Sledge v. Bellwood School District 88
Filing
108
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr on 2/13/2012. Mailed notice(tbk, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SAMUEL SLEDGE
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Plaintiff,
v.
BELLWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT 88
Defendant.
Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.
Case No. 09-cv-4186
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [101] and
Plaintiff’s motions for a motion for direct verdict [96], motion for directed verdict [98],
motion to dismiss [99], and motion to dismiss Defendant’s summary judgment motion
[105]. Plaintiff, who is pro se, filed this lawsuit in July of 2009 [1] and filed an amended
complaint [9] on September 15, 2009. Plaintiff was formerly employed as a school bus
driver with Defendant, and this lawsuit arises out of his employment with and termination
from employment with Defendant. Construing Plaintiff’s amended complaint liberally,
the Court interpreted the amended complaint as asserting eight separate claims. (See [32]
at 1).
On April 20, 2010, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss all of
Plaintiff’s claims except his Title VII claims of race-based discrimination and retaliation
on res judicata grounds. Id. at 9-10. On June 17, 2011, the Court denied Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment [83], and again reminded Plaintiff that the Pro Se Help
Desk could assist Plaintiff in preparing his motion and helping to ensure that his filings
were in conformance with court rules and procedures.
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Plaintiff then filed a motion for direct verdict [96], a motion for directed verdict
[98] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, and a motion to dismiss [99].
Defendant responded by filing a motion for summary judgment [101], and Plaintiff filed
a motion to dismiss summary judgment [105].
For the reasons explained below,
Defendant’s motion [101] is granted and Plaintiff’s motions [96, 98, 99, 105] are
respectfully denied.
I.
Background
The following facts are undisputed or have been deemed admitted pursuant to
Local Rule 56.1(b). 1 Defendant Bellwood School District 88 (“Bellwood”) is a
kindergarten through eighth grade school district located in Illinois. Plaintiff Samuel
Sledge, who is African American, was hired by Bellwood as a bus driver on August 29,
2005.
During the 2005-2006 school year, a job opened up for the Evening Building and
Grounds Coordinator after Ray Zaabel retired. The job description listed the position’s
essential duties and responsibilities, which included fifteen job duties related to custodial
and building maintenance functions.
On January 20, 2006, Plaintiff submitted an application for the position, and
included his resume, high school diploma, and other documents in his application.
Plaintiff’s resume did not indicate any prior experience performing custodial or building
maintenance functions or any prior employers. Sledge listed his skills related to the job
as “Communicating with the appropriate chain of command, assuring daily all codes
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The Court takes the relevant facts primarily from Defendants’ statement of facts (“Def.
SOF”)[103]. Because Plaintiff failed to file a response to Defendants Statement of Facts pursuant
to L.R. 56.1(b), “all materials set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be
deemed admitted.” L.R. 56.1(b); see also Arns v. U.S., 2001 WL 522421, *1 (“A district court
may strictly apply Rule 56.1(b) and consider a party who fails to submit such a statement as
having admitted the controverted facts alleged in the opposing party’s Rule 56.1(a) statement.).
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regulation & sanitations are in compliance and repaired. Diploma St. Phillips High
School.” He listed his work experience and education as, “Mystique Barber Schools,
Molar Beauty and Winslow Beauty supplies and Institutional Administrator, Coyne
Institute of Trade, Institutional Administrative Certification from the U.S. Dept. of
Education.” Previously, on January 9, 2006, Joe Crowell submitted an application for the
evening grounds coordinator position, including a cover letter and resume. Crowell, who
is also an African American male, had been a custodian at the Bellwood Building and
Grounds Department for six years. He also had previous building maintenance experience
from 1983 to 1994.
Janiece Jackson, the Bellwood Human Resources Director at the time,
interviewed all of the candidates for the evening coordinator position, including both
Plaintiff and Crowell. After the interviews, Jackson decided that Crowell was qualified
for the position and Plaintiff was not. She offered Crowell the job, which he started in
May 2006. According to Jackson, who is also African American, race was not a factor in
selecting the new evening coordinator. On May 4, 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint
against Bellwood in the Circuit Court of Cook County to compel arbitration on the basis
of the denial of his union rights.
On June 2, 2006, Plaintiff and his bus assistant, Rhonda Rhodes, were suspended
without pay pending a disciplinary hearing regarding an allegation that they left a
sleeping student on the school bus after completing the afternoon route. Four days later
Plaintiff received a disciplinary hearing at which he was allowed to submit evidence and
provide testimony. On June 26, 2006, a summary of the hearing was presented to the
Board of Education, and the Board authorized Plaintiff’s termination effective June 30,
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2006. In his complaint, Plaintiff argues that he was fired in retaliation for filing a
complaint in the circuit court after he was not given the evening coordinator job in
violation of union rules.
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of fact, the Court
“must construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party.” Foley v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir.
2004). To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must go beyond the pleadings
and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. The party seeking
summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Summary
judgment is proper against “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322. The non-moving party “must do more than
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant’s] position will be
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insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
III.
Analysis
A.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant argues that it is entitled summary judgment because Plaintiff has failed
to establish any genuine dispute as to the material facts that Defendant violated Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., when Plaintiff was not offered a
job as the evening coordinator and his job was terminated in retaliation for a lawsuit he
filed against the Defendant in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
1.
Race Discrimination
As a Title VII plaintiff alleging racial discrimination, it is initially Plaintiff’s
burden to prove that Defendant has discriminated against him. Plaintiff can prove this
under either the “direct or indirect method.” Montgomery v. American Airlines, Inc., 626
F.3d 328, 393 (7th Cir. 2010). Under the direct method, Plaintiff must provide “direct
evidence of—or sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow an inference of—intentional
racial discrimination.” Id. “The indirect method of proof requires [Plaintiff] to introduce
evidence demonstrating four elements to establish a prima facie case * * * on his racial
discrimination claim: (1) that he was a member of a protected class, (2) that he was
performing his job satisfactorily, (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and
(4) that [Defendant] treated a similarly situated individual outside [Plaintiff’s] protected
class more favorably.” Id. at 394. Once a plaintiff puts forth evidence to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions taken against him.
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See, e.g.
Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 978-79 (7th Cir. 2004). Under both
methods it is initially Plaintiff’s burden to introduce evidence that shows that he was the
victim of discrimination.
Plaintiff has provided no direct evidence of race discrimination.
“Caselaw
establishes that direct proof of discrimination is relatively difficult to adduce.” Stanus v.
Perry, 2007 WL 257679, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2007). In this regard, the Seventh
Circuit has defined direct evidence in the employment law context as evidence which, if
believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular issue in question without reliance on
inference or presumption. See, e.g., Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th
Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly counseled that “[d]irect evidence usually
requires an admission by the decisionmaker that his actions were based on” the illicit
decision-making criterion. Balderson v. Fairbanks More Engine Div. of Coltec
Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 321 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Rogers, 320 F.3d at 753 (stating that
direct evidence “essentially requires an admission by the decision-maker that his actions
were based on the prohibited animus.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has explained that evidence of this sort is exemplified by statements
such as “‘I fired you because of your age”’ or because of another illicit decision-making
criterion. Robin v. Expo Eng'g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted); accord, e.g., Castleman v. ACME Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir.
1992) (teaching that direct evidence will “rarely” be found).
Again, no evidence
approaching this type of evidence is present in the record.
With regard to the indirect method, Defendant admits that Plaintiff is a member of
a protected class (he is African American) and that he suffered an adverse employment
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action (termination). In regard to the second and fourth elements, however, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that he was qualified for the
position or that a similarly situated non-class member was treated more favorably than
he. The Court agrees. Defendant presented evidence that Plaintiff was not qualified to
fill the position of Evening Building and Grounds Coordinator. Specifically, Plaintiff’s
resume was devoid of any prior experience in custodial or building maintenance
functions or relevant skills, whereas Crowell, the man whom Defendant ultimately hired
for the evening coordinator position, had been a custodian working for Bellwood for 6
years and had previous building experience from 1983-1994. Furthermore, like Plaintiff,
Crowell is an African American man. Because Plaintiff was not qualified for the position
and the poison was filled with another African American male in any event, Plaintiff has
failed to prove a prima facie case of race-based discrimination. Montgomery, 626 F.3d at
393.
2.
Retaliation
Title VII makes it unlawful for any employer to discriminate against an employee
for opposing a practice made unlawful by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To prove a
case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected
expression; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of her employer; and (3) there
was a causal link between the two. Fine v. Ryan Int’l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th
Cir. 2002) (citing Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir. 1994));
see also Firestine v. Parkview Health System, Inc., 388 F.3d 229, 233 (7th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, in order to prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim, Plaintiff must establish
an initial act, protected by Title VII, as the basis for his claim.
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff is unable to establish a case for Title VII
retaliation because the alleged basis of his retaliation claim is the filing of a lawsuit in the
Circuit Court of Cook that was not based on any prohibited activity covered by Title VII.
The Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that “[t]he retaliation
began after plaintiff filed the complaint in the court.” But the state court complaint was
based only on the denial of Plaintiff’s union rights, and not based on any prohibited
activity covered by Title VII, such as racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a);
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863, 868 (2011) (“Title
VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin”). Accordingly, the filing of this complaint also cannot form the basis of a Title
VII retaliation claim. Fine, 305 F.3d at 752-53.
B.
Plaintiff’s Motions
Plaintiff filed a motion for direct verdict [96], a motion for directed verdict
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 [98], a motion to dismiss [99], and a
motion to dismiss Defendant’s summary judgment motion [105]. Because the Court now
grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [101] on Plaintiff’s discrimination and
retaliation claims, Plaintiff’s motions [96, 98, 99, 105] are denied as moot. Finally, the
Court notes that, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court does have jurisdiction to hear
all of motions currently before the Court, as this action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et.
seq. and is properly before this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion [101] is granted and Plaintiff’s
motions [96, 98, 99, 105] are respectfully denied. A final judgment will be entered in a
separate document pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
Dated: February 13, 2012
_____________________________
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
United States District Judge
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