ADT Security Services, Inc. et al v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Protection District, The et al

Filing 464

MEMORANDUM ORDER Signed by the Honorable Milton I. Shadur on 2/12/2013. Mailed notice by judge's staff. (srb,)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ADT SECURITY SERVICES, INC.,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LISLE-WOODRIDGE FIRE
PROTECTION DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.

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No.

10 C 4382

MEMORANDUM ORDER
This Court has permitted two motions filed last spring
against codefendant Lisle-Woodridge Fire Protection District
(“District”) to lie dormant for several reasons, importantly
including the changing dynamics caused by developments before
both the Court of Appeals and this Court and by District’s
enactment of a new ordinance.

This memorandum order will now

briefly address those motions--one advanced by ADT Security
Services, Inc. (“ADT”) that it labels as seeking “partial summary
judgment regarding the Commerce Clause claim” and the other
advanced by all plaintiffs (who are collectively referred to for
convenience as “Alarm Companies”) that is labeled as seeking
“summary judgment on the remaining issues in this case.”
Before that is done, however, a few words are in order about
the nature of those motions, both of which are self-defined as
seeking “partial summary judgment” or “summary judgment” under
Fed. R. Civ. P. (“Rule”) 56.

But in fact neither motion really

seeks a judgment, as contrasted with seeking to establish the
movants’ entitlement to relief on one or more theories of
recovery--a distinction that this Court has addressed less than a
week ago in an opinion in this very case (Dkt. 458, issued on
February 7).1
Although this Court sometimes feels like a lone voice crying
in the wilderness because of the tendency on the part of a good
deal of the judiciary, as well as the bar, to view such “summary
judgment” attempts in a manner not intended when Rule 56 was
adopted, it continues to distinguish between issue-narrowing
motions en route to reaching judgment (properly advanced under
Rule 16) and true Rule 56 judgment motions addressed to entire
lawsuits or discrete claims.

And if others view that as a

principle not worth pursuing, so be it.
That said, ADT’S Commerce-Clause motion (expounded in its
supporting memorandum, Dkt. 302) would appear to require little
discussion.

District’s opposition memorandum (Dkt. 361) states

accurately that its ordinance challenged by the motion was
revoked and replaced by Ordinance 12-08 on July 6, 2012, and that
the contemporaneous July 6 adoption of Ordinance 12-07 revoked

1

Even if a favorable ruling on either motion were to have
the label of “judgment” attached to it, it could not qualify for
finality (and hence enforceability or appealability) under Rule
54(b), because the same factual matrix would implicate one or
more of the Complaint’s other counts (that is, theories of
recovery)--a subject on which our Court of Appeals’ teaching is
clear.
2

the “Four County Area” provision of the earlier ordinance that
was targeted by ADT’s motion.
Under those circumstance District contends that ADT’s motion
seeking a declaration and injunctive relief based on the
superseded ordinance should be denied as moot, and this Court
finds that persuasive and so rules.

If ADT believes that it

still has a like basis for complaint under the new ordinance
structure, it may if it wishes advance a new motion that can
adopt by incorporation as much of its earlier submission as seems
appropriate,2 and this Court can then order District to parry
that new attack in the same manner.
Now to the other motion, also supported by a memorandum of
law (Dkt. 305), to which District has filed an opposition
memorandum of its own (Dkt. 367).

Although the Alarm Companies

characterize their motion as seeking summary judgment simpliciter
against District, its true nature is revealed by the Conclusion
in their supporting memorandum, which shifts to speaking of
“Partial Summary Judgment” and asks for a “Judgment in their
favor and against the Lisle-Woodridge Fire Protection District as
to Counts I, III, V, VII and VIII of plaintiffs’ complaint.”
As the analysis in this Court’s earlier opinion in Dkt. 458
explains, those counts do not advance discrete claims in the

2

This Court would see no need for ADT to reinvent the
wheel by filing a new self-contained motion under those
circumstances.
3

federal sense.

It is unclear precisely what relief is being

sought--it would seem that District’s mootness contention would
have force as to injunctive relief, while some other aspects of
the motion might lead to rulings on issues as a matter of law
(just as some motions in limine do), while still others could
point the way to appropriate jury instructions if, as and when
the case goes to trial.
Under the circumstances that second motion will be denied
without prejudice, particularly because the change in District’s
ordinances would seem likely to call for a recasting of any such
motion.

As with the first motion dealt with in this memorandum

order, if Alarm Companies choose to refile, they are encouraged
to treat any still-applicable holdovers from the original motion
via incorporation by reference, rather than having to go through
the task of a total rewrite.

___________________________________
Milton I. Shadur
Senior United States District Judge
Date:

February 12, 2013

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