Oliver v. Ramos et al

Filing 75

MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 5/26/2011.Mailed notice(sct, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
HAROLD OLIVER,
Petitioner,
vs.
MARCUS HARDY, Warden,
Stateville Correctional Center,
Respondent.

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09 C 7541

MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
This case comes before the Court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by Petitioner Harold Oliver (“Oliver”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons
stated below, the petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
In 1991, a jury convicted Oliver in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, of
armed robbery and aggravated criminal sexual assault. In 1994, the appellate court
reversed Oliver’s convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because the jury
selection procedure did not ensure a fair and impartial jury. In 1997, in the Circuit
Court of Cook County, a jury again convicted Oliver of armed robbery and aggravated
criminal sexual assault. The Illinois trial court sentenced Oliver to consecutive terms
of imprisonment for 30 and 60 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The

Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Oliver’s convictions. On October 6, 2009, the Illinois
Supreme Court denied Oliver’s petition for leave to appeal and Oliver did not petition
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
On February 1, 2000, Oliver filed a post-conviction petition in the Circuit Court
of Cook County and subsequently filed two supplemental post-conviction petitions.
Oliver’s post-conviction petition remains pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
On December 4, 2009, this Court received Oliver’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, raising twenty-six claims. On April 7, 2010, Hardy moved to dismiss the
petition because Oliver failed to exhaust his state court remedies. On October 20, 2010,
this Court denied Hardy’s motion to dismiss and excused Oliver from satisfying the
exhaustion requirement in this case because the Illinois courts’ delay in deciding
Oliver’s petition was both inordinate and unjustified. United States ex rel. Oliver v.
Hardy, 09-cv-7541, Dkt. No. 48.
LEGAL STANDARD
The procedural default doctrine precludes a federal court from reaching the
merits of a habeas claim if the claim was not presented to the state courts and the state
courts would now hold the claim procedurally barred. Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d
505, 514 (7th Cir. 2004). In other words, when the habeas petitioner has failed to
present to the state courts the claim on which he seeks relief in federal court and the

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opportunity to raise that claim in state court has passed, the petitioner has procedurally
defaulted that claim. Id. A court, however, may excuse a petitioner’s procedural
default if the petitioner demonstrates either cause for the default and resulting prejudice
or that a miscarriage of justice will result if the court fails to consider the claim on the
merits. Id.
DISCUSSION
I.

This Court Denies Oliver’s Habeas Petition
Oliver’s habeas petition is based on the following grounds: (1) Oliver is actually

innocent; (2) Oliver’s due process rights were violated because the State knowingly
used perjured testimony; and (3) the state court improperly instructed the jury regarding
the evaluation of eyewitness identification testimony.1 While both parties agree these
claims are procedurally defaulted, Oliver maintains that this Court must review the
claims to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
If the petitioner seeks to overcome the procedural default by establishing a
miscarriage of justice, the petitioner must present new, reliable evidence which
demonstrates that he or she is actually innocent. Woods v. Schwartz, 589 F.3d 368, 377
(7th Cir. 2009) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995)). The petitioner must

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Oliver initially raised twenty-six claims in his habeas petition. Hardy maintains that all of
Oliver’s claims are either procedurally defaulted or meritless. Because Oliver agrees that the
majority of the claims are “ultimately doomed,” Oliver now relies on only three claims originally
discussed in his habeas petition.

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establish that, in light of the new evidence, no juror could reasonably find petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Without new evidence of innocence, even a
meritorious constitutional claim is not sufficient to allow a habeas court to reach the
merits of a procedurally defaulted claim. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316; United States ex rel.
Bell v. Pierson, 267 F.3d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 2001). Since Oliver has not presented us
with any new evidence, he cannot demonstrate his eligibility for the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Adams v. Dawson, 2011
WL 760081, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2011) (Kocoras, J.) (holding that petitioner
procedurally defaulted his jury instruction claim and did not qualify for an exception
to the procedural default rule). Accordingly, Oliver’s claims are procedurally defaulted
and this Court denies his habeas petition.
II.

This Court Declines to Issue a Certificate of Appealability
According to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts, “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the [petitioner].” A district court
may issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Specifically,
when a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds, the petitioner must
satisfy two threshold inquiries and show that jurists of reason would find it debatable:

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(1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and
(2) whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
This Court addresses only the second threshold inquiry. Oliver cannot show that
reasonable jurists would find the correctness of this Court’s procedural ruling debatable.
As discussed above, Oliver’s claims are procedurally defaulted and Oliver presents no
new evidence of his innocence to demonstrate his eligibility for the miscarriage of
justice exception to the procedural default rule. Because Oliver cannot satisfy the
second inquiry, this Court need not address the first. Id. at 485 (encouraging courts to
first resolve procedural issues and restrain from unnecessarily resolving constitutional
questions). This Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court denies Oliver’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and declines to issue a certificate of appealability.

Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
Dated:

May 26, 2011

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