Doerman v. State of Illinois/Dept. of Children and Family Services et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 10/6/2009.Mailed notice(sct, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT N O R T H E R N DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS E A ST E R N DIVISION A N N M. DOERMANN, P l a i n t i f f, v s. ST A T E OF ILLINOIS/DEPARTMENT O F CHILDREN AND FAMILY SE R V IC E S and RICHARD GOETZ, D e fe n d a n t s . ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

09 C 2295

M E M O R A N D U M OPINION C H A R L E S P. KOCORAS, District Judge: B efore the Court is Defendant Richard Goetz's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted. BACKGROUND A ccording to the allegations of the complaint, which we must accept as true for purposes of this motion, Plaintiff Ann M. Doermann ("Doermann") has worked for the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") since February 1995. D efenda nt Richard Goetz ("Goetz") also worked for DCFS. During Doermann's e mp l o y m e n t with DCFS, Goetz repeatedly subjected her to various forms of sexual h ara ssm en t. Specifically, Doermann asserts that Goetz engaged in lewd conduct in her

presence, displayed nude pictures of a male DCFS ward in her office, and took sexually sugg estive photographs of himself with Doermann's cell phone. Doermann's su pe rv is o r s took no action against Goetz though they knew of his conduct and her complaints to management regarding Goetz went unanswered. On April 15, 2009, D oe rman n filed suit against DCFS and Goetz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII. G o e tz now moves to dismiss the suit against him for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. L E G A L STANDARD F e d e ra l Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) evaluates the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, construe all allegations of a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. P erkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). In order for a claim to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must satisfy two conditions: first, the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests; and second, its allegations must plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1 08 4 (7th Cir. 2008). A claim should not be dismissed "unless it is clear that no relief

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could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the a lle ga tio ns." Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hishon v. K ing & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). D IS C U S S IO N G o e tz argues that Doermann's § 1983 claim should be dismissed because he had n o supervisory authority over her and therefore could not be said to have acted under color of state law. "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the a lle ge d deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). "The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant . . . have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority o f state law." Id. at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Courts applying the "under color of state law" requirement to the sexual harassment context have generally required the defendant to possess some measure of authority over the plaintiff. See Woodward v. Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1401 (10th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases and noting that in the absence of "some authority that the w ro ng do er has over the victim . . . it is difficult to establish that the abusive action was

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perpetrated under color of state law[.]") For example, in Valentine v. City of Chicago, 452 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit held that defendants acted under color of state law because they were the plaintiff's supervisors and had the power to control the circumstances of the plaintiff's employment. Id. at 683. Similarly, in Walker v. Taylorville Corr. Ctr., 129 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1997) the court found that defendant acted under color of state law when defendant's sexual harassment of plaintiff was possible "solely because of the position of authority" defendant held over plaintiff. Id. at 413-14. T he parties have not cited, and our research has not revealed, a § 1983 case based on an incident of sexual harassment where a court found a defendant who lacked any a uth ority over the plaintiff acted under color of state law. Therefore, we conclude that to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of an incident of sexual h ara ssm en t, a plaintiff must substantiate that she can plausibly establish the "under color of state law" requirement by alleging that the defendant had some sort of authority over the plaintiff's employment. T hough Doermann's complaint states that Goetz acted under color of law in ha rassing her, the complaint is devoid of any factual allegations concerning Goetz's authority over Doermann to substantiate that conclusion. Though Doermann mentions her supervisors and managers in her complaint, she never includes Goetz among those g ro up s. In her response, Doermann contends that alleging that Goetz displayed pictures

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o f male DCFS wards on Doermann's desk is sufficient to plausibly find Goetz acted u n d e r color of state law. Though this particular episode of harassment was arguably related to Goetz's responsibilities as a DCFS employee, the allegation does not suggest G o e tz had any authority over Doermann. Absent an indication that Goetz exercised some small measure of control over Doermann at DCFS, we have no basis to conclude th at Goetz acted under color of state law. Therefore, we hold that Doermann has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Goetz. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Goetz's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is granted.

Charles P. Kocoras U nited States District Judge D a te d : October 6, 2009

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