Jones v. Finnerman et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Edmond E. Chang on 9/28/2011:Mailed notice(slb, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY D. JONES,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
DR. ADRIAN FEINERMAN, DR. STEPHEN )
CULLINAN, DR. SETH OSAFO, DR.
)
PARTHA GHOSH, WEXFORD HEALTH
)
SOURCES, INC., HEALTH
)
1
PROFESSIONALS, LTD.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 09 C 03916
Judge Edmond E. Chang

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Timothy Jones filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Adrian
Feinerman, Dr. Stephen Cullinan, Dr. Seth Osafo, Dr. Partha Ghosh, Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., and Health Professionals, Ltd. (HPL), seeking compensatory and
punitive damages for alleged violations of Jones’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.2 Feinerman, Osafo, and Wexford [R. 36]3, as well as Cullinan and HPL [R. 46],
have moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).4 For the reasons stated below, Feinerman, Osafo, and Wexford’s motion is
granted, and HPL and Cullinan’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1

The case is captioned in this Court’s system with Dr. Feinerman’s surname misspelled as
“Finnerman.” The Clerk is directed to correct the caption.
2
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
3
Citation to the docket is “R.” followed by the docket entry.
4
Ghosh answered the complaint and has not filed a motion to dismiss.

I.
At this stage of the litigation, we accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw
reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079
(2011). From November 26, 2003 until October 9, 2009, Timothy Jones was
incarcerated at various Illinois correctional facilities, including Pinckneyville
Correctional Center and Illinois River Correctional Center. R. 26 ¶ 2. Wexford and
HPL contracted with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) to provide health
care services to inmates at Pinckneyville and Illinois River. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Dr. Adrian
Feinerman, a physician and Wexford employee, was the medical director at
Pinckneyville during Jones’s incarceration there. Id. ¶ 3. Beginning in February 2005,
Jones complained to Feinerman on multiple occasions of pain on his left side, but
Feinerman refused to examine him. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. In or about July 2005, Jones’s spleen
ruptured. Id. ¶ 17. Jones was then transported to a hospital, where he underwent an
emergency splenectomy. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Upon awaking from surgery, hospital staff
diagnosed Jones for the first time with Stage 3 Non-Hodgkin’s Mantle Cell Lymphoma.
Id. ¶ 20. Based on conversations with hospital staff, Jones expected to receive
chemotherapy upon his return to Pinckneyville. Id. ¶ 21. Jones repeatedly requested
chemotherapy treatment from Feinerman, but Feinerman ignored these requests. Id.
¶¶ 22-23. Jones went two months without receiving any treatment for his lymphoma
by the end of 2005. Id. ¶ 23.
In late 2005, Jones was transferred to Illinois River so that he could receive
cancer treatment. Id. ¶ 24. Dr. Seth Osafo and Dr. Stephen Cullinan provided health

care services to inmates at Illinois River. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Osafo was the medical director at
Illinois River and Cullinan co-founded HPL. Id. Beginning in January 2006 and lasting
over a period of six to seven weeks, Jones received his first lymphoma treatment, which
Cullinan administered. Id. ¶ 26. Afterward, Cullinan did not provide additional care
to Jones, administer any tests of his condition, and or tell him that the lymphoma was
in remission. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. Jones received no medical treatment or testing at all until
months later, in June or July of 2007, when he underwent a biopsy and a
Computerized Tomography (CT) scan that revealed that his cancer had metastasized
to his bone marrow. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
Jones filed a complaint in June 2009. R. 1. The exact date of filing will be
discussed in greater detail below. Jones alleges that Feinerman and Wexford displayed
deliberate indifference to his medical needs by recklessly failing to diagnose his
diseased lymphoma and spleen, which caused him personal injury. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36, 38.
Jones also alleges that Feinerman, Wexford, Cullinan, Osafo, and HPL all displayed
deliberate indifference to his medical needs by recklessly failing to effectively treat his
diseased lymphoma and spleen, which caused him personal injury. Id. ¶¶ 41, 44, 46.
Because Defendants acted under the color of state law, Jones alleges that they violated
his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment (as
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment). Id. ¶¶ 37, 45.

II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only
include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell
Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this
rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on
the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of
court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police
Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[W]hen ruling on a
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations
contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); McGowan v.
Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 637 (7th Cir. 2010) (courts accept factual allegations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor). A “complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. –, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And the allegations that are entitled to

the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
III.
Jones’s allegations all advance a theory of deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against a person, who, acting
under color of state law, deprives an individual of any “rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512
U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). It provides the procedural vehicle for
bringing suit as a “method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Thus, job one is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Id. at 394. Here, deliberate indifference to the
serious medical needs of a prisoner violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th
Cir. 2008). Jones alleges that each Defendant knew of his serious medical conditions
but recklessly disregarded them. R. 26 ¶¶ 34, 36, 41, 44.
As detailed below, however, Jones’s claims with respect to the failure to diagnose
and treat his diseased spleen are barred by the statute of limitations, as are his claims
that Feinerman failed to effectively diagnose or treat his lymphoma. His allegations
against Osafo fail because they are too speculative, and fail to plausibly state a claim.
His allegations against Wexford and HPL fail because they do not plausibly allege a
policy of unconstitutional acts. Only Jones’s allegation against Cullinan survives the

motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations, arguably, began to run when he
was notified that his cancer had metastasized, and thus this action was filed within the
statute of limitations period.
A.

Diseased Spleen – All Defendants

The statute of limitations bars Jones’s claims regarding his spleen, and all
claims against Feinerman. The applicable statute of limitations for this § 1983 action
is derived from state personal-injury law. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275, 280
(1985). Jones’s suit is based on personal injuries he suffered as an inmate at various
prisons in Illinois. R. 26 ¶¶ 1-2. Therefore, he is subject to Illinois’s two-year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13-202 (2008); see
Anton v. Lehpamer, 787 F.2d 1141, 1142 (7th Cir. 1986).
Although state law determines the length of the statute of limitations, federal
law determines when that statute of limitations begins to accrue. Wilson v. Giesen, 956
F.2d 738, 740 (7th Cir. 1991). Federal law dictates that accrual begins when a “plaintiff
knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated.” Id. In
this case, therefore, the statute of limitations began to run when Jones knew or should
have known that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated by Defendants’
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
Jones alleges that Defendants generally, without singling out those Defendants
who were actually responsible for him at the time, failed to diagnose his ruptured
spleen. R. 26 ¶ 34. But, even if true, the statute of limitations for that claim accrued

more than two years before the case was filed. In July 2005, Jones’s spleen ruptured.
Id. ¶ 17. Accordingly, Jones was on notice that his constitutional rights were violated
due to a failure to diagnose his diseased spleen. And Jones’s claims concerning his
spleen are amenable to a bright-line deadline. The spleen ruptured in July 2005, and
the damage was repaired. Thus, the statute of limitations for deliberate indifference
to the condition of his spleen began to run in July 2005. Jones had until July 2007 to
file his suit for that claim, but did not do so until June 2009. Because Jones failed to
bring his suit within the statute of limitations period, his claims based on his spleen,
including against Feinerman and Wexford for failing to diagnose his diseased spleen,
are barred by the statute of limitations.
B.

Failure to Diagnose Lymphoma – All Defendants

Separate from the condition of his spleen, Jones also alleges that Defendants
failed to diagnose (as distinct from the failure to treat) his lymphoma. Id. ¶ 34. Jones
first became aware of the lymphoma in July 2005 when he awoke from the splenectomy
and hospital staff told him that he had lymphoma and needed treatment for it. Id. ¶¶
20-21. This put Jones on notice in July 2005 that he had a lymphoma and that
Defendants had failed to diagnose it up until that time. Again, because Jones failed to
bring his suit within two years of July 2005, his claims regarding diagnosis of the
lymphoma are barred by the statute of limitations.

C.

Failure to Treat Lymphoma – Feinerman

Jones alleges that Feinerman failed to effectively treat his lymphoma. Id. ¶ 41.
Jones became aware that he needed treatment for lymphoma at least as early as July
2005. Id. ¶ 20. After his diagnosis, Jones “expected” chemotherapy treatment, but his
requests were “ignored” by Feinerman. Id. ¶¶ 21-23. In late 2005, Jones was
transferred out of Feinerman’s care, and on to a new facility. Id. ¶ 24. Jones argues
that Feinerman’s deliberate indifference was part of a “continuing violation” that was
not discovered until June 2007. R. 41 at 5 (citing Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 31718 (7th Cir. 2001)).
But Jones’s arguments are not persuasive. With regard to when the
constitutional violation was discovered, Jones alleges that after his splenectomy, he
“expected” chemotherapy, and that he was “ignored.” Thus, based on Jones’s own
allegations, he knew or should have known then and there that Feinerman was
ignoring his serious medical need to receive cancer treatment.
Relying on Heard, Jones argues that this is not fatal to his claims, because
Feinerman’s conduct was part of a continuing violation, and that the Court can reach
outside of the statute of limitations period to Feinerman’s conduct. Heard held that a
statute of limitations for a claim based on deliberate indifference – in contrast to
medical malpractice – does not begin to run as soon as a plaintiff discovers he has a
medical problem that requires attention. Heard, 253 F.3d at 318. Instead, the
continuing violation doctrine recognizes the reality that every day a state actor fails

to treat a prisoner’s painful condition is a fresh infliction of punishment, and that it
would be unreasonable to require a plaintiff to sue separately over every incident of
unlawful conduct in the continual series. Id. at 318, 319. Given the impracticality of
filing a series of suits, a plaintiff is permitted to reach back to the beginning of the
series of violations, even if the start would otherwise fall outside of the statute of
limitations, and pursue the series in one claim, so long as part of the series is within
the statute of limitations. Id. at 319.
But the series of violations continue only “for as long as the defendants [have]
the power to do something about [the prisoner’s] condition.” Id. at 318. Measured by
this standard, Jones’s claims against Feinerman must be dismissed. The series of
violations Jones alleges against Feinerman terminated when Feinerman no longer had
the power to do something about Jones’s condition, that is, when Feinerman was no
longer responsible for Jones’s care. That occurred in late 2005, when Jones was
transferred to another IDOC facility and out of Feinerman’s care. The continuing
violation doctrine would have allowed Jones to file a claim in late 2007, but no later,
because the series of violations ended when Feinerman no longer had the power to do
anything about Jones’s lymphoma. Because Jones did not bring this suit within two
years of the completion of Feinerman’s series of violations, the failure to treat claims
against Feinerman must also be dismissed.

D.

All Claims Against Osafo

In one set of paragraphs of the complaint, Jones alleges that Osafo failed to
effectively treat his lymphoma; more precisely, without naming Osafo separately or
alleging facts specific to him, the paragraphs allege that “Defendants” were
deliberately indifferent to the need for lymphoma treatment. R. 26 ¶¶ 41-47. The
complaint mentions no facts about Osafo except that he was the medical director of
Illinois River. Id. ¶ 5. Nothing is alleged about any interactions between Jones and
Osafo while Jones was an inmate at Illinois River. As discussed above, a claim of
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs requires that a plaintiff prove that the
defendant subjectively knew of and disregarded a risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety.
Proof is not required at this stage, Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir.
2009), but allegations beyond “formulaic recitation of the elements” of the claim are,
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court categorized as “conclusory” “bare
assertions” – and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth – allegations that the
defendants “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” the
plaintiff to unconstitutional treatment. Id. Similarly, Jones’s complaint offers against
Osafo only the conclusory allegation of deliberate indifference against all “Defendants,”
R. 26 ¶ 41, without any more allegations from which to draw an inference that Osafo
knew of Jones’s lymphoma and refused to treat it effectively.5 Perhaps discovery into
the remaining claim (see infra) against Cullinan for the medical care (or lack thereof)
5

The complaint is distinguishable from Burks, where at least a grievance handler directed the
medical unit – of which the relevant defendant in Burks was the director – to send the plaintiff
to a specialist, thus making it likely that the medical unit director knew of the medical need.
555 F.3d at 594. It is also worth noting that Burks was decided three months before Iqbal.

at Illinois River, or perhaps even discovery into the claim against Ghosh, will reveal
a basis for additional allegations against Osafo, but the current complaint fails to state
a claim against Osafo.
This is true even if Jones is trying to invoke some sort of supervisory liability
theory against Osafo, who was the medical director at Illinois River. There is no
vicarious liability under § 1983. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948. And the Supreme Court has
even labeled “supervisory liability” as a “misnomer” in the § 1983 and Bivens context.
129 S. Ct. at 1949. It is not clear what impact, if any, Iqbal has on the line of cases that
hold supervisors may be held liable if they “facilitated, approved, condoned, or turned
a blind eye” to constitutional violations. E.g., Trentadue v. Redmon, 619 F.3d 648, 652
(7th Cir. 2010). Perhaps this is all just a way of saying what the Seventh Circuit has
previously held, that “a supervising prison official cannot incur § 1983 liability unless
that officer is shown to be personally responsible for a deprivation of a constitutional
right.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 992 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Vinning-El v. Evans,
– F.3d –, 2011 WL 4336661, at *1 (7th Cir., Sep. 16, 2011) (“Section 1983 does not
authorize ‘supervisory liability.’”) (citation omitted). Or perhaps Iqbal has set a more
demanding standard than previously set for supervisors to be held responsible for
conduct in which they did not personally engage. In this case, however, there is no need
to reconcile the standards: here, Jones has not alleged any personal conduct or
responsibility of Osafo at all, other than the conclusory allegations that address
“Defendants” as a group. R. 26 ¶¶ 41-47. For Osafo to be personally liable, the
complaint must allege some causal connection between Osafo personally and the

violation of Jones’s constitutional rights. Vance, 97 F.3d at 993. Jones’s claims against
Osafo are dismissed.
E.

All Claims Against Wexford and HPL

Jones’s allegations against Wexford and HPL must also be dismissed. Jones
alleges that Wexford and HPL failed to effectively treat his lymphoma. Id. ¶ 41. As
corporations, Wexford and HPL can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if
they had a policy or practice that caused the violation. Woodward v. Correctional Med.
Services of Ill., Inc., 368F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). Wexford and HPL “must have
been aware of the risk of harm and, by failing to act to rectify it, sanctioned the
harmful conduct.” Novack v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2000). The
complaint, however, does not allege that either Wexford or HPL were engaged in any
policy or practice to violate inmates’ constitutional rights.
There may still be liability if there is a “series of bad acts” that allow “the court
to infer from them that the policymaking level of government was bound to have
noticed what was going on and by failing to do anything must have encouraged or at
least condoned, thus in either event adopting, the misconduct of subordinate officers.”
Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, Jones argues that
there is such a series of bad acts. R. 41 at 8. Jones argues that the deliberate
indifference he experienced over the course of more than one facility for a wide span
of time compels the conclusion that Wexford and HPL are liable. Id. But so far as the
complaint alleges, to the extent that either Wexford or HPL acted unconstitutionally,

Jones’s allegations are limited only to his treatment, or lack thereof. Ordinarily, absent
a policy expressly adopted by a final policy-maker, a plaintiff must show that there is
a “pattern” of failing to treat “inmates.” Novack, 226 F.3d at 531 (holding that the
plaintiff’s failure to prove a pattern of suicide across inmates at a facility required
judgment in favor of the defendant-corporation). In this case, Jones’s allegations are
insufficient, because they are limited only to him, and do not represent a pattern of
deliberate indifference to multiple inmates across the facilities where he was
incarcerated. There might be other cases where a policy may be sufficiently alleged as
a pattern (again, as distinct from municipal liability via a final policymaker’s conduct)
even though it is applicable to only one or a handful of inmates, but the allegations
here simply do not state that type of pattern. Therefore, Jones has failed to state a
cause of action against either Wexford or HPL.
F.

Failure to Treat Lymphoma – Cullinan

Jones’s final allegation that is the subject of the present motion to dismiss
alleges that Cullinan failed to effectively treat his lymphoma. R. 26 ¶ 41. Cullinan
began treating Jones’s lymphoma in early 2006. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. After the initial therapy
ended, Cullinan failed to follow up with more testing, treatment, or even an update as
to whether or not the cancer was in remission. Id. ¶¶ 27-29. In light of these
allegations – that Cullinan kept Jones in the dark – the statute of limitations with
respect to Jones’s claim against Cullinan did not accrue in early 2006; instead, accrual
began in June or July 2007 when Jones was made aware that his cancer had
metastasized. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. Only at that point could Jones have known that Cullinan

violated his constitutional right to medical care by failing to effectively treat his
lymphoma earlier. Perhaps discovery will show otherwise; if so, the limitations defense
may be raised again at the summary-judgment stage.
The precise date in June or July 2007 that Jones learned that his cancer
metastisized is crucial because the effective date on which Jones’s complaint was filed
falls in the same period of time, plus two years. The complaint was filed on the Court’s
docket on June 29, 2009, it was mailed in an envelope postmarked June 25, 2009, and
the complaint itself is dated June 18, 2009. R. 1. As discussed below, Jones’s case will
be deemed filed when he properly tendered it to the prison mail system for mailing.
The “mailbox rule” states that a pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed
when it is placed in the prison mail system. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).
The mailbox rule is arguably applicable to this case. Although the Seventh Circuit has
“assume[d]” that the rule applies to other filings by a pro se prisoner, Simmons v.
Ghent, 970 F.2d 392, 393 (7th Cir. 1992) (a rule 59(e) motion), Jones v. Bertrand later
stated that the Seventh Circuit had “not ruled on whether [Houston] should be
extended to a pro se prisoner’s filing of other papers.” 171 F.3d 499, 501 (applying the
mailbox rule to habeas corpus petitions). Although the Seventh Circuit has not
explicitly applied the mailbox rule to § 1983 complaints of pro se prisoners, Edwards
v. United States held that “we need not decide here whether there is any kind of paper,
or any circumstance, under which a district court would be entitled to hold a pro
se prisoner litigant to an actual receipt standard, but we are confident that this would
be an exceptional situation.” 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).

Edwards suggests that the Court should apply the mailbox rule to Jones’s § 1983
complaint, just as other courts have to other § 1983 cases.6 And there is also a clear
answer based on the Local Rules: Local Rule of Civil Procedure 3.3 resolves the
question for this particular case, which included an application to proceed in forma
pauperis. Local Rule 3.3(d) provides in pertinent part:
(d) Date of filing. If the judge grants the [in forma pauperis] petition, the
complaint shall be filed as of the date of the judge’s order except that where the
complaint must be filed within a time limit and the order granting leave to file
is entered after the expiration of that time limit, the complaint shall be deemed
to have been filed:
(1) in the case of any plaintiff in custody, as of the time of the plaintiff's
delivery of the complaint to the custodial authorities for transmittal to
the court . . . .
Jones filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis, R. 4, and it was granted, R. 6.
Accordingly, the date the complaint was filed is when it was delivered to authorities
for transmittal to the court. To be sure, although Jones dated his complaint June 18,
2009, that does not necessarily mean that Jones tendered the complaint to the
appropriate officials that same day. The precise date of filing can only be determined
with additional discovery. At this stage of the litigation, it is Cullinan’s burden to
establish that Jones has failed to state a claim. Because Cullinan has not proved that
Jones learned of the metastasis before June 18, 2007, and because Jones has made the

6

Other circuits have applied the mailbox rule to § 1983 complaints. See, e.g., Cooper v.
Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995); Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d
733, 735-6 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). A colleague in this district too has extended Houston
to § 1983 complaints. See e.g., Tolliver v. Jenkins, 1993 WL 317259, *2 (N.D.Ill., Aug. 18,
1993). See also the unpublished (but post-January 1, 2007, so citable under Circuit Rule 32.1)
decision, Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 Fed. Appx. 3, 4 (7th Cir. Dec. 13, 2007) (applying mailbox rule
to § 1983 complaint alleging deliberate indifference to medical need).

necessary allegations for a claim of deliberate indifference, the motion to dismiss is
denied as to Cullinan.
IV.
Osafo, Feinerman, and Wexford’s motion to dismiss [R. 36] is granted. Cullinan
and HPL’s motion to dismiss [R. 46] is granted in part and denied in part. All claims
against HPL are dismissed. Jones’s claim for failure to treat his lymphoma against
Cullinan survives the motion to dismiss. As to all other claims against Cullinan, the
motion to dismiss is granted. The only claims remaining in the case are those claims
against Ghosh, and the claim for Cullinan’s failure to treat Jones’s lymphoma. The
status hearing of 10/12/2011 remains as scheduled.
ENTERED:

____________________________
Honorable Edmond E. Chang
United States District Judge

DATE: September 28, 2011