Jones et al v. National Council of Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States of America et al

Filing 397

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Arlander Keys on 10/30/2012: Mailed notice.(ac, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES JONES, NICOLE STEELS,
and KAVON WARD,
on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly
situated,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
v.
)
)
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF YOUNG
)
MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS )
OF THE UNITED STATES OF
)
AMERICA (“YMCA OF THE USA”), )
an Illinois not-for-profit
)
corporation, and ELINOR HITE, )
former Senior Vice President )
of YMCA of the USA
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 09 C 6437
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.
Magistrate Judge
Arlander Keys

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On June 19, 2012, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class
Certification [358].

Defendants were to file their response to

the Motion for Class Certification on September 25, 2012.
Instead, on September 4, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to
Strike Plaintiffs' New Class Definition and For An Order
Requiring The Parties To Brief Class Certification Based On The
Class Definition in Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint and
Extending The Deadline By Which Defendants Must Respond To
Plaintiffs' Motion [385].

That motion is now fully briefed.

the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is denied.

For

On October 13, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their original
Complaint, which asserted putative class action race
discrimination claims and defined the putative class as follows:
[A]ll current and former African-American employees of the
YMCA employed at any point since September 2005 who had his
or her performance was [sic] assessed as part of the YMCA’s
annual performance assessment process (regardless of whether
a written performance evaluation was completed) or who was
granted or denied a merit-based compensation adjustment at
any point since September 2005.
[1, ¶ 126.]

On December 14, 2010, December 30, 2010, and July

18, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their Second, Third, and Fourth
Amended Complaints, respectively.

Plaintiffs’ class definition

did not change. [83, ¶ 290; 91, ¶ 289; 220, ¶ 323.]
In their Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs include
the following definition of the class:
African American employees of the Y employed at any point
from October 13, 2005 to September 30, 2008, excluding
Leadership Group members and in-house counsel.
[359, p. 1.] Defendants objected to this definition initially,
arguing that Plaintiffs were bound to their original definition,
and that Defendants were prejudiced by the new definition since
all discovery, including expert discovery, has been completed.
[385]
In their response brief, Plaintiffs argue that the new
proposed class definition does not cause any prejudice against
Defendants, because their class definition in the Motion to
Certify is similar to the original, and if anything, is more

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specific and limited as Plaintiffs applied the information
accumulated during discovery to focus their proposed class
definition. [389] In addition, in their response, Plaintiffs
provided authority and supportive caselaw to argue that courts
routinely permit modification of the proposed class definition.
Resp., p. 6; Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook Co., 256 F.R.D. 609, 611
(N.D. Ill. 2009); Flanagan v. Allstate Ins. Co.¸ 228 F.R.D. 617,
618-19 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav.
Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322, 328-29 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
In their Reply brief [390], Defendants abandon their
argument regarding Plaintiffs’ inability to amend their proposed
class definition, but instead argue that the definition is
inadequate because it does not identify the class claims.

In

addition, for the first time, Defendants proposed that the Court
adopt a “hybrid” definition of the proposed class that Defendants
drafted.

The proposed “hybrid” definition is:

African American employees of the Y employed at any point
from October 13, 2005 to September 30, 2008, excluding
Leadership Group members and in-house counsel, who had their
performance assessed as part of the Y’s annual performance
assessment process (regardless of whether a written
performance evaluation was completed) or were granted or
denied a merit-based compensation adjustment.
Reply at 2.

The Court directed Plaintiffs to respond to these

new arguments by filing a Sur-Reply. [391]
In their Sur-Reply, Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ “hybrid”
definition and again request that Defendants’ Motion to Strike

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Plaintiffs' New Class Definition be denied.

Plaintiffs argue

that Defendants’ attempt to “control or limit the claims of the
putative class” should be rejected. Sur-Reply at 2.

Plaintiffs

add that “the so-called ‘hybrid’ definition does not accurately
describe Plaintiffs’ class claims.”

Id.

In support, Plaintiffs

expound that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 does not require
them to include their claims in the definition of the proposed
class, citing Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 904-08
(7th Cir. 2012).

The Court agrees.

In Ross, the Seventh Circuit

clarified the elements required in the proposed class definition
by distinguishing between the requirements needed to define the
class from the list of claims, issues, or defenses to be included
in the order certifying the class.

Id. at 905-07.

Therefore, Defendants’ arguments to strike the definition of
the proposed class, at this point in the litigation, are
rejected.

In addition, the Court will not adopt the proposed

hybrid definition.

However, this ruling in no way precludes

Defendants from challenging the proposed class definition in
their response to the Motion for Class Certification.
Conclusion
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' New Class
Definition and For An Order Requiring The Parties To Brief Class
Certification Based On The Class Definition in Plaintiffs' Fourth
Amended Complaint [385] is denied.
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The parties are to continue

their briefing of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification
[358].

Defendants’ Response to the Motion for Class

Certification is due by November 23, 2012.

Plaintiffs’ Reply is

due by December 14, 2012.

Dated: October 30, 2012

ENTERED:
______________________________
ARLANDER KEYS
United States Magistrate Judge

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