Johnson v. Astrue

Filing 36

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Young B. Kim on 9/30/2010. (aac, )

Johnson v. Astrue

Doc. 36

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT N O R T H E R N DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS E A S T E R N DIVISION A N G E L A JOHNSON for her minor c h ild , K.J., P la in tif f , v. M IC H A E L J. ASTRUE, C o m m is s io n e r of Social Security, D e f e n d a n t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

C a s e No. 09 CV 4522 M a g is tr a te Judge Young B. Kim

S e p te m b e r 30, 2010

M E M O R A N D U M OPINION and ORDER B e f o re the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff A n g e la Johnson ("Johnson") seeks supplemental security income ("SSI") child's benefits u n d e r the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C), on behalf of K.J., her minor son. Johnson claims that K.J. is disabled by a combination of a learning disability, attention deficit h yp e ra c tiv ity disorder, behavior disorder, and depression. The Commissioner of Social S e c u rity issued a final decision denying her claims, and Johnson appeals. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4 0 5 ( g ) , 1383(c). For the following reasons, Johnson's motion for summary judgment is d e n ie d and the Commissioner's motion is granted. Procedural History J o h n s o n filed an application for SSI on K.J.'s behalf in November 2006, claiming that K .J . had become disabled on October 1, 2005. (A.R. 49.) After the Social Security A d m in is tra tio n ("SSA") denied her claim initially and on reconsideration, (id. at 50-52, 565 9 ), Johnson was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), (id. at 23-

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47). On December 29, 2008, the ALJ denied Johnson's claims. (Id. at 11-22.) The Appeals C o u n c il denied Johnson's request for review, (id. at 1-3), at which point the ALJ's decision b e c a m e the final decision of the Commissioner, see Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 841 ( 7 t h Cir. 2007). Johnson then filed the current suit seeking judicial review of the ALJ's d e c is io n . See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this c o u rt. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Legal Framework T h e social security disability benefit program allows low-income parents of disabled c h ild re n to access benefits designed for disabled workers--the rationale being that parenting a disabled child "may limit the amount of productive work that the parents can do, inflicting h a rd s h ip on families of limited means." Sanchez v. Barnhart, 467 F.3d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ). A child is considered disabled if he has a "physical or mental impairment, which re s u lts in marked and severe functional limitations, and . . . which has lasted or can be e x p e c te d to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U .S .C . §1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). Because "disabled children generally do not have a work history," their SSI claims are c o n s id e re d under a framework distinct from that used for adults. Sanchez, 467 F.3d at1082. The first two steps are the same: the ALJ asks whether the child is engaged in substantial g a in f u l activity (if so, the claim is denied) and whether he has a medically severe impairment o r combination of impairments (if not, the claim is denied). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924;

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Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 2007). Next, the ALJ asks whether the child's im p a irm e n t meets, or is medically or functionally equal to, one of the listings set forth in 20 C .F .R . § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Murphy, 496 F.3d at 633. To determine whether a n impairment functionally equals a listing, the ALJ evaluates the severity of its impact in s ix domains of functioning: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and c o m p le tin g tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating o b jec ts; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and physical well-being.

2 0 C.F.R.§ 416.926a(a), (b)(1). Functional equivalence exists where the ALJ finds that the c h ild has a marked limitation "in two domains of functioning or an extreme limitation in o n e ." Murphy, 496 F.3d at 633; 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). A marked limitation interferes s e rio u s ly-- a n d an extreme limitation, "very seriously"--with a child's "ability to initiate, s u s ta in , or complete activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)-(3); Patino v. Astrue, 574 F. S u p p . 2d 862, 869 (N.D. Ill. 2008). F a c ts K .J . was born on August 7, 1994, and at the time of the hearing he was a 13 year-old e ig h th grader living in Joliet, Illinois with his mother, sister, and nephew. (Id. at 27, 30, 48.) K.J. had been diagnosed with depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"), a n d a learning disability, and he had a long history of academic and behavioral problems.

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A.

S c h o o l and Psychological Records

K .J .'s school records from his seventh-grade year show that he was failing almost all o f his classes. (A.R. 440-41.) K.J.'s teacher noted that his behavior in class was "horrible" a n d stated that his "behavior is affecting his grades." (Id. at 440.) In January 2007 K.J. was re f e rre d to Dr. John Brauer, a clinical psychologist, for a mental status examination. (A.R. 4 4 4 -4 6 .) Dr. Brauer noted that K.J. attended weekly counseling at the Will County Health D e p a rtm e n t to address his behavioral issues and took medications for depression and ADHD. (Id. at 444.) Dr. Brauer noted that K.J.'s hygiene, vocabulary, and "general fund of k n o w le d g e " were "poor," and his reading level was "quite poor." (Id. at 445-46.) Dr. Bauer c o n d u c te d psychological tests that showed K.J. to be "in the low average range of cognitive f u n c tio n in g ." (Id. at 446.) In February 2007 K.J. underwent a psychological assessment with Karen Smith at the W ill County Health Department. Smith interviewed Johnson, who reported that K.J. hides d irty dishes and garbage around their home and had been wetting the bed for about two years. (A.R. 531.) Johnson reported that K.J. does not necessarily shower on a daily basis and has a n ongoing hygiene problem. (Id. at 532-33.) K.J. told Smith that when he is in trouble or w h e n people yell at him he had transient thoughts of suicide, but denied ever trying to hurt h im s e lf . (Id. at 533.) Smith administered cognitive tests which showed that K.J. has a lowa v e ra g e IQ and below grade-level skills in a number of academic subjects. (Id. at 534-35.) She noted that K.J.'s "deficits in academics likely reflect years of inattention." (Id. at 537.)

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She predicted that his academics would advance with special education services and that his b e h a v io r should improve "once he is placed in the correct academic environment." (Id. at 5 3 8 .) The following month, in March 2007, K.J. underwent school evaluations for special e d u c a tio n classes. (A.R. 138, 152.) A school psychologist evaluated K.J.'s academic skills a s being in the low-average range, with "very low" skills in reading and writing, and almost n o phonetic awareness skills. (Id. at 144.) She estimated that his reading and writing skills w e re up to five years delayed. (Id.) A school social worker noted that K.J. is popular with h is classmates, personable, and "can be respectful and polite." (Id. at 141.) She noted that h e often disrupts his classes by "attempting to amuse his peers," and that he "appears to have little self control" in class. (Id.) The social worker also observed that K.J. argues with his te a c h e rs before the start of a new lesson and would then "shut down" and "refuse to work." (Id.) She said that K.J. "appears to be fearful of failure" and his lack of preparation and o rg a n iz a tio n was of increasing concern. (Id.) She noted that K.J. had twelve office referrals a n d five suspensions for disciplinary infractions. (Id.) Based on these evaluations, K.J. was placed in special education classes for the first tim e . (Id. at 138, 532.) A year later, his grades had improved significantly. In the first two q u a rte rs of the 2007-2008 academic year, K.J. had earned 3.38 and 3.25 grade-point a v e ra g e s , respectively. (Id. at 317.)

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The record includes reports from three state agency reviewers who evaluated K.J.'s lim ita tio n s in each of the six domains of functioning. In February 2007 two reviewers signed a n evaluation opining that K.J. has no marked or extreme limitations in any of the functional d o m a in s . (A.R. 448-50.) They noted that K.J. "does not have significant mental health is su e s" but "appears to have some limitations in academic performance." (Id. at 452.) Three m o n th s later a third reviewer opined that K.J. has a marked limitation in attending and c o m p le tin g tasks, but less than a marked limitation or no limitation in the remaining domains. (Id. at 511.) The record also conveys several incidents of K.J.'s troubling behavior. During the w in te r break of his seventh-grade year, K.J. ran away from home twice. Both times he was g o n e for only a day, turning up first at his grandmother's house and then at a friend's a p a rtm e n t, but Johnson was concerned enough to alert the police. (A.R. 573, 575.) Two m o n th s later, K.J. was hospitalized for a night after he threatened suicide during an argument w ith his mother. (A.R. 123, 486-87.) He later told his psychiatrist that he had not actually b e e n suicidal, but rather was acting out because he was angry at his mother. (A.R. 499.) K.J. re ite ra te d that explanation at the hearing. (Id. at 43.) That summer K.J. stole his mother's c re d it card and an acquaintance's bike and told his therapist that he felt no remorse for his m isc o n d u c t. (Id. at 563, 565.) In September 2007 K.J. was caught smoking marijuana and h e later reported to his therapist that he and a friend had consumed alcohol on the school bus. (Id. at 549, 561.) Finally, in April 2008, K.J. was expelled from school for pushing a teacher.

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(Id. at 300, 330). As a result he was transferred to Thompson Instructional Center, an a lte rn a tiv e school for children with behavioral problems. (Id. at 27, 46.) B. K .J .'s and Johnson's Testimony

A t the hearing the ALJ asked K.J. to describe his typical day. He said that he gets up a t 5 a.m. to take his medicine, then goes back to sleep until 6 a.m., when he gets ready for s c h o o l and watches tv. (A.R. 35.) K.J. said that as an eighth grader at Thompson, he was a tte n d in g regular classrooms for math and social studies but special education classes for his re m a in in g academic courses. (Id. at 32.) He testified that his teachers give him extra time to take tests and read the questions out loud for him. (Id.) K.J. said that after school he takes th e bus home and then watches tv and goes outside or to a friend's house until about 6:30 p .m ., when he comes home to eat, watch tv, and get on the computer, where he spends time o n myspace.com or listens to music online. (Id. at 36, 42.) Then he talks on the phone and g o e s to bed at 10:30 p.m. (Id. at 36.) K.J. said that he does chores, likes playing football and b a s k e tb a ll, and spends time with friends every day. (Id. at 37-38.) W h e n asked about his relationships, K.J. testified that he sometimes has trouble g e ttin g along with people. (A.R. 38.) He also said that he has difficulty concentrating at s c h o o l and that he stops working when it gets too difficult. (Id. at 39.) K.J. testified that b e f o re moving to Thompson, he often got in trouble for talking back, arguing with teachers, a n d failing to do his work. (Id. at 41.) He said he did those things because he "didn't get the

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work." (Id.) When asked why he threatened to hurt himself in March 2007, K.J. testified th a t he "was angry," and that he had not "done anything like that since." (Id. at 43.) Johnson testified that she believes that K.J. is disabled because he "doesn't have a lot o f patience to keep up," and "he gives up easy, fast, and I don't see him doing a lot of p o s itiv e things." (A.R. 33.) She said that K.J. has difficulty concentrating and that she c o n s ta n tly reminds him to clean up after himself. (Id. at 39.) She said that he does not wash h is clothes regularly and that he requires constant reminders to maintain his hygiene. (Id. at 4 4 .) Johnson testified that she does not believe that her son is truly depressed and does not b e lie v e that depression was behind his March 2007 suicide gesture. (Id. at 34.) She e x p la in e d that K.J. had been seeing a psychiatrist at the Will County Health Department on a weekly basis for about two years and she believed that the medication that he prescribed w e re helping her son. (Id. at 34-35.) C. A L J 's Decision

In denying Johnson's application for child disability benefits, the ALJ found that K.J. h a d not engaged in substantial gainful activity and that he had severe impairments in the form o f learning problems, ADHD, behavior disorder, and depression. (A.R. 14.) The ALJ next d e te rm in e d that none of K.J.'s impairments--either individually or in combination--meet, e q u a l, or functionally equal the listings. (Id.) In analyzing whether K.J.'s impairments f u n c tio n a lly equal the listings, the ALJ found that he has no extreme limitations in any of the s ix domains of function. (Id. at 15-21.) The ALJ determined that K.J. has a marked

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limitation in attending and completing tasks, but no limitation or less than a marked lim ita tio n in the remaining domains. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that K.J. is not d is a b le d . (Id. at 21-22.) Analysis In challenging the Commissioner's decision denying K.J. benefits, Johnson argues that the ALJ erroneously overlooked or down-played evidence which would support a finding that K .J . has marked limitations in the domains of acquiring and using information, interacting a n d relating with others, and caring for oneself. Although the Commissioner received two e x te n s io n s of time to file a responding brief and then sought (and received) leave to file its b rie f two days late, the response does little more than highlight a few facts meant to show t h a t K.J.'s behavioral and academic problems were improving by the time of the hearing. Despite that unsatisfying response, the Commissioner benefits here from the applicable s ta n d a rd of review, under which this court upholds the Commissioner's decision as long as " it is supported by substantial evidence and is free of legal error." Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F .3 d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002); Patino, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 868. "Substantial evidence is `such re le v a n t evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 6 6 4 , 668 (7th Cir. 2004)). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision for substantial evidence th is court will "not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, o r substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Commissioner." Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d

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863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). Instead, this court will uphold the Commissioner's decision if the A L J builds an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion. See Giles ex r e l. Giles v. Astrue, 483 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2007). Johnson first argues that the ALJ's finding that K.J. has less than a marked limitation in acquiring and using information lacks the support of substantial evidence. According to Johnson, the ALJ failed to consider the special education services and other accommodations th a t K.J.'s school made for him, did not account for the evidence showing that K.J.'s a c a d e m i c s were years below grade level, and selectively drew evidence favorable to his c o n c lu s io n s from Dr. Brauer's disability evaluation and Smith's psychological assessment. Although it is true that an ALJ may not overlook whole lines of evidence or "cherry-pick" e v id e n c e from the record that supports his conclusions, see Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 4 2 5 (7th Cir. 2010), that is not what happened here. The ALJ discussed the results of K.J.'s c o g n itiv e testing and acknowledged that his IQ placed him in the low-average range. (A.R. 1 6 .) The ALJ noted that K.J. was reading only at a second-grade level as of the winter of 2 0 0 7 . (Id.) The ALJ pointed out that Smith believed that he would improve academically w ith special education services and that one of his teachers believed that his achievement la g s could be pinned on K.J.'s lack of desire rather than his lack of ability. (Id.) The ALJ w e n t on to discuss at length K.J.'s subsequent grades in his special education classes and o b s e rv e d that by February 2008 K.J. was placed on his school's high honor roll. (Id.)

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Contrary to Johnson's argument, the ALJ specifically acknowledged K.J.'s testimony that h is teachers accommodate him by reading tests to him and giving him extra time. (Id.) Johnson's argument that the ALJ "cherry-picked" evidence from Dr. Brauer's and K a re n Smith's report is unpersuasive. As to the former, Johnson argues that "[w]hile the A L J stated that Dr. Brauer found K.J. to have a low reading level, Dr. Brauer's actual f in d in g s were that [K.J.]'s `reading level is quite poor.'" (R. 21, Pl.'s Br. at 8 (quoting A.R. 4 4 6 ).) She does not say what relevant difference there is in this distinction, nor does this c o u rt see one. It is hard to view this argument as anything other than the kind of quibbling th a t the substantial evidence standard precludes. See Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 811 (7 th Cir. 2000) (noting that court's role is to examine ALJ's decision for "fatal gaps or c o n tra d ic tio n s " rather than to nit-pick). As for the Smith assessment, Johnson acknowledges th a t the ALJ highlighted Smith's view of K.J.'s reading lag, but faults the ALJ for not m e n tio n in g K.J.'s spelling and math lags "and that K.J. was considerably behind where he s h o u ld be in school." (R. 21, Pl.'s Br. at 9.) It is true that the ALJ did not specifically m e n tio n Smith's assessment of K.J.'s spelling and math lags, but his decision assures this c o u rt that he reviewed and considered Smith's full report. The ALJ pointed out Smith's o p in io n that K.J.'s scores in those areas would likely improve with special education s e rv ic e s , and then relied on the evidence showing that Smith's prediction was right--K.J. b e g a n receiving A's in math just months after his special-education assessment. (A.R. 16.) What's more, the ALJ reasonably relied on the fact that no treating professional had found

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K.J. to have a marked or extreme limitation in this domain. (Id.) Because the ALJ a d e q u a te ly explained how this evidence supports his conclusion that K.J.'s limitation in a c q u irin g and using information is less than marked, his conclusion has to stand. See Rice v . Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that ALJ need not "provide a written e v a lu a tio n of every piece of evidence" as long as satisfies "minimal duty to articulate his re a s o n s " ). N e x t Johnson argues that the ALJ "made significant oversights" in concluding that K .J . has less than a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, and argues that h is decision on this point "does not reflect careful consideration of the record as a whole." (R. 21, Pl.'s Br. at 12.) Specifically, Johnson argues that the ALJ failed to consider K.J.'s p e rs is te n t disrespect for his teachers--culminating in the teacher-shoving incident--and his o n -g o in g efforts to disrupt class by amusing his classmates. But once again, Johnson m isc h a ra c te riz e s the ALJ's explanation. The ALJ did specifically reference K.J.'s tendency to disrupt his class and engage in horseplay at school, but he thought that evidence o u t w e ig h e d by the evidence that K.J. is able to make and keep friends and spends a lot of tim e socializing. (A.R. 19.) And although it is true that the ALJ did not discuss K.J.'s e x p u ls io n in this section (he discussed it instead in the previous section finding that K.J. had m a rk e d impulse control problems), the ALJ specifically noted K.J.'s tendency to argue with h is teachers and referenced K.J.'s multiple suspensions for disrespecting his teachers and f a ilin g to follow directions. (Id. at 18-19.) After noting that the social worker thought that

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K.J. can also be personable, respectful, and polite and that K.J.'s family thought his behavior w a s improving, the ALJ reasonably concluded that his treatment of teachers was not caused b y a functional limitation in interacting and relating to others. (Id.) At bottom, Johnson's a rg u m e n t with respect to the ALJ's findings in this domain is not so much that the ALJ im p ro p e rly overlooked evidence helpful to K.J., but rather that the ALJ did not weigh the e v id e n c e as she would have preferred. But it is not this court's role to reweigh the evidence o r second-guess the ALJ's judgment, but instead to ensure it is supported by substantial e v id e n c e . See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869. Because the ALJ's decision provides that assurance h e re , his determination that K.J. has less than a marked limitation in the domain of in te ra c tin g and relating to others must stand. F in a lly, Johnson argues that in deciding that K.J. has no limitation in the domain of s e lf -c a re , the ALJ made "omissions of pertinent evidence." (R. 21, Pl.'s Br. at 15.) Putting a s id e the questionable phrasing of this argument--after all, the ALJ is not required to include in his decision every scrap of pertinent evidence, see Denton, 596 F.3d at 425; Rice, 384 F.3d a t 371--this court finds no reversible error in the ALJ's decision in this domain. Johnson's a rg u m e n t takes two forms. First, Johnson argues that the ALJ erroneously emphasized K.J.'s p h ys ic a l ability to bathe, dress, and groom himself when the relevant question is whether he d o e s these things regularly in order to maintain a healthy physical and emotional state. She p o in ts out that more than one observer noted K.J. has a hygiene problem, that she constantly m u s t remind him to clean his clothes and shower, and that there is evidence that K.J. had a

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habit of hiding garbage and wetting the bed. Johnson argues that the ALJ committed re v e rsib le error in failing to address those problems. Johnson is correct that the first sentence of the ALJ's analysis in this domain suggests th a t he focused on K.J.'s physical ability to bathe and groom himself. But the remainder of th e discussion shows that the ALJ considered the regularity with which K.J. performed these ta s k s . The ALJ noted that K.J. regularly takes his medication, does chores, and gets himself to and from school. (A.R. 20.) He mentioned Johnson's testimony that she has to remind K .J . to shower and clean his clothes, which assures the court that the ALJ considered the e v id e n c e that K.J. had a mild hygiene problem. (Id.) (And in any event, Johnson points to n o evidence suggesting that K.J.'s showering and laundry habits were outside the scope of n o rm a l behavior for a boy in early adolescence.) It is more troubling that the ALJ did not d is c u s s K.J.'s bed-wetting in this domain, but the oversight does not constitute reversible e rro r. Johnson reported to Smith in February 2007 that K.J. had been wetting the bed for two ye a rs . (A.R. 531.) Smith recommended that K.J. pursue treatment with a physician. (Id. at 5 3 7 - 3 8 .) Johnson points to no evidence showing whether she followed up on that

re c o m m e n d a tio n ; nor is there evidence that the problem persisted at the time of the hearing. (Id . at 29.) Accordingly, to the extent the ALJ erred in overlooking K.J.'s bed-wetting issue, th a t error was harmless. See Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 994-95 (7th Cir. 2003). The second part of Johnson's argument with respect to this domain is her contention th a t the ALJ insufficiently dealt with K.J.'s difficulties in controlling his emotions. Johnson

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faults the ALJ for not analyzing K.J.'s suicide threat in this domain and for failing to discuss th e catalogue of behavioral incidents that Johnson recounts in her brief (including the runa w a y attempts, the stealing incident, and the marijuana and alcohol incidents). As for K.J.'s s u ic id e threat, the record supports the ALJ's decision to analyze that incident under the d o m a in of relating and interacting with others. K.J.'s psychiatrist, Johnson, and K.J. himself re p o rte d that he did not intend to hurt himself, but rather made the threat because he was a n g ry at his mother. (A.R. 34, 43, 499.) Because there is evidence supporting the ALJ's in te rp re ta tio n of K.J.'s suicide threat as an act of angry retaliation toward his mother rather th a n a suicidal ideation, the ALJ reasonably discussed it in the previous domain. And to the e x te n t that Karen Smith noted in 2007 that K.J. reported having on-going suicidal ideations b e f o re that incident, Social Security Ruling 09-7P states that even suicidal gestures "do not n e c e s s a rily describe a `marked' or an `extreme' limitation" in the domain of self-care. See 2 0 0 9 WL 396029, at *6. Moreover, the most recent notes from K.J.'s therapist showed that a s of May 2008 he reported having no thoughts of suicide. (A.R. 546.) Accordingly, to the e x te n t that the ALJ erred in failing to analyze K.J.'s past suicidal thoughts in the domain of s e lf -c a re , once again the error is not grounds for reversal. As for Johnson's attempt to link K.J.'s behavioral difficulties to a marked limitation in the domain of self-care, the regulations pertaining to self-care emphasize the need for a c h ild to use "effective coping strategies, appropriate to your age, to identify and regulate your f e e lin g s , thoughts, urges, and intentions." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(k)(1)(iii). For adolescents,

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the regulations contemplate that the child "should begin to discover appropriate ways to e x p re s s your feelings, both good and bad." Id. § 416.926a(k)(2)(v). In other words, the re g u la tio n s recognize that adolescents are works in progress; they are not expected to c o n s is te n tly express their emotions in appropriate ways. Again, the court finds the ALJ's d e c is io n not to analyze K.J.'s behavioral problems in this section questionable, but Johnson h a s cited no cases or other authority to show that isolated incidents of running away, stealing, a n d substance experimentation fall outside the normal range of early adolescent behavior. When asked why she believes K.J. is disabled, Johnson said nothing about his ability to care f o r himself. (A.R. 33.) And as the ALJ pointed out, not a single state agency evaluator o p in e d that K.J. has any limitation--even one that is "less than marked"--in this domain. For these reasons, the court concludes that the ALJ's finding that K.J. has no limitation in th is domain is supported by substantial evidence. See Steele, 290 F.3d at 940. Conclusion A lth o u g h there can be no doubt from any review of this record that K.J. has serious b e h a v io ra l problems and faces substantial academic challenges, the ALJ sufficiently tied his c o n c lu s io n that those challenges are not disabling to substantial evidence in the record. As th e Seventh Circuit has pointed out, a child may have a turbulent adolescence, a low-average I Q , problems with concentration, and poor grades in some classes, but still be "able to f u n c tio n more or less adequately in school, so that if he were deemed disabled so would m illio n s of other children be." Keys, 347 F.3d at 994. The ALJ adequately explained that

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such is the case with K.J., and accordingly, the denial of benefits must stand. See id. For the f o re g o in g reasons, Johnson's motion for summary judgment is denied, the Commissioner's is granted, and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. ENTER:

_________________________________ Y o u n g B. Kim U n ite d States Magistrate Judge

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