Muczynski v. Lieblick et al
Filing
145
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 11/8/2012:(mb, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRIS MUCZYNSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.
JACK LIEBLICK,
DETECTIVE WRONKOWSKI,
JEFFREY LOQUERCIO,
CITY OF CHICAGO,
SERGEANT GRECO,
VILLAGE OF MELROSE PARK, and
MIKE FARMER,
Defendants.
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Case No. 10-CV-0081
Judge John W. Darrah
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Chris Muczynski, filed this action against the City of Chicago; Chicago Police
Officers Jack Lieblick, Anthony Wronkowski, and Jeffrey Loquercio (the “Chicago
Defendants”); Sergeant Greco, a Melrose Park Police Officer, and the Village of Melrose
Park (the “Melrose Park Defendants”); and Mike Farmer, an individual. Plaintiff alleges
he was falsely arrested and charged with a crime he did not commit. All four claims in
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint relate to his arrest and prosecution. Count I alleges
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class-of-one, Equal Protection claim; Count II alleges a false arrest
claim, pursuant to Section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment; Count III alleges a Section
1983 conspiracy claim; and Count IV is an indemnity claim against the City of Chicago,
pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102. The Chicago Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
Count I, the class-of-one, Equal Protection claim of Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Melrose Park Defendants also filed
a motion, seeking to dismiss the class-of-one claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on March 8, 2010. The Chicago Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part; Plaintiff’s class-of-one claim was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead a plausible claim for relief. (Dkt. No. 60,
Mem. Op. and Order at 9.) Plaintiff then filed a Second Amended Complaint on
September 21, 2010. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged he was
similarly situated to those who were not arrested because of falsified information, and
Plaintiff alleged that Greco developed an animus toward Plaintiff, which resulted in the
false arrest. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39-43.) The Court again granted the Chicago
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and Count I, the class-of-one claim, was dismissed in its
entirety. (Dkt. No. 95, Mem. Op. and Order at 8.) Plaintiff filed a Third Amended
Complaint on June 4, 2012. Count I of the Third Amended Complaint contains
allegations similar to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. Both the Chicago
Defendants and the Melrose Park Defendants move to dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s
Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); the motions have been
fully briefed and are ripe for ruling.
The following facts taken from Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint are accepted as true
for purposes of these motions to dismiss. On January 11, 2008, three individuals were
sprayed with mace at 3132 N. Harlem Avenue, in Chicago, Illinois. (Third Am. Compl.
¶ 8.) On January 27, 2008, Plaintiff was arrested “by and/or due to the conduct of” the
Defendant Officers and Mike Farmer and charged with three counts of criminal battery
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under Illinois law based on the January 11 incident. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff did not
commit the alleged battery. (Id. ¶ 21.) The three victims of the mace incident later
withdrew their criminal charges against Plaintiff, and all charges were immediately
dismissed. (Id. ¶ 16.) The victims had signed the criminal charges and assisted with
Plaintiff’s prosecution based on coercion and intimidation by the Defendant Officers.
(Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) The Defendant Officers falsified police reports and other documentation
in order to charge Plaintiff with battery. (Id. ¶ 19.) At some point before the charges
were dropped against Plaintiff, Farmer admitted to macing the victims. (Id. ¶ 29.)
Plaintiff worked at the Village of Melrose Park Police Department from approximately
December 2004 to December 2005 as an auxiliary police officer.
(Id. ¶ 37.) During that time, Plaintiff caused Farmer to be arrested on numerous
occasions, which resulted in Farmer’s dislike and animus toward Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 38.)
Furthermore, during the time that Plaintiff worked at the police department, Greco and
other Melrose Park Police Officers developed an animus toward Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 39.)
This animus was communicated by Greco to the Chicago Defendants, and they all acted
pursuant to this animus when they conspired to have Plaintiff arrested and prosecuted.
(Id. ¶¶ 38, 41.)
Plaintiff was similarly situated to other citizens who were stopped and investigated by
police officers. (Id. ¶ 42.) But, the other similarly-situated individuals have not had false
evidence generated against them. (Id. ¶ 43.) The Defendant Officers have effectuated
the arrests of multiple individuals and have not falsified information contained within
police reports and charging instruments. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50, 52-53, 55-56, 58-59.) The
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Defendant Officers had no reasonable basis to falsify a police report or criminal
complaint against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 54, 57, 60.)
LEGAL STANDARD
To properly assert a claim in a complaint, the plaintiff must present “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for the
relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a claim under
Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Rule
8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009) (Iqbal) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(Twombly)).
While a court is to accept all allegations contained in a complaint as true, this principle
does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. To defeat a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual matter to state a
claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
However, “[w]here the well-settled pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. For a claim
to be plausible, the plaintiff must put forth enough “facts to raise a reasonable
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expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s allegations.
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (2009) (Brooks) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
ANALYSIS
Consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Geinosky v. City of Chicago, Plaintiff has
sufficiently pled the requisite facts necessary to draw a reasonable inference that
Defendants are liable for creating a class-of-one constitutional violation. Geinosky v.
City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 747-49 (7th Cir. 2012) (Geinosky).
To state a class-of-one claim for a constitutional violation of his right to equal protection
of the laws, Plaintiff must allege: (1) that Defendants intentionally treated him
differently from others who are similarly situated and (2) that there is no rational basis
for the different treatment or that he was treated differently because of Defendants’
“totally illegitimate animus” toward him. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553
U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000));
McDonald v. Village of Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004) (McDonald).
“[T]he purpose of entertaining a ‘class of one’ equal protection claim is not to
constitutionalize all tort law nor to transform every claim for improper provision of
municipal services or for improper conduct of an investigation in connection with them
into a federal case.” McDonald, 371 F.3d at 1009. But, where a plaintiff has alleged the
requisite elements with factual content sufficient to demonstrate that a defendant could
be liable, the claim can survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion. The plaintiff is
“required to show that he was the victim of discrimination intentionally visited on him by
state actors who knew or should have known that they had no justification, based on their
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public duties, for singling him out for unfavorable treatment — who acted in other words
for personal reasons, with discriminatory intent and effect.” Del Marcelle v. Brown
County Corp., 680 F.3d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (4-1-5 split decision)
(emphasis in original).
Plaintiff has properly pled the requisite elements. First, he asserts Defendants
intentionally treated him differently from others similarly situated to him, by
demonstrating that he was singled out for a false arrest. Plaintiff alleges that other
individuals that may be investigated for a crime (i.e., other similarly situated individuals)
are not also subject to falsified evidence. In Geinosky, the Seventh Circuit made clear
that a general allegation that a plaintiff was treated differently than others similarly
situated would suffice. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748 (and further providing that “[t]o
require more would elevate form over substance.”). If the alleged facts clearly
demonstrate harassment by police officers that has no legitimate purpose, then the
plaintiff has met his burden at the pleading stage. Plaintiff alleges he was falsely arrested
due to the coercion and intimidation of witnesses by the Defendant Officers. This
alleged behavior by police officers has no legitimate purpose and demonstrates an
improper departure from the norm, being executed on Plaintiff alone.
The second element of a class-of-one claim requires a plaintiff to claim that because of
an illegitimate animus, the plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated
individuals. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Officers arrested him because they wanted to
effectuate their dislike toward him by charging him with a battery they knew he did not
commit. Plaintiff alleges there is no reasonable justification for the officers’ behavior.
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He further asserts that due to various unjustifiable reasons, Defendants acted because of
their personal animi toward Plaintiff. In Geinosky, the plaintiff did not know exactly
why he was the target of multiple invalid parking tickets. Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748.
The plaintiff suspected it was because of a relationship between his estranged wife and
local law enforcement. Id. All that is required from Geinosky is that the plaintiff “tell[] a
story in which [he] was targeted.” Id. That is precisely what Plaintiff provided in his
Third Amended Complaint. For example, Plaintiff asserts that Farmer developed an
animus towards him because Plaintiff arrested him various times while Plaintiff was
employed as a police officer with the Village of Melrose Park. Also, Plaintiff alleges that
Greco developed an animus toward him during their working relationship at the Melrose
Park Police Department. It is from these animi that Plaintiff believes he was targeted.
The Court in Geinosky noted that situations arise wherein individuals may be treated
differently by law enforcement but where that disparate treatment does not amount to
valid class-of-one claims. “The litigation floodgates should not open for the additional
reason that truly random law enforcement, as when an officer picks one of many
speeding cars to stop and ticket, provides a rational basis for the selection even if the
ticketed driver feels she was unfairly singled out.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 749. But, the
conduct alleged here by Plaintiff is the falsification of evidence and his intentional false
arrest, which are not discretionary actions by police officers.
While the facts alleged may not amount to an unreasonable and unjustified pattern of
behavior like the officers in Geinosky, Plaintiff has at least presented enough facts in his
Third Amended Complaint to put Defendants on notice, and the alleged facts permit a
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reasonable inference that Defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Plaintiff’s
allegations contain sufficient “facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence” supporting his allegations. Brooks, 578 F.3d at 581 (quoting Twombly,
127 S.Ct. 1955).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Count I of
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint are denied.
Date:
November 8, 2012
______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge
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