Martin v. City of Evanston, IL.

Filing 111

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Sharon Johnson Coleman on 6/7/2013:Mailed notice(rth, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CRAIG J. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,

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v.
CHRISTINA FERRARO, KAREN HAWK,
and CITY OF EVANSTON
Defendants.

10-cv-4004
Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Craig J. Martin (“Martin”) filed a second amended complaint against
defendants the City of Evanston, Christina Ferraro, and Karen Hawk (collectively “the City” or
“defendants”) alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”), and
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“§ 2000e”). The City moves for summary judgment on all Martin’s
claims. For the following reasons, the City’s motion is granted in its entirety.
Background
The undisputed facts of this case are relatively simple and largely undisputed. 1 In June
2005, Martin, a 59 year old African-American male, was hired by the City of Evanston Levy
Senior Center as a temporary, part-time Building Supervisor. In May 2008 Martin became a
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This Court notes that Martin’s Rule 56.1 Statement, whether viewed as a response or statement of additional facts,
does not properly comply with Local Rule 56.1 and does not properly contain citations to affidavits, the record, or
supporting material as required by Local Rules 56.1(b)(3)(A) and 56.1(b)(3)(B). Martin sent opposing counsel for
defendants a copy of his Rule 56.1 Statement, but never filed his response electronically with this Court. Despite
this Court’s attempts to accommodate Martin and this Court granting Martin an extension to submit any additional
documents he found necessary to his response, as of the date of this opinion Martin has yet to file or hand deliver
any Response Brief, affidavits, or Rule 56.1 Statement to the Court directly. See Tr. Excerpt of December 20, 2012
Proceedings, Dkt. 109. This Court received a copy of Martin’s Response and Rule 56.1 Statement from counsel for
the defendants, as an attachment to the defendants’ Reply Brief.
While courts are generally solicitous of pro se plaintiffs confronting the procedural requirements of responding to
summary judgment motions, Martin’s pro se status does not absolve him from meaningfully complying with Local
Rule 56.1. Laramore v. City of Chicago, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18240, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2004). This
Court is also cognizant of Martin’s failure to cooperate with three counsel appointed to represent him. In light of the
extensive opportunities afforded Martin to file additional documents, this Court exercises its discretion to require
compliance with the local rules governing summary judgment. Accordingly, the City’s Local Rule 56.1(a)(3)
statements are deemed admitted to the extent that they are properly supported by affidavits, record evidence, or other
supporting material and Martin fails to properly contest them by citing to supporting materials. See Local Rule
56.1(b)(3)(B).

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permanent, part-time Facility Supervisor. Martin complained to Christina Ferraro, the Director
of Levy Center about his work schedule set by Karen Hawk, the Program Director of Levy
Center. Martin was scheduled to have a meeting with Christina Ferraro on June 13, 2008 to
discuss his complaints. However, on June 11, 2008, Martin sent Christina Ferraro a resignation
letter with the subject line “Resignation – Faculty Supervisor, Evanston Levy Senior Center.”
(Def.’s Rule 56.1 Stmt. of Facts, Ex. 13). In the letter, Martin set forth his job complaints while
making it clear that he intended to resign from his position “effective immediately.” Per his
request, the City of Evanston accepted Martin’s resignation upon receipt of his letter on June 11,
2008.
Martin subsequently filed this instant action alleging that he was discriminated against
and terminated in retaliation for complaints made during his employment. Martin alleges that
the City’s stated reasons for his termination are “false” and “untrue.” The City of Evanston
argues that summary judgment should be granted in its favor because Martin voluntarily resigned
and fails to present any issue of material fact.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The
burden is upon the moving party to demonstrate that no genuine issue respecting any material
fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, all ambiguities must be resolved and all inferences drawn in
favor of the nonmoving party. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423, F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005).
However, “summary judgment is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit.” Siegel v. Shell Oil
Co., 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010). Once a party has made a properly-supported motion for
summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the pleadings but must
instead submit evidentiary materials that set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Id.
Discussion
The City moves for summary judgment on Counts I and II of Martin’s Second Amended
Complaint arguing that Martin fails to present any direct or indirect evidence of retaliation. In

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Counts I and II, Martin alleges that he was discriminated and retaliated against because of his
race and for complaining to his supervisors in violation of § 2000e.
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee because the employee has “opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff may establish
retaliation under either the direct or indirect method of proof. Northington v. H&M Int’l, 712
F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 2013). Under the direct method of proof, a plaintiff must present evidence,
direct or circumstantial, demonstrating that: “(1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity;
(2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the two.”
Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012). To prove a retaliation claim
under the indirect method, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that
“(1) after lodging a complaint about discrimination, (2) only he, and not any otherwise similarly
situated employee who did not complain, was (3) subjected to an adverse employment action
even though (4) he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner.” Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ.,
424 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2005).
Here, Martin fails to establish retaliation under either a direct or indirect method of proof.
Under the direct method of proof, Martin fails to establish a causal connection between his
alleged protected action of complaining to supervisors and his termination. A causal link
between protected conduct and the retaliatory act may be established by showing that the
protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer’s decision. Antonetti v.
Abbott Labs, No. 07 C 0768, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14141, at *26-27 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 2008).
Martin fails to make such a showing and offers no evidence demonstrating that his complaints to
a supervisor were a substantial or motivating factor in the City’s decision to terminate him. Even
if this Court were to ignore Martin’s failure to comply with the local rules, Martin still fails to
offer any evidence that he was terminated because of his race. In fact, notwithstanding Martin’s
arguments, his June 11, 2008 letter requesting that his resignation be effective immediately is the
only evidence proffered concerning the City’s reasons for terminating his employment.
Additionally, Martin fails to establish a prima facie case under the indirect method of
proof. Martin proffers no evidence that he was subjected to any adverse action that other
similarly situated employees were not subject to. Once again, were this Court to ignore Martin’s
failure to comply with the local rules, Martin still fails to make the necessary showings under the
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indirect method. Martin simply alleges that the City provided false and untrue explanations for
its decision to terminate his employment without any supporting facts. Accordingly, the City’s
motion for summary judgment as to Counts I and II of Martin’s Second Amended Complaint is
granted.
Martin’s allegations of racial discrimination in violation of § 1981 (Counts III and IV)
similarly fail. Martin makes the same factual allegations as listed in Counts I and II; namely,
that the City terminated him for making complaints about his schedule and that the defendants’
stated reasons for terminating his employment were “false and untrue.” § 1981 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race in the making, enforcing, and terminating of contracts,
including employment contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Similar to Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision, a claim of discrimination under § 1981 may be pursued via the direct or indirect
method of proof. The direct method requires Martin to produce evidence that the City was
motivated by animus based upon his race when it discriminated against him in the making and
enforcing of a contract. De v. City of Chicago, No. 11 C 4521, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178693,
2012 WL 6605009, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2012). Alternatively, Martin can proceed under the
indirect method, which requires him to demonstrate that “(1) he is a member of a racial minority;
(2) [the City] had the intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination
concerned the making or enforcing of a contract.” Pourghoraishi v. Flying J, Inc., 449 F.3d 751,
756 (7th Cir. 2006).
Martin fails to provide any evidence necessary to sustain his § 1981 allegations. Martin
cites to no evidence demonstrating a discriminatory intent of the City or that discrimination
played a role in his termination. Additionally, outside of his conclusory statements, Martin
provides no evidence that the City was motivated by animus based on his race at the time he was
allegedly discriminated against. Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary judgment as to
Counts III and IV of Martin’s Second Amended Complaint is granted.
Martin’s allegations of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and § 1983 (Counts
V and VI) also fail. Employment related race discrimination claims under Title VII, § 1981, and
§ 1983 are analyzed under the same framework. Egonmwan v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 602
F.3d 845, 850 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The same requirements for proving discrimination apply to
claims under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983”). Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary

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judgment as to Counts V and VI of Martin’s Second Amended Complaint alleging violations of
Title VII and § 1983 is granted.

Conclusion
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Martin’s
Second Amended Complaint is therefore dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 7, 2013
____________________________
Sharon Johnson Coleman
United States District Judge

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