Scott v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 133

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Ronald A. Guzman on 4/17/2012. Mailed notice(cjg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

RICKY SCOTT,
Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, KENNETH
TAYLOR, and CARLIE YOUNG,
Defendants.

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No. 09 C 2201
Hon. Ronald A. Guzmán

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On July 21, 2011, the jury returned a verdict for defendants and against the
plaintiff on all claims in this case. The Court entered judgment on the verdict. Plaintiff
has filed a motion renewing his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 50 motion for
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), or, in the alternative, for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59. For the reasons given below, the motions are denied.
Under Rule 50, a jury verdict must stand unless the movant demonstrated that no
rational jury could have rendered the verdict it did. Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s
Dept., 588 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2009). The jury verdict should not be disturbed so
long as there is a “legally sufficient evidentiary basis for its verdict.” Id. (quoting
Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 493 (7th Cir. 2008)). In passing on a motion for a
new trial, however, “the district court has the power to get a general sense of the weight
of the evidence, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the comparative strength of
the facts put forth at trial. . . . If, after evaluating the evidence, the district court is of the
opinion that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a new trial is
appropriate.” Mejia v. Cook County, 650 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2011).
Whether the defendant officers’ conduct was a mere investigatory stop under
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), and its progeny, or a full custodial arrest of plaintiff
was a contested issue in this case. Plaintiff’s argument is that when defendants
approached his vehicle with their weapons drawn, handcuffed him and placed him in
their squad car, they had, as a matter of law, conducted a full custodial arrest. But the
distinction between an investigatory stop and a formal arrest depends on the intrusiveness
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of the detention, “which is a ‘flexible and highly fact-intensive’ inquiry.” Jewett v.
Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515
(7th Cir. 1995)).
In the case at bar, defendants testified that a security guard told them that students
complained of an individual riding around Calumet High School, wearing a bandana,
possibly with a weapon, scaring the students. (Mot. New Trial, Ex. 1, Trial Tr. Excerpt at
7:7-13; 7:24-8:4; 69:1-69:11.) The defendant officers testified that the plaintiff drove by
their parked car and Officer Taylor saw plaintiff wearing a bandana across his face. (Id.
at 75.) The defendant officers then activated their emergency lights, and plaintiff pulled
to the side of the road. (Id. at 76-77.) When the defendant officers approached plaintiff’s
vehicle, they suspected plaintiff was the individual that the students had complained
about and they had their weapons drawn. (Id. at 21:11-13; 77:25-78:2.). Officer Taylor
testified that he approached with his gun drawn because plaintiff matched the description
given as the individual with a possible weapon, and so “[he] didn’t know what [he] was
up against when [he] approached [plaintiff’s] window.” (Id. at 77:8-13; 103:1-4.) The
defendant officers testified that plaintiff was placed in handcuffs because he would not
obey Officer Taylor’s command to turn around and keep his hands on the trunk of
plaintiff’s car. (Id. at 33:1-2; 33:9-11; 86:4-7; 86:10-11; 103:25-104:4.) After plaintiff
failed to comply after being asked several times to turnaround and keep his hands on the
trunk, the defendant officers placed plaintiff in handcuffs. (Id. at 38:10-11; 38:14-18;
86:21-23.) When plaintiff was being handcuffed, Officer Taylor told plaintiff that he was
being handcuffed for plaintiff’s own and the defendant officers’ safety, but he was not
under arrest. (Id. at 39:10-13; 86:21- 87:3.) During the time of plaintiff’s stop, there
were students on the corner of 81st and Racine getting on the bus to go home. (Id. at
43:24-25.) Plaintiff was placed in the squad car so that the defendant officers could
further their investigation without making a scene in front of the students or have the
students gather around plaintiff. (Id. at 43:24-44:1; 107:16-23.) While plaintiff was thus
detained, the defendant officers were running a name and license plate check.
Plaintiff’s testimony painted quite a different picture. According to plaintiff, the
defendant officers verbally abused him by cursing at him when they initially approached
his car. When Officer Taylor approached plaintiff, he yanked on the bandana around
plaintiff’s neck four or five times. Once plaintiff was escorted to the back of his vehicle
the defendants screamed at him and violently pushed him onto the trunk. Plaintiff also
claims that while he was being detained, the defendants were searching his car, not
running his name or license plate. Depending on which of these two sets of testimony, or
what combination of the two, the jury believed, it could reasonably have concluded that
plaintiff was under arrest or that he was merely being detained pursuant to an
investigatory stop.
Plaintiff argues that when defendants approached his vehicle with their weapons
drawn, handcuffed him and placed him in their squad car, they had, as a matter of law,
conducted a full custodial arrest. In support of this contention, plaintiff cites Wolinksy,
No. 99 C 2995, 2000 WL 631292, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2000) (Hibbler, J.),
Thompson v. Wagner, 319 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brown, 233
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Fed. Appx. 564, 566 (7th Cir. 2007). But these cases are not dispositive of the issue in the
case at bar. In Wolinksy, the court analyzed plaintiff’s pleadings in a § 1983 practice and
policy claim alleging the inadequate training of proper handcuffing techniques for
Chicago police officers. 2000 WL 631292, at *2. The court never addressed what
circumstances transformed an investigatory stop into a full custodial arrest. Id. In
Thompson, the Court held that the defendant officers were not protected by qualified
immunity when they arrested plaintiff without probable cause. 319 F.3d at 935. The
court addressed the issue of an investigatory stop in a single line, concluding that the
plaintiff’s handcuffing and detention could not be justified as an investigatory stop
because the defendant officers did not make any “attempt to say their actions were
necessary for their own protection.” Id. Finally, in Brown, the defendant-appellant
moved to suppress the introduction of evidence at trial because he alleged that he was not
under arrest when officers searched him. 233 Fed. Appx. at 566. In that case, when the
officers stopped the defendant appellant, he fled the scene and assaulted the officers.
Both officers had to wrestle with him. Id. at 567. The officers sprayed him with pepper
spray, handcuffed him, and locked him in the squad car. The court held that the
defendant-appellant was under arrest. Id. at 568. None of these cases are sufficiently
similar to the case at bar to sustain plaintiff’s argument that the evidence in this case
requires a finding as a matter of law that plaintiff was immediately placed under a full
custodial arrest.
Terry v. Ohio, of course, established the concept of an investigatory stop. 392
U.S. at 19 n.16. In Terry, the defendant was observed engaging in behavior which an
experienced law enforcement officer concluded was “casing a job, a stick-up.” Id. at 6.
Furthermore, in Terry, the constitutional seizure occurred when the officer “frisked” the
defendant as a measure of self- protection after having approached him and asked him
questions on the street. Id. at 19-20. Actions needed to reasonably protect an officer
otherwise engaged in conduct which is not a traditional search or seizure were sanctioned
by the Terry court on reasonable suspicion – a lesser standard than probable cause to
arrest. Id. at 30-31. This case differs from the Terry situation in that the initial stop here
was not a seizure constituting a protective frisk for the purpose of protecting police
officers otherwise engaged in conduct that does not constitute a search or seizure. In
contrast to the Terry situation, the seizure in the present case was for the specific purpose
of initiating investigatory questioning because of the officer’s reasonable suspicion that
the defendant was in the process of committing a crime. In Terry, the officer’s initial
investigation, questions to the defendants on the street, did not itself involve any
constitutional seizure because the defendant was not detained at the time the officer
questioned him. Id. at 28. Only after initiating the questions did the officer feel the need
to frisk the defendant thereby engaging in a constitutional seizure. Id. It was this
protective pat down search that the Supreme Court concluded was permissible on a
reasonable suspicion basis. Id. at 30-31. In the case at bar, the initial detention occurred
when the defendant’s car was pulled over. The reason for the initial stop of the
automobile was not to protect the officers, but to further investigate the suspicion of
criminal activity.

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However, in United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1995), the
Seventh Circuit sanctioned a Terry stop in a situation involving a stop of an automobile
on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the automobile was transporting a controlled
substance. The analysis in that case makes it clear that the Seventh Circuit has no
objection to the use of the Terry stop rationale in a situation such as the one before us,
although that specific objection was not raised by the defendant in Vega. The bulk of the
discussion in that case pertained to whether the length and manner of the “stop,” which
included handcuffs, removal from the automobile and the use of drug sniffing dogs which
had to be called to the scene, was such as to go beyond the “brief detention which gives
officers a chance to verify (or dispel) well-founded suspicions that a person has been, is,
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity” authorized by Terry. Id. Interestingly, the
Vega court was reluctant to sanction such a long and intrusive detention on mere
suspicion.
Nevertheless, we have over the years “witnessed a
multifaceted expansion of Terry . . . For better or for worse,
the trend has led to the permitting of the use of handcuffs,
the placing of weapons and other measures of force more
traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory
detention.” United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224-25
(7th Cir. 1994). “Unfortunately, the line between a lawful
Terry stop and an unlawful arrest is not bright.” United
States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1095 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 515.
Thus, the Vega court sanctions the use of Terry stop criteria in a situation such as
the one at bar. Further, the definition utilized in Vega, a brief detention which gives
officers a chanced to verify (or dispel) well-founded suspicions that a person has been, is,
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity, fits the facts of the case before us. See
United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 508-09 (7th Cir. 2005) (defendant’s car stopped
while driving through a parking lot on reasonable suspicion of engaging in a drug
transaction); United States v. Fiasche, No. 05-CR-765, 2006 WL 695395, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 10, 2006) (defendant’s automobile stopped on reasonable suspicion of transporting
drug proceeds based upon corroborated information from an informant).
Numerous subsequent Seventh Circuit opinions have made clear that the use of
handcuffs, placing a suspect into a squad car and officers’ drawing their weapons does
not always convert an investigatory stop into a full custodial arrest.
Whether Bullock’s seizure amounted to a de facto arrest when
he was handcuffed, placed in the squad car, and transported to
the residence is a closer question. Admittedly, the facts here
approach the outer boundaries of a permissible Terry stop.
“Subtle, and perhaps tenuous, distinctions exist between a
Terry stop, a Terry stop rapidly evolving into an arrest and a de
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facto arrest.” Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224. Police restraint may
become so intrusive that, while not technically an “arrest,” it
becomes “tantamount” to an arrest requiring probable cause.
Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-16, 99 S.
Ct. 2248, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979)). “Given the ‘endless
variations in the facts and circumstances,’ there is no ‘litmuspaper test for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds
of an investigative stop’ and becomes an arrest.” Id. (quoting
Royer, 460 U.S. at 506, 103 S.Ct. 1319). The question is
whether the officer’s actions were reasonable under the
circumstances and whether the surrounding circumstances gave
rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety on the part of the
officer. Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2008).
United States v. Bullock , 632 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011). Under the facts of this
case, the jury could reasonably conclude that the initial seizure did not exceed the bounds
of an investigative stop and, thus, required only a reasonable suspicion. As described in
Bullock, the jury in this case was presented with evidence of several possible
combinations of facts during a situation which could reasonably have been interpreted as
a Terry stop, an arrest, or a Terry stop evolving into, at some point, an arrest. The
officers, for example, testified that the plaintiff refused to follow their directive to keep
his hands on the back of the car and thus, they handcuffed him solely for reasons of
personal safety concerns. Thus, their use of handcuffs was more in keeping with what
has been approved in investigative stop situations than with a full custodial arrest.
Because of the conflicting evidence regarding the chain of events in this case; what the
officers actually did and said, what they knew at time of the stop and in sequence
thereafter, their intentions, the circumstances in the surrounding area and the plaintiff’s
reaction to being stopped, the jury was properly allowed to determine whether what
occurred was a Terry stop, an arrest or a Terry stop evolving into, at some point, an
arrest.
Plaintiff argues that when defendant officers approached his vehicle with their
weapons drawn, handcuffed him and placed him in their squad car, they had, as a matter
of law, conducted a full custodial arrest. But, as pointed out above, the distinction
between an investigatory stop and a formal arrest depends on the intrusiveness of the
detention, “which is a flexible and highly fact-intensive’ inquiry.” Jewett v. Anders, 521
F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir.
1995)). On the evidence in this case, the jury could reasonably conclude that the initial
seizure did not exceed the bounds of an investigative stop for which the officers needed
only a reasonable suspicion.
Plaintiff argues that Earnest Goodwin’s testimony should have been barred
because defendants failed to disclose the subject matter of Earnest Goodwin’s anticipated
testimony, in violation of Rule 26(a). Goodwin testified that on April 18, 2008, he was a
security guard at Calumet High School and during that same month, he remembers
overhearing students complaining that an individual was in the neighborhood wearing a
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clown mask or bandana. Goodwin’s name and address were first disclosed by plaintiff in
his Fourth Supplemental Rule 26(a) Disclosures on April 4, 2012 – more than a year
before the trial. In addition, both plaintiff and defendants disclosed him as a possible
witness in the Final Pretrial Order, and his name was read to the prospective jurors during
jury selection as a person who may be a witness in the case or whose name may come up
during the course of the case. Any argument that plaintiff was taken by surprise by the
existence of this witness is specious.
Plaintiff, however, argues that this amount of disclosure is insufficient and that
under Rule 26(a), defendants should have disclosed that they spoke to this witness. Not
so. Rule 26(a) includes no such requirement. Plaintiff further argues that under Rule
26(a), defendants should have disclosed the subject matter of the witness’ expected
testimony. Not quite. Rule 26(a) requires disclosure of the subject matter of the
discoverable information a potential witness may have. But plaintiff already knew the
subject matter of the discoverable information. Plaintiff himself disclosed that Mr.
Goodwin “was assigned to work as a security guard at Calumet High School on April 18,
2008 (the date of the incident). Plaintiff knew defendants were claiming a security guard
at Calumet High School told them that there was an individual riding around, with a
bandana on his face, scaring students, with a possible weapon. So plaintiff knew full well
the subject matter of the security guard’s possible knowledge – which is all Rule 26(a)
requires. Plaintiff was well aware of the issues this witness might have information
about. What plaintiff is actually arguing is that defendants had a duty to advise him of
the actual contents of their interview of Goodwin. But Rule 26(a) does not require this.
Furthermore, plaintiff failed to exercise the same level of diligence to find and
interview this witness as did defendants. Plaintiff failed to send an investigator out to the
school to talk to Goodwin and so plaintiff did not know exactly what the officer would
say. But this is different from not knowing the subject matter of the discoverable
information the officer had. The only thing plaintiff did not know is precisely what this
witness would testify to. The only way to know that is to interview the witness. Plaintiff
failed to do this, though he could easily have done so in the same manner the defendants
did. There is nothing in the rules that allows a party to demand of another the content of
an interview with a potential witness who was equally accessible to both. There is no
indication here that defendants hid this witness or his whereabouts from plaintiff - just the
opposite. Both sides had equal access to the witness and could have interviewed him in
the same manner. Both sides were on notice as to the subject matter of his knowledge.
There is no unfair prejudice here.
Plaintiff also complains that Goodwin’s testimony was hearsay. This Court ruled
that Goodwin’s testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove that there
was someone in the area of Calumet High School wearing a clown mask or bandana, but
only to establish that students did make such a complaint. United States. v. Bursey, 85
F.3d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Statements that are offered not to prove the truth of the
matter asserted, but for some other legitimated purpose, do not qualify as hearsay.”).
That the students made such a complaint to someone is relevant in this case because the
officers stake their claim to probable cause or reasonable suspicion on the assertion that
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one of the guards at the school, whose name they did not know or could not recall, told
them that the students had made such a complaint. That the students told at least one
such guard this information makes it much more likely that one of the other guards
present that day passed such information along to the officers. Surely, if defendants
could have shown that none of the guards recalled being told such a thing by any student,
this would have been strong circumstantial evidence that the officers’ assertion was not
true. The probative value of this evidence was substantial and it was not hearsay. Nor
was it likely that the jury would be confused or use the evidence for an improper purpose
as the Court instructed the jury at the time of the testimony that any testimony as to what
the students said was being offered to prove that the statements were actually made, not
that the statements were actually true.
For the reasons given above, plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or
in the alternative for a new trial is denied.

SO ORDERED

ENTER: April 17, 2012

--------------------------------------------RONALD A. GUZMÁN
District Judge

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