House v. Astrue

Filing 60

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Maria Valdez on 9/26/2012.Mailed notice(yp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANTHONY HOUSE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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No. 09 C 3217
Magistrate Judge
Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff Anthony House’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the
United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons
that follow, House’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 45] is denied, and the
Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 52] is granted.
BACKGROUND
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
House originally applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on July 6, 2005,

alleging a disability since November 29, 2001 due to osteoarthritis in the feet and
back strain. (R. 73.) The application was denied on August 30, 2005 and upon
reconsideration on September 13, 2006. (R. 73-79, 81.) House filed a timely request
for a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on April 16,

2008. (R. 22-72.) House personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was
represented by counsel. (Id.) House’s wife and a vocational expert also testified at
the hearing. (Id.)
On October 20, 2008, the ALJ denied House’s claim for benefits and found
him not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 12-21.) The Social Security
Administration Appeals Council denied House’s request for review on May 8, 2009,
(R. 1-3), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and
therefore reviewable by the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v.
Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Background

House was born on May 30, 1957, and was fifty years old at the time of the
ALJ hearing. (R. 26, 113.) He is five feet nine inches tall and weighs around 180
pounds. (R. 26.) House lives with his wife and three children. (R. 277.) He dropped
out of school in the eleventh grade and did not obtain a GED. (R. 26, 29-30, 277.) He
was in the Army Reserve for three months in 1975 and received an honorable
discharge. (R. 30-31, 276.) House was previously employed as a security guard and
a custodian. (R. 129.) His prior employment in custodial work involved
maintenance, loading and unloading, and lifting as much as 100 pounds or more.
(R. 130-33.)
House alleges a disability onset date of November 29, 2001 due to various
impairments including lower back pain, foot pain, chest pain, Type 2 diabetes,
2

cellulitis, and headaches. (R. 183-88, 194-97, 218, 228, 277.) In his form seeking
reconsideration of the initial denial of benefits, House added that he had been
afflicted with mental illnesses since 2005. (R. 147.) House has taken or is taking
Vicodin, aspirin, Lasix, and medications for arthritis and high blood pressure. (R.
47-48.)
B.

Testimony and Medical Evidence
1.

House’s Testimony

House testified that he has problems with both feet, dating from 2001, when
he had surgery to remove a bone from his foot. (R. 33-34, 37.) He also complained of
swelling and arthritis in his neck, feet, and hands. (R. 33-34.) House claims he has a
problem with a disc in his back, and sometimes when he bends down he cannot get
back up. (R. 35.)
House reported that he has aching and burning pains all over his body, and
nothing relieves the pain. (R. 43-44.) Approximately three times a day, when his
foot starts to get hot, he gets headaches that sometimes last three hours. (R. 47.)
When he gets headaches, he takes aspirin, Vicodin, or arthritis pills. (R. 47-48.)
House also takes Lasix for high blood pressure and another pill for diabetes. (R. 4849.) He cannot carry anything heavier than a gallon of milk, and when he does
carry something, it will fall out of his hands. (R. 35, 44.) Over an eight-hour time
period, House cannot walk more than thirty minutes, stand more than twentythirty minutes, or sit for thirty minutes. (R. T4-45.)

3

For about eight months prior to the hearing, House had been seeing a
physician who gave him an ultrasound test, performed blood work, and treated
House’s high blood pressure. (R. 36.) The doctor did not refer House to any
specialists. (Id.)
In a typical day, House gets out of bed at 6:00 a.m. and drinks coffee. He
walks around for as long as he can, then sits on the couch and sometimes watches
movies. (R. 38-39.) He can dress, shower, and shave himself, and he can make
something simple to eat. (R. 40.) House does not shop for groceries, nor does he do
any chores around the house such as laundry, vacuuming, or dishes. (Id.) He is no
longer able to play basketball or work on cars, and he does not do any kind of
exercise. (R. 40-41.) He attends church every Sunday and has no problem getting
along with people there. (R. 42-43.) House claims to have problems with his
memory; for example, if he puts his keys down, he cannot find them. (R. 43.)
House reported “see[ing] things in strange places,” and stated that in a
workplace setting, people would think he was crazy and “wouldn’t understand.” (R.
41.) He says that at night, he sees “[o]ther places in other worlds.” (R. 50-51.) He
does not sleep very well and is tired as a result. (Id.) He was not receiving and had
received no treatment for a mental impairment. (R. 41.)
2.

Elizabeth House’s Testimony

Plaintiff’s wife of eighteen years, Elizabeth House, testified at the hearing.
(R. 58.) She is a Certified Nursing Assistant and works from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
(R. 65.) Elizabeth stated that before Plaintiff got sick, they were active, going to the
4

park and restaurants, visiting family, and exercising, but he no longer can do those
things. (R. 58.) She does most of the household chores, and her sons perform
maintenance in the home. (R. 59.)
Elizabeth testified that House’s memory is not good, and he cannot remember
to keep doctors’ appointments if she does not remind him. (R. 60.) She said that
after drinking his coffee, House will lie down on the couch for fifteen to thirty
minutes. (R. 61.) House is able to sit and stand in church, but the service does not
last that long. (R. 63.)
3.

Medical and Investigative Evidence
a.

Physical Limitations

The record contains several years’ worth of progress notes from Dr. V.R.
Kuchipudi, beginning in 2001. (R. 183-235.) The notes describe various symptoms,
including lower back and foot pain. Many of the notes are illegible, and Plaintiff has
not pointed to any particular notes demonstrating a diagnosis or treatment
supporting his claim of disability. Furthermore, House testified that Dr. Kuchipudi
“didn’t really do nothing” for House’s pain, high blood pressure, or arthritis. (R. 3637.)
House was admitted to La Grange Hospital on January 19, 2002 due to foot
pain following an injury at work on November 29, 2001. (R. 257.) House had been
wearing a short leg cast for six weeks, and the fracture healed. (Id.) The
examination revealed a severe painful callosity under the right first metatarsal
head, and an x-ray showed a spur on the right first metatarsal head. (Id.) Due to
5

the pain on weight-bearing, the physician recommended osteophytectomy and
callectomy, and the surgery was performed the same day. (R. 257, 261-62.) There
were no complications, and House left the operating room in good condition. (R.
262.)
X-rays of House’s feet were ordered on July 15, 2002 due to his complaints of
pain. The radiological findings showed evidence of House’s prior surgery but found
no lytic or destructive bone lesion or significant degenerative change. (R. 254.) The
radiologist concluded that there was no radiographic evidence of acute bony
abnormality involving the right foot. The radiologist suggested that if the
unexplained bone pain persisted, then further imaging may be appropriate. (Id.)
The record also contains a March 31, 2005 radiology examination of House’s feet,
which was ordered by Dr. Kuchipudi. (R. 230.) The radiologist’s impression was
moderate degenerative arthritis of the first metatarsophalangeal joints of both feet.
(Id.)
A CT scan of his abdomen and pelvis was conducted on April 4, 2003 based on
an indication of abdominal pain and abnormal liver function test as well as
hematuria. (R. 233-34.) The examiner’s impression was a suggestion of slight
thickening of the wall of the urinary bladder, with a notation that it could be a
normal finding in a non-distended bladder. The test revealed no other
abnormalities. (R. 233.) An April 22, 2004 radiological examination of Plaintiff’s
liver concluded that there was a suggestion of mild fatty liver, but otherwise no
abnormalities were identified. (R. 231.)
6

A physical Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) assessment was completed
by Agency consultant Dr. Robert Patey on August 29, 2005. (R. 266-73.) The RFC
limited House to lifting twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently;
standing or walking for about six hours in eight-hour work day; sitting about six
hours in an eight-hour workday; and unlimited pushing and pulling. (R. 267.)
House had postural limitations of never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and
occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or
crawling. (R. 268.) He had no manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations
but was to avoid concentrated exposure to fumes or odors. (R. 269-70.) Dr. Patey
described the medical evidence in the record and stated that it did not support a
claim of total disability. (R. 273.) He noted an August 6, 2005 examination by Dr.
Kuchipudi showing that House has chronic low back pain with associated reduced
range of motion with no spasms or tenderness, which was characterized as a lumbar
strain. (Id.) The consultant also mentioned the March 31, 2005 x-ray of House’s feet
and noted that he walks independently without an assistive device. (Id.) He further
opined that Plaintiff’s headaches are not of the frequency or duration to be totally
disabling. (Id.)
b.

Mental Limitations

After House indicated that he suffered from mental illnesses on his
reconsideration form, the DDS referred him for a consultative examination with Dr.
Syed Ali, a psychiatrist, which took place on February 27, 2006. (R. 275-78.) House
told Dr. Ali that he saw things, including “fallen angels,” who talked and “would be
7

killing people.” (R. 276.) House’s wife reported that he has many sleepless nights,
and if he does sleep, it is not more than five hours a night. (Id.) He also told her that
he sees things, “like a genie thing flying through the house.” (Id.)
Dr. Ali described House as alert and oriented in all three spheres, with a
depressed affect. (R. 277.) His thought content was not delusional, and there was no
indication of any derealization or depersonalization. (Id.) House incorrectly
identified the President of the United States as “President Bush,” and when asked
to name five large U.S. cities, he responded, “Pennsylvania, Oklahoma,
Washington, Illinois, Joliet.” (Id.) House did name Washington, DC as the location
of the White House. (Id.) He was unable to serially subtract 7s, starting from 100,
and could only remember two out of the five words “dog, apple, chair, room, and
grass” in a span of five minutes. (Id.) When asked how an apple, an orange, and a
banana were alike, House stated that “You can eat them,” and he said that if he
saw a stamped, addressed envelope with a letter inside it lying on the street, he
would leave it there. (Id.)
Dr. Ali diagnosed House with psychotic disorder, NOS, with rule-out mental
disorder, NOS (secondary to intracranial pathology), and rule-out malingering. (Id.)
Dr. Ali further stated that if House were found eligible for disability payments, he
would not be able to handle the funds in his own interests. (R. 278.)
A Psychiatric Review Technique (“PRT”) form was completed by Dr. Donald
Cochran on April 13, 2006 and was based on the February 27, 2006 consultative

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examination. (R. 288-300.) Under Listing 12.03, the category of schizophrenic,
paranoid, and other psychotic disorders, Dr. Cochran found psychotic features and
deterioration that are persistent, as evidenced by delusions or hallucinations, as
well as incoherence, loosening of associations, illogical thinking, or poverty of
content of speech associated with flat affect. (R. 290.) With regard to the “B” criteria
of the listings, Dr. Cochran concluded that House had moderate limitations in his
activities of daily living; maintaining social functioning; and in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace, with no episodes of decompensation. (R. 298.)
Dr. Cochran found no evidence of the presence of the “C” criteria. (R. 299.) Dr.
Cochran’s notes state that House reported depression as well as auditory and visual
hallucinations. (R. 300.) Dr. Cochran’s mental status examination found no
evidence of psychotic process, and House was diagnosed with psychotic disorder
NOS, with rule-out malingering, and the report concluded that House would not be
capable of even simple work related tasks. (Id.) The report ended, however, with a
recommendation that a fraud investigation be commenced based upon the diagnosis
“and the lack of objective medical evidence to support the allegation.” (Id.)
Dr. Cochran also completed a mental RFC assessment. (R. 316-19.) The
report found House not to be significantly limited in the areas of remembering
locations and work-like procedures or understanding, remembering, and carrying
out very short and simple instructions, with moderate limitations in understanding
and remembering detailed instructions. (R. 316.) House also had moderate
limitations in sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision, working
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with others without being distracted, and making simple work-related decisions.
(Id.) Dr. Cochran reported marked limitations, however, in the areas of carrying out
detailed instructions; maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods;
performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being
punctual; and completing a normal workday without interruptions from
psychologically-based symptoms and performing without an unreasonable number
of rest periods. (R. 316-17.)
In the area of social interaction, House was not limited in his ability to ask
simple questions, get along with co-workers without exhibiting behavioral
extremes, or maintain socially appropriate behavior. (R. 317.) House did have
moderate limitations in the ability to interact with the general public and to accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Id.)
Although House was found to be moderately limited in his ability to travel in
unfamiliar places, he had no limitations in the ability to respond appropriately to
changes in the work setting, to be aware of normal hazards, or to set realistic goals
or make plans independently of others. (Id.)
In light of Dr. Cochran’s recommendation, the Cooperative Disability
Investigations (“CDI”) Unit completed a Report of Investigation on August 15, 2006.
(R. 280-85.) The report stated that House had been evicted from all addresses
known to the investigators, and he was not interviewed by anyone from the CDI. (R.
282.) According to the investigation, despite House’s stated inability to leave the
house alone or to do yard work, neighbor interviews revealed that he often left home
10

alone and cut the grass. (R. 282.) He had no difficulty communicating and did not
appear to have any physical or mental impairments. (R. 283-84.) Neighbors also
reported that House did not use a cane, walked his dog every day, and walked
normally. (R. 282, 284.) House did not have difficulty climbing the stairs to his
apartment, and he was able to carry a bicycle out of his home unassisted. (R. 283.)
Another witness stated that when House moved from his home, he carried all the
boxes and furniture without difficulty. (R. 284.)
Dr. Terry Travis completed another PRT on September 12, 2006, which was
based on Dr. Ali’s consultative examination and the CDI report. (R. 302-15.) Dr.
Travis’s mental status examination concluded that House had a depressed affect,
poor judgment, and poor abstraction. (R. 314.) He diagnosed House with psychotic
disorder, NOS, with possible malingering. (Id.) Dr. Travis further opined that the
symptoms described by House and his wife “are not typical of any known mental
dis[order]” and that based on the CDI investigation, the consultative examination
“is not valid as claimant & wife are prevaricating and dissembling.” (Id.)
4.

Vocational Expert’s Testimony

William Schweihs testified at the hearing as a Vocational Expert (“VE”). The
ALJ asked the VE whether there would be any work available for a hypothetical
individual aged 44 to 50; with an 11th grade education and House’s past relevant
work; who was limited to light work, never climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds;
occasionally climbing ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching,
and crawling; and who must avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants.
11

(R. 65-66.) The VE responded that maintenance and custodial positions would be
ruled out, but House could perform his past relevant work as a security guard. (R.
66.) In addition, the individual could perform approximately 30,000 to 40,000 jobs
in the regional economy at the light level, including assembly, packaging, and
visual inspection jobs; and at the sedentary level, 20,000 jobs are available. (R. 6668.) The VE also testified that if the ALJ were to find House credible as to all of his
physical symptoms, there would be no jobs available to him. (R. 68.)
C.

ALJ Decision

The ALJ found that House had not engaged in substantial gainful
employment since the alleged onset date of November 29, 2001. (R. 17.) At step 2,
the ALJ concluded that House had severe impairments of arthritis, headaches,
obesity, back pain, and degenerative joint disease. (Id.) At step 3, the ALJ found
that none of House’s impairments, alone or in combination, met or equaled a listing.
(R. 18.)
The ALJ next determined that House had the RFC to perform light work,
subject to the following limitations: no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or
crawling; and no concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants. (R. 18.) The ALJ
concluded that House could perform his past relevant work as a security guard and
thus was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 20.)

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DISCUSSION
I.

ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42. U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a claimant is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the claimant
presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have a severe impairment? (3) Does
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments
enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his former
occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4) (2008).
An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the
claimant is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389
(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a
finding of disability. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id.
Once the claimant shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts
to the Commissioner to show the ability to engage in other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

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II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are support by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d. 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). This Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence,
resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478
F.3d at 841.
The ALJ is not required to address “every piece of evidence or testimony in
the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning
behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th
Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to a claimant, “he must build an
accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d
at 872. The ALJ “must at least minimally articulate the analysis for the evidence
with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Boiles v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 630, 634

14

(7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record before drawing any
conclusions, and must adequately articulate his analysis so that we can follow his
reasoning.”).
Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the
responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls upon the
Commissioner, not the court. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990).
However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors his
ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v.
Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
III.

ANALYSIS
House argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error because: (1) his credibility

determination was wrong and deprived Plaintiff of his due process rights; (2) the
step 2 and step 3 evaluations were incorrect; and (3) the ALJ’s RFC determination
was flawed.
A.

Credibility

In his ruling, the ALJ found House’s subjective complaints not credible in
light of the CDI investigation. (R. 20.) House argues that the ALJ’s decision to
credit the CDI report was in violation of his procedural and substantive process
rights to confront witnesses against him, to cross-examine those witnesses and the
investigators whose report the ALJ considered, or to present contrary evidence.
Plaintiff further contends that he had no prior notice that the issue of the fraud
investigation would be raised at the ALJ hearing, which prevented a full and fair
15

hearing. The Commissioner responds that House has waived the issue, as he never
asked for a continuance in order to present contrary evidence or impeach the
witnesses or investigators.
First, House does not dispute that he had access prior to the hearing to the
entire administrative file, which included the CDI investigative report and Dr.
Travis’s report concluding that Plaintiff was prevaricating. It defies logic to
conclude that Plaintiff was unaware these reports would be relevant to the ALJ’s
decision.
Second, House’s counsel was expressly given an opportunity to take more
time to review the record and/or subpoena all needed witnesses, and thus there was
no due process violation. In Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), the
Supreme Court held that a Social Security claimant may not complain that he had
no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses if he fails to take advantage of the
opportunity to request witness subpoenas. Id. at 404-05 (noting that the claimant
“was notified that the documentary evidence on file was available for examination
before the hearing and, further, a supplemental hearing could be requested”); see 20
C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(2) (providing the procedure for a party to request a subpoena at
least five days before the hearing date). At the beginning of the hearing, Plaintiff’s
counsel stated that he was provided a copy of the file on disk while he was on
vacation and was only able inspect the disk on the date of the hearing. (R. 25.) The
ALJ asked counsel whether he wanted to go forward or needed time to review the

16

file. Counsel indicated that he would go forward, and that while he “would normally
put more time into it,” he reviewed as much as he could. (Id.)
Furthermore, the ALJ’s credibility finding was adequately supported. An
ALJ’s credibility determination is granted substantial deference by a reviewing
court unless it is “patently wrong” and not supported by the record. Schmidt v.
Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 2007); Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th
Cir. 2000). However, an ALJ must give specific reasons for discrediting a claimant’s
testimony, and “[t]hose reasons must be supported by record evidence and must be
‘sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent
reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the
reasons for that weight.’” Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539-40 (7th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 887-88).
When assessing the credibility of an individual’s statements about symptoms
and their functional effects, an ALJ must consider all of the evidence in the case
record. See SSR 96-7p.1 “This includes . . . the individual’s own statements about the
symptoms, any statements and other information provided by treating or examining
physicians or psychologists . . . and any other relevant evidence in the case record.”
Id. at *1. In instances where the individual attends an administrative proceeding
conducted by the adjudicator, the adjudicator may also consider his or her own

1

Interpretive rules, such as Social Security Regulations (“SSR”), do not have force of
law but are binding on all components of the Agency. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1); accord
Lauer v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1999).

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observations of the individual as part of the overall evaluation of the credibility of
the individual’s statements. Id. at *5.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s credibility analysis was erroneous because it
included a meaningless boilerplate statement2 and the ALJ failed to consider
critical evidence and articulate his reasoning. However, the mere presence of the
boilerplate language is insufficient grounds for remand. See, e.g., Carter v. Astrue,
413 Fed. Appx. 899, 905-06 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the use of the boilerplate is, for
the most part, incidental. The ALJ adequately supported his credibility finding with
reasons, including the CDI report and House’s failure to receive any mental health
treatment or explain why he did not do so. See SSR 96-7p, at *7 (stating that an
ALJ must consider an individual’s explanations for failing to pursue medical
treatment).
House also argues that the ALJ fails to discuss his treating physician’s
opinions, even though they are entitled to controlling weight. The only functional
capacity assessments in the record are from DDS consultants, so it is unclear what
opinions Plaintiff relies on. Assuming he is referring to the medical reports, House
fails to describe which medical evidence he feels the ALJ should have discussed and
2

The following is the language in question: “Upon considering the evidence of
record, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms. However, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, duration, and limiting effects of these symptoms are
not entirely credible.” (R. 18.) This “credibility template” has been subject to criticism
because of its meaninglessness and the circular logic that it embraces. See Bjornson v.
Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding the template “gets things backwards,”
and is “meaningless boilerplate” that “implies that ability to work is determined first and
is then used to determine the claimant’s credibility”).

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how the evidence demonstrates he suffers from disabling injuries. It is not the
function of this Court to sift through the administrative record to find Plaintiff’s
best arguments.
B.

Step 2

House maintains that the ALJ improperly ascertained his severe
impairments at step 2 of the evaluation by failing to include his foot pain. The
Commissioner responds that the step 2 determination is merely a screening step in
order to determine if further sequential evaluation is necessary.
The Court agrees that the failure to list all impairments at step 2 is not error
here. See Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2010). Where at least some
severe impairments are found, the sequential evaluation continues, and all
impairments are then considered in determining the claimant’s ability to perform
work. Id.
C.

Step 3

House faults the ALJ at step 3 for failing to cite a listing or undertake an
analysis of the medical evidence before concluding that he did not suffer from an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals a listing. House,
however, fails to cite to any listings he believes are met in this case. See Knox v.
Astrue, 327 Fed. Appx. 652, 655 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Although an ALJ should provide a
step-three analysis, a claimant first has the burden to present medical findings that
match or equal in severity all the criteria specified by a listing.”). The Court will not
undertake the burden of reviewing the record and evaluating the medical evidence
19

in light of all the listings potentially applicable in this case. Moreover, the ALJ
relied on several mental and physical DDS consultant evaluations in concluding
that none of House’s symptoms met or equaled a listing.
D.

RFC Determination

House criticizes the ALJ’s adoption of the DDS consultant’s RFC because the
ALJ failed to conduct a functional evaluation of House’s work-related capacities or
to consider all the medical evidence.3 The Commissioner responds that, pursuant to
SSR 96-8p, a narrative discussion of a claimant’s symptoms and medical source
opinions is sufficient. The Court agrees that “an ALJ is not required to provide an
item-by-item or function-by-function analysis of the claimant’s RFC.” Herrera v.
Astrue, No. 11 C 8593, 2012 WL 4120485, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2012). In this
case, the ALJ considered the medical evidence, Plaintiff’s credibility, and the
physical and mental RFC assessments in the record. And again, Plaintiff does not
articulate which specific aspects of the ALJ’s RFC determination were incorrect.

3

House also complains that at step 5, the VE was expressly told to disregard any
information in the medical record and that the hypothetical question posed to the VE failed
to include any limitations in those records. House’s argument is directed toward the ALJ’s
step 5 analysis, but it is actually related to the RFC conclusion. The ALJ’s hypothetical was
intended to elicit whether there are any jobs available to a person with House’s RFC, the
determination of which had already been made. House’s other step 5 argument is a repeat
of his credibility argument. House contends that the ALJ failed to explain why he did not
consider the VE’s testimony that there would be no jobs available to House if his claims
were deemed credible. But the ALJ found House not to be credible, and thus the VE’s
conclusions in this vein are irrelevant to the decision.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Anthony House’s motion for summary
judgment [Doc. No. 45] is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for
summary judgment [Doc. No. 52] is granted.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED:

DATE:

___________________________
HON. MARIA VALDEZ
United States Magistrate Judge

September 26, 2012

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