Reed v. Sarabia et al
Filing
84
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Joan B. Gottschall on 8/1/2012:(mb, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DEVONNE REED,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK SARABIA and J.E. WRIGLEY,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Judge Joan B. Gottschall
Case No. 09 C 5581
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Devonne Reed brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 against
two Chicago police officers, alleging they used excessive force (spraying mace on his
bare genital area and repeatedly beating him with a police baton) pursuant to his lawful
arrest.
Those officers, Frank Sarabia and J.E. Wrigley, now move for summary
judgment, arguing that the force they used to detain Mr. Reed was reasonable as a matter
of law because Mr. Reed evaded an earlier arrest and was previously seen with a weapon.
For the reasons stated below, the court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
On September 6, 2007, a Chicago Police narcotic surveillance team observed
Devonne Reed selling a substance later identified as cocaine to at least three pedestrian
customers in a vacant lot on the 3100 block of W. Roosevelt Road in Chicago. (Defs.
Rule 56.1(a)(3) Statement (hereinafter “Defs. St.”) ¶¶ 12-13.) The surveillance team also
observed Mr. Reed pulling a black handgun from his waistband and placing it in the front
passenger area of a nearby green Chevrolet. (Defs. St. ¶ 15.)
The surveillance team then directed Chicago Police Officers Frank Sarabia and
J.E. Wrigley (“defendant officers”) to arrest Mr. Reed. (Defs. St. ¶ 3.) Defendant
officers handcuffed Mr. Reed and placed him in the backseat of an unlocked police
vehicle. (Defs. St. ¶ 4.) During that arrest (referenced hereinafter as the “first arrest”),
Mr. Reed did not have any drugs or weapons on his person.
(Pl. Rule 56.1(b)(3)
Statement (hereinafter “Pl. St.”) ¶ 2.)
After placing Mr. Reed in the backseat of the police vehicle, defendant officers
talked and inspected the green Chevrolet, from which they ultimately recovered a
handgun. (Defs. St. ¶ 12.) Meanwhile, Mr. Reed reached for the lever of the police car’s
door, opened it, and fled on foot. (Defs. St. ¶ 5.) Mr. Reed found an abandoned car and
hid in its back seat area for approximately 25-30 minutes until the officers found him.
(Defs. St. ¶ 6.) When defendant officers found Mr. Reed, they pulled him from the
abandoned vehicle and again placed him under arrest (referenced hereinafter as the
“second arrest”). (Defs. St. ¶ 9.)
The parties dispute whether Mr. Reed remained handcuffed behind his back
during his escape and hiding. Defendant officers contend that, although Mr. Reed was
handcuffed behind his back during his initial arrest, when they found him in the
abandoned vehicle Officer Sarabia “saw that the handcuffs were now in front of the
plaintiff.”
(Defs. St. ¶ 22.)
Defendant officers contend that Officer Sarabia then
unlocked one of Mr. Reed’s handcuffs and relocked them behind Mr. Reed’s back.
(Defs. St. ¶ 23.) Mr. Reed contends that he was handcuffed behind his back during his
first arrest and remained so during his escape and the entirety of the second arrest. (Pl.
St. ¶ 10.)
2
The parties also dispute whether Mr. Reed resisted the second arrest. Defendant
officers contend, without any additional detail, that Mr. Reed “fought with” them during
the second arrest. (Defs. St. ¶ 24.) Mr. Reed denies fighting with the officers (Pl. Resp.
to Defs. St. ¶ 24) and states that “[a]t no point [did he] punch, kick, or grab any of the
Officers.” (Pl. St. ¶ 9.)
Finally, the parties dispute the degree of force used in the second arrest. Mr. Reed
contends that Officer Sarabia sprayed mace all over his body and lifted his pants and
undergarments to spray mace on his bare genitals. (Pl. St. ¶¶ 12-13.) Mr. Reed contends
that the mace burned his genital area, and that after he was transported to jail and placed
in a cell, he drenched his shirt in toilet water and used that in an attempt to wash the mace
off. (Pl. St. ¶¶ 15-16.) Mr. Reed also contends that while Officer Sarabia sprayed mace,
Officer Wrigley repeatedly beat Mr. Reed with a police baton. (Pl. St. ¶ 14.) Defendant
officers concede that they used mace to subdue Mr. Reed, but deny spraying mace on Mr.
Reed’s bare genital area or beating him with the baton. (Defs. Resp. to Pl. St. ¶¶ 12-16).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether
factual issues exist, the court does not “judge the credibility of the witnesses, evaluate the
weight of the evidence, or determine the truth of the matter. The only question is whether
there is a genuine issue of fact.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir.
2009).
3
Rule 56 mandates, however, that the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment may not rest on the pleadings or mere speculation. See Springer v. Durflinger,
518 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2008). It must instead affirmatively demonstrate, through the
presentation of admissible evidence, that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be
resolved at trial. United States v. 5443 Suffield Terrace, Skokie, Ill., 607 F.3d 504, 510
(7th Cir. 2010). If there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, the court must view the
relevant evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Weber v. Univ. Research Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th
Cir. 2010).
III. ANALYSIS
Mr. Reed claims that Officers Sarabia and Wrigley violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by using excessive force during the second arrest. The officers have
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the use of force was “inherently reasonable.”
Even when a police officer has probable cause to execute an arrest, he or she may
still commit an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment “if, judging from the
totality of circumstances at the time of the arrest, the officer used greater force than was
reasonably necessary to make the arrest.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 539
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Excessive force claims are reviewed
under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir.
2005). The court must examine the “totality of the circumstances to determine whether
the intrusion on the citizen’s Fourth Amendment interests was justified by the
countervailing government interests at stake.” Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758,
773 (7th Cir. 2000). The nature and extent of the force that may reasonably be used to
4
effectuate an arrest depends on the specific circumstances of the arrest, including “the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety
of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Understanding that law enforcement officers
must make critical, split-second decisions in difficult and potentially dangerous
situations, courts assess the reasonableness of the officer’s actions “from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.
Once the relevant events have been established—either at trial or through submission of
undisputed facts—the question of whether an officer’s actions were objectively
reasonable is a legal determination, rather than a jury determination. Bell v. Irwin, 321
F.3d 637, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2003).
In this case, there is conflicting evidence about the nature and extent of the force
used and the extent to which Mr. Reed resisted his second arrest. Defendant officers
claim that Mr. Reed fought them during his second arrest and needed to be re-handcuffed
behind his back, which exposed the officers to a substantial risk of harm. They also
contend that, although they used mace, they used only the amount necessary to subdue
Mr. Reed. They deny spraying his bare genital area and beating him with a police baton.
Mr. Reed presents a very different version of the events. He contends that he remained
handcuffed behind his back and did not resist the arrest. He also contends that the
officers used substantial force in a punitive manner—pulling down his pants and
undergarments to spray mace on his bare genitals and beating him with a baton—while
he lay compliantly first in the back of the car and then on the ground. These are key
factual disputes, which are not susceptible to resolution on summary judgment. Cyrus v.
5
Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment where
parties presented substantially divergent evidence about the nature of force used and the
extent of plaintiff’s resistance of arrest).
Defendant officers appear to argue that, even accepting Mr. Reed’s version of the
events as true, they cannot be found to have used excessive force because Mr. Reed was
evading arrest and had previously been observed with a handgun. The court rejects that
notion. Although the use of mace has been held to be inherently reasonable in cases
involving a suspect who is physically resisting arrest, it has also been held unreasonable
when used excessively or without provocation. Brooks v. City of Aurora, 653 F.3d 478,
486-87 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing cases). That makes sense of course, because force is
reasonable only when exercised in proportion to the threat posed. Oliver v. Fiorino, 586
F.3d 898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that although a single taser shock may have
been justified, repeated taser shocks were grossly disproportionate to any threat posed
and unreasonable under the circumstances). Moreover, the use of force against a suspect
who is already subdued may be deemed punitive in nature, and therefore unreasonable.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Oliver, 226 F. Supp. 2d 943, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (leg sweep by an
officer on a handcuffed suspect was excessive force); Taylor v. Kveton, 684 F. Supp. 179,
185 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“[N]o reasonable officer would have believed that his actions in
kicking an unresisting [plaintiff] . . . were lawful under the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard.”).
Accepting Mr. Reed’s version of the events as true (which the court must do at
this stage of the litigation), a jury in this case could reasonably conclude that defendant
officers repeatedly beat Mr. Reed with a police baton and pulled down his pants and
6
underwear so they could spray mace on his bare genitals. A jury could also conclude
that, from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, Mr. Reed did not present a
substantial threat because he was already handcuffed behind his back and he did not resist
the arrest. Finally, a jury could conclude that defendant officers’ actions were punitive in
nature because Mr. Reed was subdued at the time.1 Those factual findings would support
a ruling in Mr. Reed’s favor on his excessive force claim. Accordingly, the court cannot
grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the court denies Officers Sarabia and Wrigley’s motion for
summary judgment.
ENTER:
/s/
JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL
United States District Judge
DATED: August 1, 2012
1
Defendant officers’ motion for summary judgment makes a passing reference to the concept of qualified
immunity. (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. 6, ECF No. 65.) If defendant officers intend to argue
that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of their conduct was not apparent in
light of pre-existing law, the court notes that it cannot grant summary judgment on that basis because a jury
could conclude that defendant officers’ conduct was punitive in nature or otherwise unreasonably
disproportionate to the threat posed. In that event, the officers would not be entitled to qualified immunity.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Oliver, 226 F. Supp. 2d 943, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Taylor v. Kveton, 684 F. Supp. 179,
185 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Because factual questions remain concerning the nature of the force and Mr. Reed’s
resistance, the court cannot yet rule on the qualified immunity issue. Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 652
(7th Cir. 1987).
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?