Bronzino v. Sheldon et al

Filing 120

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 1/5/2012:Mailed notice(kef, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY BRONZINO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
OFFICER DAVID SHELDON, OFFICER )
BRIAN SHIELDS, and the CITY OF
)
AURORA,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 09 C 1048

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
On February 18, 2009, Plaintiff Timothy Bronzino filed a ten-count Complaint alleging
violations of his constitutional rights, along with state law claims, against Defendants City of
Aurora and Aurora Police Officers David Sheldon and Brian Shields. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1367(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment as to Bronzino’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim (Count II) and the
corresponding portions of Bronzino’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim (Count VII), as well as
Bronzino’s state law claims of false arrest (Count III) and malicious prosecution (Count V). See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Timothy Bronzino (“Bronzino”) resides at 3047 Derby Court, Aurora, Illinois,
and is a hairdresser employed at Salon Bronzino, which is owned by his wife, Stacy Bronzino
(“Stacy”). (R. 100, Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. Facts. ¶ 1.) The City of Aurora employs both
Defendant Officers Brian Shields and David Sheldon as a police officers. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.) The City

of Aurora is a municipal corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Illinois. (Id. ¶
4.)
Prior to the incident that is the basis of this lawsuit, Bronzino suffered – and continues to
suffer – from bipolar disorder, cluster headaches, anxiety disorder, and depression. (Id. ¶ 5.)
More specifically, in December 2007, Bronzino’s primary care physician diagnosed him as
having anxiety disorder, insomnia, and depression. (Id.) Around that same time, Bronzino was
also diagnosed with bipolar disorder Type 1 and his physician placed him on several medications
to control his behavioral and medical conditions. (Id. ¶ 6.)
On the morning of June 18, 2008, Bronzino woke up feeling tired and was suffering from
a headache. (Id. ¶ 8.) He took his medications at or about 9:00 a.m., but he did not feel well
enough to go to work that day. (Id.) Instead, he watched some television and went back to
sleep. (Id.) When his wife Stacy left for work around 1:00 p.m., Bronzino was sleeping on the
couch. (Id. ¶ 9.) Bronzino awoke at approximately 3:00 p.m. and still felt nauseous and tired.
(Id.) Bronzino believes that he then took his medication a second time. (Id.) When Stacy came
home around 5:00 p.m., Bronzino was sitting on the couch watching television and after Stacy
asked him how he was feeling, he informed her that he had a migraine, was nauseous, and felt
dizzy. (Id. ¶ 10.) At that time, Stacy observed that Bronzino’s face was red and flushed. (Id. ¶
11; R. 112, Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 2.) Stacy then asked him if he had taken his medications a second
time and he told her that he had double-dosed. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 11; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 4.)
Bronzino was only supposed to take his medications once a day, and thus Stacy called his
primary care physician and spoke with the doctor’s service between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on
June 18, 2008. (Id. ¶ 12.)

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Stacy then told her daughter to call Bronzino’s mother, Lucille Wellman, to ask her to
call for an ambulance. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶¶ 14, 15.) The daughter then called Wellman and
asked her to call 911, telling her grandmother that something happened with Bronzino’s
medicine. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.) Stacy testified that she overheard her daughter say to Wellman: “Dad
took too much medicine. We have to take him to the hospital. My mom wants you to meet us
there.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Wellman eventually called 911 and requested a police squad car to go to
Bronzino’s house stating that Bronzino was “going crazy.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Meanwhile, Bronzino
went outside around 8 p.m. to smoke a cigarette and Stacy went outside to talk to him. (Pl.’s
Stmt. Facts ¶ 8; Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 20.)
Officers Sheldon and Shields were dispatched to Bronzino’s home at or around 8:15 p.m.
(Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 25.) The dispatch instructed them to investigate a domestic violence
situation at 3047 Derby Court. (Id.; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 10.) There is evidence in the record that
dispatch also advised Defendant Officers that there was a possibility of a drug overdose. (Pl.’s
Stmt. Facts ¶ 11.) When Defendant Officers arrived at Bronzino’s home, they parked their squad
cars across the cul-de-sac and observed a woman at the front door of the home and that a man
was outside smoking a cigarette. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 27.) The parties dispute whether
Bronzino then told the Defendant Officers to “Get off my property. I didn’t call you. Get off my
property.” (Id.) The parties also dispute whether Officer Shields said: “We’re here to
investigate a domestic. We have to do our job.” (Id. ¶ 28.) The parties do not dispute that
Officer Sheldon approached Stacy and asked her if everything was okay to which Stacy
responded yes. (Id. ¶ 30; Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 16.)
Meanwhile, Officer Sheldon observed a pitcher and towels on the floor, as well as liquid

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on the wall, through the open front door. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 31.) Officer Sheldon then asked
Stacy for the second time if she was okay to which she answered yes. (Id. ¶ 32.) Stacy testified
that she assured Officer Sheldon that everything was fine, but that Bronzino had taken an
overdose of his prescription medications and that they had called 911. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 17.)
Defendant Officers dispute whether Stacy told Officer Sheldon this information.
Officer Shields then approached Bronzino, but the parties dispute whether Bronzino was
agitated and angry and whether Bronzino stated: “What the fuck are you doing here?” (Defs.’
Stmt. Facts ¶ 33.) In fact, the parties dispute the vast majority of Bronzino’s interactions with
Officers Shields and Sheldon. The parties do not dispute, however, that after Officer Shields
talked to Bronzino, Bronzino began walking toward his home where Officer Sheldon was talking
to Stacy. (Defs.’ Stmt. Facts ¶ 37.) Officer Shields testified at his deposition that he told
Bronzino to stop or he would arrest him for obstructing his investigation into the alleged
domestic dispute. (Id. ¶ 38.) Bronzino and Stacy testified otherwise.
Defendant Officers maintain that Bronzino then escalated the situation by clenching his
right fist and yelling. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41.) Bronzino and Stacy deny this happened. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts
¶¶ 21-23.) Officer Shields then grabbed Bronzino’s right arm and Officer Shields grabbed
Bronzino’s left arm, after which they allege that they ordered him to the ground. (Defs.’ Stmt.
Facts ¶ 42.) Defendant Officers maintain that after Bronzino refused to go to the ground, they
had to place him there. (Id. ¶ 43.) Stacy and Bronzino, on the other hand, testified that Officer
Shields threw Bronzino to the ground. (Pl.’s Stmt. Facts ¶ 24.) The parties do not dispute that
thereafter Defendant Officers lifted Bronzino and took him across the cul-de-sac to the patrol
cars parked there. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 27.)

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In his Complaint, Bronzino alleges a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim (Count I);
a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim (Count II); a state law false arrest claim (Count III); a
state law battery claim (Count IV); a state law malicious prosecution claim (Count V); a Section
1983 conspiracy claim based on his Fourth Amendment excessive force and false arrest claims
(Count VII);1 a state law conspiracy claim (Count VIII); an indemnification claim against the
City of Aurora (Count IX); and a respondeat superior claim against the City of Aurora. (Count
X).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment
motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there
is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167
L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After “a properly supported motion for summary
judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (quotation omitted).

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On October 19, 2010, the Court granted the parties’ agreed upon motion to dismiss
Count VI of the Complaint – Bronzino’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to
medical needs claim – with prejudice. (R. 58.)
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ANALYSIS
I.

Counts II and VII – Federal False Arrest and Conspiracy Claims
Defendant Officers argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Bronzino’s

false arrest claim as alleged in Count II and the corresponding portions of Bronzino’s Section
1983 conspiracy claim alleged in Count VII. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102
S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). “In actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of
constitutional rights, qualified immunity shields an official from liability for civil damages,
provided that the illegality of the official’s conduct was not clearly established at the time he
acted.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 858 (7th Cir. 2011). In determining whether Defendant
Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must decide if: (1) the facts, taken in a light
most favorable to Bronzino, make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the
right was clearly established at the time of Defendant Officers’ alleged misconduct. See Saucier
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Hernandez v. Cook County
Sheriff’s Office, 634 F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011).
Under the first Saucier prong, Defendant Officers argue there are no genuine disputes as
to any material fact that a reasonable police officer could have concluded that there was probable
cause to arrest Bronzino for resisting or obstructing a police officer under 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a).
“The existence of probable cause to arrest a suspect for any offense, even one that was not
identified by the officers on the scene or in the charging documents, will defeat a Fourth
Amendment false-arrest claim.” Sroga v. Weiglen, 649 F.3d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 2011). Probable
cause exists if “at the time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing,

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in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit
an offense.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th Cir. 2009). “In evaluating
probable cause, [courts] look only to the information known to the officer at the time of arrest,
and []view the circumstances of the arrest from the perspective of a reasonable person in the
position of the officer.” Mucha v. Village of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053, 1057 (7th Cir. 2011).
In short, Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity only if they had probable cause to
arrest Bronzino or if a reasonable officer in their position could have mistakenly believed that
probable cause existed. See Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677, 684 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Courts have referred to the second
inquiry as asking whether the officer had ‘arguable’ probable cause.”). Meanwhile, the Illinois
statute for resisting or obstructing a police officer states: “A person who knowingly resists or
obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer, firefighter, or
correctional institution employee of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a
Class A misdemeanor.” 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a). “In Illinois, the crime of resisting a peace officer
involves the commission of ‘a physical act of resistance or obstruction ... that impedes, hinders,
interrupts, prevents, or delays the performance of the officer’s duties, such as by going limp or
forcefully resisting arrest.’” Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill., 653 F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted).
The facts surrounding Bronzino’s arrest are hotly disputed. In fact, Stacy’s and
Bronzino’s version of the events surrounding Bronzino’s arrest differ significantly from
Defendant Officers’ version. Also, at least two of Bronzino’s neighbors witnessed Bronzino’s
interactions with the Defendant Officers and these neighbors offer additional testimony about the

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arrest. As the Seventh Circuit repeatedly cautions, “[i]t is not for courts at summary judgment to
weigh evidence or determine the credibility of [a witness’s] testimony; we leave those tasks to
factfinders.” O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). Indeed, at this procedural posture the Court must view the facts and all reasonable
inferences in Bronzino’s favor to determine whether Defendant Officers had probable cause to
arrest him or if a reasonable officer in Defendant Officers’ position could mistakenly have
believed that probable cause existed. See Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 538; Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d
767, 776-77 (7th Cir. 2003).
Construing the facts and all reasonable inferences in Bronzino’s favor, he has presented
sufficient evidence creating genuine factual disputes as to whether Defendant Officers had
probable cause to arrest him – or whether a reasonable officer under the same circumstances
could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed under the “arguable probable cause”
standard. See Williams v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 2001); Humphrey, 148 F.3d at
725. Looking to what the Defendant Officers knew at the time of the arrest, see Mucha, 650
F.3d at 1057, evidence in the record shows that Officers Sheldon and Shields were dispatched to
Bronzino’s home at or around 8:15 p.m on June 18, 2008. Dispatch instructed them to
investigate a domestic violence situation at 3047 Derby Court. There is also evidence in the
record that dispatch advised Defendant Officers that there was a possibility of a drug overdose.
When Defendant Officers arrived near Bronzino’s home, they observed a woman at the front
door and a man outside smoking a cigarette. Officer Sheldon then approached the woman,
Bronzino’s wife Stacy, and asked her if everything was okay to which Stacy responded yes.
After Officer Sheldon observed a broken pitcher inside the Bronzino home, he again asked Stacy

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if she was okay and Stacy assured Officer Sheldon that everything was fine, informing him that
Bronzino had taken an overdose of his prescription medications and that they had called 911.
Bronzino and Stacy also testified that Defendant Officers did not warn Bronzino that they would
arrest him or that he was under arrest. Further, Bronzino and Stacy deny that Bronzino raised his
voice while speaking to Officer Shields. Meanwhile, Stacy and Bronzino deny that Bronzino
was agitated or angry, as Defendant Officers maintain, or that Bronzino raised his fist. Further,
Stacy and Bronzino testified that Officer Shields threw Bronzino to the ground, after which
Defendant Officers lifted Bronzino and took him across the cul-de-sac.
Viewing the facts in Bronzino’s favor, there is an issue of fact as to whether Bronzino
physically resisted or obstructed Defendant Officers’ performance. Under Illinois law, conduct
constituting the resisting or obstructing of a police officer must be physical, not merely verbal.
See Brooks, 653 F.3d at 484; Payne, 337 F.3d at 776. Thus, any statements, whether profanityladen or not, directed at Defendant Officers cannot constitute resisting or obstructing a police
officer. See Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 538 (“the First Amendment protects even profanity-laden
speech directed at police officers.”) (citation omitted). In addition, Defendant Officers’
argument that they had probable cause to arrest Bronzino simply because he turned and walked
toward his wife Stacy while Officer Shields was conducting his domestic violence investigation
is simply unavailing without evidence that this conduct impeded, hindered, interrupted,
prevented, or delayed Defendant Officers’ performance. See Brooks, 653 F.3d at 484. As
discussed, the Court must construe the facts and all reasonable inferences in Bronzino’s favor –
not in Defendant Officers’ favor. See id. at 483.
Because Bronzino has presented sufficient evidence creating a genuine issue of material

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fact that Defendant Officers violated his constitutional right to be free from arrest without
probable cause, he has established the first prong of the Saucier qualified immunity test. See
Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2009). Moreover, Bronzino’s right to be free
from arrest without probable cause was clearly established at the time of his arrest under the
second Saucier prong. See Gonzalez, 578 F.3d at 541; see also Jones v. Clark 630 F.3d 677, 682
(7th Cir. 2011). In sum, factual disputes prevent resolution of Defendant Officers’ qualified
immunity defense. See Jones, 630 F.3d at 680. The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion
for partial summary judgment as to Bronzino’s false arrest claim as alleged in Count II and the
corresponding portions of Bronzino’s Section 1983 conspiracy claim as alleged in Count VII.2
II.

Counts III and V – State Law Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims
Next, Defendant Officers maintain that because they had probable cause to arrest

Bronzino, his common law false arrest and malicious prosecution claims must fail. In order to
establish a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show
the absence of probable cause. See Gauger v. Hendle, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 352 Ill.Dec. 447, 467,
954 N.E.2d. 307, 327 (Ill. 2011); Hurlbert v. Charles, 238 Ill.2d 248, 255, 345 Ill.Dec. 68, 938
N.E.2d 507 (Ill. 2010). As discussed above, there are genuine disputes as to the material fact of
whether Defendant Officers had probable cause to arrest Bronzino. Accordingly, the Court
denies Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts III and V of the
Complaint.

2

Defendants’ argument in their Reply Brief that Bronzino did not engage in any
qualified immunity analysis is without merit. (See R. 110, Pl.’s Resp. Brief, at 3-9.)
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CONCLUSION
For the these reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment. Because the Court addressed Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s Local Rule
56.1(b)(3)(B) Responses in the context of each fact, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to
strike – that Defendants did not file as a separate motion or properly notice before the Court in
violation of Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 5.3(b).
Date: January 5, 2012
ENTERED

_______________________________
AMY J. ST. EVE
United States District Court Judge

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