatively simple. Additionally,
almost three of the reply’s thirteen pages are dedicated to an issue that Defendants
claimed was irrelevant. Billing for more than eight hours on such a memorandum
would be unreasonable.
2.

the motion to amend

Defendant maintains that the Court should issue a fee award that includes
fees for the 28.15 hours Defendant spent preparing and arguing its motion to
amend the Court’s April 18, 2011 order. This amount is also excessive. The time
spent actually arguing the motion (and waiting to argue in court, and even traveling
to and from court) was not more than one hour. The motion itself was only eight
pages, nearly four of which merely recounted the events that had led to the Court’s
April 18, 2011 order. The remainder of the motion arguably included some content
that was novel, but it was not complicated. A reasonable amount of time for the
preparation and argument on Defendant’s motion to amend is four hours.
3.

enforcement of the first fee award

Defendant requests fees based on the work it did attempting to collect the
initial fee award. Defendant explains that it spent 19.8 hours researching Illinois
Fraudulent Transfer Act, investigating Plaintiff’s assets and transfers of assets, and
preparing for and initiating post-judgment proceedings, and that it spent 27.1 hours
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responding to Plaintiff’s motion to quash the citation to discover assets. Both
amounts are excessive. Defendant’s research and investigation should not have
taken more than five hours, and the “preparation and initiation of post-judgment
proceedings,” so far as the Court can tell, consists of the issuance of a citation to
discover assets, the work in support of which might take one hour. Defendant’s sixpage response to Plaintiff’s motion to quash the citation did require Defendant to
parse federal and state law on the issue of judgment finality, but little research and
analysis were required. The work spent preparing the response and appearing in
court should have been no more than six hours.
4.

responding to the motion to bar

Defendant requests fees based on the 10.4 hours it spent responding to
Plaintiff’s motion to bar. The amount is excessive. The response is three pages and
the sur-reply another one page, and the briefs simply explain that the Court reset
the Local Rule 54.3 process on May 10, 2011. The work spent responding the
Plaintiff’s motion to bar could not have reasonably exceeded two hours.
5.

the second fee petition

Defendant contends that the Court should award it 12.75 hours for complying
with Local Rule 54.3 for its supplemental fee petition, and 56.9 hours for work spent
preparing the motion for supplemental attorney’s fees and its accompanying
memorandum of law. These amounts are excessive. Assembling and revising billing
statements, preparing a statement concerning the requested fees and sending those
documents to Plaintiff should not have taken more than four hours. For its motion
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and supporting memorandum, Defendant was obligated to present evidence
reflecting the fees it has incurred, but the bulk of the memorandum consists of
Defendant recounting what its counsel has spent its time doing since August 23,
2010, an annoying task perhaps, but not a difficult one. The work spent preparing
the instant motion and its accompanying memorandum could not have reasonably
exceeded twelve hours.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion for Supplemental Attorney’s Fees
and Costs [Doc. No. 121] is granted. The amount of fees will be determined upon the
filing of Defendant’s revised billing statement. The statement shall be filed within
fourteen (14) days of this Order and shall be consistent with this Order.
Specifically, in its revisions, the amount of time spent on the aforementioned tasks
is not to exceed seventy-three (73) hours. This includes eight (8) hours for
compliance with Local Rule 54.3 for the first fee petition; three (3) hours for seeking
Plaintiff’s compliance with Court orders; twenty (20) hours for the preparation of
the first motion for attorney’s fees; eight (8) hours for the reply brief; four (4) hours
on the motion to amend; six (6) hours for Defendant’s collection efforts; six (6) hours
for responding to the motion to quash; two (2) hours for responding to the motion to
bar; four (4) hours for compliance with Local Rule 54.3 for the second fee petition;
and twelve (12) hours for preparing the instant motion. As to each task, the
individual who carried the laboring oar is the attorney whose time is compensable.
Defendant is also entitled to costs in the amount of $1,080.18.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED:

DATE: January 24, 2011

___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge

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