Reliford v. Dr. Ghosh et al
Filing
99
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber on 6/27/2012:Mailed notice(wp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
EDDIE RELIFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 10 C 3555
Hon. Harry D. Leinenweber
DR. GHOSH, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Eddie Reliford (“Plaintiff”) has brought this pro se
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff alleges
that
rights
Defendants
violated
his
constitutional
by
being
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical condition.
More
specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that in August 2009, he hurt his
ankle on the yard at Stateville Correctional Center (hereinafter,
“Stateville”), and received inadequate or delayed medical care from
Defendants.
Presently before the Court are Motions for Summary Judgment
filed by Correctional Medical Technician Joe Sheehy and Correctional
Officer Downs [Dkt. 66, as amended by Dkt. 80, Exhibit 1] and
Defendants Ghosh, Halloran, and Karraker [Dkt. 84].
For the reasons
stated herein, the Motions are granted.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
FED . R. CIV . P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Vision Church v.
Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir. 2006).
In
determining whether factual issues exist, the court must view all the
evidence and
draw
all reasonable
inferences
favorable to the non-moving party.
in
the
light
most
Weber v. Universities Research
Assoc., Inc., 621 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2010).
The court does not
“judge the credibility of the witnesses, evaluate the weight of the
evidence, or determine the truth of the matter.
The only question is
whether there is a genuine issue of fact.”
Gonzalez v. City of
Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2009), citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
However, Rule 56(a) “mandates the entry of summary judgment,
after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for
trial.”
Sarver v. Experian Information Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 970
(7th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
“A genuine issue of material
fact arises only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
exists to permit a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Egonmwan v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 602 F.3d 845, 849 (7th Cir.
- 2 -
2010), quoting Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 640-41
(7th Cir. 2008).
A.
Local Rule 56.1 (N.D. Ill.)
The Defendants filed Statements of Uncontested Material Facts
pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 (N.D. Ill.). Together with their Motions
for Summary Judgment, the Defendants included a “Notice to Pro Se
Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment” [Dkts. 68, 75], as
required by Local Rule 56.2.
That notice clearly explained the
requirements of the Local Rules and warned the Plaintiff that a
party’s failure to controvert the facts as set forth in the moving
party’s statement results in those facts being deemed admitted. See,
e.g., Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th
Cir. 2003).
Local Rule 56.1(b) requires a party opposing a motion for
summary judgment to file:
(3)
a concise response to the movant’s statement that
shall contain
(A)
a response to each numbered paragraph in the
moving party’s statement, including, in the case of
any
disagreement,
specific
references
to
the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting
materials relied upon, and
(B) a statement, consisting of short numbered
paragraphs, of any additional facts that require
denial of summary judgment, including references to
the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials relied upon.
L.R. 56.1(b).
The district court may rigorously enforce compliance with Local
Rule 56.1.
See, e.g., Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880, 886-87 (7th
- 3 -
Cir. 2011) (“Because of the high volume of summary judgment motions
and the benefits of clear presentation of relevant evidence and law,
we have repeatedly held that district judges are entitled to insist
on strict compliance with local rules designed to promote the clarity
of summary judgment filings”) (citing Ammons v. Aramark Uniform
Serv., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004).
Although pro se
plaintiffs
compliance
are
entitled
to
procedural rules is required.
lenient
standards,
with
Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1061
(7th Cir. 2006); see also Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of
Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2004).
“We have . . .
repeatedly held that a district court is entitled to expect strict
compliance with Rule 56.1.”
Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., 401
F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2005).
Despite the admonitions stated above, the Plaintiff failed to
file a proper response to the Defendants’ Statements of Uncontested
Facts.
In his opposing briefs, while Plaintiff disputes some of the
Defendants’ contentions, he cites to no specific evidence in the
record that supports his claims.
A Motion for Summary Judgment
“requires the responding party to come forward with the evidence that
it has - it is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit.”
Eberts
v. Goderstad, 569 F.3d 757, 767 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
The Plaintiff’s Statements of Fact are not supported by the record.
Dent v. Bestfoods, (Case No. 02 C 7922) 2003 WL 22025008, at *1 n.1
(N.D. Ill. August 27, 2003) (St. Eve, J.); Malec v. Sanford, 191
- 4 -
F.R.D. 581, 585 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
Consequently, the Plaintiff’s
responses to the Defendants’ proposed undisputed facts are not in
compliance with Rule 56.1(b)(3)(A).
Accordingly, the Defendants’
proposed undisputed facts are deemed admitted.
See Chelios v.
Heavener, 520 F.3d 678, 687 (7th Cir. 2008); L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B).
Because the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will grant
him considerable leeway and take into account the factual assertions
he makes in his summary judgment materials.
However, the Court will
entertain the Plaintiff’s factual statements only insofar as he could
properly testify about the matters asserted.
See FED . R. EVID . 602.
The Court notes, in any event, that the sequence of events set forth
in
this
opinion
is
gleaned
largely
from
the
Plaintiff’s
own
deposition testimony and the submitted medical records.
Given the considerations stated above, the Court views the
Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statements supported by the record and not
properly rebutted by the Plaintiff to be true and uncontested.
In
order to meet its obligation to view the record in the light most
favorable
to
the
non-movant,
the
Court
has
supplemented
the
Defendants’ Statement of Facts with additional facts the Plaintiff
asserted during his deposition and in his opposing brief:
II.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Eddie Reliford, is incarcerated in the Illinois
Department
of
Corrections
Correctional Center.
and
currently
housed
at
Stateville
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical condition when he
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suffered a
sprained
Complaint.)
Dr. Partha Ghosh was the Medical Director at Stateville
Correctional
Center.
ankle
in
(Id.)
August of
Alan
2009.
Karraker
(See
was
Plaintiff’s
the
Regional
Administrator for Wexford Health Sources, Inc. at the time of the
events giving rise to the complaint. (Id. at p. 3.)
Kevin Halloran
is the Chairman of Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (See Affidavit of
Joseph Ebbitt, ¶ 5.)
Joseph Sheehy, is a Correctional Medical
Technician (“CMT”) at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”)
and
held
that
position
during the
time
Declaration of Joseph Sheehy, ¶¶ 1 and 2.)
Correctional Officer at Stateville.
in
question.
(See
Charles Downs is a
(See Plaintiff’s Complaint, p.
2).
Sheehy examined the Plaintiff’s ankle on August 13, 2012, the
date of his injury, and his evaluation was that the Plaintiff had
suffered a sprained ankle. (See Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendants
Sheehy
and
Downs’
Exhibit
D,
Bates
Stamp
No.
00003).
Sheehy
instructed the Plaintiff to keep the ankle elevated, prescribed ice
for 24 hours, referred the Plaintiff to Dr. Zhang, and provided him
with a crutch.
(Id.)
Sheehy also provided the Plaintiff with a
prescription for Motrin for 10 days for relief of pain.
(See
Defendants Sheehy and Downs’ Group Exhibit D, Bates Stamp Nos. 00003,
00004).
The Plaintiff was scheduled for an x-ray of his ankle by Dr.
Zhang on August 13, 2009.
(Id. at Bates Stamp No. 00006).
The x-ray
was taken on August 19, 2009, and showed no new pathology, some
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slight degenerative joint disease (“DJD”), and an “old unreunited
fracture at the tip of the medial malleolus.” (Id.)
With respect to Downs, the Plaintiff testified at his deposition
that Downs was present on August 13, 2009, when CMT Sheehy examined
his ankle, and spoke with Sheehy about the Plaintiff’s injury and the
care that was rendered.
(See Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 18.)
was
had
aware
that
Plaintiff.
Sheehy
prescribed
pain
medication
(Id. and see Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 8).
Downs
for
the
In his
deposition, the Plaintiff testified that the following day, he asked
Defendant Downs to see a med-tech or a doctor because his ankle was
swollen and he was suffering from severe pain.
(See Plaintiff’s
Deposition, pp. 10-11 and Plaintiff’s Affidavit.)
Defendant Downs told him he had already received care, including
pain
medication.
(Id.)
Defendant
Downs
additionally
spoke
to
Lieutenant Bishop and told her that he had spoken to the med-tech,
and the med-tech told Downs that the Plaintiff did not need further
treatment. (See Defendant Sheehy and Downs’ Uncontested Statement of
Fact 18)
On August 20, 2009, the Plaintiff was examined by Physician’s
Assistant Latonya Williams.
(Id. at Bates Stamp No. 00007).
Ms.
Williams’ assessment reconfirmed the prior finding that the Plaintiff
had
suffered
a
sprained
ankle.
(Id).
Ms.
Williams prescribed
crutches, heat, a lay-in for two weeks, ibuprofen, and an ankle
support. (Id).
Physician’s Assistant Williams’ assessment of the
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Plaintiff’s injury was essentially the same as that of Defendant
Sheehy, i.e., a sprained ankle. (Id).
The Plaintiff’s only claim against Dr. Ghosh is a delay in
approving a prescribed ankle brace, and that the Plaintiff did not
receive any brace until February 2010. (See Plaintiff’s Complaint and
Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 20.)
The Plaintiff was seen at UIC
hospital on November 6, 2009, and an ankle brace was recommended.
(See Plaintiff’s Complaint, and see Defendants’ Ghosh, Halloran, and
Karraker’s Group Exhibit D, p. 5.)
When the Plaintiff was seen at UIC on November 6, 2009, Dr.
League, a UIC physician, wrote in his report:
“Left ankle sprain
discussed with patient the need for immobilization via an ankle
brace.
We have recommended that the patient continue to use this in
his lace-up orthotic type shoe with daily activities as well as with
any physical activity. (Id.) On December 30, 2009 Plaintiff reported
to LaTonya Williams that he had not received the brace ordered by
UIC. (Id.)
LaTonya Williams ordered a brace for Plaintiff that same
day. (Id. at p. 9)
On March 15, 2010, Dr. Ghosh saw the Plaintiff because he was
complaining of pain in his left ankle. (Id. at pp. 10-11)
On
March 15, 2010, Dr. Ghosh placed another order for an ankle brace for
the Plaintiff. (Id.)
On March 22, 2010, Dr. Ghosh saw the Plaintiff
again, because his ankle brace was too big.
Dr. Ghosh ordered
another, smaller brace for the Plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 12-13.)
From
the evidence supplied by both the Plaintiff and the Defendants in
- 8 -
support of their motions and responses, it appears that the Plaintiff
received medical care for his sprained ankle on August 13, 2009,
August 19, 2009, August 20, 2009, November 6, 2009, December 30,
2009, March 15, 2010, and March 22, 2010, both within the prison and
at an outside healthcare facility.
(See Defendants’ group exhibits,
prescription orders for the applicable dates.)
The Plaintiff states
in his affidavit that he was required to participate in physical
therapy as a result of his injury until sometime in 2011.
(See
Plaintiff’s Affidavit, ¶ 14.)
The Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Kevin Halloran, the
Chairman of Wexford Health Sources, Inc., is that he sent him letters
and Halloran did not respond. (See Plaintiff’s Deposition, p 21.)
The Plaintiff concedes he does not know if Mr. Halloran ever received
those letters.
(Id.)
The Plaintiff also concedes he does not know
if Mr. Halloran has any medical training. (Id.)
Halloran’s position
does not involve the responsibility for making or implementing
medical policies or procedures, which are made by the Chief Medical
Officer of the facility. (See Affidavit of Joseph Ebbitt, ¶ 5.)
Halloran is not involved in the delivery of medical care to any of
the sites serviced by Wexford. (Id. at 6 and 7.)
The
Plaintiff’s
claim
against
Alan
Karraker,
the
Regional
Administrator for Wexford, is also that he sent him letters and Mr.
Karraker did not respond. (See Plaintiff’s Deposition, p. 22.)
Again, the Plaintiff concedes he does not know if Mr. Karraker ever
received those letters.
(Id.)
Karraker is not involved in the
- 9 -
medical care provided at the sites he supervises. Karraker does not
have any medical training. (See Affidavit of Joseph Ebbitt, ¶ 9.)
Any
correspondence
received
by
Wexford
Health
Sources,
Inc.,
regarding medical care from patients is directed to the attention of
the Manager of Risk Management regardless of to whom it is addressed.
(Id. at
¶ 3.)
III.
ANALYSIS
The courts have recognized that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
See Gonzalez v. Feinerman,
663 F.3d 311, 313-314 (7th Cir. 2011), citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
A
prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when: (1) the
Plaintiff establishes an objectively serious injury or medical need;
and (2) that Defendants knew that the risk of injury was substantial
but nevertheless failed to take reasonable measures to prevent it.
Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001).
Deliberate
indifference encompasses a broader range of conduct than intentional
denial
of
necessary
medical
treatment,
but
it
stops
short
of
malpractice or “negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical
condition.”
citing
Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006),
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
See also Jones v. Simek, 193 F.3d
485, 489 (7th Cir. 1999); Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 178 (7th Cir.
1996). An official is deliberately indifferent when he acts or fails
- 10 -
to act “despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”
to the inmate.
Farmer, at 842.
A delay in treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if
the delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an
inmate’s pain.
Estelle, at 104-05; Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610,
619 (7th Cir. 2010); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir.
2007).
However, an inmate who complains that delay in medical
treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying
medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of
delay in medical treatment to succeed.
See Gomez v. Snyder, Case No.
03 C 2084, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75775, *32 (C.D. Ill., Sept. 30,
2008) (McCuskey, J.), citing Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 124041 (7th Cir. 1996).
Additionally, delay is not a factor that is
either always, or never, significant.
Instead, the length of delay
that is tolerable depends on the seriousness of the condition and the
ease of providing treatment.
See McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636,
640 (7th Cir. 2010); citing Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 77880 (7th Cir. 2008). In light of these governing standards, the Court
finds as a matter of law that none of the five remaining Defendants
was deliberately indifferent to the Plaintiff’s serious medical
needs.
A.
An
objectively
Defendant Sheehy
serious
medical
condition,
for
purposes
of
determining deliberate indifference is “one that has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
- 11 -
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention.”
Chapman, at 845 (7th Cir. 2001); citing Zentmyer v.
Kendall County, 220 F. 3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000); quoting Gutierrez
v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, the
Plaintiff has satisfied the objective component of the test for
deliberate indifference.
However, the Plaintiff cannot satisfy the test for subjective
component of deliberate indifference.
On August 13, 2009, the
Plaintiff injured his ankle at Stateville.
evidence
shows
that
Defendant
Sheehy,
the
The uncontroverted
Correctional
Medical
Technician, treated the Plaintiff on the same day he injured his
ankle, evaluating the injury and diagnosing it as a sprained ankle.
He then implemented a treatment plan approved by a doctor, Dr. Zhang,
that included ice, keeping the ankle elevated, Motrin for pain, a
crutch to assist the Plaintiff with mobility and to keep weight off
of the injured ankle.
Defendant Sheehy also scheduled the Plaintiff
for an x-ray, per Dr. Zhang’s treatment plan.
The Plaintiff asserts, but provides no evidence, that Defendant
Sheehy told him to put pressure on the injured ankle.
It is the
Plaintiff’s contention that this mistake in treatment resulted in
making the injury worse and in his suffering additional pain.
Plaintiff’s response.)
mere
disagreement
with
deliberate indifference.
(See
However, neither medical malpractice nor a
a
doctor’s
medical
judgment
amounts
to
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th
- 12 -
Cir. 2010); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
Additionally, a party cannot defeat summary judgment by relying
on unsubstantiated facts or by merely resting on its pleadings.
See
Hemsworth, II v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.
2007); Greer v. Board of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 267 F.3d 723,
729 (7th Cir. 2001).
Instead, the party that bears the burden of
proof on an issue must affirmatively demonstrate with admissible
evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists that requires
a trial.
See Hemsworth, 476 F.3d at 490.
Further, statements in a
motion or brief are not evidence and are not entitled to any
evidentiary weight.
See, e.g., Topi v. Mukasey, 264 Fed.Appx. 504,
506 (7th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Hosey, No. 09 C 7777, 2012 WL 957488,
*7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 2012) (Norgle, J.) (citations omitted). While
the Plaintiff pled that Sheehy acted with deliberate indifference, he
provides no evidence to support such a claim. Accordingly, the Court
grants the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Sheehy.
B.
Defendant Downs
With respect to Defendant Downs, the record establishes that he
was present when Defendant Sheehy examined the Plaintiff on August
13, 2009.
Defendant Downs spoke to Sheehy during or after treatment
and was aware of the treatment plan put in place by Defendant Sheehy,
including the fact that the Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication.
- 13 -
The next day, the Plaintiff notified Defendant Downs that his
ankle was swollen and that he was in severe pain.
Allegedly,
Defendant Downs refused to call a med-tech or to send the Plaintiff
to the health care unit because he had already received care.
When
the Plaintiff talked to Lieutenant Bishop, Defendant Downs intervened
and told her the Plaintiff did not need any medication because he had
already been treated and did not require additional care.
According
to
the
record,
the
Plaintiff
including pain medication on August 13, 2009.
had
received
care
The Plaintiff had an
x-ray of his ankle on August 19, 2009, and saw Physician’s Assistant
Williams on August 20, 2009.
The Plaintiff has provided no evidence
that any delay that might have been caused by Defendant Downs in
preventing him from seeing medical personnel on August 14, 2009,
resulted in any detrimental effect, as required for liability to
attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Gomez v. Snyder, Case No. 03 C
2084, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75775, *32 (C.D. Ill., September 30,
2008) (McCuskey, J.); citing Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 124041 (7th Cir. 1996).
Additionally, the evidence reflects that Defendant Downs was
aware of the care the Plaintiff received the day prior and it is an
uncontroverted fact that Downs was told by the med-tech on August 14,
2009, that the Plaintiff did not require additional pain medication.
As (1) Defendant Downs was aware of the care provided to the
Plaintiff on August 13, 2009, (2) he relied on the med-tech’s
judgment that the Plaintiff did not require additional care on August
- 14 -
14, 2009, (3) the Plaintiff received additional care on August 19,
2009, and August 20, 2009, and (4) there is no evidence in the record
that any delay in care that may have been caused by Defendant Downs,
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
C.
Defendant Ghosh
The crux of the Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Ghosh is
that he delayed approval of the Plaintiff’s ankle brace.
A delay in
treatment
the
may
constitute
deliberate
indifference
if
delay
exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate’s pain.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 619 (7th
Cir. 2010); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 832 (7th Cir. 2007).
While the record reflects that the Plaintiff was seeing medical
personnel starting the day of the injury, and that treatment was
being prescribed, the record is not clear about when the Plaintiff
received the ankle brace that was prescribed to immobilize the ankle.
In examining prisoner
claims of deliberate indifference, the
Court considers the totality of the inmate’s care.
See Arnett v.
Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir 2011), citing Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374 (7th Cir. 1997).
The totality of care
the Plaintiff received after injuring his ankle indicates that the
Defendants,
including
Defendant
Ghosh,
constitutionally adequate health care.
provided
him
with
The record indicates some
delay in the Plaintiff’s receiving his prescribed ankle brace,
however, it also reflects multiple visits with health care providers
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both at Stateville and a referral to a specialist.
While the delay
might amount to negligence or medical malpractice, neither is enough
to
establish
deliberate
indifference.
See
Norfleet
at
396.
Additionally, the Plaintiff has provided no evidence that any delay
in receipt of the ankle brace had any detrimental effect regarding
the treatment of his injury.
See Gomez, supra.
The record indicates that the Plaintiff was seen multiple times
the week of the injury.
It further reflects that he was sent to an
orthopedic specialist for treatment at UIC on November 6, 2009.
After seeing the specialist, the Plaintiff was seen on December 30,
2009, March 15, 2010, and March 22, 2010, and he was prescribed
physical
therapy
until
2011,
two
years
after
his
injury.
Accordingly, based on the evidence in the record of the abundance of
care the Plaintiff received for a sprained ankle, no reasonable jury
could
determine
constitutionally
that
Defendant
inadequate
Ghosh
medical
provided
care.
him
with
Accordingly,
the
Defendants’ Motion is granted as to Defendant Ghosh.
D.
The
Defendants Halloran and Karraker
Defendants
Plaintiff
Halloran
Source, Inc.
alleges
and
that
he
Karraker,
sent
multiple
executives
at
letters
Wexford
to
Health
The record indicates that at Wexford, when a letter
arrives complaining about quality of medical care, regardless of whom
it is addressed to, it is diverted to Joseph Ebbitt, the Manager of
Risk Management.
The record contains no evidence that Defendants
Halloran and Karraker received or read the Plaintiff’s letters of
- 16 -
complaint.
Finally, the record indicates that medical policy and
procedures are made by the Chief Medical Officer of the facility
involved, in this case Dr. Ghosh at Stateville.
As such, Halloran
and Karraker are entitled to judgment.
Section
1983
creates
a
cause
of action
based
on
personal
liability and predicated upon fault; thus, “to be liable under
§ 1983, an individual defendant must have caused or participated in
a constitutional deprivation.”
Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430
F.3d 805, 809-810 (7th Cir. 2005).
In short, some causal connection
or affirmative link between the action complained about and the
official sued is necessary for §1983 recovery.
Hildebrandt v.
Illinois Dep’t of Natural Resources, et al., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.
1995)).
Plaintiff has established no such causal connection.
There
is no evidence in the record, beyond the Plaintiff’s unsupported
argument, that Defendants Halloran and Karraker are responsible
because he sent them letters of complaint.
Accordingly, Defendants
Halloran and Karraker are granted summary judgment.
E.
Official Capacity Claims
In denying the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on August 19, 2011,
the Court allowed the Plaintiff to pursue an official capacity claim
against Defendants Ghosh, Halloran, and Karraker pursuant to Monell
v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for
an alleged custom and policy of delaying treatment to inmates at
Stateville.
As
Plaintiff
has
failed
- 17 -
to
establish
deliberate
indifference as to the Defendants individually, and his Monell claim
is entirely dependent upon the underlying claim, it is dismissed, as
well.
See Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 493 -494 (7th Cir.
2008), citing King v. East St. Louis School Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812,
817 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is well established that there can be no
municipal liability based on an official policy under Monell if the
policy
did
not
result
in
a
violation
of
[a
plaintiff’s]
constitutional rights”); see also Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d
606, 615 (7th Cir. 2003) (“a municipality cannot be found liable if
there is no finding that the individual officer is liable on the
underlying substantive claim”), citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).
The Plaintiff cannot prevail
on his official capacity claim, as he has no actionable claim against
the Defendants on his underlying individual claims of deliberate
indifference.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment [Dkt. 66 (as amended by 80) and 84] are granted and
this case is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
DATE:6/27/2012
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