Martinez v. Sun et al

Filing 103

MEMORANDUM OPINION Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on September 13, 2012. Mailed notice(cdh, )

09-5422.121-RSK

Sept. 13, 2012

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
AURELIO RUIZ MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER SHANI SUN,
CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER TIDWELL,
and the CITY OF CHICAGO
Defendants.

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No. 09 C 5422

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the court is the motion for summary judgment of
defendants

Shani

Sun

and

Sherman

Tidwell.

For

the

reasons

explained below, we grant the defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
The parties agree on many of the central facts of this civil
rights case, but they disagree about a detail that is usually
uncontroversial: the plaintiff’s name. The plaintiff contends that
his name is “Aurelio Ruiz-Martinez” — “Ruiz” is his father’s last
name and “Martinez” is his mother’s maiden name.

(See Pl.’s Rule

56.1 Stmt. Of Add’l Facts (hereinafter, “Pl.’s Stmt.”) ¶ 2.)

We

will assume that he goes by that name and refer to him throughout
this opinion as “Ruiz-Martinez.”

But the defendants correctly

point out that the hyphen in “Ruiz-Martinez” does not appear in any
of the legal documents in the record, including the “Welcome

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Notice” that the plaintiff received from the INS when he was
granted permanent resident status (“Aurelio R. Martinez”), his
social security card (“Aurelio Ruiz Martinez”), and the case
caption (same). (See Welcome Notice, dated Aug. 20, 2003, attached
as part of Group Ex. M to Pl.’s Stmt., at FCRL000067; Social
Security Card, attached as part of Group Ex. M to Pl.’s Stmt., at
FCRL000068.)

Ruiz-Martinez immigrated to the United States from

Mexico in 1989 and was granted permanent resident status in 2002.
(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 1.)
last name “Ruiz.”

In 1997, he married Annette Arce, who took the
(Id. at ¶ 3.)

Ruiz-Martinez has lived in

Ligonier, Indiana with his wife since 2002.

(Id. at ¶ 4.)

On Saturday, September 1, 2007, Ruiz was driving with the
plaintiff in the passenger seat when they were stopped by the
Indiana State Police (“ISP”) near LaPaorte, Indiana. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
The state troopers told Ruiz that they had pulled her over because
her license plate registration had expired.

(Id. at ¶ 7.)

Ruiz

had the registration stickers in the car’s glove compartment, but
had forgotten to place them on her license plates.

(Id. at ¶ 8.)

According to the police report, state trooper Maggie Short entered
Ruiz’s name and vehicle information into her squad car’s on-board
computer, which returned information about a “Protection Order.”
(See Supp. Case Report, dated Sept. 17, 2007, attached as Ex. D to
Pl.’s Stmt., at 2-3.)

This prompted the state troopers to ask the

plaintiff for his identification.

(Id. at 3; Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 10-

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11.) The case report states that the plaintiff, who appeared “very
nervous,” gave the state troopers his Indiana driver’s license
identifying him as “Aurelio Ruiz Martinez.”
3.)

(Supp. Case Report at

Short then entered the plaintiff’s information into the

computer

and

discovered

a

warrant

for

a

man

named

“Aurelio

Martinez” wanted in connection with a 1981 murder committed in
Chicago, Illinois. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Ruiz-Martinez insists that his
name did not match the murder suspect’s, (see id. at ¶ 32), but
Short concluded otherwise.

(See Dep. of M. Short, attached as Ex.

J to Pl.’s Stmt., at 14 (testifying that the name “matched”); Supp.
Case Report at 3 (same).)

His birth date also matched the murder

suspect’s, and his height and weight were similar. (Def. Officers’
L.R. 56.19(a) Stmt. of Undisputed Facts (hereinafter, “Defs.’
Stmt.”) ¶ 7.)

However, his social security number was different.

(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 16.)

In fact, Ruiz-Martinez is not the person

identified in the warrant, as his wife attempted to explain.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 5, 13-15.)

(See

Ruiz told the troopers that her husband

— who does not speak English — had been mistakenly detained on the
same warrant on October 3, 1999 in Ligonier, Indiana.
13.)

(Id. at ¶

On that occasion, the officers promptly recognized their

mistake after contacting authorities in Chicago and receiving a
photograph of the warrant suspect that did not match Ruiz-Martinez.
(Id. at ¶ 14.)

Apparently, there is no record in Indiana or

Illinois of Ruiz-Martinez’s mistaken identification in 1999.

(Cf.

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Group Ex. E to Pl.’s Stmt. (records indicating that the plaintiff
was cited for driving without a license without mentioning the
warrant issue).)

Despite Ruiz’s protests, the officers took her

husband into custody and notified the Chicago Police Department
(“CPD”).

(Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 8.)

Upon arrival at the LaPorte County Jail Short contacted
defendant

Tidwell,

Extradition

Unit.

a

police

(Id.

at

officer
¶¶

4,

assigned

9.)

to

Tidwell,

the
or

CPD’s
another

Extradition Unit officer, faxed Short a copy of the warrant and a
CPD bulletin from 1981 containing a picture of the person named in
the warrant.

(Id. at ¶ 10.)

Short concluded that the photograph,

which was small (“approximately 2 inches square”) and 26 years old
by that time, was insufficient to “confirm whether or not Mr.
Martinez was their [CPD’s] suspect.” (Supp. Case Report at 5.) An
officer in the CPD’s Extradition Unit — apparently not one of the
defendants — told Short that the CPD wanted the ISP to detain RuizMartinez on the warrant.

(See Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 48;

see also Supp. Case Report at 5 (stating that a person identified
as “Officer Harper” asked the ISP to hold Ruiz-Martinez in LaPorte
County Jail while the CPD continued its investigation).)

But for

that request, the ISP would have released Ruiz-Martinez because he
had not been charged with any crime in Indiana.

(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶

48-49) Ruiz-Martinez insists that Short also determined that there
were “[in]sufficient identifiers to keep him in custody.”

(Id. at

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¶ 49.)

We tend to agree with the defendants that the plaintiff is

reading too much into Short’s testimony,1 but the issue is not
material: whether Short would have detained the plaintiff if she
had been in the defendants’ shoes is irrelevant.
The defendants contend that the Extradition Unit merely does
the bidding of the CPD’s Detective Division and/or the State’s
Attorney’s Office, the entities responsible for investigating and
prosecuting the warrant suspect.
also Defs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 12-14.)

(See Defs.’ Mem. at 8-10; see

However, there is no evidence that

any Extradition Unit officer consulted these entities before asking
the

ISP

to

detain

the

plaintiff.

And

Defendant

Sun

—

the

Extradition Unit’s supervising officer — testified that she has the
authority to release a suspect held in another jurisdiction.
Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 39; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 12.)

(See
As

Tidwell explained in his deposition, police officers in the CPD’s
Extradition Unit use their judgment when deciding whether to detain
a person arrested in another state on an Illinois warrant.

(See

Tidwell Dep. at 9-10 (“[O]ur job as being police officers in the
extradition unit was to just make the basic determination if we had

1/

During Short’s deposition, plaintiff’s counsel asked a leading question
that clearly mischaracterized Short’s earlier testimony. (See Short Dep. at 26
(“And prior to the request from the Chicago Police Department, you were prepared
to release Mr. Martinez because you didn’t think there was sufficient identifiers
to keep him in custody, is that correct?”).) After defense counsel objected on
that basis, Short gave an ambiguous response: “Wow. That would be fair to say.
And we had no charges on him..” (Id.) It is unclear whether Short was answering
plaintiff’s counsel’s question, or commenting on the objection. She evidently
believed that there was sufficient identifying information to arrest the
plaintiff on the warrant.

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good enough reason to detain the individual.”); see also id. at 1520 (testifying about the kinds of identifying information officers
consider when making the decision whether to detain a suspect in
another jurisdiction — name, gender, height, weight, etc.).)

On

the other hand, it is effectively undisputed that the Extradition
Unit does not make the ultimate decision whether to extradite and
prosecute the suspect.

(See Defs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 20, 24.)

That

decision is made by the State’s Attorney’s Office and/or the
Detective Division.

(Id.; see also id. at ¶ 12 (officials in the

Detective Division and the State’s Attorney’s Office “can stop the
extradition at any point”).)
On the day after plaintiff’s arrest, the Extradition Unit
contacted the Detective Division and asked it to gather the files
and reports related to the warrant.

(Id. at ¶ 14.)

Detective Jude

Martinez was assigned to the case and began gathering relevant
records.

(Id. at ¶ 15.)

computerized
missing.
the

records

were

(Id. at ¶ 16.)

plaintiff’s

wife

Because the warrant was issued in 1981,
unavailable

and

some

records

were

On that same day — September 2, 2007 —

contacted

Tidwell

and

delivered

several

documents that she claimed proved that her husband was not the
person named in the warrant.

(Id. at ¶ 18.)

Ruiz testified that

she gave Tidwell her husband’s passport, his “resident card,” “his
social security card,” two “welcome notices” he had received from
the INS, and a letter verifying his employment in Indiana.

(See

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Ruiz Dep., attached as Ex. B to Pl.’s Stmt., at 31.)

Defendant Sun

returned to work after the Labor Day holiday on September 4, 2007
and reviewed the documents that Ruiz had given Tidwell.
Stmt. ¶ 19.)

(Defs.’

None of the documents established the plaintiff’s

whereabouts in 1981.

(Id.)

Sun began preparing a report for the

State’s Attorney’s Office asking it to review the case and advise
whether it was going to seek the plaintiff’s extradition.
¶ 20.)

(Id. at

While she was preparing the report, Sun received a fax from

the ISP advising her that Ruiz-Martinez had waived extradition.
(Id. at ¶ 21.)

The plaintiff contends that no one explained the

waiver forms to him in Spanish and that he believed that he would
not be released unless he signed the waiver.
41-42.)

(See Pl.’s Stmt. at

But the ISP told Sun that it had properly advised the

plaintiff:
Holding subject Martinez, Aurelio R. DOB 9/25/1955, [] on
your charges, your charges only.
A signed Waiver of
Extradition has been signed and is attached with this fax
along with a booking photo. Be advised his rights of
Extradition were explained to him in Spanish, and he
understood what he was signing. Please advise earliest
possible date and time of pick up.
(Fax from Deputy B. Nurnberg to Sun, dated Sept. 4, 2007, attached
as Ex. 9 to Defs.’ Stmt.)

In an attempt to establish that the

defendants had a hand in obtaining his waiver, the plaintiff
contends that Sun told his wife that extradition could take as long
as 90 days if he did not execute a waiver.

(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 34.)

However, there is no evidence that Sun’s statement affected his

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decision to waive extradition. The testimony that plaintiff relies
on concerns a note that Sun wrote to her file documenting a
conversation that she had with Ruiz on September 7, 2007, three
days after her husband had waived extradition.

(See Sun Dep. at

63; see also Notes dated Sept. 7, 2007, attached as part of Group
Ex. M to Pl.’s Stmt., at FCRL000028.)

According to Sun, the CPD

had 30 days after Ruiz-Martinez’s waiver to take him into their
custody, although she was unable to identify a specific source for
that requirement.

(Defs. Stmt. ¶ 23.)

On September 5, 2007, the State’s Attorney’s Office confirmed
that it wished to proceed with plaintiff’s extradition and told Sun
that the Detective Division would soon provide a date when someone
was available to travel to Indiana to take the plaintiff into
custody.

(Id. at ¶ 24.)2

Meanwhile, Ruiz continued to protest her

husband’s innocence, (see Pl.’s Stmt. 23), although apparently she
did not provide any further documentation substantiating her claim
that her husband was not the person named in the warrant.

We

accept as true for purposes of this motion that Sun was insulting
and dismissive in her conversations with Ruiz. (See Pl.’s Stmt. at
¶¶ 28-29; cf. Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. at 28-29.)
Ruiz-Martinez contends that, in violation of CPD procedures,
the defendants failed to consider (or discover) several pieces of
information relevant to the warrant.

2/

(See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 17-19,

Neither side indicates whether Sun told the State’s Attorney’s Office
about the materials that Ruiz had given to Tidwell.

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35-38;

see

also

CPD

Special

Order

S06-12-04

(“Extradition

Procedures”), attached as Ex. H to Pl.’s Stmt., at 3 (“When a
person being held by an out-of-state jurisdiction is wanted on a
Chicago warrant, the extradition officer will . . . prepare the
required court documents, fugitive warrants, complaints, police
reports, records and photographs to facilitate the extradition . .
. .”).)

First, he points out that neither Tidwell nor Sun could

recall seeing a particular photograph of the 1981 murder suspect —
larger than the one that Tidwell faxed to the ISP — that was “in
CPD possession in 2007.”

(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 17.)

They also did not

know whether the photograph was provided to Indiana authorities.
(Id.)

Second, CPD reports indicate that in 1981 a suspect was

detained on the same warrant in Mercedes, Texas.
25.)

A

judge

in

Texas

declined

to

(Id. at ¶¶ 24-

extradite

the

suspect,

identified in the reports as “Baudelio Martinez,” because “there
was not enough information to identify the arrested suspect as
Martinez . . . .”

(Supp. Report, attached as part of group Ex. M

to Pl.’s Stmt., at FCRL000138.)

The report states that the judge

turned the suspect over to immigration authorities to be deported
to Mexico and that the investigating detectives requested that the
case be closed on that basis.

(Id.)

A separate CPD report

indicates that in 1985 another suspect was detained on the warrant
in Laredo, Texas. (See Supp. Report, attached as part of group Ex.
M

to

Pl.’s

Stmt.,

at

FCRL000094.)

That

report

states

that

authorities in Texas again declined to authorize extradition and

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that the investigating detective requested that the case remain
“EXCEPTIONALLY CLEARED/CLOSED.”

(Id.; see also Stop Order or

Cancellation Request, attached as part of group Ex. M to Pl.’s
Stmt., at FCRL000004.) The warrant was later “re-issued” in 2002.
(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 24.)

Tidwell testified that he does not know

whether the CPD reports concerning the suspect’s deportation, and
the cancellation of the warrant, were contained in the Extradition
Unit’s file in 2007.

(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 26.)

However, Tidwell spoke

to Short about the 1985 incident shortly after the plaintiff’s
arrest.

(See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 47; see also Supp. Case Report at 4

(stating that Tidwell told Short that a subject named “Aurelio
Ruiz” was detained in 1985 in Laredo, Texas.).)3
On September 18, 2007, Detective Martinez, his partner, and an
Assistant State’s Attorney traveled to the jail in LaPorte, Indiana
to pick up Ruiz-Martinez.

(Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 27.)

Because Martinez

had recently been assigned to two murder investigations, this was
the soonest he could travel to Indiana to take the plaintiff into
custody.

(Id. at ¶ 25.)

The plaintiff contends that Martinez

apologized to him, expressed disbelief that he had been detained so
long in light of the documents that his wife had given the CPD, and
made similar comments to his wife.

(See Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 40, 43-44;

cf. Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Stmt. ¶¶ 40, 43-44 (denying that Martinez

3/
Neither side remarks on the reference to “Aurelio Ruiz” in Short’s
incident report. However, it appears to have been a mistake because the name
“Ruiz” does not appear in the records relevant to the 1985 arrest in Laredo.

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made

those

statements.)

Once

in

Chicago,

Ruiz-Martinez

participated in a lineup before a witness to the 1981 crime and
provided a buccual swab to detectives for DNA testing.
Stmt. ¶¶ 29-31.)

(Defs.’

On September 19, 2007, plaintiff appeared before

a judge for the first time and was released on an “I-bond,” which
Martinez believes is unusual for a fugitive murder suspect.
at ¶ 32; see also Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 51.)

(Id.

On October 10, 2007, the case

against the plaintiff was dismissed.

(Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 33.)

DISCUSSION
Ruiz-Martinez has sued Tidwell and Sun under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for

violating

Amendment.

his

due

process

rights

under

the

Fourteenth

He has also sued the City of Chicago under Monell v.

Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 659
(1978).

The parties apparently dispute the effect of City’s

“Certification of Entry of Judgment” on that claim.
Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. ¶¶ 2, 40.)

(See Pl.’s

We express no opinion on that

issue at this time because the plaintiff’s Monell claim is not
before us: only Tidwell and Sun have moved for summary judgment.
They argue that the undisputed facts establish that they did not
participate in a constitutional violation and, in the alternative,
they assert qualified immunity for their actions.
A.

Legal Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
P. 56(a).

Fed. R. Civ.

In considering such a motion, the court construes the

evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

See Pitasi v.

Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1999). “The court
need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other
materials in the record.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

judgment should be denied if the dispute is ‘genuine’:

“Summary
‘if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.’”

Talanda v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d

1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The court will enter summary

judgment against a party who does not “come forward with evidence
that would reasonably permit the finder of fact to find in [its]
favor on a material question.” McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 569
(7th Cir. 1995).
B.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Ruiz-Martinez, relying on Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137

(1979) and its progeny, contends that his mistaken arrest and
prolonged detention violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Baker,

the plaintiff’s brother was arrested on drug charges in Potter
County Texas.

Id. at 140.

With the help of a forged driver’s

license, he persuaded the authorities there that he was actually
the plaintiff.

Id.

He was processed and released on bail as the

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plaintiff, and a warrant was later issued for his arrest under the
plaintiff’s name.

Id. at 141.

When the plaintiff was later

stopped for a minor traffic violation in Dallas a routine warrant
check revealed that he (really his brother) was wanted in Potter
County.

Id. at 141.

He was held for several days in Dallas until

Potter County deputies took him into their custody.

Id.

He was

held in Potter County jail for another three days over the New
Years holiday (December 30, 1972 to January 2, 1973).

Id.

At that

time officials consulted a file photograph of the person named in
the warrant (i.e., the plaintiff’s brother), concluded that they
were holding the wrong person, and released the plaintiff.

Id.

The plaintiff sued the Potter County sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for “the intentional failure to investigate and determine that the
wrong man was imprisoned.”

Id. at 143.

The Supreme Court

concluded the plaintiff’s claim did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment because he did not challenge the warrant or his initial
arrest.

See id. at 144 (“Respondent was indeed deprived of his

liberty for a period of days, but it was pursuant to a warrant
conforming, for purposes of our decision, to the requirements of
the

Fourth

Amendment.”).

Instead,

the

Court

analyzed

plaintiff’s claim under the Fourteenth Amendment:
Obviously, one in respondent’s position could not be
detained indefinitely in the face of repeated protests of
innocence even though the warrant under which he was
arrested and detained met the standards of the Fourth
Amendment. For the Constitution likewise guarantees an
accused the right to a speedy trial, and invocation of

the

- 14 -

the speedy trial right need not await indictment or other
formal charge; arrest pursuant to probable cause is
itself sufficient. . . . We may even assume, arguendo,
that, depending on what procedures the State affords
defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial,
mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the
face of repeated protests of innocence will after the
lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of
“liberty . . . without due process of law.” But we are
quite certain that a detention of three days over a New
Year's weekend does not and could not amount to such a
deprivation.
Id. at 144-45 (internal citation and footnote omitted).

The Court

went on to reason that the plaintiff’s “innocence of the charge
contained in the warrant, while relevant to a tort claim of false
imprisonment

in

most

if

not

all

jurisdictions,

is

largely

irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of liberty without due
process of law.

The Constitution does not guarantee that only the

guilty will be arrested.”

Id. at 145.

The question instead is

whether the plaintiff has received due process, which “does not
require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to
eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.”

Id.

A sheriff executing an arrest warrant is not “required by the
Constitution

to

investigate

independently

every

claim

of

innocence,” or to perform an “error-free” investigation of such
claims. Id. at 145-46. “The ultimate determination of such claims
of innocence is placed in the hands of the judge and the jury.”
Id. at 146; see also id. at 145 (“A reasonable division of
functions between law enforcement officers, committing magistrates,

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and judicial officers — all of whom may be potential defendants in
a § 1983 action — is entirely consistent with ‘due process of
law.’”).
There are at least two lines of authority originating in
Baker’s dicta that are relevant to Ruiz-Martinez’s claim.

In our

opinion denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, we relied on the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Gray v. Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s
Dept., 150 F.3d 579, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1998), which dealt with a
plaintiff’s 41-day detention pursuant to an out-of-state warrant.
The Gray court concluded that the defendants’ failure to consult
photographic evidence clearly indicating that the plaintiff was not
the person named in the warrant could support a § 1983 claim.

Id.;

see also Baker, 443 U.S. at 148 (Blackmun, J. concurring) (“I do
not understand the Court’s opinion

. . . to foreclose the

possibility that a prisoner in respondent’s predicament might prove
a

due

process

violation

by

a

sheriff

who

deliberately

and

repeatedly refused to check the identity of a complaining prisoner
against readily available mug shots and fingerprints.”).

As the

Sixth Circuit framed the issue on remand, “the principal question
for the trier of fact will be whether [the defendants] acted with
something akin to deliberate indifference in failing to ascertain
that the [person] they had in custody was not the person wanted by
the

Michigan

warrant.”

authorities

on

the

outstanding

parole-violation

Gray, 150 F.3d at 583; see also Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d

- 16 -

1472, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Defendants’ failure to contact
Plaintiff’s alibi witnesses and the individuals who witnessed David
Benavidez threaten David Douglas did not display deliberate or
reckless

intent

to

falsely

imprison

Plaintiff.”);

Sanders

v.

English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that Baker
did not foreclose a lawsuit based on the plaintiff’s allegation
that the defendant “failed to release him even after he knew (or
should have known) that Sanders had been misidentified.”).

The

second line of authority, discussed in more detail infra, holds
that the Constitution requires a timely appearance before a judge
following an arrest pursuant to a warrant.

See Coleman v. Frantz,

754 F.2d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1985); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d
564, 571-82 (7th Cir. 1998).
1.

The Plaintiff’s Initial Detention and the Defendants’
Investigation of His Claim of Mistaken Identity

Assuming

for

the

moment

that

the

two

defendants

were

responsible for Ruiz-Martinez’s initial detention — recall that
Short’s report identifies “Officer Harper” as the person who asked
her to detain the plaintiff on the warrant — that decision was
clearly reasonable in light of the evidence available at that time.
The plaintiff’s name, birth date, and physical characteristics
matched the person named in the warrant. Cf. Patton v. Przybylski,
822 F.2d 697, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1987) (officer acted reasonably in
arresting the plaintiff where his name, race, and birth year
matched the warrant suspect’s); Brown v. Patterson, 823 F.2d 167,

- 17 -

169 (7th Cir. 1987) (officer acted reasonably in arresting the
plaintiff whose name matched an alias used by the warrant suspect).
After they were notified of the plaintiff’s arrest, officers in
Chicago’s Extradition Unit sent a photograph of the warrant suspect
to the ISP.

Cf. Johnson v. City of Chicago, 711 F.Supp. 1465, 1470

(N.D. Ill. 1989) (denying a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants failed to take “even minimal steps to
determine whether they had the right person”).
that the photograph was inconclusive.

Short determined

It was certainly reasonable

for officers in the Extradition Unit to request Ruiz-Martinez’s
detention at that point.

The following day Ruiz gave Tidwell

documents that she believed demonstrated the CPD’s mistake, which
Sun reviewed when she returned to work following the Labor Day
holiday. Those materials, while relevant to Ruiz’s contention that
her husband was not the person identified in the warrant, are not
conclusive.

The fact that he was granted legal permanent resident

status in 2002 does not rule out the possibility that he committed
a murder in this country 21 years earlier.
Ruiz-Martinez

points

out

that

the

defendants

failed

to

consider other potentially relevant information: (1) “a certain
photograph of the 1981 murder suspect in CPD possession in 2007,”
(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 17); (2) the circumstances surrounding the detention
and deportation of another suspect in Texas on the same warrant in
1981, (id. at ¶¶ 24-26, 37, 47); and (3) the fact that Ruiz-

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Martinez had been picked up on the same warrant eight years
earlier, (id. at ¶¶ 13-14, 27, 52).

First, there is not enough

evidence in the record to establish that the defendants recklessly
disregarded this evidence.

The fact that the photograph was “in

CPD possession in 2007" does not mean that these defendants were
reckless (or even negligent) in failing to uncover it. Second, the
information does not conclusively establish that Ruiz-Martinez was
not the person named in the warrant.

The cited photograph is

larger than the one that Tidwell sent to the ISP, but it is still
difficult to discern the suspect’s features.

Moreover, it depicts

the suspect as he appeared 26 years prior to the plaintiff’s
arrest. Detective Martinez testified that during his investigation
he compared this photograph with a photograph of the plaintiff and
was unable to determine “if it was the same person or not.”
(Martinez Dep. at 37.)4

So, this is not a case like Gray where the

defendants ignored photographic evidence clearly showing that they
were holding the wrong person.

Cf. Gray, 150 F.3d at 582-83

(“There is no dispute that Fuerst and Ussery were in possession of
a photograph that bore virtually no resemblance to Gray, as well as
a physical description detailing certain permanent scars that Gray
did not have.”).

The person detained in Texas in 1981 may or may

not have been the murder suspect, and even if he was, it would not

4/

There are photographs of the plaintiff in the record, but he does not
even attempt to argue that they support his claim. Based on our own inspection,
we do not believe that the differences between the photographs of the plaintiff
and the suspect are sufficient to create a triable issue.

- 19 -

be surprising if he had reentered the United States and returned to
an area near Chicago.5

Finally, there is apparently no record in

Indiana or Illinois of Ruiz-Martinez’s mistaken detention in 1999.
The defendants had only Mrs. Ruiz’s statement that her husband had
been mistakenly detained, which they were not required to believe.6
The defendants’ investigation may have been flawed, but as the
Supreme Court explained in Baker, the Constitution does not require
police officers to perform “error-free” investigations. See Baker,
443 U.S. at 145-46.

We conclude that the defendants are entitled

to summary judgment insofar as the plaintiff’s claim is that the
defendants should have discovered their error earlier.

See id. at

146 (“Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights
protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care
arising out of tort law.”).
2.

The Plaintiff’s Prolonged Detention Without an Appearance
Before a Judge

Ruiz-Martinez was detained for 18 days before he was brought
before a judge.

Our Court of Appeals, relying on Baker’s dicta,

has recognized “a constitutional right to a timely first appearance

5/

Ruiz-Martinez and his wife were stopped by the ISP near LaPorte,
Indiana on their way to a family picnic in Chicago. (Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 6.)
6/

The failure of any official to create a record of the plaintiff's
mistaken detention in 1999 is the most troubling aspect of this case. A simple
notation in the warrant file with Ruiz-Martinez's identifying information would
likely have prevented his 18-day ordeal. But he has not cited any evidence that
the defendants were involved in his 1999 arrest.

- 20 -

under the Due Process Clause.”

Coleman, 754 F.2d at 725.

In

Coleman, a state court issued a bench warrant for the plaintiff’s
arrest for receiving stolen property and set bond at $10,000.
at 721.

Id.

The plaintiff turned himself in to the county jail, where

the sheriff detained him for not making bail.

Id.

He was held for

18 days and during his incarceration protested his innocence and
asked several times when he was going to court.
repeatedly

called

the

prosecutor’s

office

Id.
to

The sheriff
arrange

the

defendant’s “first appearance” without any response until the
prosecutor told him to release the plaintiff, which he promptly
did.

Id. at 721-22.

The Coleman Court reasoned that under Baker

“the duration of the detention and the burden placed on state
officials in providing procedural safeguards are highly relevant to
a constitutional examination of post-arrest detentions.”

Id. at

724. The challenged detention in Baker was relatively short (three
days) and “could only have been prevented by the institution of
significant

and

burdensome

investigative

procedures

by

the

defendant sheriff.” Id. By contrast, the plaintiff in Coleman was
held for 18 days despite his repeated requests to go to court. Id.
Moreover, most states provide for a first appearance before a judge
or a magistrate to, among other things, ensure that the person
being detained is the person named in the complaint.
721 n.1.

See id. at

“Where first appearances are provided, the requirement

that they be timely would place a relatively small burden on law

- 21 -

enforcement and judicial officers.”

Id.

The Court observed that

a defendant’s first appearance implicates several constitutional
rights, (e.g., the defendant is informed of the charges against him
and of his right to counsel), which are substantially undermined if
the first appearance is unreasonably delayed.

Id.

The Court

declined to set any precise time limits, id., but held that an 18day detention without an appearance before a judge or magistrate
“is wholly inconsistent with notions of ‘fundamental fairness’
required of criminal prosecutions under the Due Process Clause . .
. and with the concept of ‘ordered liberty.’”

Id. at 723 (quoting

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) and Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (internal citations omitted).
The court went on to observe that it was “doubtful” that the
plaintiff had carried his burden to show that the sheriff caused
the due-process violation, but resolved the case instead on the
basis of qualified-immunity.
“based

on

objective

Id. at 725.

circumstances,

was

The sheriff’s conduct,
reasonably

undertaken

pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of
his authority.” Id. at 728. Also, the right recognized in Coleman
was not clearly established when the plaintiff was detained.

Id.

at 731.
Our Court of Appeals revisited Coleman in Armstrong.

In

Armstrong, the plaintiff was held on a “body attachment warrant”
for 57 days despite his repeated inquiries about when he would be

- 22 -

taken to court.

Id. at 568.

The plaintiff had voluntarily

surrendered and likely would have been brought before a judge much
sooner if the warrants division had not transposed two digits in
the case number when it notified the court that it was holding the
plaintiff.

Id. at 567-68.

The warrants division’s error meant

that the court did not know that the plaintiff was being held, and
therefore did not call him to court.

Over the next 57 days guards

dismissed the plaintiff’s repeated inquiries about when he would be
taken to court and refused to accept his written “Inmate Request
Forms” pressing the same question.

Id. at 568.

Although the

plaintiff was held on a civil warrant for civil contempt, the Court
concluded that procedures governing such warrants were analogous to
criminal warrants.

Id. at 573-75.

Therefore, Coleman’s analysis

of the constitutional interests at stake applied with equal force.
Id.

And like the plaintiff in Baker, the plaintiff in Armstrong

repeatedly protested his confinement.

Id. at 575-76.

The Court

then asked whether the defendants’ conduct exhibited “deliberate
indifference” to the plaintiff’s rights.

Id. at 577.

Most

relevant to the current motion, the Court concluded that the
defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
claim against the guards at the jail where he was confined.
580.

Id. at

His repeated protests about his confinement supported “an

inference that the guards knew of a serious risk.

For the guards

to have continued to refuse Armstrong’s complaints and for them to

- 23 -

have continued only to check the will call list evinces the serious
possibility of deliberate indifference to Armstrong’s plight.” Id.
The Court went on to reject the guards’ claims of qualified
immunity because “Coleman clearly established a right to a prompt
appearance after arrest pursuant to a warrant.”

Id. at 582.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Coleman and Armstrong, Ruiz-Martinez
was detained in Indiana pursuant to an out-of-state warrant.

“The

obligation imposed on states to extradite fugitives from justice
within its borders to the state from which he has fled upon proper
demand from that state is rooted in the Constitution.”

McBride v.

Soos, 594 F.2d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 1979); see U.S. Const. Art. 4, §
2, cl. 2.

The federal statute implementing this obligation

provides procedural safeguards protecting the rights of alleged
fugitives.

McBride, 594 F.2d at 612 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3182).

“Before an individual can be extradited, the governor of the asylum
state

must

determine:

(1)

whether

the

person

demanded

is

substantially charged with a crime; and (2) whether the person
demanded is a fugitive from justice from the state making the
demand.”

Id.

In addition to these safeguards, both Indiana and

Illinois have enacted the Uniform Extradition Act, which provides
further procedural protections. See Ind. Code 35-33-10-3; 725 ILCS
225/1 et seq.

Indiana’s version of the Act describes three

situations in which a person may be arrested for a crime committed
in another state: (1) an arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by

- 24 -

Indiana’s governor based upon a demand for extradition from the
executive authority of another state, see Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(8)(10); (2) an arrest pursuant to a warrant issued by an Indiana
judge, see Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(14); and (3) an arrest “by an
officer or private citizen without a warrant upon reasonable
information that the accused stands charged in the courts of
another state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for
a term exceeding one (1) year,” see Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(15).

In

this case, no Indiana warrant was ever issued for Ruiz-Martinez’s
arrest.

He was arrested because a computer search returned an

Illinois murder warrant for an individual with plaintiff’s name and
birth date.

See Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(15).

Accordingly, he was

entitled under Indiana law to an appearance “before a judge with
all practicable speed,” where a complaint would be filed against
him setting forth the grounds for his arrest.

Id.

The presiding

judge would then decide whether he was “the person charged with
having committed the crime . . . .”

Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(16).

If

so, the judge would have committed him to jail for an unspecified
time

period

long

enough

governor’s warrant.

to

permit

his

arrest

pursuant

to

a

See id.; see also Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(18)

(providing that the judge may impose a second unspecified period of
confinement if the initial period lapses before the governor issues

- 25 -

a warrant).7
Martinez

If the governor had issued such a warrant, Ruiz-

would

have

been

entitled

before

his

extradition

to

challenge his detention by applying for a writ of habeas corpus.
See Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(11).
The defendants — two Chicago police officers — are not
responsible

for

implementing

Indiana’s

extradition

laws.

In

McBride v. Soos, 679 F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1982), our Court of
Appeals held that two Indiana police officers who transported the
plaintiff from Missouri to Indiana pursuant to an extradition
warrant were not liable for the failure of Missouri officials to
comply with Missouri’s extradition statute. “It is unreasonable to
require

the

demanding

state

agents

to

be

familiar

with

the

procedural safeguards enacted in the asylum state’s extradition
statutes and then further require them to ensure that the statutory
safeguards have been followed.”

Id.

Here, the police officers in

Indiana — not the defendants — were responsible in the first
instance for bringing Ruiz-Martinez before a judge to determine
whether he was in fact the person named in the warrant.

It appears

that they did not do so because he waived extradition on September
4, 2007, which was likely the first day that the courts were open

7/

Because Ruiz-Martinez was being held on murder charges, he would not
have been eligible for release on bond if the judge had confined him pending a
governor’s warrant. See I.C. 35-33-10-3(17) (the judge must “admit the person
arrested to bail by bond or undertaking” unless the prisoner is charged with an
offense punishable by death or life imprisonment); see also 720 ILCS 5/9-1
(providing that a person convicted of first degree murder may be sentenced to
life imprisonment).

- 26 -

following his arrest.8

An alleged fugitive who waives extradition

has “neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to specific
extradition procedures.”

Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588, 596

(10th Cir. 2000) (cited with approval in Schreiber v. Buncich, No.
05-3243, 2006 WL 565894, *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 6, 2006)).

Ruiz-

Martinez claims that the officers in Indiana did not explain the
forms to him in Spanish, but there is no evidence that either of
the

defendants

conveyed to him.

controlled

what

information

Indiana

officers

In fact, Sun was told that the ISP had explained

the forms to Ruiz-Martinez in Spanish.

(See Fax from Deputy B.

Nurnberg to Sun, dated Sept. 4, 2007 (“Be advised his rights of
Extradition were explained to him in Spanish, and he understood
what he was signing.”).) The plaintiff also contends that Sun told
his wife that “if her husband did not sign an extradition waiver,
extradition could take 90 days.”
at

64

(“I

explained

to

her

to

(Pl.’s Stmt. ¶ 34; cf. Sun Dep.
the

best

of

my

ability

the

extradition procedure, and explained to her that if her husband did
not sign the waiver we still have 90 days to get a governor’s
warrant to get him extradited back to the State of Illinois.”).)
There is no evidence that this information was relayed to RuizMartinez, or even that it was inaccurate.

It appears that Sun was

referring to the procedures governing an arrest in Illinois on an

8/

holiday.

Ruiz-Martinez was arrested on the Saturday before the Labor Day

- 27 -

out-of-state warrant.

Although both Illinois and Indiana have

adopted the Uniform Extradition Act, only Illinois’s version sets
a specific limit on the time that an arrestee may be detained
pending a governor’s warrant: 30 days initially, subject to a
60-day extension if the governor has not yet issued a warrant. See
725 ILSC 225/15 & 225/17; cf. Ind. Code 35-33-10-3(16), (18).
Potentially, Ruiz-Martinez could have been held even longer under
Indiana’s statute.

Moreover, as we discussed infra, the plaintiff

is relying on Sun’s testimony about a conversation that she had
with Ruiz on September 7, 2012.

By that time, her husband had

already executed documents waiving extradition. Even assuming that
Ruiz-Martinez’s waiver was coerced, or at least uninformed, there
is no evidence that the defendants are responsible.
Neither side has cited, nor are we aware of, any case or
statute establishing limits on the time that a suspect may be
detained following a waiver of extradition. The significant delays
built into the extradition process tend to undercut plaintiff’s
argument that his 18-day detention violated the Constitution.
we

just

discussed,

an

alleged

fugitive

may

be

held

for

As
a

significant period of time pending a governor’s warrant for his
arrest and extradition. In addition, under the federal extradition
statute, a formal demand for extradition triggers a 30-day period
for agents in the demanding state to take custody of the alleged
fugitive.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3182.

Chicago police officers took

- 28 -

custody of Ruiz-Martinez in approximately half that time.
other

hand,

it

appears

that

Ruiz-Martinez

was

held

On the
for

an

additional two weeks after he waived extradition merely because it
was inconvenient for the investigating detective to pick him up
sooner.

The defendants suggest that the matter was out of their

hands once the State’s Attorney’s Office indicated on September 5
that it wished to proceed with Ruiz-Martinez’s prosecution.

But

the Extradition Procedures attached to the plaintiff’s response
indicate that extradition officers are responsible for “direct[ing]
the police personnel effecting the fugitive[‘s] return.”

(See

Extradition Procedures at 3.) Sun called the Detective Division on
September 5 to get a date for plaintiff’s pick up.
attached as Ex. 7 to Def.’s Stmt., ¶ 17.)

(Sun Aff.,

She waited nine days for

a response, apparently without any further effort to expedite the
plaintiff’s transfer.
about

September

14

(See id. at ¶ 18 (stating that “[o]n or
[she]

was

told

that

the

Detectives

were

available to pick up Plaintiff on September 18"); cf. Coleman, 754
F.2d 721-22 (sheriff “repeatedly” called the prosecutor’s office to
arrange the plaintiff’s first appearance).9

9/
On the other hand, we do not believe that the record supports the
plaintiff’s suggestion that Sun maliciously delayed Ruiz-Martinez’s appearance
before a judge. For purposes of the defendants’ motion, we accept as true his
contention that Sun told Ruiz that “she’s going to go [pick up the plaintiff]
when she feels like doing it.” (Ruiz Dep., attached as Ex. B to Pl.'s Stmt., at
41.) But there is no evidence that Sun in any way delayed Detective Martinez's
trip to Indiana. It is undisputed that September 18, 2007 was the earliest date
that the investigating detectives were available to pick up the plaintiff. (See
Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 25.)

- 29 -

However, we need not decide this difficult constitutional
question because it is apparent that the defendants are entitled
qualified

immunity.

“Determining

whether

qualified

immunity

applies to the actions of a public official involves a two-part
inquiry: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, amount to a constitutional violation;
and (2) whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.”
Brickley, 673 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 2012).
directly to the second question.

McComas v.

We will proceed

See id. (the court may address

the elements of qualified immunity “in any order”) (citing Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–42 (2009)).
burden

to

establish

established.”

that

the

It is the plaintiff’s

asserted

right

was

“clearly

Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir.

1999). “A violation may be clearly established if the violation is
so obvious that a reasonable state actor would know that what they
are doing violates the Constitution, or if a closely analogous case
establishes that the conduct is unconstitutional.”
Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2001).

Siebert v.

The ISP — not the

defendants — had a duty to bring Ruiz-Martinez before a judge in
the first instance.

As far as the defendants knew, Ruiz-Martinez

validly waived that right.

In light of that waiver, and the

lengthy detentions permitted by the extradition process, it would
not

have

been

obvious

to

CPD

officials

that

they

had

a

- 30 -

constitutional duty to bring Ruiz-Martinez before an Illinois judge
sooner than they did.

Second, the plaintiff has not cited any

cases addressing this issue.

As Coleman and Armstrong indicate,

the procedures governing a particular suspect’s detention are
highly

relevant

violation.

to

the

existence

of

a

Fourteenth

Amendment

Accordingly, cases establishing the general right to a

timely appearance before a judge are not “closely analogous” to our
case involving detention pursuant to an out-of-state warrant.
Therefore,

we

conclude

that

the

defendants

are

entitled

to

qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment [71] is granted.
We conclude that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
the merits of the plaintiff’s claim that they were deliberately
indifferent to evidence indicating plaintiff’s innocence.

We

conclude that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
with respect to the plaintiff’s claim that they were responsible
for the 18-day period before plaintiff was brought before a judge.
DATE:

September 13, 2012

ENTER:

___________________________________________
John F. Grady, United States District Judge