Moore et al v. Pogue et al

Filing 136

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 3/29/2013: Mailed notice(etv, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
GERIAN STEVEN MOORE, and
GEORGE PROVIDENCE II,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE WATSON, President of Chicago
State University, and ERMA BROOKS
WILLIAMS, Associate President for
Communications and External Relations,
in their official capacities
Defendants.

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No. 09 C 0701
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs, Gerian Steven Moore (“Moore”), a former professor at Chicago State University
(“University”), and George Providence II (“Providence”), a former student at the University and
editor of its student newspaper, brought suit alleging that Defendants had violated the First
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Illinois College Campus Press Act
(“ICCPA”). Both Plaintiffs’ claims survived summary judgment, but the court concluded they were
not entitled to a money damages award. See Moore v. Watson, 738 F. Supp. 2d 817 (N.D. Ill.
2010). Following a bench trial, this court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff Moore only. See
Moore v. Watson, 838 F. Supp. 2d 735 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Moore has now filled his bill of costs and
petitions for an award of attorneys’ fees. Defendants acknowledge their liability for fees expended
in obtaining a successful result, and for costs, but contend that Moore has overstated the amount
to which he is entitled. For the reasons explained here, Plaintiff’s motion [112] is granted in part
and denied in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case began more than four years ago and has cost hundreds of thousands of dollars
in legal fees. (Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Att’y’s Fees and Costs [114], (hereinafter “Pl.’s Mem.”),

at 1, 22.) Plaintiffs filed their complaint on February 3, 2009, alleging that Defendants violated their
rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Illinois College
Campus Press Act, and seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and money damages.
(Compl. [1], at 1, 8.) Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Moore–a faculty member at Chicago State
University–was terminated in retaliation for his refusal to censor the student newspaper, Tempo,
which had published a series of news stories critical of the University administration. (Id. at 2-7.)
Plaintiffs alleged further that the University took action to shut down the paper. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff
Providence was the student editor of that publication. (Id. at 2.) Publication of Tempo ceased, and
Providence withdrew from the University, citing harassment by University officials. Watson, 738
F. Supp. 2d at 820. The complaint sought a declaration that Moore’s termination and Defendants’
interference with the publication of Tempo violated the First Amendment and ICCPA. (Compl. at 8.)
The complaint also sought Moore’s reinstatement, back pay, and an injunction prohibiting further
interference with the publication of Tempo. (Id. at 8.)
By November 2009, discovery had concluded and the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. On September 7, 2010, this court denied Plaintiffs’ motion, and Defendants’
motion was denied in part. See Moore v. Watson, 738 F. Supp. 2d 817. Significantly, the court
permitted all of Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed to trial, but money damages were barred. Id. at 835.
In May 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Memorandum on Appropriate Equitable Remedies (hereinafter
“Remedies Memo”) expanding on the relief requested in the complaint. (See Remedies Memo
[98].) The Remedies Memo requested declarations that the Defendants’ attempts at prior review
of Tempo violated the First Amendment and ICCPA; that suspending publication of Tempo was
unlawful; that Moore’s removal as the faculty advisor to Tempo and his termination violated the First
Amendment and ICCPA; that Defendants’ “public relations protocol” violated the First Amendment
and ICCPA; that by withdrawing financial support, removing Tempo’s business manger position,
and refusing to support the continued operation of Tempo, Defendants violated the First
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Amendment and ICCPA; and that Providence’s resignation as editor of Tempo, and withdrawal from
the University, were the result of harassment and the censure of Tempo. (Id. at 1-13.) The memo
also requested that the court issue an injunction against (a) Defendants’ prior review of the paper;
(b) the suspension, restriction, and interference with the publication of Tempo; and (c) enforcement
of Defendants’ public relations protocol. Plaintiffs further sought reinstatement of Tempo and the
business manager position; Moore’s reinstatement; Providence’s readmission to the University and
reinstatement as editor of Tempo; and removal of all negative information from Plaintiffs’ files. (Id.)
In March 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ICCPA claims. That motion
remained pending when the case proceeded to trial on April 11, 2011. Both Plaintiffs testified, as
did three other witnesses, and the parties introduced numerous exhibits. On March 13, 2012, this
court entered a judgment in favor of Plaintiff Moore. See Moore v. Watson, 838 F. Supp. 2d 735.
The court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss the ICCPA claims, but determined that Moore could
only be granted relief pursuant to the First Amendment. Id. at 755, 763. The court declared that
Moore’s termination was a violation of the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, and ordered
Defendants to reinstate Moore with all negative material regarding his termination expunged from
his record. Id. at 763. Although the court declared that Moore’s termination violated Providence’s
First Amendment rights, the court declined to grant any of the other relief pertaining to Providence.
Id.
Plaintiff Moore now seeks $2,542.48 in costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1920; and $240,336.11 in
attorney’s fees for 630.2 total hours of work by three attorneys, plus a thirty-percent upward
adjustment under 42 U.S.C. 1988.
DISCUSSION
I.

Attorney’s Fees
A prevailing party in a civil rights action is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees.

County of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 578 (1986) (fee awards encourage meritorious
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claims); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984). There is a strong presumption that the
lodestar is a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542 (2010);
Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 1995). The lodestar is calculated by
multiplying the reasonable number of hours by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The inquiry into what is a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees does not
end, however, with a calculation of the lodestar, which may be adjusted in some circumstances.
Sottoriva v. Claps, 617 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927 (7th Cir.
2012).
A.

Plaintiff as Prevailing Party

The Seventh Circuit held in Sottoriva that plaintiffs are “prevailing parties” for the purpose
of attorney’s fees “if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” 617 F.3d at 975. In this case, Plaintiff Moore was
reinstated and his personnel file purged of all negative comments. Further, the court declared that
Moore’s removal and termination violated the First Amendment. Plaintiff believes he succeeded
on significant issues when the court ordered Defendants to reinstatement him and expunge his
employment records. (Pl.’s Mem. at 7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff argues, he is entitled to his full
requested fees and costs. See Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir.
2009) (fee award should not be reduced because judgment amount obtained was less than what
plaintiff originally sought or because fees were greater than amount plaintiff recovered so long as
there is a more than nominal award).
Defendants see the circumstances differently. Plaintiff was not granted relief pursuant to
ICCPA itself, they note, and was not granted much of the relief requested in the complaint or in the
Remedies Memo. (Defs.’ Objection to Pl.’s Mot. [123] (hereinafter “Defs.’Mem.”), at 6.) Defendants
point out that Plaintiff’s complaint and the Remedies Memo requested wide-ranging injunctive and
declaratory relief and money damages, yet the court ordered only limited injunctive and declaratory
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relief. (Id.) This limited success justifies a significant downward departure from the lodestar,
Defendants urge. (Id. at 6, 17-20.) Defendants also object to particular time entries from Plaintiff’s
lawyers that they claim are insufficiently specific, unrelated to the successful claims, or duplicative.
Plaintiff resists any reduction from his claimed fees and urges that a downward departure
for partial success is not appropriate. In fact, Plaintiff urges, the court should increase the award
beyond the lodestar. (Pl.’s Mem. at 22.) Plaintiff argues that Hensley factors weigh in favor of
awarding his attorneys a thirty-percent lodestar increase. In arguing for this result, Plaintiff asks
the court to recognize, among other things, that he brought an “undesirable” case which involved
difficult and novel legal and factual issues; that his attorneys provided the majority of their services
to Plaintiff on a contingency basis; and that his attorneys are of distinguished experience,
reputation, and ability. (Id. at 14-21.)
The court recognizes that Defendants have engaged in a line-by-line analysis of the fees
billed by Plaintiff’s attorneys. The court acknowledges, further, that Plaintiff not did receive all of
the relief he requested. In this case, however, Plaintiff’s First Amendment and ICCPA claims and
the various requests for relief involve the same operative facts and controlling legal principles. As
explained below, the court concludes that some of the Hensley factors favor a lodestar reduction
while others do not. Ultimately, an award based on the lodestar is appropriate, utilizing the hours
and rates outlined below, with no additional adjustment.
B.

Calculation of the Lodestar
1.

Hourly Rates

Defendants have challenged the billing rates claimed by Plaintiff’s attorneys as excessive.
(Defs.’ Mem. at 8.) Plaintiff argues that the rates charged by his attorneys were reasonable based
on their skill, experience, and the rates paid other civil rights attorneys in the Chicago legal market.
(Pl.’s Mem. 8, 10.) The requested hourly rates for his attorneys are:
Roma J. Stewart

(admitted in 1972)
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$450

Stephen Stern
Madeleine S. Podesta

(admitted in 1977)
(admitted in 2007)

$350
$275

(Pl.’s Mem. at 22.) Roma J. Stewart was admitted to the bar in 1972. (Stewart Aff. [114-4] ¶ 3-4.)
Through she has provided no copies of retainer agreements, Stewart’s affidavit states that she bills
her clients between $0 and $400 per hour. (Id. ¶ 29.) The highest attorney’s fees rate awarded
Stewart was $300 per hour by the Illinois Human Rights Commission in 2003. (Id. ¶ 27.) Stephen
Stern was admitted to the bar in 1977. (Stern Aff. [114-4] ¶ 1.) Judge Castillo approved a billing
rate of $275 for Stern in August 2004. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Stern offers no evidence of his current billing
rate. Madeleine S. Podesta was admitted to the bar in 2007. (Podests Aff. [114-4] ¶ 3.) Podesta
has provided an affidavit from a partner from the law firm that employs her stating that the firm bills
its clients $275 per hour for her work. (Burke Aff. [114-5] ¶ 4.)
Plaintiff has submitted no other evidence of his attorneys’ billing rates, but does present
affidavits from two civil rights attorneys attesting that the rates for Stewart and Stern are
reasonable. (Gonzalez Aff. [114-5] ¶ 4-8; Lee Aff. [114-5] ¶ 13-15.) Plaintiff includes the affidavit
of David L. Lee, a hearing officer for the Cook County Commission on Human Rights and sole
practitioner who specializes in civil rights litigation. Lee states that the rates sought by Stewart and
Stern are “below market, as the rate is less than the rates charged by other practitioners of similar
experience in the employment field in the Illinois legal community.” (Lee Aff. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff also
includes an affidavit from Richard J. Gonzalez, a Clinical Professor who practices exclusively
employment law within the Chicago Kent College of Law Legal Clinic, who stated that the rates
sought by Stewart and Stern represent “normal and customary rates for attorneys of their
experience and competence levels within the Chicago area for lawyers handling civil rights cases.”
(Gonzalez Aff. ¶ 8.)
Though it is not controlling in the Seventh Circuit, Plaintiff also references the Laffey Matrix
created by the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, as well as various

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Northern District cases where Plaintiff argues the Laffey Matrix has been approved, either expressly
or implicitly. (Pl.’s Mem. at 8.) Under the Laffey Matrix for 2008-2011, the suggested hourly rate
is $475 for twenty or more years of experience, $420 for eleven to nineteen years of experience,
$335 for eight to ten years of experience, $275 for four to seven years of experience, and $240 for
one to three years of experience. (Laffey Matrix [114-6] at 1.) Without adjusting for geographical
differences in pay, Plaintiff argues, the rates sought for his attorneys are less than, or equal, to the
Laffey Matrix presumptions. (Pl.’s Mem. at 5-7, 10.)
Defendants counter that Plaintiff’s attorneys fees are excessive. Defendant propose the
following rates:
Roma J. Stewart
Stephen Stern
Madeleine S. Podesta

$325
$300
$200

(Defs.’ Mem. at 8, 10.) Defendants urge that the rates sought by Plaintiff’s attorneys reflect a
“premium” as opposed to a “true average” of what has been paid by previous clients in similar civil
rights cases. (Id.)
Plaintiff is not required to establish a “true average” rate. The presumptive hourly rate is the
actual billing rate the attorney typically receives for similar litigation. Pickett v. Sheridan Health
Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011). There are situations where an attorney has little
evidence of his or her established market rate, for example, where the attorney most often relies
on contingent fee arrangements or statutory fee awards. In that situation, the court will evaluate
the “next best evidence” of the attorney’s market rate: “evidence of rates similarly experienced
attorneys in the community charge paying clients for similar work and evidence of fee awards the
attorney has received in similar cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
For both Stewart and Stern, Defendants have suggested that the hourly rate must be in line
with counsel’s previous attorneys’ fees awards ($300 for Stewart and 275 for Stern). (Id. at 8-9.)
These rates were awarded in 2003 and 2004, however. Podesta provided an affidavit from a
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partner at her firm stating that her work is billed at $275 per hour, which is the rate she seeks in the
present case. Defendants point out that the rate for commercial work may not be applicable to civil
rights litigation, and question whether the rate at which Podesta is billed is the rate clients actually
pay. (Id. at 10.) It might be ideal for the court to have evidence that each attorney’s rate is the
typical rate paid by clients for similar work in similar circumstances, but such a showing is not
required. Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that Stern and Podesta’s rates are reasonable.
The evidence establishes that the rates requested are actually paid by other clients, are in line with
market rates, and are at or below the unadjusted Laffey Rates for attorneys of comparable
experience. The court approves Stern and Podesta’s requested hourly rates. Stewart has not
provided evidence sufficient to support a rate of $450, however; her affidavit states that she bills
her clients between $0 and $400 per hour. (Stewart Aff. ¶ 29.) Stewart has not shown why she
is entitled to a fee greater than the rate she charges her own clients, and $100 per hour greater
than Stern, an attorney of comparable experience. The court awards Stewart fees at the rate of
$400 per hour.
2.

Number of Hours Billed

The court next considers the number of hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case.
“Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request
hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 see also
Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 931 (7th Cir. 2012). In addition, “the court may reduce the
award where the description of the work performed is inadequate.” Thompson v. City of Chicago,
No. 07 C 1130, 2011 WL 2837589, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb.14, 2011). Defendants raise several
objections to the number of hours expended in this case, which the court considers below.
Plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees for 630.2 total hours of work by three attorneys
broken down as follows:
Roma J. Stewart

284.5 hours
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Stephen Stern
Madeleine S. Podesta

243.1 hours
102.6 hours

(Pl.’s Mem. at 22.) Defendants respond that the number of hours billed is excessive because
Plaintiff did not receive all the relief he originally sought. Defendants specifically challenge billing
entries for “unsuccessful matters,” including time spent on a motion for injunctive relief, on Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment, on the Remedies Memo and time spent regarding Timothy Edwards.
(Id. 12-13.) The court is unwilling to draw such fine lines. See Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983,
988 (7th Cir. 1988) (Where the plaintiff’s claims involve a common core of facts or are based on
related legal theories the court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the
plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.) Plaintiff brought two claims,
one alleging that Defendants’ actions violated the First Amendment, the second alleging that the
same conduct violated ICCPA. While Plaintiff was not granted relief under ICCPA, he was
successful on this claim because it is ICCPA that establishes that Tempo is a public forum, a
showing necessary to succeed on his First Amendment Claim. Although Plaintiff was not granted
all of the injunctive and declaratory relief he sought, all of the relief he did achieve was dependent
on the same operative facts and legal principles. The work performed on the contested matters
certainly contributed to Plaintiff’s success and streamlined the evidence presented at trial. Further,
the court is not convinced that Edward’s testimony was entirely duplicative or unnecessary to
Plaintiff’s claims.
Defendants also take issue with several billing entries characterized as vague, duplicative,
and clerical. (Defs.’ Mem. at 11-12, 14-16.) Specifically, Defendants claim that several of Stewart’s
entries are impermissibly vague. (Defs.’ Mem. at 12.) The court has reviewed the subject time
entries, and found that while, not a model of clarity, they are sufficiently detailed to identify the how
the time was spent. Defendants argue, in addition that some of the time Plaintiff’s counsel spent
on the case was duplicative. (Defs.’ Mem. at 14-15.) For example, both Stewart and Stern billed

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time for preparing the pretrial memorandum and the closing argument. (Id. at 15.) Again, the court
is not convinced. That the core responsibilities for a case might shift among the lawyers is not
remarkable, and the combined totals are not unreasonable. Defendants also claim that Plaintiff’s
attorneys inappropriately billed time for clerical matters. (Id. at 14-15.) These objections are
similarly without merit. In each instance the time entry is either not clerical, or the time spent on the
task was de minimus.
Finally, Defendants contend that the time spent preparing the fee petition was
unreasonable. (Defs.’ Mem. at 16.) Plaintiff seeks 102.62 hours for preparing the fee petition split
among the three attorneys as follows:
Roma J. Stewart
Stephen Stern
Madeleine S. Podesta

27.57 hours
56.05 hours
19 hours

(Id. at 17.) Defendants point out that Plaintiff seeks 530 hours for the underlying litigation. (Id.)
Defendants suggest the court grant no more than 40 hours for the petition–24 hours for Stern, 8
hours for Stewart, and 8 hours for Podesta. (Id.) The court agrees that in light of the hours billed
for the underlying litigation, the time spent on the fee petition was excessive. The court will grant
Plaintiff’s attorneys 55 hours for preparation of the fee petition: 25 hours for Stern; 20 hours for
Stewart; and 10 hours for Podesta.
In sum: the court approves the lodestar as itemized below:

Roma J. Stewart
Stephen Stern
Madeleine S. Podesta
Total Attorney’s Fees:
C.

Hours
276.93
212.05
93.6

Rate
$400
$350
$275

Total
$110,772.00
$74,217.50
$25,740.00
$210,729.50

Adjustment of the Lodestar

A court may adjust the lodestar based on the twelve factors described in Hensley v. Eckhart,
461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983): (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
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employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the
fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Id. at 430 n. 3.
Plaintiff argues that his attorneys are entitled to a thirty-percent upward adjustment of the
lodestar. (Pl.’s Mem. at 22.) Plaintiff first contends that the novelty and difficulty of the subject
matter warrants a ten-percent adjustment. (Id. at 15-16.) Plaintiff is correct that this was a case
of first impression, involving the recently-amended Illinois College Campus Press Act and its
application in First Amendment cases. (Id. at 15.) The court agrees with plaintiff that this factor
weighs in favor of an upward adjustment. Plaintiff argues for a five-percent adjustment for time
limitation because Stewart experienced a health emergency, which required another experienced
attorney–Stern–to step in late in the process creating case management difficulties. (Pl.’s Mem.
at 16-17.) Defendants point out that this factor concerns the time limitations imposed by the client
and the circumstances of the case. (Defs.’ Mem. at 20.) While the court is sensitive to the
difficulties caused by Stewart’s medical emergency, any associated time limitations were not
created by the client or the case itself. Defendants also argue that time and labor this case required
was not as extensive as Plaintiff contends. (Defs.’ Mem. at 19.) Defendants point out that only four
depositions were conducted, and the trial only lasted three days. The court agrees that the time
required for this case was not excessive, and that Plaintiff’s counsel would not have been precluded
from performing other work. This factor does not weight in favor of an upward adjustment, nor does
it warrant reducing the value of the hours the attorneys actually spent on this case.
Plaintiff also seeks a ten-percent adjustment for the experience, reputation, and ability of
his counsel. (Pl.s Mem. at 20.) Plaintiff’s attorneys do have considerable experience handling civil

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rights cases and good reputations in the legal community, but the court believes that expertise is
reflected in the claimed hourly rates.
Plaintiff seeks a five-percent adjustment for the “undesirability” of the case. (Pl.s Mem. at
20-21.)

Plaintiff cites the length of time involved in the case, and cash flow problems stemming

from uncertainty and dely in fee awards. (Id. at 21.) Similarly, Plaintiff requests an additional fivepercent adjustment because both Podesta and Stern have provided their services on a purely
contingency basis, and that Stewart provided the “vast majority” of her services on contingency as
well. (Pl.s Mem. at 18.) The court recognizes that Plaintiff undertook a substantial risk of
nonpayment.
The Supreme Court has stated that “the most critical factor” is “the degree of success
obtained” by the prevailing party. Linda T. ex rel. William A. v. Rice Lake Area Sch. Dist., 417 F.3d
704, 708 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). When determining the degree of
success, the Seventh Circuit has applied a three part test, where the court looks at “the difference
between the judgment recovered and the recovery sought, the significance of the legal issues on
which the plaintiff prevailed, and finally, the public purpose served by the litigation.” Conolly
v.National School Bus Srvs., Inc., 177 F3d. 595, 597 (7th Cir. 1999). The question is whether the
fees are reasonable in relation to the difficulty, stakes, and outcome of the case. Id.
Defendants’ suggestion that Plaintiff’s degree of success in this case was minimal is
unconvincing. There is a distinction between the claims Plaintiff brought and the relief sought
pursuant to those claims. Plaintiff brought two claims; one alleging that Defendants’ actions
violated the First Amendment, the second alleging that the same actions violated ICCPA. While
Plaintiff was not granted relief under ICCPA, he was successful on this claim because it is ICCPA
that establishes that Tempo is a public forum, a showing necessary to succeed on his First
Amendment claim. Defendants correctly observe that Plaintiff was not granted all the various forms
of relief he requested. It is the court’s view, however, that Plaintiff was successful with regard to
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the most substantial relief available to him, i.e., reinstatement to the same or a similar position, and
a declaration that the actions taken against him violated the First Amendment. Although Plaintiff
was not granted all of the injunctive and declaratory relief he sought, all of the relief he did achieve
was dependent on the same operative facts and legal principles. Balancing all of the above factors,
the court declines to either increase or decrease the lodestar.
II.

Bill of Costs
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that “[c]osts other than attorneys’ fees

shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” Rule 54(d)
“establishes a presumption in favor of a cost award” within certain categories. Cefalu v. Village of
Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 2000). That presumption is a strong one. See Mungo v.
Taylor, 355 F.3d 969, 978 (7th Cir. 2004) (presumption is strong); Congregation of the Passion,
Holy Cross Province v. Touche, Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 219, 222 (7th Cir.1988) (“the presumption
is difficult to overcome”).
Counsel for Plaintiff lists $2,542.48 in costs taxable under § 1920. (Pl.’s Mem. at 21-22.)
Under § 1920, a prevailing party may recover for (1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees of the
court reporter for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the
case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) fees for exemplification and copies
of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1923; and (6)
compensation of court-appointed experts and interpreters. 28 U.S.C. § 1920; Harney v. City of
Chicago, 702 F.3d 916, 927 (7th Cir. 2012). The court considers both whether Plaintiff’s bill of
costs identifies expenses of the type authorized by the statute and whether the costs were
reasonably incurred. Majeske v. City of Chicago, 218 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Weeks v.
Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997)). The losing party has the
burden of demonstrating that costs are not appropriate. Harney, 702 F.3d at 927 (citing Beamon v.
Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 864 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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Plaintiff requests $350 for fees of the clerk; $1,176.90 for court reporter fees; $151.44 for
printing; $569.50 for summons and subpoena fees; $150.00 for witness fees; and $104.64 for
copies. (Am. Bill of Costs [114-5], Ex. 7 to Pl.’s Mem.) Plaintiff argues that all costs were
reasonable. Defendants dispute only the costs associated with the testimony of Timothy Edwards
($150), arguing that his testimony was duplicative and not reasonably necessary. (Defs.’ Mem. 2122.) The court disagrees. The court is not convinced that Edward’s testimony was entirely
duplicative, and given that he was one of only five witnesses to testify, Plaintiff’s decision to call him
at trial was not unreasonable. The court therefore grants Plaintiff’s motion as to all costs sought.
In sum, Plaintiff is entitled to $2,502.48 in costs under § 1920.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs [112] is granted
in part and denied in part. Plaintiff is awarded $2,502.48 in costs and $210,729.50 in attorney’s
fees.
ENTER:

Dated: March 29, 2013

_________________________________________
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

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