Lee v. Northwestern University et al
Filing
222
MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 5/24/2012.Mailed notice(sct, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
FREDERICK LEE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
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10 C 1157
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Frederick Lee’s (“Lee”) and
Defendant Northwestern University’s (“Northwestern”) cross-motions for summary
judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Lee’s motion for summary judgment on
Counts I and II is denied, and Northwestern’s cross-motion on these counts is granted.
Lee’s remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Lee, a Chinese-American male, was employed by Northwestern as a police
officer from September 2005 until he was terminated in October 2009. In April 2008,
Lee complained of racist and derogatory remarks made by three fellow officers to
Northwestern’s Office of Equal Opportunity and Access (the “EOA Office”), a division
of Northwestern’s Human Resources Department (“HR”). Lee suggested that he would
consider his complaint resolved if he received apologies from the alleged offenders and
if Northwestern personnel were required to undergo discrimination sensitivity training.
Each of the officers apologized, and the EOA Office conducted sensitivity training. Lee
was not exposed to any racially offensive comments thereafter.
The Locker Room Incident
On August 18, 2009, Lee noticed that three pairs of his shoes were scattered
throughout various parts of the locker room coach house. Lee believed that other
officers had intentionally strewn his shoes around the locker room and that he was
targeted because of his race. Lee reported this incident to his supervisors and also wrote
a memo describing the incident to Commander Darren Davis (“Cdr. Davis”) and Chief
of Police Bruce Lewis (“Chief Lewis”).
At a roll call meeting on August 25, 2009 (the “Roll Call Meeting”), Lee
expressed his ire with the locker room incident and openly questioned whether Sergeant
Steve Stoeckl (“Sgt. Stoeckl”), Officer Frank Walsh, (“Walsh”), or Officer David
Kramarz (“Kramarz”) were involved. During this meeting, Lee and Officer Kasia
Smerdka (“Smerdka”) raised their voices, and Sgt. Stoeckl told Lee to lower his voice.
Sgt. Stoeckl prepared a report of the incident, in which he stated that no foul language
was used, no discriminatory statements were made, and no threats were communicated.
Two days later, Lee complained to Chief Lewis about the incident.
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On August 28, 2009, Lee met with Leah Gidron (“Gidron”), an investigator in
Northwestern’s EOA Office. Lee indicated that he believed other officers were
targeting him because of his race and that Kramarz wanted to harm him. During this
meeting, Pamela Pirtle (“Pirtle”), the Director of Northwestern’s EOA Office, overheard
Lee yelling but soon realized that Lee’s yelling was not directed at Gidron.
Nevertheless, Pirtle reported the incident to Chief Lewis.
Gidron conducted an investigation into Lee’s allegations and ultimately
concluded that his complaints of discrimination were unsubstantiated.
In her
investigation report, Gidron recommended to Northwestern that Lee submit to
confidential counseling to help him cope with his anger and distrust of his co-workers.
Northwestern did not follow Gidron’s recommendation, and Lee never received any
confidential counseling.
On September 5, 2009, Lee sent an e-mail to the officers on his shift in which he
expressed his displeasure with the way some of his colleagues had treated him. In this
e-mail, Lee encouraged the recipients to maintain a professional and mutually respectful
working environment and stated that he would not tolerate disrespect from his fellow
officers. Chief Lewis stated that he believed that this e-mail communicated an implicit
threat and posed a risk to the police department.
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The Fitness-For-Duty Evaluation
On September 10, 2009, Chief Lewis issued Lee a letter from Deputy Chief
Daniel McAleer (“Dep. McAleer”). The letter notified Lee that he was being placed on
administrative leave and ordered Lee to submit for a fitness-for-duty evaluation
(“FDE”). Dep. McAleer’s letter cautioned Lee that failure to submit for an FDE would
be considered insubordination and would result in disciplinary action. The letter also
prohibited Lee from discussing the matter with other officers and supervisors. Lee was
the only officer that Chief Lewis had ordered to submit to an FDE in his tenure as Chief
of Police at Northwestern.
Dr. Friedman, an associate professor of clinical psychiatry and behavioral
sciences at the Northwestern University’s Feinberg School of Medicine, conducted
Lee’s FDE over three days. Dr. Friedman administered three psychological tests: the
MMPI-2, the PAI, and the M-Pulse. Each of these tests contains a built-in validity scale
to determine whether the test taker is being truthful in his answers. Lee’s scores on the
validity scales indicated that Lee was not answering the questions honestly and
candidly. Dr. Friedman also observed that Lee was behaving defensively during the
FDE. For example, Lee had been taking notes and “writing down everything that
[Dr. Friedman] asked.” Dr. Friedman testified that he had never encountered this
behavior in any of the hundreds of FDEs that he had previously conducted in his thirty-
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year career. Additionally, Dr. Friedman noted that Lee showed significant reluctance
to answer his questions and would only do so after considerable prodding.
Dr. Friedman ultimately concluded that Lee was “faking good,” i.e., overstating
positive traits beyond which is typically endorsed in an FDE, and therefore not fully
cooperating with the administration of the tests. As a result, the test results were invalid
and Dr. Friedman was unable to draw a conclusion as to whether Lee was fit for duty.
Chief Lewis recommended that Lee be terminated for insubordination for failing to
comply with the FDE, and his recommendation was approved on October 15, 2009. On
October 20, 2009, Chief Lewis sent Lee notice of his termination.
Lee’s Personal Affects
Lee kept several personal items in the locker room at the police station, including
a laptop computer, personal audio recordings on compact discs (“CDs”), a weight set,
personal journals, and a voice recorder. All of Lee’s personal property was stored in
his locker with the exception of the weight set, which was stored in a drawer elsewhere
in the locker room. Sometime after he was placed on administrative leave, Lee
attempted to contact Dep. McAleer to arrange a time for Lee to retrieve his property.
Lee claims that Dep. McAleer denied his requests. On October 22, 2009, all of Lee’s
property was mailed to his residence except the barbell set. During the course of this
litigation, Northwestern attempted to return the barbell set but Lee refused to accept it.
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Cdr. Darren created an inventory of the property removed from Lee’s locker,
made copies and read several portions of Lee’s journals and listened to some of the
audio files on the CDs. Cdr. Darren delivered copies of these materials to Dr. Friedman
without first consulting with Lee.
On September 23, 2011, Lee filed a six-count Third Amended Complaint alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and multiple torts under Illinois
law. Upon the completion of discovery, Lee and Northwestern filed cross-motions for
summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, disclosures,
and affidavits establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, such that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Winsley v.
Cook Cnty., 563 F.3d 598, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). A genuine issue of material fact
exists when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Trinity Homes LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 629 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir.
2010). When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, the court views all facts
and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under
consideration is made. Edwards v. Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 639 F.3d 355, 359 (7th
Cir. 2011).
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DISCUSSION
Lee’s Third Amended Complaint alleges two counts of employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
and state law claims alleging conversion, trespass to chattels, intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”), and intrusion upon seclusion. Prior to assessing the merits
of the parties’ cross-motions, we first consider an evidentiary issue raised by
Northwestern.
I.
Admissibility of Lee’s Expert Report
Dr. Friedman conducted Lee’s FDE and administered three psychological tests,
one of which was the MMPI-2. The MMPI-2 contains several built-in validity scales
that are designed to determine whether a test-taker is answering the questions truthfully.
Lee’s score on one of these validity scales, the L-Scale or “Lie Scale”, was
extraordinarily high, indicating that he was not being entirely truthful in his answers.
The validity scales of the other psychological tests yielded similar results. Relying in
large part on the validity scores, Dr. Friedman concluded that Lee had been
uncooperative with the FDE. Chief Lewis stated that he based his decision to terminate
Lee solely on Dr. Friedman’s conclusions.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Lee has submitted an expert
report from Dr. James Butcher, Ph.D. (“Dr. Butcher”). Dr. Butcher opined that there
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are several reasons why an individual may produce high L-scale scores, including
religious background, cultural factors, and the reasons for which the individual was
directed to take the MMPI-2. Northwestern seeks to exclude Dr. Butcher’s expert
opinions.
Lee seeks to introduce Dr. Butcher’s report to criticize Dr. Friedman’s findings
and to support his claim that Chief Lewis’s decision to terminate his employment for
insubordination was pretextual. Even assuming the admissibility of the report at a trial
on the merits, it does not supply a basis to conclude that Dr. Friedman’s opinions were
unreasonable or ill-founded. More significantly, it supplies no basis to infer that Chief
Lewis acted unreasonably and unlawfully in relying on Dr. Friedman’s conclusions to
terminate Lee’s employment. Evidence of pretext it is not.
We now turn to the merits of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment
on Lee’s federal claims.
II. Northwestern’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Title VII prohibits an employer from discharging, retaliating, or otherwise
discriminating against an individual because of that individual’s race.1 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3; Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 809 (7th Cir.
1
Retaliation claims under Title VII and Section 1981 contain similar elements and are
routinely analyzed together. Hobbs v. City of Chi., 573 F.3d 454, 459 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted)..
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2011). A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII may proceed under either the
direct or indirect method. Andonissamy v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841, 849-50
(7th Cir. 2008). While the direct method requires evidence that “points directly” to a
discriminatory reason for an employer’s action, the indirect method allows a plaintiff
to establish a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and shifts the burden on the
defendants to rebut the presumption. Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671-72 (7th Cir.
2008).
A.
Count I: Retaliatory Discharge
In Count I, Lee maintains that Northwestern terminated his employment in
retaliation for his complaints of racial discrimination. Lee has attempted to establish
retaliatory discharge through both the indirect and direct methods of proof.
1.
Indirect Method
To establish a claim of retaliatory discharge under the indirect method, Lee must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) he engaged in a
statutorily protected activity; (2) he was meeting Northwestern’s legitimate
expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated
individuals who did not engage in protected activity were treated more favorably.
Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted). If Lee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to
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Northwestern to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. Should
Northwestern meet this burden, Lee must present evidence that Northwestern’s reason
is pretextual. Id.
Northwestern maintains that Lee has failed to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation because he has not identified any similarly situated individuals who were
treated more favorably. Employees are similarly situated to a plaintiff if they are
“directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Patterson v. Ind.
Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 365-66 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
Courts generally consider “if the two employees deal with the same
supervisor, are subject to the same standards, and have engaged in similar conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their
conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d
534, 540 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “Similarly situated” does not mean
identical, though the employee who allegedly received more favorable treatment must
at least share “a comparable set of failings” with the plaintiff.2 Haywood v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
2
Northwestern contends that only those individuals who failed to cooperate with an FDE
or were otherwise insubordinate can be similarly situated to Lee because Lee was terminated for
insubordination. Although Lee’s FDE does not constitute an adverse employment action, it may
nevertheless be considered when evaluating whether Lee was treated differently than those
similarly situated.
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Lee was required to submit to an FDE for allegedly violating Northwestern’s
“Courtesy Rule,” which states that officers “shall be quiet, civil, orderly, and shall at
all times, be attentive and zealous in the discharge of their duties, controlling their
tempers and exercising the utmost patience and discretion.” Lee contends that Kramarz,
Smerdka, Lt. Parashis, and Sergeant Bob Wiley (“Sgt. Wiley”) each violated the
Courtesy Rule but were treated more favorably.
As a preliminary matter, Lt. Parashis and Sgt. Wiley were Lee’s supervisors, and
“ordinarily, it will not be the case that a plaintiff is similarly situated to another
employee when the plaintiff is subordinate to that employee.” Patterson, 589 F.3d at
366 (quotation omitted). Kramarz and Smerdka, on the other hand, dealt with the same
supervisor as Lee and were subject to the same standards. The only issue, therefore, is
whether Kramarz and Smerdka engaged in similar conduct as Lee.
It is undisputed that Smerdka raised her voice at the Roll Call Meeting but was
not disciplined. Lee testified that Kramarz also raised his voice during the Roll Call
Meeting. Additionally, Gidron’s report indicates that on a separate meeting about the
incident, Kramarz was “extremely upset about [Lee’s] allegations and appeared
noticeably agitated.”
Although Lee has presented evidence that Kramarz and Smerdka were angry, we
must consider whether their conduct rose to the same level as Lee’s. Lee was not
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required to undergo an FDE solely because he was angry at the Roll Call Meeting.
Rather, Chief Lewis also considered Lee’s e-mail and Gidron’s report in reaching his
decision to order Lee’s FDE. These additional events are sufficient to distinguish Lee’s
conduct from that of both Kramarz and Smerdka.
In his e-mail, Lee stated that he would “not tolerate negativity and disrespect in
any way” and that as long as people are respectful, he did “not anticipate any
problems.” Although Lee’s therapist opined that the e-mail was positively worded, his
opinion is not dispositive. As the Chief of Police, Chief Lewis had a duty to ensure that
Northwestern’s armed police officers did not pose a threat to themselves, other officers,
or the general public. Lee’s e-mail contained sufficiently threatening language to justify
a precautionary FDE. Lee has not presented evidence that either Kramarz or Smerdka
communicated a potential threat to other officers such that Chief Lewis would question
their fitness for duty.
Moreover, Chief Lewis testified that he also based his decision to order an FDE
on Gidron’s report. Gidron reported that Lee believed that Kramarz wanted to harm
him. When Gidron inquired as to whether Lee had made any efforts to express these
feelings to Kramarz, Lee responded, “If someone hates you and wants to kill you, why
would you hug the person?” Lee was so agitated during the meeting that Pirtle, another
HR employee, heard Lee yelling loudly from Gidron’s office and reported this incident
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to Chief Lewis. Gidron’s report called Lee’s mental well-being into question, and she
recommended that he submit to confidential counseling.
Lee has not identified any conduct on the part of either Kramarz or Smerdka to
indicate that they engaged in similarly menacing behavior. Although Smerdka raised
her voice at the Roll Call Meeting and Kramarz may have appeared noticeably agitated
by Lee’s allegations of discrimination, neither officer showed the same pattern of anger
and hostility as Lee. Because Smerdka and Kramarz did not engage in similar conduct
as Lee, they are not similarly situated to him in all material respects, and Lee has failed
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
Even if Lee was able to establish a prima facie case, he has not demonstrated that
Northwestern’s reasons for his termination are pretextual. Northwestern maintains that
it terminated Lee’s employment because of his non-compliance with the FDE. Dep.
McAleer cautioned Lee that failure to cooperate with the FDE would be considered
insubordination. Dr. Friedman conducted the FDE and concluded that Lee had not
provided honest and candid answers to the psychological exams and was therefore
uncooperative with the FDE. Because Dep. McAleer advised Lee that failure to
cooperate with the FDE would be considered insubordination, and Dr. Friedman
concluded that Lee had not cooperated with the FDE, Northwestern has offered a
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legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Lee’s termination for insubordination.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to Lee to establish that this reason is pretextual.
To show that an employer’s reason for termination was pretextual, a plaintiff
“must present evidence suggesting that the employer is dissembling.” O’Leary v.
Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). A court need only consider
“whether the employer honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the
discharge.” Id.
Lee’s evidence of pretext is unavailing. First, Lee maintains that Chief Lewis
had several alternatives to terminations, despite Dep. McAleer’s warning that failure to
cooperate with the FDE could result in disciplinary measures. For example, Lee
submits that Chief Lewis could have ordered that Lee be re-tested. Dr. Butcher, an
expert on the MMPI-2, noted that it is common practice in the employment setting for
an employer to allow an employee to re-take the MMPI-2 if the results are initially
inconclusive.
Alternatively,
Chief Lewis could
have
explored
Gidron’s
recommendation of requiring Lee to submit to confidential counseling. Although the
availability of these alternatives may suggest that Chief Lewis’s decision was
imprudent, it does not support Lee’s claim that Chief Lewis’s decision was pretextual.
See id. (stating that a court need not concern itself with the accuracy or fairness of an
employment decision).
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Lee also suggests that he believed he was answering Dr. Friedman’s questions
honestly and that the MMPI-2 test manual cautions psychologists not to interpret high
L-Scale scores as indicative of intentional deceit. Lee’s argument misses the point for
two reasons. First, Dr. Friedman did not rely exclusively on the results of the MMPI-2
to conclude that Lee was uncooperative. Rather, Dr. Friedman noted that Lee’s
demeanor during the interviews was highly defensive and that he would have to
continually prod Lee to answer his questions. Additionally, Dr. Friedman administered
two other psychological exams which also indicated a lack of candor in Lee’s answers.
Second, and more importantly, whether Dr. Friedman’s conclusions were accurate has
no bearing on the propriety of Chief Lewis’s reliance on these conclusions. Chief
Lewis is not a psychologist, and Northwestern employed Dr. Friedman to assist Chief
Lewis in making an informed determination as to Lee’s fitness for duty. The issue
before the Court is not whether Lee was actually insubordinate, but whether Chief
Lewis reasonably believed that he was. Lee has not offered any evidence to suggest
that Chief Lewis’s reliance on Dr. Friedman’s conclusions was misplaced.
Lee has not provided sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Northwestern’s proffered reason for his termination was pretextual. Nor
has he identified any similarly situated individuals who were treated more favorably.
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Accordingly, Lee cannot succeed under the indirect method, and Northwestern’s motion
for summary judgment on Count I under the indirect method is granted.
2.
Direct Method
To succeed under the direct method, Lee must show: (1) that he engaged in a
statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered a materially adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Abuelyaman, 667 F.3d at 813
(citation omitted). Northwestern does not dispute that Lee’s multiple complaints of
discrimination constituted protected activity or that his termination was a materially
adverse employment action.
Instead, Northwestern maintains that Lee has not
established a causal connection between the two.
Under the direct method, a plaintiff may establish a causal connection by
presenting a “‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence” from which intentional
retaliation could be inferred. Coleman v. Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp. 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004)). The
Seventh Circuit has recognized three types of circumstantial evidence that a plaintiff
may use to establish causation: (1) “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements . . . and
other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn;”
(2) “evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse employment
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action;” and (3) evidence “that similarly situated employees were treated differently.”3
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). We consider Lee’s evidence from each
of the categories in turn.
Suspicious timing may be offered to support a plaintiff’s claim if “an adverse
employment action follows close on the heels of protected expression.” Hicks v. Forest
Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty., Ill., 2012 WL 1324084, at *5 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001)). Here, less than two months
had passed between Lee’s complaints of discrimination and his termination, and only
a few days passed between Lee’s complaints and his placement on administrative leave.
Additionally, Chief Lewis made the decision to terminate Lee less than one week after
Lee sent a memo to Northwestern minority student groups to attend a meeting to voice
their concerns about discrimination by Northwestern police. The temporal proximity
between Lee’s complaints and Northwestern’s actions suggests a discriminatory animus.
However, a significant intervening event occurred between Lee’s final complaint to HR
and his termination: Lee’s FDE. Chief Lewis testified that he based his decision to
terminate Lee on the results of the FDE, and as discussed in greater detail above, Lee
has failed to provide any evidence that Chief Lewis’s decision was pretextual.
3
The categories of permissible circumstantial evidence under the direct method of proof
are similar to the elements under the indirect method of proof, and the analyses therefore overlap.
Coleman, 667 F.3d at n.8.
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Finally, as discussed above, Lee has failed to identify any similarly situated
individuals who were treated more favorably. Ultimately, Lee’s relevant circumstantial
evidence consists entirely of suspicious timing, which alone is generally insufficient to
establish a casual relationship. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860-61. Additionally, Lee’s lack
of candor during the administration of the FDE was a significant intervening event that
outweighs his allegations of suspicious timing. The undisputed facts therefore establish
that there was no causal connection between Lee’s complaints of discrimination and his
termination, and Northwestern is entitled to summary judgment on Count I under the
direct method.
As Lee has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on his claims of
retaliatory discharge under either the direct or indirect method, Northwestern’s motion
for summary judgment on Count I is granted.
B.
Count II: Retaliation
In Count II, Lee maintains that Northwestern retaliated against him for his
discrimination complaints by banning him from entering Northwestern’s campus,
barring him from speaking with anyone about his situation, coercing him to see a
psychologist, and placing him on administrative leave. Northwestern argues that none
of its actions amount to an adverse employment action. “While adverse employment
actions extend beyond readily quantifiable losses, not everything that makes an
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employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” O’Neal v. City of Chi., 392 F.3d
909, 911 (7th Cir. 2004). The Seventh Circuit has articulated three general categories
of actionable adverse employment actions: (1) cases in which the employee’s
compensation, fringe benefits, or other financial terms of employment are diminished,
including termination; (2) cases in which a lateral transfer reduces the employee’s
career prospects; and (3) cases in which the employee’s work conditions are altered in
such a way that she is subjected to a humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthful, or
otherwise significantly negative alteration in her workplace.
Id. at 911 (citing
Herrnreiter v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 744-45 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Northwestern’s actions do not fall into any of these categories. Lee’s allegations
that Northwestern prevented him from entering its campus or speaking with anyone
regarding his situation did not affect the financial terms of Lee’s employment, nor did
they significantly alter the conditions of his employment in such a way that his
workplace became degrading, humiliating, or unsafe. Although Lee was placed on
administrative leave pending an evaluation of his fitness for duty, Lee continued to
receive his salary during this period. The Seventh Circuit has explicitly held that
placing an officer on paid administrative leave does not constitute an actionable adverse
employment action. Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 786-87
(finding that a university police department’s placement of an officer on paid
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administrative leave pending the results of fitness-for-duty psychological examination
did not constitute a materially adverse action). Because Northwestern’s actions did not
constitute an adverse employment action, Lee cannot succeed on his retaliation claims
under either the direct or indirect methods as a matter of law. Accordingly, summary
judgment on Count II of Lee’s complaint is granted in favor of Northwestern.
Chief Lewis was confronted with an employee who visibly demonstrated anger
and hostility towards his co-workers. Moreover, Northwestern’s officials were not
dismissive of Lee’s complaints of discrimination. To the contrary, Gidron fully
investigated Lee’s complaints, adhering to the protocols established by Northwestern
for that very purpose. When Lee transmitted his e-mail to others, including his coworkers, the text of the e-mail could reasonably have been interpreted as containing an
implied threat. Lee’s position as a police officer required that he carry a firearm, and
Chief Lewis had a duty to ensure Lee’s mental fitness in light of his hostile behavior.
The FDE led Dr. Friedman to conclude that Lee did not cooperate with the
testing procedure. His inability to draw a conclusion as to Lee’s fitness for duty
supplied a basis for Chief Lewis to conclude that Lee was not fit to continue,
particularly when Lee had been apprised of the consequences of failing to cooperate
with the FDE. It was eminently reasonable and prudent for Chief Lewis to rely on that
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belief. Any subsequent criticism of Dr. Friedman’s work by Lee’s expert in no way
supports the notion that the decision to terminate Lee was pretextual.
Because Northwestern has established that there is no genuine issue of material
fact such that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Counts I and II,
Northwestern’s motion for summary judgment on these counts is granted, and Lee’s
cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.
III.
State Law Claims
In addition to his federal retaliation claims, Lee asserts four state law claims:
conversion (Count III), trespass to chattels (Count IV), intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Count V), and intrusion upon seclusion (Count VI). Generally,
“when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish
jurisdiction over pendant state-law claims rather than resolving them on the merits.”
Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). A court may nevertheless consider the pendant state law claims if “substantial
judicial resources have already been committed, so that sending the case to another
court will cause a substantial duplication of effort.” Sharp Elec. Corp. v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Although the parties have completed discovery and briefed cross-motions for
summary judgment on Lee’s state law claims, there would be little duplication of effort
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by requiring the parties to present these matters to an Illinois state court. The parties
would not be required to repeat discovery or even draft new cross-motions for summary
judgment. Therefore, we decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lee’s
remaining state law claims.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Lee’s motion for summary judgment is denied in its
entirety. Northwestern’s motion for summary judgment is granted on Counts I and II.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on Lee’s remaining claims.
Accordingly, Counts III through VI are dismissed without prejudice to Lee’s refiling
in state court.
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
Dated: May 24, 2012
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