Jackson v. The Renaissance Collaborative Inc et al

Filing 105

MEMORANDUM and Order Signed by the Honorable Blanche M. Manning on 2/16/2012:Mailed notice(rth, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CURTIS JACKSON, SR.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
v.
)
)
THE RENAISSANCE COLLABORATIVE, )
INC., PATRICIA ABRAMS, TIFFANY
)
SLEDGE, PRISCILLA FOSTER, and
)
DENISE RANKIN,
)
Defendants.
)

09 C 7992

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pursuant to the Rehabilitation and Fair Housing Acts, pro se plaintiff Curtis Jackson
seeks monetary and injunctive relief from the Renaissance Collaborative (a non-profit
organization that provides housing and support to homeless and disabled individuals) and four of
its employees. According to Mr. Jackson, Renaissance denied him housing because he was
disabled and its employees attempted to extort him for their own personal gain. The defendants’
motion for summary judgment is before the court. Mr. Jackson also has filed a motion to
reconsider the magistrate judge’s order striking Mr. Jackson’s motion to compel discovery
responses based on his failure to notice the motion for presentment. For the following reasons,
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety and Mr. Jackson’s motion
to reconsider is denied.
I.

Background

The following facts are drawn from the parties’ submissions. As Mr. Jackson is
proceeding pro se, the court has construed his filings generously, as it has done throughout the
entire pendency of this case.
A.

The Renaissance Apartment Program

The Renaissance Apartment Program provides 101 single room units for disabled,
homeless adults. On site supportive services at the Apartment Program include employment
education and training, job readiness, employment referrals and retention training, health and
wellness support, and life skills coaching. In the Fall of 2009, Mr. Jackson sought to obtain
housing through the Apartment Program.
To qualify for housing with the program, applicants must, among other things, be
chronically homeless. The “chronic” part of this requirement refers to an unaccompanied
homeless individual with a disabling condition who has been continuously homeless for at least

one year or has had at least four instances of homelessness in the past three years. The
“homeless” part refers to being on the streets or in an emergency shelter. Transitional housing
does not qualify. “Disabling condition” means a diagnosable substance abuse disorder, serious
mental illness, developmental disability, or a chronic physical illness or disability, including the
co-occurrence of two or more of these conditions. Proof of documented homelessness and
disability is required to complete an application for housing.
B.

Mr. Jackson’s Application

Defendant Denise Rankin is Renaissance’s property manager and defendant Priscilla
Foster is the health and wellness manager. On November 11, 2009, Ms. Rankin and Ms. Foster
met with Mr. Jackson as part of his application process. According to Ms. Rankin and Ms.
Foster, Mr. Jackson did not provide personal references and adequate proof of chronic
homelessness. Thus, they believed he was not eligible for the program. In his third amended
complaint, however, Mr. Jackson alleges that he gave Ms. Rankin a “Chicago Department of
Family & Support Services Supportive Housing Program Homeless Verification Form” dated
November 10, 2009, stating that he had been homeless for two years. Third Amended
Complaint, Dkt. 47, at p.6, Page ID#171.
Mr. Jackson asserts that he is obese, has bi-polar disorder, impaired mobility, a left
shoulder that dislocates, and hypertension, and suffers from migraines, allergic rhinitis, and
sinusitis. According to Mr. Jackson, during his interview, Ms. Rankin and Ms. Foster intimated
that they would not process his application without a bribe because they knew he had some
money from receiving Social Security benefits. Id. at pp.2, 4, Page ID#167, 169. In addition, he
contends that when they met, Ms. Rankin told him his problems were such that he “need[s] to be
in an old folks home” and called him “pitiful” for having bi-polar disorder. Id. at pp.3-4, Page
ID#168-169.
Following the meeting, Ms. Rankin completed the form letter Renaissance sends to
applicants who do not meet the program’s requirements or are ineligible by checking off the
sections of the form indicating that Mr. Jackson had failed to provide personal references and
adequate proof of chronic homelessness. The letter advises applicants that they may seek review
of the decision by sending a letter within 14 days. Mr. Jackson received the letter on or about
November 22 or 23, 2009. He submitted a request for review. Renaissance asserts that the
request was misplaced due to a clerical error. Mr. Jackson followed up by calling defendant
Patricia Abrams, Renaissance’s Executive Director, on December 22, 2009. She offered him an
opportunity for review. In response, Mr. Jackson said, “This is not right; I did what I was asked
to do.” Dkt. 47 at p.7, Page ID#172. Following his interview, Mr. Jackson did not supplement
his application with the additional documentation requested in Renaissance’s letter.

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C.

Mr. Jackson’s Federal Claims

Mr. Jackson filed a federal lawsuit in July of 2010 asserting claims under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.1 The
parties pursued discovery. As noted above, this court and the assigned magistrate judge have
given Mr. Jackson wide latitude and construed all of his filings generously as he is proceeding
pro se. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is before the court. The court notes that
the defendants provided Mr. Jackson with the notice to pro se litigants opposing summary
judgment required by Local Rule 56.2.
II.

Discussion
A.

Standard for A Motion For Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Valenti
v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1992). A court should grant a motion for
summary judgment only when the record shows that a reasonable jury could not find for the
nonmoving party. Id.
To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, however, the non-moving party
must do more than raise a “metaphysical doubt” as to the material facts. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, it must demonstrate
that a genuine issue of fact exists. See id. at 587; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a party fails
to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of
fact” the court may: “(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider
the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and
supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is
entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order”).
II.

Discussion
A.

The Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, provides that an institution
receiving federal funds (such as Renaissance) may not discriminate against an “otherwise
qualified handicapped individual.” Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 841 F.3d 737, 740 (7th
Cir. 1988). “In order to prevail on a claim of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, a
1

Other claims were dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) upon initial screening.
See Dkt. 46.
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plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) [he] is disabled as defined by the Act; (2) [he] is otherwise
qualified for the position sought; (3) [he] has been excluded from the position solely because of
[his] disability; and (4) the position exists as part of a program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.” Burks v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2006).
“Section 504 is a civil rights provision that prohibits a federal grant recipient from
discriminating against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals solely because of that
handicap.” Mallett v. Wisconsin Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d 1245, 1257 (7th Cir.
1997). Renaissance acknowledges that the “otherwise qualified” prong does not fit neatly into
the traditional framework of § 504 Rehabilitation Act claims because Mr. Jackson suffers from
multiple health conditions and the Rehabilitation Act is meant to ensure program accessibility to
people. The defendants focus on the second and third prongs, contending that the record does
not demonstrate that Mr. Jackson was “otherwise qualified” to receive the services he requested
from Renaissance or that he was rejected based on his disability. They also assert that Mr.
Jackson cannot bring an Rehabilitation Act against the individual defendants because they do not
receive federal financial assistance.
The court finds the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mallett v. Wisconsin Div. of Vocational
Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d at 1257, to be instructive. In Mallett, the disabled plaintiff received
college financial aid from the Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (“DVR”)
pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. After the plaintiff requested additional funds to attend
graduate school, DVR told the plaintiff that it intended to close his file and discontinue his
financial assistance. The plaintiff filed suit, contending, among other things, that the denial of
financial aid violated the Rehabilitation Act.
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the “otherwise qualified”
prong, explaining:
[The plaintiff] was not “otherwise qualified” to receive vocational benefits from
DVR. “An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a
program’s requirements in spite of his handicap.” Southeastern Comm. Coll. v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979); see also Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Northwest
Indiana, 104 F.3d 116, 120 (7th Cir. 1997). [The plaintiff] would not have been
eligible to receive any rehabilitative services in the absence of his handicap. See
Flight v. Gloeckler, 878 F.Supp. 424, 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding
individual with disabilities is not “otherwise qualified” for Rehabilitation Act),
aff'd, 68 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1995). DVR only treats individuals who qualify.
“‘Without a showing that the non-handicapped received the treatment denied to
the ‘otherwise qualified’ handicapped, the appellant[ ] cannot assert that a
violation of section 504 has occurred.’” Grzan, 104 F.3d at 121 (quoting Johnson
by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1494 (10th Cir. 1992). [The plaintiff]
has failed to do so in this case.

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Id. at 1257.
Here, Renaissance asserts that Mr. Jackson did not meet the program’s eligibility
requirements. In support, they stress that all applicants were required to provide the same
documentation and that Mr. Jackson did not provide the required personal references or adequate
proof of chronic homelessness. Mr. Jackson may have believed that the letter he provided was
adequate. The court, however, need not address his alleged belief as Mr. Jackson does not point
to any evidence demonstrating that he provided references. Moreover, no evidence indicates that
Renaissance applied the reference requirement inconsistently.2 Renaissance, like DVR in the
Mallett case, “only treats individuals who qualify.” Id. No evidence shows that a similarly
situated person without references, whether handicapped or not, received a spot in Renaissance’s
program. Mr. Jackson, therefore, cannot establish that he was “otherwise qualified” and
nevertheless failed to receive services.
The court also notes the parties’ disagreement regarding the events following
Renaissance’s rejection of Mr. Jackson’s application. Renaissance contends it realized that Mr.
Jackson’s request for reconsideration was inadvertently misplaced but after he brought this to its
attention, it offered him a chance for rehearing that he did not pursue. Mr. Jackson asserts that he
had a conversation with Tiffany Sledge, Chief Operating Officer of Renaissance, who said his
appeal would be heard if and when she chose to consider it. In response, he expressed his belief
that this was unfair. Dkt. 47 at Page ID#172. It is clear, however, that Mr. Jackson was told in
writing that he lacked references and was not considered to be chronically homeless as these
issues are listed in the notice declining to offer housing that Mr. Jackson attaches to his response
to the motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 95, at Page ID#478-79. Moreover, it is undisputed
that Mr. Jackson did not attempt to address these issues. He did not provide references and he
chose to stand on the materials he submitted about chronic homelessness. His view about the
appeal process does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether he was “otherwise qualified”
because, as discussed above, the record does not show that he was “otherwise qualified” and that
the defendants nevertheless used the appeals process to deny him services that he otherwise was
entitled to receive.
The defendants also stress that according to Mr. Jackson, his application was unfairly
rejected because Renaissance employees told him he would be accepted only if he bribed them.
The Mallett case is again on point. The plaintiff in Mallett claimed that he was denied services
based on an improper reason (DVR’s decision not to support graduate education). The Seventh
2

The court also acknowledges the defendants’ reference to Jackson v. McGaw YMCA
Evanston, No. 09 C 2449 (N.D. Ill.). In that case, Mr. Jackson alleged that he resided at the
McGaw YMCA from September 22, 2008, through April 20, 2009. See No. 09 C 2449, Dkt. 34.
According to the defendants, this recent stay meant that he was not “chronically homeless” as
that term is used by Renaissance. Mr. Jackson does not attempt to retract his allegations in the
McGaw case. The court will not address the admissibility and use of the complaint in the
McGaw case as it is not necessary for resolution of the pending motion for summary judgment.
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Circuit held that this failed “to demonstrate that [the plaintiff] was denied treatment ‘solely by
reason of his . . . handicap.’” Id., quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). It then elaborated:
“The word solely provides the key: the discrimination must result from the
handicap and from the handicap alone.” Johnson, 971 F.2d at 1493 (establishing
that discrimination does not result “solely by reason of [the] handicap” if others
with the same handicap do not suffer the discrimination). [The plaintiff] alleges
that DVR closed his file because of an agency policy disfavoring graduate school
and because DVR’s failure to follow its procedures prevented him from
establishing his merit for this funding in his administrative appeals. Neither of
these reasons is related to his handicap. See Flight, 68 F.3d at 64 (concluding §
504 is inapplicable when denial of funding was based on type of vehicle
modification requested).
Id. at 1257.
Here, if the court accepts Mr. Jackson’s version of events for purposes of the motion for
summary judgment, Renaissance rejected him because he refused to bribe its employees. The
negative decision, according to Mr. Jackson, was thus based on rogue employees’ improper
behavior. By definition, therefore, assuming Mr. Jackson’s recitation of events is accurate, his
rejection did not “result from the handicap and from the handicap alone,” Johnson by Johnson v.
Thompson, 971 F.2d at 1493, and “[r]egardless of whether the reasons why [the plaintiff] was
denied [assistance] were legal or illegal, they were not based on his handicap,” Mallett v.
Wisconsin Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d at 1257. Accordingly, Mr. Jackson’s
Rehabilitation Act claim fails as he has not established that he was “otherwise qualified” or that
he was excluded from Renaissance’s program solely because of his disability. The defendants’
motion for summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim is, therefore, granted and the court
will not consider their other arguments.
B.

The Fair Housing Act

Mr. Jackson asserts generally that the defendants violated the Fair Housing Act when it
declined to accept him into the Apartment Program. The defendants, with no objection from Mr.
Jackson, construe his claim as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), which provides that it is
unlawful “[t]o discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of – (A) that buyer or renter, (B) a person
residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold, rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.”
“To state a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must show that
he is 1) a member of a protected class; 2) the defendant was aware of plaintiff’s class
membership; 3) plaintiff was ready, willing and able to buy, rent or otherwise inhabit the
dwelling; and 4) the defendant refused to deal with him.” Fincher v. South Bend Housing
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Authority, 612 F. Supp.2d 1009, 1025 (N.D. Ind. 2009), citing Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383,
387 (7th Cir. 1985). The court’s consideration begins and ends with the “ready, willing and able
to buy, rent or otherwise inhabit the dwelling” prong. To satisfy this prong, Mr. Jackson must
show that he was qualified to rent through Renaissance’s Apartment Program. As discussed, at
the least, he did not provide references and thus did not meet admission criteria that were applied
to all disabled individuals seeking housing at the Apartment Program. Accordingly, the
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Jackson’s Housing Act claim. See Hu v.
Cantwell, No. 06 C 6589, 2009 WL 1270142, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2009) (putative buyer’s
inability to obtain financing meant she was not able and willing to buy the property).
C.

Mr. Jackson’s Motion to Reconsider

On May 18, 2011, Mr. Jackson filed a motion to compel and noticed it for presentment
before this court on May 24, 2011. On May 20, 2011, the court entered an order stating, “[t]his
case having been referred, in part, for ruling on all nondispositive pretrial motions, plaintiff’s
motion to compel discovery responses to his request for admissions [79] shall be re-noticed
before Magistrate Judge Brown. No appearance is required before this court on 5/24/2011.” Mr.
Jackson did not re-notice his motion. Thus, on January 4, 2012, Magistrate Judge Brown struck
the motion pursuant to Local Rule 78.2, which requires movants to notice motions for
presentment. On January 11, 2012, instead of re-noticing his motion before Magistrate Judge
Brown, Mr. Jackson filed a motion with this court stating that Magistrate Judge Brown’s January
4th order should be vacated because he was not aware that he needed to re-notice his motion and
believed it would be automatically done for him.
Mr. Jackson has pursued litigation in federal court since April of 2009 to the present. He
filed his case against the McGaw YMCA on April 4, 2009, and that case was closed on
December 9, 2009. Jackson v. McGaw YMCA Evanston, No. 09 C 2449 (N.D. Ill.). A few
weeks later on December 28, 2009, he filed the present case against Renaissance and its
employees. He has vigorously litigated this matter throughout its pendency and taken advantage
of the ability to interact with the courtroom deputies for this court as well as the assigned
magistrate judge. This court and the magistrate judge have afforded him wide latitude given his
pro se status. The court finds that even if he at first erroneously believed his motion would be
heard without further court action, at the point that he received the magistrate judge’s order, he
knew this belief was incorrect. He nevertheless did not re-notice his motion before the
magistrate judge and instead filed a motion to reconsider before this court.
Because the order at issue deals with discovery, this court’s review is limited to
considering whether it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). A
finding is clearly erroneous when the court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); Weeks v.
Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). The court cannot make such
a finding here. It is well-established that “[a]lthough the filings of pro se litigants are subject to
more liberal review and interpretation, a pro se plaintiff must still comply with local rules.”
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Navejar v. Iyiola, No. 09 C 4108,WL 33901, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan 6, 2012). Mr. Jackson’s
assertion that his inaction was due to lack of knowledge is thus unavailing. In any event, upon
receipt of the magistrate judge’s order striking his motion and citing to the applicable rule, he
chose to file a motion to reconsider with this court rather than attempting to have his motion
heard before the magistrate judge.
Once Mr. Jackson was notified of the rule, any continued claim of lack of knowledge
must fail. In addition, while the court has viewed his filings liberally, it is not required to ignore
the applicable rules that govern all litigants, whether counseled or pro se. Accordingly, in an
exercise of its discretion, Mr. Jackson’s motion to reconsider is denied.
III.

Conclusion

The court appreciates that Mr. Jackson believes that the defendants treated him unfairly.
Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment
[Dkt. 85] is granted and Mr. Jackson’s motion to reconsider the striking of his motion to compel
[Dkt. 101] is denied. The clerk is directed to enter a Rule 58 judgment and terminate this case
from the court’s docket.

DATE: February 16, 2012

_____________________________
Blanche M. Manning
United States District Judge

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