Laslie v. Chicago Transit Authority et al
Filing
86
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Laslie has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact on his Title VII claims. The Court understands Laslie's frustration that Grabski largely escaped discipline for the January 2009 collision. But Laslie has not presented even a scintilla of evidence that race was a motivating factor for the CTA's disciplinary decisions for the January 2009 collision, or that his December 23, 2009 discharge was retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint in April 2009. The CTA's Motion for Summary Judgment 68 , is granted in its entirety. This action is dismissed with prejudice. Case Terminated Signed by the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin on 3/22/2013:Mailed notice(srn, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Peter J. Laslie,
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Plaintiff,
v.
Chicago Transit Authority,
Defendant.
No. 10 C 3031
Judge Thomas M. Durkin
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
The Chicago Transit Authority (“CTA”) suspended Peter Laslie for 17 days
and placed him on probation after he contributed to a train collision on January 1,
2009. Laslie believed he was disciplined more harshly than a co-worker because he
is African American and filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. On
December 12, 2009, less than a year after the accident, Laslie was involved in a
second train collision. At that point, the CTA discharged Laslie (at least
temporarily; he was later rehired). Laslie filed this lawsuit under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that (1) the
CTA discriminated based on race when it disciplined him for the first collision, and
(2) its later decision to discharge him was in retaliation for filing the charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. Presently before the Court is the CTA’s Motion for
1
Summary Judgment. R. 68. For the reasons explained below, the CTA’s motion is
granted.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986). The court considers the entire evidentiary record and must view all of the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Egan Marine Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 665 F.3d 800,
811 (7th Cir. 2011). A nonmovant must produce more than “a mere scintilla of
evidence” to defeat summary judgment and “must come forward with specific facts
demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Carmichael v. Vill. of
Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d
629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008)). Ultimately summary judgment is warranted only if a
reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The following background is a summary of the
material facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Laslie.
2
Background 1
Laslie began working for the CTA in October 2001. DSMF ¶ 1; PR ¶ 1. He
started off as a combined rail operator, which included train operator, customer
assistance, flagging, and switching duties. Id. By 2009, Laslie was working as a
switchman. DSMF ¶ 2; PR ¶ 2. He worked at O’Hare four days a week and the
Forest Park Yard (the “Yard”) one day a week. Id. Laslie’s duties included moving
trains around the Yard. DSMF ¶ 3; PR ¶ 3. The Yard has an adjacent train repair
facility called the Des Plaines Shop (the “Shop”). DSMF ¶ 4; PR ¶ 4.
The January 1, 2009 Collision
On January 1, 2009, Laslie was working at the Yard with another
switchman, Rosemary Stanciel. DSMF ¶¶ 6-7; PR ¶¶ 6-7. Laslie and Stanciel are
both African Americans. DSMF ¶¶ 1, 7; PR ¶¶ 1, 7. The Rail Supervisor and acting
Yard Leader on duty was Edward Lomax. DSMF ¶ 7; PR ¶ 7.
A train car—Car 3119—displayed a blue warning light, indicating a failure
with the braking system. DSMF ¶¶ 8-9; PR ¶¶ 8-9. 2 Laslie and Stanciel were each
aware of the blue warning light. DSMF Ex. 1 at p. 3. Lomax instructed Stanciel to
move Car 3119 elsewhere in the Yard. DSMF ¶ 9; PR ¶ 9. Lomax then instructed
Laslie to go to the Shop to retrieve a different train. Id.
The Court cites to Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts, R. 70,
as “DSMF ¶ __” or “DSMF Ex. __,” Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Statement of
Material Facts, R. 77, as “PR ¶ __,” Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material
Facts, R. 78, as “PSMF ¶ __” or “PSMF Ex. __,” and Defendant’s Response to
Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts, R. 81, as “DR ¶ __.”
1
Throughout this order, the Court uses the term “train” either generally or to refer
to a group of cars, and “car” to refer to a particular, individual train car.
2
3
At the Shop, Laslie met with Dave Grabski. Id. Grabski, a Caucasian, was
the lead car repairer in the Shop. DSMF ¶ 10; PR ¶ 10. There was no maintenance
manager on duty. PSMF ¶ 1. Laslie asked Grabski, “what train do you want me to
get that’s ready?” DSMF ¶ 10; PR ¶ 10. Grabski led Laslie to a train with Cars 2291
and 2292. DSMF ¶ 11; PR ¶ 11. Car 2291 did not have any brakes. DSMF ¶ 28; PR
¶ 28. Grabski and Laslie tried various measures to start the train but failed; its
battery was dead. DSMF ¶¶ 11-12; PR ¶¶ 11-12; PSMF ¶ 14.
At that point, Grabski radioed Stanciel to bring Car 3119 to the Shop. DSMF
¶ 13; PR ¶ 13. Grabski then instructed Laslie to tell Stanciel to bring Car 3119 over
to them so they could hook it up to Cars 2291 and 2292 as a “horse” to push the
cars. Id. Laslie and Stanciel complied without objection. DSMF ¶ 14; PR ¶ 14.
After the cars were connected, Grabski instructed Stanciel to operate the
train from Car 3119. DSMF ¶ 17; PR ¶ 17. Grabski borrowed Laslie’s sleet scraper,
a tool used to remove sleet, and used it to deactivate the brakes on Car 2292 so that
the train could be pushed along. DSMF ¶ 18; PR ¶ 18. At that point, Laslie was
acting as a flagman from Car 2291. PSMF ¶ 16 & Ex. 1 ¶ 13. Laslie was aware that
Grabski had deactivated the brakes on Car 2292; Stanciel claimed that she did not
know. DSMF ¶ 19 & Ex. 1 at p. 3; PR ¶ 19. In sum, Grabski, Stanciel, and Laslie
were using a car with brake problems (Car 3119) to push a car with no brakes (Car
2291) and a car with deactivated brakes (Car 2292).
As Stanciel operated the train, the train was slow to stop and collided with
the Shop door, which was sticking out by about one foot. DSMF ¶¶ 19-21; PR ¶¶ 19-
4
21. The front Car 2292 sustained some damage, DSMF Ex. 1 at p. 2, and the Shop
door had to be replaced entirely. DSMF ¶ 21; PR ¶ 21.
Transportation Manager Mervin McKinney investigated the accident and
recommended discipline for Laslie and Stanciel. DSMF ¶ 23; PR ¶ 23. McKinney is
also African American. Id. McKinney interviewed Laslie and considered Laslie’s
general defense that although he knew of the blue warning light on Car 3119 and
that the brakes on Car 2292 were deactivated, he assisted moving the cars because
he was instructed to do so by Grabski. DSMF Ex. 1 at pp. 2-3. McKinney
nonetheless concluded that Laslie violated numerous CTA rules and standing
orders, including by using a defective car as a “horse.” DSMF Ex. 3 at pp. 2-3;
DSMF ¶ 23; PR ¶ 23. McKinney charged Laslie with a “Class I Accident” under the
CTA’s Vehicle Accident Guidelines. DSMF ¶ 24; PR ¶ 24. A Class I Accident
involves “serious damage and/or serious injury.” DSMF ¶ 26; PR ¶ 26. An employee
involved in a Class I Accident is “[r]eferred to the appropriate supervisor for
consideration of progressive action up to and including administrative separation.”
Id. An employee involved in a second Class I Accident is “[r]eferred to the
appropriate supervisor for administrative separation.” DSMF Ex. 2 at p. 2. In part
because Laslie was also involved in a Class II accident in July 2007, McKinney
decided to refer him to Richard Newton, the General Manager for the Pink and Blue
Lines, with a recommendation for discharge. DSMF ¶ 27; PR ¶ 27; DSMF Exs. 1 &
3. McKinney recommended that Stanciel be discharged as well. DSMF Ex. 1 at p. 3.
5
Newton discharged Stanciel (she was later re-instated) but decided not to
discharge Laslie as McKinney recommended. DSMF ¶¶ 29, 31; PR ¶¶ 29, 31.3
Instead, Newton placed Laslie on a Last Chance Agreement effective January 13,
2009. DSMF ¶ 29; PR ¶ 29. The Agreement explained that “[a]s part of the train
movement [on January 1, 2009], you are considered to have had some responsibility
in the accident that occurred,” and that Laslie had violated numerous CTA rules
and standing orders. DSMF Ex. 4 at p. 1. The Agreement then stated that “in lieu of
Discharge you will be placed on Probation for accidents until at least January 13,
2011. Any future Class I or class II accident may be grounds for recommendation of
discharge.” Id. at p. 2. Laslie was also suspended for 17 days and went through paid
training before he returned to work. DSMF ¶ 30; PR ¶ 30; PSMF ¶ 21.
McKinney testified that he had no authority to discipline Grabski because
Grabski worked in the Maintenance Department. DSMF Ex. B at p. 34. Grabski
generally reported to Maintenance Manager Tom Ciezadlo. DSMF ¶ 32; PR ¶32.
Grabski was later interviewed regarding the January 2009 collision by three
managers in the Maintenance Department. DSMF ¶ 34; PR ¶ 34. Grabski was
verbally admonished by Inspection Manager John Dowdall to be more safety
conscious, but was not otherwise disciplined for the collision. Id.
On April 23, 2009, Laslie filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. R.
43, Second Am. Compl., Ex. A. The EEOC charge alleged that Laslie’s “employer
suspended and disciplined [him] for alleged policy violations for a workplace
3
Newton’s race is not in the record.
6
incident. A non-Black member was involved in the same incident and was not
disciplined or suspended.” Id. Laslie explained that he “believe[s] [he] has been
discriminated against because of [his] race, Black, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.” Id.
The December 12, 2009 Collision
On December 12, 2009, Laslie was again working in the Yard. DSMF ¶ 39;
PR ¶ 39. The Yard Leader was Tonisha Sulton. DSMF ¶ 40; PR ¶ 40. Sulton is
African American. DSMF Ex. D at p. 45.
That day, Tracks 3 and 4 held 16 cars each, even though each track only has
room to safely store 14 cars. DSMF ¶ 41; PR ¶ 41. The extra cars on Track 4 at least
partially obstructed Track 3; as a result, a train from Track 4 would have to be
moved before a train from Track 3 could be moved safely. Id.
Sulton instructed Laslie to move a train out of the Yard. According to Sulton,
she told Laslie to move a train from Track 2. DSMF ¶ 42; PR ¶ 42. According to
Laslie, Sulton told him to move a train from Track 3. DSMF ¶ 43; PR ¶ 43. Laslie
proceeded to take an 8-car train from Track 3. DSMF ¶ 39; PR ¶ 39. The first car of
the train Laslie was operating cleared the cars that were parked on Track 4, but as
Laslie continued to move the train forward, he heard a “screeching noise” as a car in
his train made contact with a car on Track 4. DSMF ¶ 44; PR ¶ 44. After the
collision, Laslie went to the opposite end of his train and, although no one told him
to do so, pulled the train back “to see how much damage was done to the train.”
DSMF ¶ 47; PR ¶ 47. This move exacerbated the damage; in the process of pulling
7
the train back, Laslie bent the side railing of one of the trains. Id. The total damage
to both rail cars was approximately $40,000. DSMF ¶ 56; PR ¶ 56.
Transportation Manager Kenneth Elam investigated the collision. DSMF ¶
48; PR ¶ 48. Elam is African American. Id. Elam ultimately credited Sulton’s
recollection that she told Laslie to take a train from Track 2. Elam determined that
Laslie was responsible for the collision because he failed to take Sulton’s direction to
take a train from Track 2 and because he exacerbated the damage by pulling the
trains apart. DSMF ¶ 58; PR ¶ 58. Elam found that Laslie violated numerous CTA
rules and standing orders. DSMF Ex. 14 at pp. 3-5. Elam then concluded:
As a switchman, it was Mr. Laslie’s responsibility to
operate trains on sight and to ensure and maintain proper
clearance between moving and standing trains to avoid
collision. In the instant matter, Mr. Laslie admitted to
striking the standing train located on track #4 in Forest
Park Yard. Furthermore, his action in pulling the train
back without authorization contributed to excessive
damage to CTA property.
In view of the above, there are no mitigating factors such
as tenure of service or overall good work record to warrant
consideration of a penalty less than discharge. Moreover,
Mr. [Laslie] was on probation in lieu of discharge for
vehicular accidents at the time the triggering incident
took place. Therefore, Mr. [Laslie] is referred to the
General Manager, Elevated Lines, December 23, 2009,
with a recommend[ation] for discharge.
Id. at p. 5.
Elam notified Laslie that he was being recommended for discharge. PR ¶ 61;
PSMF ¶ 33. At that time, Laslie discussed the January 2009 collision with Elam
8
and explained that he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. PR ¶ 61. 4
Elam told Laslie that he would investigate further and that the matter would be
referred to General Manager Ron Ester for a final decision. Id.
On December 23, 2009, Ester notified Laslie that he was being discharged.
DSMF Ex. 15. Ester is also African American. DSMF Ex. D at p. 47. At the
discharge hearing on December 23, Laslie did not tell Ester about the EEOC charge
or that the discipline he received for the January 2009 collision was discriminatory.
R. 81-1, Aff. of Ronald Ester ¶ 6. At the time of Laslie’s discharge, Ester was
unaware that Laslie had filed an EEOC charge. Id. ¶ 7.
Laslie was eventually re-hired by the CTA and reinstated to his switchman
position. DSMF ¶ 62; PR ¶ 62.
Analysis
I.
Title VII Discrimination Claim
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, it is unlawful for
an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Moreover, in order to prevail, a plaintiff only needs to
demonstrate that “race . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.” Id. § 2000e-2(m).
According to Elam, Laslie only said that he had filed a grievance with the union
and did not mention the EEOC charge or that he thought the discipline was
discriminatory. R. 81-1, Second Aff. of Kenneth Elam at ¶ 3. For purposes of
summary judgment, the Court assumes that Laslie’s account is true.
4
9
Laslie alleges that the CTA discriminated based on race when it disciplined
him for the January 2009 collision. Laslie seeks back pay for the 17 days he was
suspended and other damages.
A plaintiff can establish unlawful discrimination either directly or indirectly.
See, e.g., Lucas v. Chicago Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 728 (7th Cir. 2004). Laslie
attempts to establish his discrimination claim under both the direct and indirect
methods of proof. The Court addresses each in turn.
A.
Direct Method
As its name implies, the “direct” method of proof focuses on “whether the
evidence ‘points directly’ to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.”
Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Under the
direct method, a plaintiff “must offer either direct evidence that would prove the
fact in question—the discriminatory intent—without reliance on inference or
presumption, or a ‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that would allow a
jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Silverman v. Bd. of
Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
A plaintiff using the “convincing mosaic” approach may present three broad
types of circumstantial evidence: (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral
or written, behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the
protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of
discriminatory intent might be drawn; (2) showing that the employer systematically
treated other, similarly situated employees better; and/or (3) showing that the
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employer’s justification for the adverse action is pretextual. Id. at 734; Venturelli v.
ARC Cmty. Servs., Inc., 350 F.3d 592, 601 (7th Cir. 2003).
Laslie relies exclusively on pretext to establish a “convincing mosaic” of
circumstantial evidence. R. 79 at 8-9. Laslie argues at length that “he clearly was
not culpable for” the January 2009 collision and that his recommended discharge
and eventual 17-day suspension were “unjust.” Id. at 9-11.
Laslie’s pretext argument is fundamentally flawed. An employer’s actions
might be “unjust,” but that does not establish that the employer’s justification is a
pretext for race discrimination. Courts are not “superpersonnel departments.”
Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Blise v.
Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2005)). As the Seventh Circuit has
repeatedly stated, “it is not the court’s concern that an employer may be wrong
about its employee’s performance, or be too hard on its employee. Rather, the only
question is whether the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning that it
was a lie.” Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 691 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2005)). A plaintiff therefore has
the burden of establishing that “the employer’s proffered reasons are factually
baseless, were not the actual motivation for the [adverse action] in question, or were
insufficient to motivate the [adverse action].” Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating
Co., 307 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246
F.3d 878, 888-89 (7th Cir. 2001)). Thus, the “only question” for the Court is
“whether [the defendant] had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
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[disciplining its employee], not whether it made the correct decision. If it is a true
ground and not a pretext, the case is over.” Naik v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm.,
Inc., 627 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
McKinney (also an African American) recommended that the CTA discharge
Laslie as a result of the January 2009 collision, and Newton ultimately placed
Laslie on probation following a 17-day suspension. Laslie has not established that
McKinney’s or Newton’s justifications for those actions were factually baseless, not
the actual motive for their actions, or were insufficient to motivate their actions.
Although Laslie asserts that he was just following Grabski’s orders, the fact
remains that, as Newton concluded, Laslie still had “some responsibility in the
accident that occurred.” DSMF Ex. 4 at p. 1. Most significantly, Laslie relayed
Grabski’s instruction to Stanciel to use Car 3119 as a “horse” to push Cars 2291 and
2292. Notably, in relaying that instruction, Laslie may have been the only one who
knew that none of the cars had properly functioning brakes. Stanciel knew about
the blue warning light on Car 3119, but claimed that she did not know that Grabski
deactivated the brakes on Car 2292. Conversely, Grabski knew that he had just
deactivated the brakes on Car 2292, but claimed that he did not know about the
blue warning light or other defects on Car 3119. DSMF Ex. B at pp. 89-90. Laslie
admittedly knew about both the blue warning light on Car 3119 and that Grabski
deactivated the brakes on Car 2292. Yet, he said nothing and flagged the train
along, where it collided with the Shop door and caused serious damage.
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Laslie argues that the CTA’s Vehicle Accident Guidelines apply only to
employees who were actually “operating” a vehicle, and that he was merely a
flagman. R. 79 at 9. But the CTA’s Rail System Rulebook expressly provides that
“[t]he term operating employee includes any employee working as a flagman.”
PSMF Ex. 3 at R1.1.1. Laslie also cites the Vehicle Accident Guideline provision
that “[a]n employee who during a twenty-four (24) month period is involved in any
combination of a Class I and Class II Accident is subject to Administrative
Separation for any subsequent accident,” DSMF Ex. 2 at p. 2, and argues that he
only should have been recommended for discharge after a third accident. R. 79 at 910. But that is not the only circumstance where discharge is allowed. The Vehicle
Accident Guidelines expressly provide that after one Class I accident, an employee
is “[r]eferred . . . for consideration of progressive action up to and including
administrative separation.” DSMF Ex. 2 at p. 2 (emphasis added). Finally, Laslie
notes that Grabski only received a verbal reprimand. R. 79 at 10-11. But as
discussed below, Grabksi was not a similarly situated employee—he reported to and
was ultimately disciplined by the Maintenance Department. And if the CTA
believed his account, Grabski did not know that Car 3119 was defective.
In short, like the plaintiff in Lucas, 367 F.3d at 731, Laslie “may believe that
his suspension was incorrect, ill-advised, or undesirable; he has not established,
however, that the CTA did not honestly believe [its justification].” (Internal citation
omitted.) As a result, Laslie has not established pretext, and offers no other
evidence to establish a discrimination claim under the direct method of proof.
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B.
Indirect Method
The indirect method of proof involves three steps. First, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that: (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated
employees outside of the protected class more favorably. For a discriminatory
discipline claim, like Laslie asserts here, the second and fourth prongs merge
together. Caskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 535 F.3d 585, 592 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus,
instead of needing to show that he performed his job satisfactorily, a plaintiff must
establish “that he received dissimilar—and more harsh—punishment than that
received by a similarly situated employee who was outside the protected class.”
Lucas, 367 F.3d at 728. Second, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employment action. This has been described as “[a] light burden.” Stockwell, 597
F.3d at 901. Third, once the employer has produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision, the plaintiff then has the burden of producing sufficient
evidence to show that reason to be pretextual. Id.
As discussed above with respect to the direct method of proof, the CTA has
produced legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to discipline Laslie
for the January 2009 collision, and Laslie has not produced sufficient evidence to
show pretext. As a result, Laslie cannot prevail under the indirect method of proof
either. In addition, Laslie would not even be able to advance to steps two and three
14
of the indirect proof analysis because Laslie has not established a prima facie case
of discrimination. In particular, he has not identified any similarly situated nonAfrican American employee who was disciplined more leniently than himself.
A plaintiff has the “burden . . . to establish the similarity between himself
and the proposed comparable employees.” Peters, 307 F.3d at 546. Although a
similarly situated employee need not be “identical,” Caskey, 535 F.3d at 592, he
must be “directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Naik, 627
F.3d at 600 (quoting Patterson v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 365-66
(7th Cir. 2009)). As the Seventh Circuit has explained,
in disciplinary cases – in which a plaintiff claims that he
was disciplined by his employer more harshly than a
similarly situated employee based on some prohibited
reason – a plaintiff must show that he is similarly
situated with respect to performance, qualifications and
conduct. This normally entails a showing that the two
employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to
the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct
without such differentiating and mitigating circumstances
as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s
treatment of them.
Peters, 307 F.3d at 546 (quoting Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 61718 (7th Cir. 2000)). See also Gates, 513 F.3d at 690.
Laslie holds out Grabski as a non-African American employee who was
disciplined more leniently for the January 2009 collision. Grabski was certainly
disciplined more leniently, but he is not similarly situated. Laslie is in operations
and Grabski is in maintenance; they report to entirely different chains of command.
There is no dispute that Laslie’s discipline was handled by Transportation Manager
15
McKinney and General Manager Newton, while Grabski’s discipline was handled
within the Maintenance Department. This setup may very well lead to uneven
discipline decisions, but it does not support a Title VII claim for race discrimination.
Laslie argues that McKinney—in his role as Incident Commander after the
collision—could have interviewed or perhaps disciplined Grabski. R. 79 at 10-11, 13.
Laslie’s argument is unavailing. As an initial matter, to the extent McKinney had
discretion to discipline Grabski (McKinney testified he did not), Laslie has not
submitted any evidence or even suggested that McKinney’s decision to leave
Grabski’s discipline to the Maintenance Department had anything to do with race.
And in any event, Laslie has not submitted any evidence showing that McKinney
(or Newton) had authority to discipline Grabski. With respect to McKinney, Laslie
cites Standard Operating Procedure 8191 and Rule 1.2 of the CTA’s Rail System
Rulebook. R. 79 at 10; PSMF Ex. 7; DSMF Ex. 6. Neither says anything about
imposing discipline. With respect to Newton, Laslie merely argues in conclusory
fashion that “it is beyond belief” that Newton did not have the authority to
discipline Grabski. R. 79 at 13. Laslie’s conjecture is not evidence.
In short, Laslie has not established a prima facie case because he has not
shown that he received harsher punishment than a similarly situated non-African
American employee. And even if Laslie could establish a prima facie case, he has
not submitted evidence that the CTA’s justification for disciplining him is a pretext.
Laslie’s discrimination claim therefore fails under the indirect method.
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II.
Title VII Retaliation Claim
Laslie does not contend that his December 23, 2009 discharge was the result
of discriminatory discipline for the December 2009 collision. Instead, Laslie alleges
that the CTA discharged him in retaliation for filing his April 23, 2009 charge of
discrimination with the EEOC regarding the January 2009 collision. Laslie seeks
compensation for lost pay and benefits after he was discharged and other damages.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, it is unlawful for
an employer “to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge . . . under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). As with a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff can establish
unlawful retaliation either directly or indirectly. Again, Laslie attempts to establish
his retaliation claim under both the direct and indirect methods of proof.
A.
Direct Method
To prove a retaliation claim under the direct method, a plaintiff is required to
establish that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) his employer took an adverse
action against him; and (3) there is a causal connection between the plaintiff’s
protected activity and the adverse employment action. Leitgen v. Franciscan Skemp
Healthcare, Inc., 630 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2011).
Laslie easily meets the first two elements. He engaged in protected activity
when he filed his charge of discrimination with the EEOC on April 23, 2009. The
CTA also took an adverse action against Laslie when it discharged him (at least
17
temporarily) on December 23, 2009. The key issue here is the third element—
whether there is a causal connection between these two events.
The CTA discharged Laslie eight months after he filed his charge of
discrimination with the EEOC. As a general matter, the passage of eight months is
too long to infer retaliation. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625,
635 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that the passage of 60 days “is not strongly suggestive
of retaliation”); Filipovic v. K & R Express Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 398 (7th Cir.
1999) (holding that plaintiff failed to show retaliation after four months and
explaining that “[a] substantial time lapse between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action ‘is counter-evidence of any causal connection’”) (quoting
Johnson v. Univ. of Wis.-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 480 (7th Cir. 1995)); Davidson v.
Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 511 (7th Cir. 1998) (“As the period of time
separating the two lengthens, the hint of causation weakens. Davidson’s discharge
occurred five months after she filed her charge of discrimination, and we have
previously concluded that when so much time passes before the adverse action
takes place, the order in which the events occurred does not by itself suggest a
causal link between them.”) (internal citation omitted).
This is not a case where a plaintiff might still prove retaliation after such a
lengthy period of time. First, the December 2009 collision—which caused nearly
$40,000 in property damage—was Laslie’s second Class I Accident in less than a
year. His discharge was all but certain. The CTA’s Vehicle Accident Guidelines
provide that an employee involved in a second Class I Accident is “[r]eferred to the
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appropriate supervisor for administrative separation.” DSMF Ex. 2 at p. 2. Laslie
was also still on probation from the January 2009 collision; his aptly-named “Last
Chance Agreement” provided that “Any future Class I or class II accident may be
grounds for recommendation of discharge.” DSMF Ex. 4 at p. 1. Second, Laslie has
not presented any evidence that Elam or Ester (both African Americans) were
motivated by Laslie’s filing of an EEOC charge when they recommended or decided
Laslie’s discipline for the December 2009 collision. Indeed, it is undisputed that
Elam decided on his discharge recommendation before he even knew of the EEOC
charge and that Ester never knew of the EEOC charge at all.
Laslie takes issue with the fact that Elam decided to credit Sulton’s
recollection of the December 2009 collision over Laslie’s and argues that Elam
conducted a “sham investigation.” R. 79 at 14-15. But that is not evidence of
retaliation for filing an EEOC charge. As discussed above, it is undisputed that
Elam conducted that supposedly “sham” investigation and decided on his discharge
recommendation before he even knew that Laslie had filed an EEOC charge in April
2009. Laslie also cites a statement from Ester the day Laslie was discharged, where
Ester told Laslie that he “knows that it doesn’t make any sense but you should not
take it personally” and that “the decision came from up top and there is nothing I
can do about it.” R. 79 at 15. 5 But this does not suggest a retaliatory or other
improper motive. Laslie had just been involved in a second train collision in less
Ester denies ever saying this, R. 81-1, Aff. of Ronald Ester ¶ 6, but again, for
purposes of summary judgment, the Court assumes that Laslie’s account is true.
5
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than a year that caused nearly $40,000 in damage to CTA property. It certainly
would not be surprising if those “up top” wanted him discharged.
Laslie has not presented any direct evidence or a “convincing mosaic” of
circumstantial evidence to support an inference that Elam or Ester retaliated
against him for filing an EEOC charge in April 2009. As a result, Laslie cannot
establish his retaliation claim under the direct method of proof.
B.
Indirect Method
To prove a retaliation claim under the indirect method, a plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that “(1) after lodging a complaint
about discrimination, (2) only he, and not any otherwise similarly situated employee
who did not complain, was (3) subjected to an adverse employment action even
though (4) he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner.” Whittaker v. N. Ill.
Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub.
Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2002)). As discussed above, in cases involving
disciplinary decisions, the second and fourth elements merge. If a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate reason for the adverse action, which the plaintiff must then rebut with
evidence of pretext. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 473 (7th Cir. 2011).
Laslie has not presented evidence of pretext. Once again, Laslie asks the
Court to act as a superpersonnel department and second-guess the results of the
CTA’s investigation into the December 2009 collision. But Laslie cannot establish
that Elam’s or Ester’s justifications were factually baseless, not the actual motive
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for their actions, or were insufficient to motivate their actions. Again, before Elam
even knew that Laslie had filed an EEOC complaint, he investigated the December
2009 collision and decided to credit Sulton’s recollection that she told Laslie to take
a train from Track 2, not Track 3. Moreover, even if Elam believed Laslie’s account
that Sulton told him to take a train from Track 3, Laslie still readily admits that
after the initial collision, he moved the train before investigators arrived and caused
additional property damage. Coupled with Laslie’s prior Class I Accident, Elam and
Ester had ample grounds for their actions. Laslie therefore cannot establish a
retaliation claim under the indirect method of proof.
Conclusion
Laslie has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact on his
Title VII claims. The Court understands Laslie’s frustration that Grabski largely
escaped discipline for the January 2009 collision. But Laslie has not presented even
a scintilla of evidence that race was a motivating factor for the CTA’s disciplinary
decisions for the January 2009 collision, or that his December 23, 2009 discharge
was retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint in April 2009. The CTA’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, R. 68, is granted in its entirety. This action is dismissed with
prejudice.
ENTERED:
_______________________________
Honorable Thomas M. Durkin
United States District Judge
Dated: March 22, 2013
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