Magnus v. St. Mark United Methodist Church et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 11/10/2011:Mailed notice(wp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

EUNICE MAGNUS,
Case No. 10 C 380
Plaintiff,
v.

Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber

ST. MARK UNITED METHODIST
CHURCH,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Plaintiff’s sole remaining claim. For the reasons that follow,
the Court grants Defendant’s motion.
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

St. Mark United Methodist Church (hereinafter, “Church” or
“Defendant”) hired Plaintiff Eunice Magnus (“Magnus”) for the first
time as a secretary in 1997-98, and then again as a night and
weekend receptionist when Church activities increased in 2006.
Within a week of re-hiring her, Rev. Jon McCoy (“McCoy”) learned
that Magnus’ daughter has certain mental disabilities. In February
2008, McCoy offered Magnus a full-time receptionist position with
more responsibilities.

In that role she worked only Monday –

Friday. She was an at-will employee.
At the time, Magnus’ daughter LaDonna lived in residential
care facilities.

Magnus evidently understood that she could only

take LaDonna home to visit on weekends. The parties disagree as to
whether she could have made alternate arrangements.

When Magnus

worked nights and weekends in 2006, her son looked after LaDonna;
he was no longer available to do so by mid-2008.
There was at least one other full-time receptionist, Nancy
Branker (“Branker”), who worked every weekend.

(The Church claims

it could only afford the two; Magnus disagrees, noting that they
tried

to

tenure.)

hire

a

part-time

receptionist

during

her

full-time

In mid-2008, Branker sought to adjust the schedule and

have some weekends off.

The parties dispute whether a weekend

receptionist was necessary and whether Branker asked Magnus to work
some weekends.
Valentine
Committee,

It is undisputed, though, that McCoy and Julian

(“Valentine”),
asked

Magnus

a
to

member
work

of

some

the

Church

weekend

days.

Personnel
Magnus

repeatedly refused.
Defendant claims that it suggested several different rotating
schedules.

Magnus reports only being told that she must work

weekends in addition to her regular schedule - which she contends
is illegal under state and federal law.

Defendant claims that

Magnus’ obligations to her daughter and her catering business led
her to refuse; Magnus asserts that she has no such business and
refused solely to care for LaDonna.

She felt initially that her

refusal jeopardized her job, but when it was not mentioned for
several months, she thought things had blown over.

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Defendant proffers a November 3, 2008 memorandum identifying
several issues with Magnus’ work performance.

Around that time,

Branker had been on sick leave for several weeks, so Magnus worked
alone.

McCoy discussed the memo with Magnus, and claims that this

discussion was but one part of an ongoing conversation about her
shortcomings.

Magnus contends that this is the only reprimand she

ever received.
praised

her

Magnus offers a list of people that she claims

during

her

tenure,

including

McCoy

and

several

parishioners.
Magnus received a five percent raise in January 2009, she
claims for “excellent job performance.”

She reports being told

that she would receive a raise within six months of working fulltime, and that subsequent raises would be merit-based. The January
2009 raise was the only one she received.

McCoy testified in

deposition that all employees except new, part-time hires received
a five percent cost-of-living raise, regardless of merit.
In late 2008 and early 2009, the Church’s Employee Relations
Committee evidently believed that the situation was deteriorating
and that Magnus refused to make needed “adjustments.”

Defendant

claims that the Committee decided to fire her over the weekend of
January 24, 2009.

It points to a Committee e-mail requesting a

meeting on January 28, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the “Magnus
issue.”

Defendant claims that the meeting was to discuss how to

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best fire her.

Magnus has no personal knowledge of who decided to

fire her or when.
On January 27, 2009, LaDonna had a difficult episode, and
Magnus arrived at work one hour late.
a co-worker of the delay.

She claims that she notified

She says that once she arrived, she

talked to McCoy and that he approved her offer to come in early the
next day to make up the time.

However, when she arrived at 12:00

Noon on January 28, 2009, she received a termination letter, which
cited her “continued poor performance” as the reason for dismissal.
Defendant’s pleadings and proffered evidence make it clear that her
unwillingness to work weekends was a substantial factor in the
decision.

Magnus appears to claim that poor performance is a

pretext, and that she was actually fired for arriving late on
January 27 and for her inability to work weekends due to LaDonna.
Magnus

protested

her

dismissal

in

letters

to

Church

authorities and eventually to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (the “EEOC”).
II.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [it] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

FED . R. CIV . P. 56(a).

A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable
fact finder to find for the non-moving party, and material if it
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may affect the outcome of the suit.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Courts do not evaluate credibility
or determine facts on summary judgment; they decide only whether
there is enough evidence to send a case to a jury. Id. at 249.

If

the movant meets its burden, the non-movant must present facts
showing a genuine dispute to avoid summary judgment.

See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).
The Court construes all facts in favor of the non-moving
party.
draw

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009).

inferences

from

conceivable inference.

the

evidence,

but

need

not

draw

It may
every

McDonald v. Vill. of Winnetka, 371 F.3d

992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004).

A mere scintilla of evidence is

insufficient; “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is
no genuine issue for trial.”

Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2677 (citation

omitted).
Because employment discrimination cases turn on issues of
intent and credibility, they receive “special scrutiny” on summary
judgment.

Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871,

875 (7th Cir. 2002).

However, employment discrimination cases are

amenable to summary judgment if there is not enough evidence to
show the alleged discriminatory motive.

Riley v. Orthogenic

School, No. 99 C 6057, 2001 WL 1345950, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30,
2001).
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B.

ADA Association Discrimination

The sole remaining count in this case alleges that the Church
discriminated against Magnus based on her affiliation with LaDonna.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) prohibits covered
employers from “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or
benefits to a qualified individual because” he or she has a
relationship with a disabled person. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4).
also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.8.

See

“Qualified individual” in § 12112(b)(4)

does not mean the same thing as in the rest of the statute, where
it means a person with a disability.

See Larimer v. Int’l Bus.

Mach. Co., 370 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2004).

Instead, it simply

means qualified to do one’s job and able to meet an employer’s
expectations. Id. at 700, 702.
Section

12112(b)(4)

was

enacted

to

stop

employers

from

refusing to hire a qualified person out of fear that she will, for
example, miss work to care for a disabled child.

See Stansberry v.

Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101–485, pt. 2, at 61–62 (1990)).

However,

the legislative history specifies that firing an employee who
violates

“a

neutral

employer

policy

concerning

attendance

or

tardiness,” even to care for a disabled person, does not violate
the ADA. Id. at 486.

That is, there is no obligation to reasonably

accommodate a nondisabled employee. Larimer, 370 F.3d at 700. See
also 29 C.F.R. app. pt. 1630 (an employee is not entitled to
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modified work schedule to allow them to care for a disabled family
member).
There are three types of association discrimination claims:
where (1) an employer tries to dodge the expense of treating an
employee’s disabled associate; (2) an employer fears that its
employee has or will catch the disabling condition; and (3) an
employee is distracted by the disability. Dewitt v. Proctor Hosp.,
517 F.3d 944, 947–48(7th Cir. 2008).

Magnus brings a distraction

claim, alleging that she was “somewhat inattentive” at work due to
LaDonna’s disability, “yet not so inattentive that to perform to
[her] employer’s satisfaction [she] would need an accommodation,
perhaps by being allowed to work shorter hours.” Larimer, 370 F.3d
at 700.
Magnus may prove discrimination under the ADA either directly
or indirectly.
1.

Direct Approach

Under the “direct” approach, Magnus can present either direct
or circumstantial evidence to show that she was discriminated
against.

See Dickerson v. Bd. of Tr. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522,

657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011).

Direct evidence is that which

shows discrimination without requiring the fact-finder to draw any
inferences.

Of course, admissions of discrimination are rare.

Most often, plaintiffs must rely on circumstantial evidence of
discrimination,

including

suspicious
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timing

of

dismissal,

problematic actions toward other members of the protected group,
better treatment of non-protected but similarly situated employees,
and pretextual grounds for dismissal. Id. (In contrast, under the
indirect method, the question of pretext arises only after a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and a defendant has
countered with a non-discriminatory reason for dismissal. Id.)
2.
The

indirect

method

Indirect Approach
is

a

modification

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach.

of

the

familiar

Timmons v. General

Motors Corp. 469 F.3d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 2006).

Under this

approach, Magnus must show that: (1) she was “qualified” for the
job when she suffered an adverse employment action (dismissal); (2)
she was dismissed; (3) the Church knew that LaDonna was disabled
when it fired Magnus; and (4) the circumstances of Magnus’ firing
raise a reasonable inference her relationship to LaDonna was a
determining factor in the decision.
The Seventh

Circuit

has

also

See Larimer, 370 F.3d at 701.

described

this fourth

prong as

requiring Magnus to show that her claim falls within one of the
association discrimination categories – here, distraction.
v. Proctor Hosp., 517 F.3d 944, 947–48 (7th Cir. 2008).

Dewitt

Using the

broad formulation of the fourth McDonnell Douglas prong is very
similar to offering circumstantial “direct” evidence.

Timmons v.

General Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 2006).
Either way, the key question is whether Magnus adduces evidence
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that would allow a reasonable jury to find that her firing was
based upon discrimination. Id.
If Magnus makes that prima facie showing, the Church must come
forward with evidence to show that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing her.
at *4.

See Riley, 2001 WL 1345950,

If it does so, Magnus must offer evidence to show that

those reasons are pretextual.

Bodenstab v. County of Cook, 569

F.3d 651, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2009).

Pretext does not just mean that

the decision was wrong, but instead that Defendant offered a phony
justification.

See Gustovich v. A T & T Commc’ns, Inc., 972 F.2d

845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992) (construing the McDonnell Douglas test in
the ADEA context).

Ordinarily, a plaintiff must refute every

reason a defendant gave for her termination.

Wolf v. Buss (Am.)

Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
III.
A.

DISCUSSION
Credibility

Both parties bring forth evidence of each other’s supposed
dishonesty.

However, as credibility is not a proper inquiry on

summary judgment, the Court declines to consider the impeachment
evidence offered by either party.
B.

Parameters of the Remaining Claim

Although Magnus makes a variety of allegations about unjust
and illegal treatment, a relatively narrow swath is directly
relevant to the claim at bar.

In light of this case’s development
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and the convoluted nature of some of the pleadings, the Court will
take a moment to clarify what this case is not.
1.

Reasonable Accommodation

Section 12112(b)(4) does not afford Magnus a right to an
accommodation or modified work schedule.

In reading the record in

this case, it is nonetheless difficult to escape the conclusion
that the crux of this case remains Magnus’ belief that she should
not be made to work on weekends when she needs to care for her
daughter.

Unfortunately, a Court’s duty in an ADA case is not to

determine whether an employer demands too much from its employees
or to make things easier for plaintiffs regardless of the law.
E.E.O.C. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943, 950 (7th Cir.
2001).

Instead, this Court must determine whether Magnus can show

that she was fired for being somewhat distracted at work by
LaDonna’s disabilities, but not so distracted that she would need
an accommodation.
2.

Retaliation under the ADA or Title VII

Nor is this case about retaliation for protected activity.
The ADA does prohibit retaliation; however, Magnus did not bring
her case under that provision, nor do the facts here seem to fit
comfortably within its terms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).

Over one

year ago, this Court dismissed Magnus’ claims that she was fired in
retaliation for resisting the new schedule.

Nonetheless, Magnus

continues to press the retaliation claims in various forms, stating
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that she was fired “on the heels of protected activity (barely two
weeks after her protest).”
Magnus
briefing.

relies

extensively

on

retaliation

cases

in

her

It is true that an employer may not vindictively prey

upon an employee’s special vulnerabilities to disguise retaliation
as routine conduct.

Cf. Washington v. Ill. Dept. of Revenue, 420

F.3d 658, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2005). However, the key inquiry in this
case is simply whether Magnus was fired for being distracted by
LaDonna’s disability and coming late to work on January 27, not
whether she was retaliated against.

See Leavitt v. SW & B Const.

Co., LLC, 766 F.Supp.2d 263, 285 (D. Me. 2011) (plaintiff cannot
“shoehorn

a

retaliation

claim

into

the

limited

associational

discrimination provision.”).
3.

Labor Law

This is also not a case about wage and hour violations.
Magnus did allege that she was retaliated against for resisting an
illegal work schedule in her Complaint. However, those claims were
dismissed with prejudice. Nonetheless, she continues to argue that
she was fired in retaliation for being unable to work the “illegal”
schedules that the Church proposed.

The schedules’ terms, as well

as their legality, are hotly contested by the parties.

In any

event, the schedules’ legality has little bearing on whether or not
Plaintiff can make out a “distraction” claim under the ADA.

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C.

Association Discrimination

Magnus has identified no direct, non-inferential evidence that
the Church fired her because of her distraction over LaDonna.
However, she identifies the following circumstantial evidence of
discrimination:
•

Plaintiff was fired one day after coming to
work an hour late due to her daughter;

•

Defendant was unhappy with her because she was
unable to work weekend hours in addition to
her weekday schedule;

•

The proposed work schedule violated state and
federal labor laws; and

•

McCoy’s
deposition
testimony
and
Julian
Valentine’s e-mails, which show that Magnus
was fired because she could not work on the
weekends.

As noted above, even showing that the schedules were illegal
and that Magnus’ resistance to them contributed to her dismissal
would not prove association discrimination.

The Court addresses

Magnus’ pretext claims at greater length below, but finds them
lacking.

Magnus’ case thus rests largely on the inference of

discrimination raised by the fact that she was fired one day after
arriving late to work from caring for LaDonna.
As noted, there is only a fine line between using suspicious
timing as circumstantial “direct” evidence and as indirect evidence
under McDonnell Douglas.

See also Weber v. Univ. Research Ass’n,

Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 593 n.1 (7th Cir. 2010) (making a similar point
in a Title VII case).

Here, the Court opts to discuss timing only
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once, below.

As noted there, any inference of discrimination

raised by the timing of Magnus’ dismissal is insufficient to defeat
a motion for summary judgment.
1.

McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case

Even assuming that she lacks direct evidence, Magnus contends
that she has shown triable issues of fact under the McDonnell
Douglas framework. As noted above, no one contests that Magnus was
fired or that the Church knew that LaDonna was disabled. The first
and fourth prongs, however, are subject to dispute.
a.

Qualified Individual

With regard to the first prong, Magnus points to the following
evidence to show that she was qualified:
•

She was promoted from a part-time to a fulltime receptionist in February of 2008.

•

She received “accolades several times from
Rev. McCoy[,] Julian Valentine[,] and a host
of parishioners” for her “excellent job
performance and dedication.”

•

Only once during her three-year employment did
she receive any complaints about her job
performance. (Defendant contests this, but on
summary judgment this Court accepts the
Plaintiff’s version.)

•

She received a five percent pay increase two
weeks before her employment was terminated.

Defendant maintains that the raise was merely a cost-of-living
increase which all employees except for new, part-time hires
received. Magnus responds only that when she was hired, she was
made to believe that raises would be merit-based.
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The Court finds

that this assertion is insufficient to rebut Defendant’s evidence,
and thus that the raise was not merit-based.
Magnus concedes that the November 2008 memorandum identified
several problems with her performance.

However, she contends that

this is the only reprimand she received, and argues that it was
unrepresentative of her overall performance because she was working
alone (Branker was ill) and LaDonna was very difficult – in effect,
that she was distracted then, too.

Accepting Magnus’ account of

her employment as it must on summary judgment, the Court concludes
that Magnus has created a triable issue as to whether she was
qualified for her job when she was fired.

See Dickerson, 657 F.3d

at 603 (uncorroborated testimony of non-movant can create a genuine
issue of fact if based on first-hand experience.)
Defendant argues that individuals are not “qualified” unless
they can and will work their assigned shifts.

See, e.g., E.E.O.C.

v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001).
Because she would not work the requested schedule, Defendant argues
that Magnus could not be qualified.

However, the cases that

Defendant cites do not speak to whether it had the right to impose
the new schedule in the first instance.

That question is one of

contract, which neither party has genuinely briefed. On the motion
as presented, the Court concludes that Magnus has created a triable
question of fact as to her qualification.

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b.

Circumstances Surrounding Her Dismissal

As noted above, Magnus must rely heavily on the inference of
discrimination created by the timing of her dismissal. However, on
the record before the Court, that inference is insufficient to
defeat summary judgment.
In her McDonnell Douglas analysis, Magnus contends that her
allegations

fit

“perfectly”

within

the

Seventh

Circuit’s

description of a “distraction” claim, thus satisfying the fourth
prong.

She hangs this contention on two factors:

first, that she

was terminated one day after reporting late to work because of
LaDonna; and second, that she was fired after being “threatened
with termination for being ‘unable’ to comply with the draconic
schedules of working weekends in addition to regular work week
schedule[.]” From this, she concludes that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the plaintiff.
In response, Defendant offers evidence that the Church decided
to fire Magnus around January 25, before her tardy arrival on
January 27.
January 28

However, the e-mails only request a meeting on
to

discuss

Magnus.

The

inference

that

Defendant

suggests – that the decision was made, and so her tardiness was
irrelevant – may be reasonable.

At this stage, however, the Court

must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff.
In her briefing, Magnus describes Defendant as “irritated and
disgusted” with her late arrival on January 27 (and her rejection

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of the schedule change), but cites no evidence to support that
characterization.

Indeed, the record undisputedly reflects that

she was not punished for arriving late and that McCoy approved her
request

to

make

up

the

time

the

next

day.

Indeed,

the

uncontroverted evidence in this case indicates that Magnus was
never reprimanded or disciplined for taking time needed to care for
LaDonna (again, aside from the Church’s desire to have her work on
some weekends).
Thus, again, Magnus may have created a triable issue as to
whether her dismissal resulted from a rejection of the schedule
change. As this Court observed more than a year ago, however, even
though Magnus’ decision to reject the schedule related to her
obligations to LaDonna, it is not protected by the ADA.

Again,

Magnus must rely on an inference of discrimination from the timing
of her dismissal to satisfy the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas.
“[S]uspicious timing alone is almost never enough” to defeat
summary judgment, and those cases “where a weak inference regarding
suspicious timing alone is enough to create a triable issue” are
“rare.”

Reynolds v. Champaign Urbana Mass Transit Dist., 378

Fed.Appx. 579, 582 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing retaliation).

In

light of the substantial and undisputed evidence that Magnus had
faced no backlash when she took time to care for LaDonna, and her
own testimony that she received permission to make up the extra

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hour the following day, the Court finds that this is not one of
those rare cases.
c.

Pretext

Regardless of whether pretext is analyzed as “direct” evidence
of discrimination or in rebuttal to the Church’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Magnus, the Court finds that
Magnus’ evidence is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

If

the Church made a good-faith choice to fire Magnus for nondiscriminatory

reasons,

the

Court

will

not

interfere.

See

McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 799(7th Cir.
1997).

Defendant offers evidence that it terminated Magnus for

nondiscriminatory reasons:
to alter her schedule.

poor performance and her unwillingness

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,

Plaintiff must refute each ground by offering evidence that it is
a mere pretext.

See, e.g., Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d

1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2001) (pregnancy discrimination).

Under

either McDonnell Douglas or the “direct evidence” approach, the
Court

finds

that

the

pretext

evidence

proffered

here

is

insufficient to protect Magnus from summary judgment.
Magnus must show that the reasons given were a pretext for
discrimination, not just that they were a pretext for another
nondiscriminatory reason for termination.

See, e.g., St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993).

Thus, even though

Magnus’ evidence indicates that Defendant was not forthright about
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the role Magnus’ schedule inflexibility played in her firing, its
actions

were

not

unlawful

protected by the ADA.

pretext

unless

her

resistance

is

As discussed above, it is not.

Even though Magnus contends that the November 2008 warning
memo was unfairly critical in light of the circumstances, the
relevant inquiry is whether an employer’s evaluation was honest,
not whether it was objectively correct.
personnel
decisions.”
1996)

department

that

Courts are not a “super-

re-examines

an

entity’s

business

Wolf v. Buss (Am.) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919-20 (7th Cir.

(noting

this

point

in

an

ADEA

case).

While

Magnus’

statements about her merits as an employee may create a triable
question as to whether she was “qualified,” they do not raise a
triable issue as to the honesty of the Church’s evaluations.
Gustovich v. AT & T Commc’ns, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir.
1992)

(in

an

ADEA

case,

noting

that

such

statements

“do

nothing . . . to establish that the proffered reason is a pretext
for discrimination.”).
Finally,

Defendant

notes

that

pretext

seems particularly

unlikely here, in that the same group which fired Magnus in 2009
hired her for the full-time position in 2008. If the Committee was
inclined to discriminate, Defendant claims, it would not have
promoted her in 2008 when the Church had known about LaDonna since
2006.

While the Seventh Circuit has indicated that in some cases

such an inference may be appropriate, see Martino v. MCI Commc’ns

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Servs., Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 454–55 (7th Cir. 2009), all inferences
at this stage are drawn in favor of Plaintiff.

In any event, such

an inference is unnecessary, as this Court has concluded that no
reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff that her termination for
poor performance was a pretext for discrimination against her by
reason of her association with her daughter.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court is sympathetic to the position in which Plaintiff
found herself.

Her legitimate need to be home with her daughter

conflicted with the Church’s need to have both members of their
full-time staff available to work some weekend hours. However, that
does not mean that the Church’s decision to dismiss the Plaintiff
violated the ADA.
For the reasons stated herein, summary judgment is hereby
GRANTED to the Defendant on the sole remaining count of the
Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
DATE: 11/10/2011

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