Fields v. City of Chicago et al

Filing 656

MOTION by Defendant Lawrence Wharrie for judgment as a Matter of Law (Meador, Lisa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
NATHSON E. FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants.

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10 C 1168
Honorable Judge
Matthew F. Kennelly

WHARRIE’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Defendant, Larry Wharrie, by his attorney Anita Alvarez, State’s Attorney of Cook
County, through her assistants, Donald J. Pechous and Lisa M. Meador, Assistant State’s
Attorneys, moves this Court, for entry of judgment, in his favor, as a matter of law pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).
Defendant, Larry Wharrie, moves for judgment as a matter of law as no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis exists for a reasonable jury to find for the Plaintiff based on the evidence
adduced during trial in this cause. Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of
law when “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); See also,
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). The standard for granting
judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the standard for granting summary judgment. Id. (quoting
Andersen v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-1 (1986)).
I.

§1983 Due Process and Conspiracy
No reasonable jury could find based on the evidence that before the arrest or charging of

Plaintiff, Defendant Wharrie coerced, or conspired to coerce, Anthony Sumner to fabricate

testimony against Plaintiff. See Fields v. Wharrie, et al., 740 F.3d 1107, 1112-1114 (7th Cir.
2014). The coercion relates entirely to the alleged implication of Plaintiff in the Smith-Hickman
and Vaughn-White murders by Sumner. “Liability under §1983 ‘requires personal involvement
in the alleged constitutional deprivation.’” Fields v. City of Chicago, et al., 10 C 1168,
Memorandum Opinion and Order (J. Kennelly, February 6, 2014, Dkt. #483) citing Munson v.
Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Based on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury
could find that Defendant Wharrie was personally involved in the alleged constitutional
deprivation.
Plaintiff’s evidence as to his claims against Defendant Wharrie consists solely of an
audio-recorded interview of cooperating witness Anthony Sumner. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 67. An
evaluation of this evidence requires a two-pronged examination: 1) the substance of the
statement itself; and 2) the circumstances under which the statement was obtained. Analysis of
the substance of the interview and the circumstances under which the statement was obtained
leads to the inexorable conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that Defendant Wharrie was
personally involved in any alleged constitutional deprivation.
A.

The Substance of the Interview

In the interview, Sumner never claimed that Defendant Wharrie threatened, beat, or
coerced him in any way. While Sumner makes some statements as to Defendant Brannigan,
Defendant Wharrie was not present and no reasonable jury can infer that he was aware of any
alleged threats, beatings, or other coercion of any kind. Sumner stated that Wharrie was not in
the room when the claimed beating occurred.
Moreover, even if there was evidence that Sumner was coerced, there is no evidence that
Sumner was coerced to falsely implicate Plaintiff. To be sure, Sumner stated in the interview that

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the police were not the first to bring up the names of Nathson Fields, Earl Hawkins, George
Carter, and Henry Andrews. Rather, Sumner was the first to bring up these names, not the police
and certainly not Mr. Wharrie. The evidence is undisputed that Defendant Wharrie knew nothing
about either the Smith-Hickman murders or the Vaughn-White murders prior to or after the
interviews in East Cleveland. In addition, the evidence is undisputed that Defendant Wharrie had
never heard the names Nathson Fields or Anthony Sumner prior to the interviews in East
Cleveland and only knew the name Anthony Sumner after the interviews in East Cleveland.
Sumner claims in the interview that he was hit against lockers and the undisputed
evidence established that no such lockers were in any of the rooms or offices at the State’s
Attorney’s Office at 26th Street. Therefore, the alleged incident would have had to have taken
place in East Cleveland. However, the undisputed evidence established that Earl Hawkins was
released in East Cleveland. A reasonable jury can infer that had Sumner provided information
related to the Smith-Hickman or Vaughn-White murders in East Cleveland, Hawkins would not
have been released, but rather would have been charged with murder, potentially two double
murders. No evidence has been presented and no inference can be made that any of the alleged
coercion occurred once Sumner had returned to Chicago.
B.

The Interview Is Suspect

The evidence established that any coercion to fabricate was done not by police or
prosecutors, but by members of the El Rukns, specifically, Jeff Fort and Sammie Knox. The
undisputed evidence established that Sumner was taken to the interview by two El Rukn
Generals: Sammie Knox and Michael Hunter. The interview took place at the office of Nathson
Fields’ criminal lawyer, Earl Washington, William Swano, lawyer for co-defendant Earl
Hawkins, and Fred Solomon, lawyer for co-defendant George Carter. It is important to note that

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this interview was not administered under oath. In the criminal trial in 1986, under oath and upon
cross-examination, Sumner testified that El Rukn leader, Jeff Fort, told him that he should go to
the lawyers’ office and tell them what the Generals told him to say and nothing would happen to
him or his family. Sumner further testified that General Sammie Knox told him to tell the
lawyers that everything he said was a lie and that the police beat him and nothing would happen
to him or his family. A reasonable jury could find that based upon this evidence, Sumner’s
statements in this interview were coerced by the El Rukns under threat and intimidation. Based
on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant Wharrie coerced Sumner
to falsely implicate Plaintiff prior to him being arrested or charged.
Conversely, the evidence established Sumner’s motive for falsely implicating Plaintiff in
the Vaughn-White murders. In January 3, 1992, Sumner admitted that he falsely implicated
Plaintiff in the Vaughn-White murders and he did so because he was confused and afraid and
because he was mad at Plaintiff for evicting him and his family. See Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7.
Plaintiff, himself, admits that Sumner falsely implicated him because he had a beef with him for
evicting him and his family in 1985. Plaintiff testified that, in response to the eviction, Sumner
told him that he knew how to make people disappear. Importantly, Sumner stated that not until
1991, had he told any police or any prosecutors that he falsely implicated Plaintiff in the
Vaughn/White murders. Id.
Based upon the evidence, no reasonable jury could find that before the arrest or charging
of Plaintiff, Defendant Wharrie coerced, or conspired to coerce, Anthony Sumner to give false
testimony against Plaintiff. As a result, Defendant Wharrie should be granted judgment as a
matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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II.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Based upon the evidence adduced, no reasonable jury could find that before the arrest or

charging of Plaintiff, Defendant Wharrie intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff.
No evidence has been presented to establish any extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of
Defendant Wharrie or that he intended or knew that his conduct would cause severe emotional
distress on Plaintiff. Conversely, the evidence established that El Rukn “flipper” Anthony
Sumner provided Defendant Wharrie with detailed information about a number of crimes
involving other El Rukns. Most significantly, Sumner implicated himself in the Vaughn-White
double murder along with Plaintiff. Defendant Wharrie testified that based upon these factors, he
had no reason to doubt the veracity of Sumner’s statements. As such, no reasonable jury could
find that based upon the evidence presented, Defendant Wharrie intentionally inflicted emotional
distress on Plaintiff before his arrest or charging. Consequently, Defendant Wharrie is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Wharrie prays that this Honorable Court enter judgment in his
favor pursuant to Rule 50(a), and against Plaintiff on all counts as no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis exists for reasonable jury to find for the Plaintiff.
Respectfully Submitted,
ANITA ALVAREZ
State’s Attorney of Cook County
By:

/s/ Lisa M. Meador
Donald J. Pechous
Lisa M. Meador
Assistant State’s Attorneys
500 Richard J. Daley Center
Chicago, IL 60602
[phone]

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