Scott et al v. Kaneland CUSD # 302 et al

Filing 69

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 11/7/2011: For the reasons stated below, Defendants motion to dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs' amended complaint requesting declaratory judgment 58 is granted. All dates previously set on 09/28/11 to stand. Signed by the Honorable Samuel Der-Yeghiayan on 11/7/2011. Mailed notice(vcf, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan

CASE NUMBER

10 C 3871

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

11/7/2011

Richard Scott, et al. Vs. Martne McCoy, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
requesting declaratory judgment [58] is granted. All dates previously set on 09/28/11 to stand.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count V. Plaintiff Richard Scott
(Scott) was allegedly employed by Defendants as a teacher and was allegedly diagnosed at some point with
severe Attention Deficit Disorder and depression. Scott contends that Defendants discriminated against him
based on his alleged disability by giving him poor performance evaluations and by failing to accommodate
his alleged disability. Scott also contends that after he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Defendants terminated Scott’s employment in retaliation for the
filing of the charge. Scott includes in his second amended complaint claims alleging that Defendants failed
to accommodate Scott’s alleged disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Count I), failure to accommodate claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (Count II), ADA retaliation claims (Count III),
Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims (Count IV), and a claim for a declaratory judgment under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Count V). Defendants now move to dismiss Count V.
Scott seeks in his second amended complaint a declaration that Defendants’ Temporary Illness or
Temporary Incapacity Policy (Policy) violates Scott’s rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. (SA

10C3871 Richard Scott, et al. Vs. Martne McCoy, et al.

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STATEMENT
Compl. 7-8). Defendants argue that since Scott is seeking a resolution of liability for the alleged violations of
the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the request for declaratory relief is not appropriate. The purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act is to enable an “efficient resolution of disputes by an early adjudication of the
rights of the parties.” Medical Assur. Co., Inc. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh
Circuit has indicated, for example, that a declaratory judgment might be appropriate to allow a party to file
suit before damages begin to accrue or to allow a dispute to be resolved before it ripens into actionable
claims. Id.; see also NUCOR Corp. v. Aceros Y Maquilas de Occidente, S.A. de C.V., 28 F.3d 572, 577 (7th
Cir. 1994)(stating that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act “is to avoid accrual of avoidable
damages to one not certain of his rights and to afford him an early adjudication, without waiting until his
adversary should see fit to begin suit, after damage had accrued”)(internal quotations omitted)(quoting
Cunningham Bros., Inc. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1969)); Sarafin v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
Inc., 446 F. Supp. 611, 615 (N.D. Ill. 1978)(stating that “[c]ourts have declined to entertain actions for a
declaratory judgment where the declaration would result in piecemeal litigation or would try particular issues
without settling the entire controversy”).
Scott provides no basis to allow the declaratory judgment claim to remain other than arguing that the
claim “would be very useful,” and that a “declaratory judgment might facilitate the litigation.” (Ans. 3).
However, Scott has failed to adequately explain why the declaratory judgment claim will promote the
efficient resolution of this action or any other dispute. Scott does not indicate that any additional damages
are currently accruing or will accrue in the future. Nor has Scott shown that the declaratory judgment claim
will enable him and Defendants to resolve a dispute before it ripens into an actionable claim. Nor has Scott
shown that the declaratory judgment claim will in any way clarify the parties’ rights in an efficient manner.
Scott also argues that the issue of whether the Policy violates Scott’s rights under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act involves questions of fact and law. While that is true, such an inquiry regarding facts and
law falls within the resolution of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims presented by Scott in the instant
action. Thus the declaratory judgment claim is not appropriate in this action and Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count V is granted.

10C3871 Richard Scott, et al. Vs. Martne McCoy, et al.

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