Fields v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 551

ORDER signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 3/10/2014: For the reasons stated in this order, the Court denies defendants' motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling 545 , denies defendants' motion regarding evidentiary issu es relatied to the Circuit Court's order (etc.) 544 , and grants plaintiff's motion in limine to bar reference to the certificate of innocence proceeding 539 , reserving, however, the question of the admissibility of the denial of the COI petition during the damages phase of the trial in the present case. (mk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

NATHSON FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 10 C 1168

ORDER ON MOTIONS CONCERNING
CERTIFICATE OF INNOCENCE PROCEEDING
Defendants have moved for reconsideration of the Court's order denying
summary judgment, relying on a state trial court's March 4, 2014 decision adverse to
plaintiff on his state-court petition for a certificate of innocence (COI) under 735 ILCS
5/2-702. Defendants argue that the findings made by the state court judge are binding
on plaintiff via the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. They are not. In
federal court, the preclusive effect of a state court decision is determined by the law of
that state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Controlling Illinois authority establishes that collateral
estoppel does not apply unless there is finality, which "requires that the potential for
appellate review must have been exhausted." In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 100, 896
N.E.2d 316, 321 (2008); Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107, 113, 499 N.E.2d
1373, 1375 (1986). That condition is not met in this case. And even were that not so,
the Illinois statute governing COI petitions states unequivocally that "[t]he decision to
grant or deny a certificate of innocence shall be binding only with respect to claims filed

in the Court of Claims and shall not have a res judicata effect on any other
proceedings." 735 ILCS 5/2-702(j).
Defendants also argue that the state trial court's denial of the COI precludes
plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim. It does not. Illinois law requires a plaintiff in a
malicious prosecution case to establish "the termination of the [underlying criminal]
proceeding in favor of the plaintiff." Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 512, 662 N.E.2d
1238, 1242 (1996). In this regard, "a malicious prosecution claim cannot be predicated
on underlying criminal proceedings which were terminated in a manner not indicative of
the innocence of the accused." Id. That requirement is met in plaintiff's case; he was
acquitted of the murder charges against him. Defendants offer no authority, and the
Court is aware of none, suggesting that an acquittal does not satisfy the favorabletermination requirement (this is not a case, unlike a dismissal via nolle prosequi, where
the underlying result was arguably ambiguous). Nor do defendants cite any authority
suggesting that a loss on a COI petition or similar proceeding undermines in any way,
shape, or form an earlier acquittal for purposes of the favorable-termination requirement
of malicious prosecution.
The criminal proceedings against plaintiff were terminated, favorably to plaintiff,
when he was acquitted. The COI petition does not constitute a reopening of the
criminal case (nor could it, given the prohibition against double jeopardy). Rather, even
though the petition was handled in plaintiff's case by a judge in the Criminal Division of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, a COI petition is a civil proceeding under Illinois law.
It is a form of declaratory judgment action, and it is authorized by a statute that is found
not in the Illinois Criminal Code, but in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.

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Defendants have separately moved to admit the state trial judge's findings and
ruling as evidence in this case, and plaintiff has moved to preclude them. The Court
precludes admission of this evidence, at least for purposes of the liability phase of the
trial. First, as discussed above, issue preclusion does not apply to the state judge's
findings, and the denial of the petition does not bear on whether the criminal
proceedings against plaintiff were terminated in his favor. Second, the findings are not
a proper subject of judicial notice, because judicial notice cannot be used to end-run the
requirements for issue preclusion. Third, contrary to defendants' argument, the state
judge's findings regarding plaintiff's credibility are inadmissible for impeachment
purposes under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), because those findings are extrinsic
evidence offered to support his character for truthfulness. Thus the Court need not
address whether the findings should be precluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
The Court reserves ruling on whether the state trial judge's denial of the COI
petition is properly admissible during the damages phase of the trial. (Even if the denial
of the COI petition is admissible at that point, however, the considerations noted above
would preclude admission of the judge's underlying findings.)

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MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge
Date: March 10, 2014

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