Myers v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 128

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr on 8/22/2013:Mailed notice(air, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NATHAN BENJAMIN MYERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal
corporation, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 09 C 05958

Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Nathan Benjamin Myers filed this action against Alderman Joe Moore, Zoning
Administrator Patricia Scudiero, and the City of Chicago (“City”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when City zoning inspectors
allegedly inspected his property without a warrant or his consent. Now before the Court is the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’
motion is granted.
I.

BACKGROUND
A. Procedural
Myers filed an amended complaint in this matter on February 16, 2010, seeking a

declaratory judgment (Count I) and injunctive relief (Count II), and alleging claims for
promissory estoppel (Count III), unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment
(Count IV), equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count V), and conspiracy
(Count VI). Am. Compl. Dkt. 18. On January 1, 2011, Judge Pallmeyer dismissed all but Counts
IV and V of Myers’s amended complaint for wrongful search and equal protection, respectively.
See Myers v. City of Chi., No. 09 C 05859, 2011 WL 43063 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2011) (Pallmeyer,

J.). The defendants filed an amended answer on April 1, 2011. Am. Answer, Dkt. 61. Then on
November 9, 2011, Judge Chang granted the defendants leave to file a motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s equal protection claim. See Order, Dkt. 71. That motion was filed,
briefed, and subsequently granted by this Court on September 12, 2012, leaving the plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful search as the sole claim in this matter. See Mem. Op. and
Order, Dkt. 109.
This Court then granted the defendants leave to file a motion for summary judgment on
Myers’s Fourth Amendment claim and set a briefing schedule. See Order, Dkt. 112. In
accordance with that schedule, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and
“Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” pursuant to Northern District of Illinois Local Rule
56.1(a)(3) on December 12, 2012. Dkt. 116, 118. However, the plaintiff filed his response on
January 11, 2013 with neither a response to the defendant’s Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement nor
a statement of additional facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3). See Pl. Resp., Dkt. 120. The
defendants then filed their reply brief on January 23, 2013. Defs. Reply, Dkt. 121.
Three weeks after his response was due, Myers filed a motion for an extension of time to
file a response to the defendants’ Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of facts and for leave to take
additional discovery. Pl. Mot., Dkt. 123. The Court denied that motion as untimely on February
14, 2013. See Order, Dkt. 126. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, therefore, was
taken under advisement without a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) response or statement of additional facts
from the plaintiff. 1

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Myers, who is an attorney, provided no good cause (indeed, no cause at all) for his failure to
file a response to the defendants’ statement of facts. His failure to file a response to the
defendants’ statement of facts is particularly difficult to understand in view of the fact that the
noncompliant statement of facts he had submitted in connection with summary judgment
(Continued on next page.)
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Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to file:
a concise response to the movant’s statement that shall contain: (A) numbered
paragraphs, each corresponding to and stating a concise summary of the
paragraph to which it is directed, and (B) a response to each numbered paragraph
in the moving party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement,
specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting
materials relied upon, and (C) a statement, consisting of short numbered
paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment,
including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting
materials relied upon. Absent prior leave of Court, a respondent to a summary
judgment motion shall not file more than 40 separately-numbered statements of
additional facts. All material facts set forth in the statement required of the
moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement
of the opposing party.
N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A)-(C) (emphasis added). Accordingly, as a consequence of the
plaintiff’s failure to file a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) response, the defendants’ facts are deemed
admitted to the extent they are supported by admissible evidence in the record. See Keeton v.
Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause [the plaintiff] failed to timely
respond to [the defendant’s] Local Rule 56.1 statement of uncontested facts, [the Court] deem[s]
those facts admitted to the extent that the [defendant’s] statement is supported by evidence in the
record.” (citations omitted)); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Ricciardi Dev., LLC, No. 11 C 06126, 2012 WL
5471091, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2012) (“[The opposing party] filed no Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B)
response, so the facts set forth in [the moving party’s] Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement are
deemed admitted.” (citations omitted)). That said, the Court must still construe those facts in the
light most favorable to Myers, the nonmoving party, as well as draw all reasonable inferences in
his favor. Tebbens v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807, 815 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Goodman v. Nat'l Sec.
Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Keeton, 667 F.3d at 884.
motions on his equal protection claim required the Court to grant the defendants’ motion to strike
that statement. See Mem. Op. and Order, Dkt. 109 at 1-3. Having paid a high price for his prior
failure to comply with the requirements of the local rule, one might have expected Myers to have
exercised greater care in doing so the next time around.
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B. Factual
Myers owns real property located at 1102 W. North Shore Avenue, Chicago, Illinois
60626 (the “Subject Property”). Defs. 56.1 Statement of Facts, Dkt. 118 at ¶ 4. The Subject
Property is located in the City’s 49th Ward and zoned RT-4 pursuant to the City’s Zoning
Ordinance. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 9. Myers obtained two permits from the City’s Department of Buildings to
perform renovations to the Subject Property on April 20, 2009, and May 27, 2009. Id. at ¶ 8.
Thereafter, in August or September of 2009, Joe Moore, the alderman for the 49th Ward, learned
of possible violations of the City’s Zoning Ordinance at the Subject Property. Id. at ¶ 9. Pursuant
to the City’s Zoning Ordinance, fraternities and sororities are prohibited from occupying
properties zoned RT-4. Id. But Alderman Moore had learned that a fraternity had possibly taken
residence at the Subject Property and that the plaintiff was potentially renovating the property
under the permits previously issued by the City in order to accommodate a fraternity. Id.
To ensure compliance with the City’s Zoning and Building codes, Moore then requested
that the City’s Department of Zoning and Land Use Planning 2 (“Department of Zoning”) and
Department of Buildings conduct an inspection of the Subject Property. Id. at ¶ 10. The City’s
Department of Zoning employed zoning inspectors to investigate reports of violations of the
City’s Zoning Ordinance. Id. at ¶ 11. In or about August or September 2009, Patricia Scudiero,
who, at the time, was the City’s Zoning Administrator and Commissioner of the Department of
Zoning, asked Michael Hoskins, a zoning inspector, to inspect the Subject Property to determine

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As the defendants have explained in their statement of facts, “[p]ursuant to an ordinance passed
by the City Council on November 17, 2010, the Department of Zoning and Land Use Planning
ceased to exist on December 31, 2010 and its functions were assumed by the newly-created
Department of Housing and Economic Development (‘HED’).” Defs. 56.1 Statement of Facts,
Dkt. 118 at ¶ 3. “Scudiero is currently the City’s Zoning Administrator and heads the Bureau of
Planning and Zoning within HED.” Id.
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if a fraternity had taken residence there. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 12. On September 4, 2009, an unidentified
supervisor also asked Jeff Samples, an inspector with the City’s Department of Buildings, to
inspect the Subject Property to determine whether the renovations being done there were in
compliance with the building permits issued by the City. Id. at ¶ 13.
On the morning of September 4, 2009, Hoskins and Samples went to and entered the
Subject Property to inspect for violations of the City’s Zoning and Building codes. Id. at ¶¶ 14,
15. Neither Moore nor Scudiero were present at the inspection of the Subject Property. Id. at ¶
16. Moreover, Scudiero did not instruct Hoskins how to conduct the inspection of the Subject
Property or instruct Hoskins to enter the Subject Property without first obtaining consent from
the owner or his agent. Id. at ¶ 17. For his part, Moore neither supervises nor has responsibility
for the work of any inspector employed by the City, including those inspectors who inspect for
violations of the City’s Zoning and Buildings codes. Id. at ¶ 19. Moreover, Moore did not speak
with Hoskins or Samples before or after their inspection of the Subject Property, instruct the City
inspectors how to conduct their inspection, or instruct any inspector to enter the Subject Property
without the owner’s permission. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 21.
II.

ANALYSIS
“Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.” Hakim v. Accenture U.S. Pension Plan, 718 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 2013)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Summary judgment is also “properly entered against a party ‘who
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Id. (citing Parent v. Home

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Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 694 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore, a
“party opposing the motion for summary judgment must ‘submit evidentiary materials that set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citing Siegel v. Shell Oil
Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted)).
Here, Myers contends that Moore, Scudiero, and the City are liable for deprivations of his
constitutional rights allegedly carried out by Hoskins and Samples when they inspected the
Subject Property without the plaintiff’s consent. While Myers failed to submit evidentiary
materials and the defendants’ facts had been deemed admitted, “a nonmovant’s…failure to
comply with Local Rule 56.1, does not, of course, automatically result in summary judgment for
the movant.” Keeton, 667 F.3d at 884 (citing Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608
(7th Cir. 2006); Reales v. Consol. Rail Corp., 84 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 1996)). The defendants
“must still demonstrate that [they] are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing
Raymond, 442 F.3d at 608). They have succeeded here.
A. Individual Claims Against Defendants Alderman Joe Moore and Zoning
Administrator Patricia Scudiero
Section 1983 provides, in part, that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Myers contends that City inspectors Hoskins and Samples (who are not
defendants) searched the Subject Property without a warrant or his consent on September 4,
2009, thereby violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. See
Am. Compl., Dkt. 18 at 10-11. Myers argues that Moore and Scudiero are individually liable for

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that violation by virtue of their positions and role in causing the inspection of the Subject
Property to take place. Pl. Resp., Dkt. 120 at 2-6.
The briefing by the parties has narrowed the Court’s inquiry to a single issue.
Specifically, for purposes of this motion, the defendants have assumed that Hoskins and Samples
searched or inspected the Subject Property without a warrant or the plaintiff’s consent and that
such a search violated the Fourth Amendment. They argue that, even if the alleged constitutional
deprivation occurred, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Moore and Scudiero cannot be held
individually liable for that violation. Myers contends that Moore and Scudiero caused the alleged
constitutional violation by Hoskins and Samples merely by directing an inspection to occur. The
sole inquiry for the Court, then, is whether Defendants Moore and Scudiero may be held liable
for the alleged misconduct of Hoskins and Samples in conducting the assumedly unconstitutional
search.
That question, Myers avers, can be determined using a “but for” test derived from the
plain language of § 1983. Id. at 2. In other words, pursuant to § 1983’s “subjects, or causes to be
subjected” clause, the issue can be resolved by determining whether, “but for Scudiero directing
Hoskins to inspect the property, would plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated,”
and “[b]ut for Moore requesting Scudiero…to conduct an inspection of the subject property,
would plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated?” Id. at 2-3. The plaintiff’s
argument, however, misconstrues the relevant inquiry and, if applied, would yield a result
contrary to settled Seventh Circuit law on individual liability under § 1983.
The Seventh Circuit has explained that “[a] defendant will not be liable for a
constitutional violation under § 1983 if the defendant merely exercised supervisory authority
over those who violated the plaintiff’s rights and otherwise failed to participate in any violation

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of the plaintiff’s rights.” Kelly v. Mun. Courts of Marion Cnty., 97 F.3d 902, 909 (7th Cir. 1996).
That is, “a plaintiff may not rely on the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold supervisory
officials liable for the misconduct of their subordinates.” Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 305
F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001)).
“Rather, the supervisory officials also must have had some personal involvement in the
constitutional deprivation, essentially directing or consenting to the challenged conduct.” Id. at
614-15 (citing Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)). And for a
supervisor to have personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, they must “know
about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they
might see.” Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Jones v.
City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988)). In short, supervisors must “act either
knowingly or with deliberate, reckless difference.” Lanigan v. Vill. of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110
F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Jones, 856 F.2d at 992-93).
On this point, the undisputed record shows that Moore and Scudiero were not present for
the inspection, did not instruct Hoskins or Samples how to conduct the inspection, or instruct
Hoskins or Samples to conduct the inspection without the plaintiff’s consent. Defs. 56.1
Statement of Facts, Dkt. 118 at ¶¶ 16-21. Even assuming that Hoskins and Samples entered and
inspected the Subject Property without the plaintiff’s consent, there is also no evidence that
demonstrates or raises an inference that either Moore or Scudiero knew about, approved,
condoned, or turned a blind eye to that alleged misconduct. See, e.g., Matthews, 675 F.3d at 708.
In other words, nothing in the record supports a reasonable inference that either Moore or
Scudiero knowingly instructed the City inspectors to inspect the Subject Property in an

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unconstitutional manner or that they were recklessly indifferent to a risk that the City inspectors
would do so. See, e.g., Lanigan, 110 F.3d at 477.
Myers argues that Scudiero must have known that Hoskins would conduct an inspection
when she instructed him to inspect the Subject Property for violations of the City’s Zoning
Ordinance. Pl. Resp., Dkt. 120 at 3. But this argument misses the mark. The inquiry is not
whether Scudiero knew that Hoskins would conduct an inspection—of course, it can be
reasonably inferred that she assumed that he would conduct an inspection in accordance with her
directive—but whether she knew about, approved, condoned, or was recklessly indifferent to the
alleged misconduct that forms the basis of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim. See, e.g.,
Nanda v. Moss, 412 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Under § 1983…supervisory liability can be
established if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at the supervisor’s
direction or with the supervisor’s knowledge and consent.” (emphasis added and citation
omitted)). The alleged misconduct that caused the constitutional violation in this case was not
merely an inspection of the Subject Property, but an inspection of the Subject Property without
the plaintiff’s consent. Indeed, the plaintiff does not argue that the zoning inspection was
unconstitutional per se, and the Zoning Ordinance expressly states that the “Zoning
Administrator” is responsible for “requesting the Commissioner of Buildings to conduct
inspections of buildings, structures, and uses of land to determine compliance with the terms of
this Zoning Ordinance” and provides for “Zoning Inspectors.” Chi. Mun. Code, § 17-14-0202-C;
see also id. § 17-14-0501-A (stating that the Commissioner of Buildings has the responsibility
and duty to “conduct[] inspections of buildings, structures, and uses of land to determine
compliance with the terms of this Zoning Ordinance”); id. § 17-17-02196 (“Zoning Inspector. A
municipal employee supervised to issue citations for code violations and conduct inspections of

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public or private real property in Chicago to determine if code violations exist.” (emphasis
added)). But more importantly, Myers has failed to adduce any evidence that Scudiero directed
or knew that Hoskins and Samples would conduct their inspection without consent, or that
Scudiero was deliberately and recklessly indifferent to the risk that the inspectors would engage
in misconduct.
Similarly, Myers contends that Scudiero instructed Hoskins to conduct the inspection at
Moore’s behest. Pl. Resp., Dkt. 120 at 4. And, Myers alleges, Moore requested that inspection as
part of his personal vendetta against the plaintiff. Id. But even if true, these facts would not
suffice to show that either Scudiero or Moore knew (or were deliberately indifferent to the risk)
that the inspectors would conduct the inspection in an unconstitutional manner. And even if these
facts could support an inference that Moore or Scudiero knowingly, or with reckless
indifference, instructed Hoskins and Samples to inspect the Subject Property without the
plaintiff’s consent, Myers has failed to support these allegations with admissible record evidence.
Instead, the plaintiff cites to the allegations of his first amended complaint. See id. at 3-4. As the
Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held, however, such conclusory allegations devoid of factual
support are insufficient to preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., Shermer v. Ill. Dep’t of
Transp., 171 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] non-moving party may not rely solely on the
allegations in his complaint to defeat summary judgment.” (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986); Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1998)); see also Gessert
v. United States, 703 F.3d 1028, 1035 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[C]onclusory allegations devoid of
factual support do not preclude summary judgment.” (citing Ozlowski v. Henderson, 237 F.3d
837, 840 (7th Cir. 2001); Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2010)

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(“[M]ere conclusory allegations do not constitute evidence.” (citing Balderston v. Fairbanks
Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003))).
Myers also points to the fact that the affidavits of Hoskins and Samples submitted by the
defendants do not “explain[] when, where, or the manner in which plaintiff allegedly consented
to the search.” Pl. Resp., Dkt. 120 at 4. While Myers’s point is accurate, it is irrelevant. For
purposes of this motion, the defendants have assumed that there was no consent; the inquiry here
is not whether the search was constitutional but whether the defendants knew about, condoned,
or turned a blind eye to an unconstitutional search. As to that question, Myers has offered no
evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Moore or Scudiero knowingly or with
deliberate, reckless indifference caused the plaintiff to suffer a constitutional deprivation. See,
e.g., Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[The plaintiff] cannot rest on
metaphysical doubt that [the defendant engaged in misconduct] but must produce evidence so
showing.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to the individual claims against Defendants Moore and Scudiero is
granted.
B. Monell Claim Against the City of Chicago
As with the individual claims against Moore and Scudiero, “[i]t is not enough [for Myers]
to assert that the municipality is responsible under a theory of respondeat superior.” King v.
Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Srvs., 436 U.S. 658,
691 (1978)). “To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show the existence of an ‘official
policy’ or other governmental custom that not only causes but is the ‘moving force’ behind the
deprivation of constitutional rights.” Teesdale v. City of Chi., 690 F.3d 829, 833-34 (7th Cir.
2012) (citing Estate of Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting City

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of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989))). “A plaintiff can establish an official policy
through ‘(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a
widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice;
or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking
authority.’” Id. at 834 (citing Estate of Sims, 506 F.3d at 515 (citing Lewis v. City of Chi., 496
F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007))).
In this case, Myers has not presented evidence, argued, or even alleged that the City had
either an express policy or a custom or practice of City inspectors conducting inspections of
property without the property owner’s consent. See Pl. Resp., Dkt. 120 at 6-7. Instead, Myers
bases his claim solely on the third possibility—that his alleged constitutional violation was
caused by the directives of Moore and Scudiero, who both had final policymaking authority. See
id. But even assuming for purposes of this motion that the defendants are officials with final
policymaking authority and that the plaintiff suffered a constitutional deprivation, Myers’s claim
fails for the same reason as his claim against Moore and Scudiero—he has produced no evidence
that demonstrates that either Moore or Scudiero directed the inspectors to conduct an inspection
of the Subject Property without his consent. And in order “to establish municipal liability on the
theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights,”
as Myers alleges here, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with
‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Rasche, 336 F.3d at 599
(some internal quotations omitted) (citing Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
407 (1997)).
As noted above, it is undisputed that Moore and Scudiero did not enter the Subject
Property themselves, were not present for the inspections, and did not direct the City inspectors

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to inspect or search the property without Myers’s consent. Merely directing the inspectors to
conduct an inspection of the Subject Property, without more, is insufficient to create a triable
issue of fact concerning the City’s liability under § 1983, just as it is insufficient to create a
triable issue of fact concerning the defendants’ individual liability. Myers has presented no
evidence that either Moore or Scudiero knew that directing Hoskins and Samples to inspect the
Subject Property would “pose a substantial risk” of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Wragg,
604 F.3d at 469 (citing Frake v. City of Chi., 210 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2000); Brown, 520 U.S.
at 407 (finding that municipal liability attaches only where the final policymaker acts “with
deliberate indifference as to…known or obvious consequences” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the “deliberate
indifference” standard requires “subjective awareness…[i]t is not enough that the [defendant]
ought to have recognized the risk.” (emphasis in original))). There is simply no evidence to
support an inference that when Moore or Scudiero requested or directed that an inspection take
place at the Subject Property, they did so with deliberate indifference to the risk that the City
inspectors would violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, the defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on Myers’s Monell claim against the City.
*

*

*

Because the plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence to support a reasonable inference that
either Moore or Scudiero knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference caused Hoskins and
Samples to inspect the Subject Property in an unconstitutional manner, his claims against the
defendants fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted in its entirety.

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Entered: August 22, 2013

____________________________________
John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge

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