Sigle v. Stegmiller et al
Filing
121
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John J. Tharp, Jr on 4/25/2013:Mailed notice(air, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SEMIAL SIGLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, ROBERT
STEGMILLER, KERRY POZULP, S.
BRANDON, J. L. LOPEZ, and Other
UNIDENTIFIED Chicago Police Officers,
Defendants.
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No. 10 C 04618
Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Semial Sigle filed this civil rights action against Chicago Police Officers Robert
Stegmiller, Kerry Pozulp, and Sean Brandon; Sergeant Jose Lopez; other unidentified police
officers; and the City of Chicago (the “City”). Sigle alleges that the defendants deprived him of
his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by falsely arresting him and subjecting
him to the use of excessive force in the course of that arrest. The plaintiff also asserts a policyor-practice claim against the City under Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), alleging that the defendant police officers violated his constitutional rights pursuant to an
unwritten City practice or custom, in which the City failed to adequately investigate and sustain
allegations of the use of excessive force by its police officers.
Now before the Court are the City’s motions for summary judgment and to strike the
plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(c) Statement of Additional Facts. For the reasons set forth
below, the City’s motions are granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This lawsuit stems from Sigle’s arrest on July 25, 2009. The plaintiff claims that he was
walking down the street when an unmarked squad car stopped near him and three plain-clothed
officers emerged, instructing him to “come here.” Pl. 56.1 Resp., Dkt. 96 at ¶ 1. The plaintiff ran
from the officers but eventually stopped and surrendered. Id. At that point, Sigle claims that he
went to his knees and put his hands behind his head. Id. Despite the fact that the plaintiff
surrendered, however, the defendant officers allegedly kicked, stomped, and punched him in the
face and body. Id. The City does not dispute that force was used during the plaintiff’s arrest, but
contends that the use of force was reasonable. Def. Mot., Dkt. 80 at 3.
The plaintiff was arrested and charged with unlawful use of a weapon by a felon,
possession of a controlled substance, and resisting arrest. Id. The plaintiff alleges that the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest him and that the officers used excessive force during the
course of his arrest. Further, Sigle avers that he did not resist arrest, as the defendants claim, and
that the defendant officers planted a gun on him.
Subsequent to the arrest, Sigle filed a complaint with the City’s Independent Police
Review Authority (“IPRA”) against Officer Stegmiller and other officers, who, at the time, were
unknown. Pl. 56.1 Resp., Dkt. 96 at ¶ 2. That complaint, however, was not sustained by the
IPRA. Id. Sigle then filed this action against the defendant officers and City.
During the course of discovery, the City served the plaintiff with contention
interrogatories, seeking identification of the specific evidence that Sigle intended to use to
support his Monell claim. See Def. Mot. to Strike, Dkt. 102 at 2; Def. 56.1 Statement of Facts,
Dkt. 79, Ex. C. The plaintiff responded to those interrogatories by objecting that they were
premature, but also stating that he had no evidence at the time and that his investigation was
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ongoing. See id. Despite requests to amend by the City, it is undisputed that the plaintiff never
amended or supplemented his interrogatory answers before the close of discovery or before the
City filed its motion for summary judgment on August 20, 2012. The City now moves for
summary judgment only on the Monell claim against it, arguing that the plaintiff has failed to
present evidence of the City’s purported policies or customs that caused the plaintiff’s alleged
constitutional violations. Def. Mot. at 3.
II. ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678
F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In addressing the City’s motion, the
Court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. If the
moving party demonstrates the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, then “the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute.”
Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). Moreover, Rule 56 “mandates the entry of
summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case.” Scott v. Trump Ind., Inc., 337 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
To establish Monell liability, the plaintiff must show “the existence of an ‘official policy’
or other governmental custom that not only causes but is the ‘moving force’ behind the
deprivation of constitutional rights.” Teesdale v. City of Chi., 690 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing Estate of Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007)). The plaintiff can
satisfy his burden of proof by “show[ing] that his constitutional injury was caused ‘by (1) the
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enforcement of an express policy of the [City], (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent
and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law, or (3) a person with
final policymaking authority.” Wragg v. Vill. of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467-68 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citing Latuszkin v. City of Chi., 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing McCormick v. City of
Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000))). Here, Sigle bases his Monell claim on the second
theory, alleging that the City had an unwritten policy of failing to adequately investigate and
sustain allegations of the use of excessive force by its police officers, thereby encouraging and
facilitating the alleged use of excessive force by the defendant officers in this case.
The failure-to-discipline or -supervise theory can support “a finding of municipal liability
because a policy of condoning abuse may embolden a municipal employee and facilitate further
abusive acts.” Quade v. Kaplan, No. 06 C 01505, 2008 WL 905187, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
2008) (quoting Sassak v. City of Park Ridge, 431 F. Supp. 2d 810, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2006)).
However, to establish liability based on the City’s failure to investigate, supervise, and discipline
its officers, as alleged here, the plaintiff must show “deliberate indifference” on the part of the
City. See Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)); see also Kindle v. City of Harvey, No.
00 C 06886, 2002 WL 230779, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2002) (“A plaintiff relying on a failure to
investigate theory must still meet the deliberate indifference standard adopted by the Supreme
Court in [Harris].”). This is “a high threshold,” and “[e]ven where significant evidence has been
presented indicating flawed investigatory procedures courts still reject the failure to investigate
theory where plaintiffs cannot demonstrate ‘tacit authorization by city policymakers.’” Kindle,
2002 WL 230779, at *4 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 397); see also Connick v. Thompson, -- U.S. -, --, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault,
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requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his
action.” (internal citation omitted)). As the court explained in Quade:
A custom of failing to discipline police officers can be shown to be deliberately
indifferent if the need for further discipline is so obvious and disciplinary
procedures so inadequate as to be likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights such that a jury could attribute to the policymakers a deliberate indifference
to the need to discipline the police force.
2008 WL 905187, at *16 (quoting Czajkowski v. City of Chi., 810 F. Supp. 1428, 1439 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (citing Tapia v. City of Greenwood, 965 F.2d 336, 338 (7th Cir. 1992))). Further, the
plaintiff may prove deliberate indifference by showing that the City “fail[ed] to act in response to
repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its officers.” Sornberger, 434 F.3d at 1029–
30 (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 & n.10; Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d 732, 735 (7th
Cir. 1997) (indicating that failure to act after learning of pattern of violations would be
deliberately indifferent)); see also Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e
may find deliberate indifference when a repeated pattern of constitutional violations makes ‘the
need for further training…plainly obvious to the city policymakers.’” (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at
389 n.10)); see also Richardson v. City of Chi., No. 08 C 04824, 2011 WL 862249, at *12 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 10, 2011) (“Continuing adherence to an approach…that policymakers ‘know or should
know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard
for the consequences of their actions…necessary to trigger municipal liability.” (citing Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Oakland v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997))).
The City argues that Sigle cannot prevail on his Monell claim because he has failed to
offer sufficient evidence to show that the City had a custom or practice that caused his alleged
constitutional violation. Def. Mot., Dkt. 80 at 9. According to the City, the plaintiff’s only
relevant and admissible evidence consists of his allegations against the named defendant police
officers with respect to this case—a single incident that, by its definition, falls short of a
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“custom” or “practice.” Id. 9-10. Furthermore, according to the City, since there is no record
evidence that the City failed to investigate or discipline its police officers regarding the use of
excessive force, id. at 10, Sigle cannot satisfy the “causation” element of his Monell claim even
had he established such a custom or practice. Id. at 11.
When the City moved for summary judgment, there was no record evidence of a City
custom, policy, or practice, aside from the plaintiff’s allegations against the defendant police
officers. While it is true that “evidence of a single violation of federal rights can trigger
municipal liability if the violation was a ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the municipality’s
failure to act,” Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929 (7th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409), that exception is cabined to a “narrow range of
circumstances.” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361. A “hypothetical example” of an incident falling
within that narrow range of circumstances would be “a city that arms its police force with
firearms and deploys the armed officers into the public to capture fleeing felons without training
the officers in the constitutional limitation on the use of deadly force.” Id. (citing Harris, 489
U.S. at 390 n.10). But the plaintiff has neither argued, nor offered proof, that his single-incident
claim falls within that “narrow range.”
As is more often the case, a single incident is insufficient to establish a “widespread
custom or practice.” Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). As
the Seventh Circuit has explained, while there is no “bright-line rule[] defining a ‘widespread
custom or practice’…[and] there is no clear consensus as to how frequently such conduct must
occur to impose Monell liability…‘it must be more than one instance’…or even three.” Id.
(internal citations omitted). When a plaintiff is attempting to prove an unconstitutional policy
“by showing a series of bad acts and inviting the court to infer from them that the policymaking
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level of government was bound to have noticed what was going on and by failing to do anything
must have encouraged or at least condoned” the misconduct, “proof of a single act of misconduct
will not suffice; for it is the series that lays the premise of the system of inference.” Davis v.
Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 695 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Jackson v. Marion Cnty., 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th
Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, based on the record as it stood when the City filed its motion, the City
would be entitled to summary judgment on the Monell claim. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cook Cnty.,
No. 11 C 03203, 2011 WL 6009614, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2011) (“[The plaintiff’s] Monell
claim…fails because it only alleges a single instance of wrongdoing, but does not fall within the
‘narrow range of circumstances’ where the Supreme Court has allowed a ‘single-incident’ theory
of Monell liability might be sufficient.”).
That said, Sigle has attempted to produce several documents that purportedly establish
the City’s widespread custom of failing to investigate and discipline its officers in his response to
summary judgment. Pl. Resp., Dkt. 94. The plaintiff argues that his evidence shows a pattern of
similar violations by the named defendant officers, as well as the fact that the City was aware of
this pattern, not only for the defendant officers, but the CPD as a whole. Id. at 6. First, Sigle
offers the complaint register histories of Defendants Stegmiller, Lopez, Brandon, and Pozulp.
See Pl. 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt. 96 at ¶¶ 3-33, 43-53, 55-64, 66-68. The histories
span complaints registered from 1999 to 2010. See id. In general, the complaint registers consist
of allegations against each of the defendants for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure,
and the use of excessive force. See id. With a few exceptions, however, the charges against the
defendant officers in these complaints were either “not sustained,” determined to be
“unfounded,” or the officers were “exonerated,” despite the evidence and witnesses to the
alleged constitutional violations. See id. The plaintiff also points to several lawsuits filed against
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the officers. See id. at ¶¶ 34-42, 54, 65, 68. Again, in each of the lawsuits, plaintiffs alleged that
they had been falsely arrested or subjected to the use of excessive force by the defendant
officers. See id. In general, these lawsuits either settled or are currently pending. See id.
The plaintiff also offers several public records to support his claim. For example, Sigle
relies on annual reports pulled from the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) website that show
that for the years between 2003 and 2007, less than one percent of civil rights violation
complaints were sustained. See id. at ¶ 18. Sigle also produces an internal affairs memo listing
the department-wide complaint history of officers with thirty or more complaints filed against
them between 2000 and 2005. Id. at ¶ 70; see id., Ex. T. In addition, the plaintiff offers a series
of transcripts and documents generated by the City’s Committee on Police and Fire, including:
(1) transcripts from the Committee’s January 20, 2000 hearings; (2) the January 20, 2000
Resolution of William Beavers, then-Chairman of the Committee; and (3) transcripts from the
Committee’s June 11, 2007 hearings. Pl. 56.1 Resp., Dkt. 98, Exs. U–W. Each of these
documents deals with the City’s attempt to address police misconduct and lack of effective
investigatory procedures. Lastly, Sigle relies on an October 2012 report by the Chicago Justice
Project (“CJP”). Pl. 56.1 Resp., Dkt. 98-11, Ex. Y. According to the report, the IPRA and its
predecessor office, the Chicago Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”), had nearly identical
rates of sustaining civilian complaints, with the IPRA’s rate being only 0.28% higher than
OPS’s. Pl. 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts, Dkt. 96 at ¶ 75. The plaintiff contends that all of
this evidence, in addition to the allegations against the named defendant officers, raises a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the City had an unwritten policy of failing to investigate
and discipline its police officers for using excessive force.
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The City contends that, because Sigle failed to disclose this evidence during discovery
and in response to the City’s contention interrogatories, his evidence should be stricken pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1).1 Def. Mot. to Strike, Dkt. 102 at 1-2. Under Rule
26(e), a party must timely supplement or correct its interrogatory response if that party learns
that the response is incomplete or incorrect and “the additional or corrective information has not
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). If a party fails to do so, Rule 37(c)(1) prohibits the party from relying on
that information to supply evidence on a motion, unless the failure to supplement or amend the
interrogatory was substantially justified or harmless. See Dynegy Mktg. and Trade v. Multiut
Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)). “Whether a failure to
comply with [Rule 26(e)]…is substantially justified, harmless, or warrants sanctions is left to the
broad discretion of the district court.” Id. (citing David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857
(7th Cir. 2003)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)(A)-(C) (listing sanctions courts may impose).
The City states that it served Sigle with contention interrogatories seeking the
identification of evidence on which the plaintiff would rely in making his Monell claim. See Def.
56.1 Statement of Facts, Dkt. 79, Ex. C. On March 28, 2011, the plaintiff objected to the
defendant’s interrogatories as untimely, but indicated in response to each interrogatory that he
had “[no evidence] at this time, investigation continues.” Id. On May 11, 2011, the City sent the
plaintiff a letter requesting specific responses to the City’s interrogatories. Id., Ex. E. After
failing to receive a response, the City followed up on that request in a letter dated May 27, 2011.
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The City did not file a response to the plaintiff’s 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts.
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Id. Discovery then closed on December 31, 2011.2 In a final letter sent to the plaintiff, dated June
20, 2012, the City indicated that it had not received amendments to its interrogatories and
proposed that plaintiff withdraw his Monell claim against the City in view of his failure to
identify the evidence that supported his claim. Id.
Having heard (so far as the record reflects) no response from the plaintiff, the City filed
the instant motion for summary judgment and Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts, pursuant to a
briefing schedule set by this Court. Def. Mot., Dkt. 78. In response to the City’s Rule 56.1
Statement, the plaintiff admitted that “[n]o amendments or additional responses to the City’s
discovery were tendered prior to August 20, 2012 [the date the motion for summary judgment
was filed and well after the close of discovery], despite specific requests that Plaintiff do so or
withdraw his Section 1983 claim against the City.” Def. 56.1 Statement of Facts, Dkt. 79 at ¶ 12;
Pl. 56.1 Resp., Dkt. 95 at ¶ 12. The City argues that Sigle’s failure to amend or supplement his
interrogatory responses prevented the City from deposing additional witnesses or conducting
follow-up discovery related to its defense. Therefore, according to the City, Sigle’s failure to
disclose his evidence was neither substantially justified nor harmless under Rule 37(c)(1), and, as
a consequence, the plaintiff’s evidence should be stricken.
The plaintiff’s initial interrogatory responses were clearly incomplete. See Def. Mot.,
Dkt. 102, Ex. 2; Villareal v. El Chile, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 207, 212 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“An answer to
an interrogatory that is incomplete or evasive when made is not an answer; it is a failure to
answer.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4))). According to his discovery responses, Sigle had no
2
Discovery was extended for limited purposes twice, first to February 12, 2012, see Order, Dkt.
41, and then to February 13, 2012. See Order, Dkt. 50; see also Reassignment Status Report,
Dkt. 70, Ex. 1 at 2-3.
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evidence to support his § 1983 claim against the City—an answer clearly at odds with his
response to the summary judgment motion.
Sigle contends, however, that his “late amendments” to the interrogatory responses are
justified and harmless because all of the documents upon which he relies are either public or
were produced by the City during discovery. Moreover, Sigle states that the City “resisted
producing” the complaint registers—implying, perhaps, that the City partly caused the delay at
issue. Pl. Resp., Dkt 114 at 3. But the fact that the documents were either public or produced by
the City neither justifies the plaintiff’s failure to disclose what use he intended to make of that
evidence in his interrogatory responses nor renders that deficiency harmless to the City’s ability
to conduct its own discovery and properly defend against the Monell claim.
The record indicates that any delay in obtaining the complaint registers was due to the
plaintiff’s inaction. Specifically, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel discovery of the complaint
registers on February 8, 2012. Pl. Mot. to Compel, Dkt. 43. According to the parties’ joint status
report, the defendants made those complaint registers available to the plaintiff to copy, at the
very latest, by June 22, 2012, the date the report was filed.3 See Reassignment Status Report,
Dkt.70, Ex. 1 at 2. However, the plaintiff did not copy those files until September 13, 2012, well
after not only the close of discovery, but when the files were made available to the plaintiff and
the City had filed its motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. 98, Ex. 10.
Further, aside from the complaint-register evidence, if substantially all of the plaintiff’s
other evidence is publicly available, as the plaintiff asserts, there is no good reason why the
plaintiff could not have amended his interrogatories to disclose that evidence before the close of
3
The plaintiff’s motion to compel was denied as moot on September 6, 2012. See Order, Dkt. 82.
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discovery.4 See, e.g., Civix-DDI, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, No. 05 C 06869, 2011 WL 181342, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19, 2011) (“Defendants have not demonstrated that their untimely disclosure
was justified. If the system were indeed available to the public since 1994, there is no good
reason why [the plaintiff] could not have unearthed it earlier.”). As such, the plaintiff has not
shown that his failure to timely supplement or amend his responses to the City’s contention
interrogatories during discovery was justified. See, e.g., id. at *5 (delay of almost four months
rendered the defendant’s disclosure untimely (citing Contech Storewater Solutions, Inc. v.
Baysaver Techs., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 616, 624 (D. Md. 2008))).
Nor is the plaintiff’s delay harmless. The plaintiff’s failure to disclose his evidence
during discovery denied the City the opportunity to depose additional witnesses, conduct followup discovery and properly defend against the Monell claim. And the City is not required to guess
which documents the plaintiff intends to use to support his claim, regardless of whether those
documents are public or were produced by the City. See, e.g. Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med.
Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 669 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The defendants aren’t required to guess which of the
many individuals identified during discovery the [plaintiff] intends to use to support its claims—
that is the sort of indirection the disclosure rules are designed to avoid.” (quoting Rice ex rel.
Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 3:06-CV-697 RM, 2009 WL 1748059, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 17,
2009))). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts is properly excluded
from the record pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) and should not be considered by the Court. See, e.g.,
Civix-DDI, LLC, 2011 WL 181342, at *4 (holding that defendants’ untimely disclosure of
4
In his response to the City’s motion to strike, the plaintiff concedes that “the committee
comments, resolutions and minutes from the City counsel [sic] meetings were also public
documents previously attached to prior filings made to defeat similar Motions for Summary
Judgment regarding Monell claims brought by other arrestees,” and that “[s]uch documents were
not discovered until legal research was conducted in Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.” Pl. Resp., Dkt. 114 at 4.
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evidence almost a year after the close of fact discovery was not harmless (citing Heidelberg
Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., No 95 C 00673, 1996 WL 680243, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 21, 1996) (“If a party is allowed to withhold the supplementation of its discovery responses
until after fact discovery is closed…the opposing party is denied the opportunity to conduct
discovery on the supplemented responses…Had [the plaintiff] been aware of [the defendants’]
intention to raise [its] defense, it would have altered the way it conducted discovery.”); THK
Am., Inc. v. MSK, Ltd., 917 F. Supp. 563, 568 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (precluding plaintiff from
presenting evidence of two letters for several reasons, the “[m]ost important” being that the
“documents were not disclosed in answers to…interrogatories”); Abbott Labs. v. Syntron
Bioresearch, Inc., No 98 C 02359, 2001 WL 34082555, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (“The
newly revealed prior art references were not mentioned in discovery and Abbott had no
opportunity to conduct expert discovery on these prior acts.”); Luddington v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co.,
796 F. Supp. 1550, 1579 (S.D. Ind. 1990), aff’d, 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
court had “held that the plaintiff could not raise any claims regarding…four promotions because
he had not informed the defendant that he was alleging discrimination…until after discovery was
closed and over a month after the filing of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.”))).
Even if the Court considered all of the plaintiff’s untimely evidence, summary judgment
would still be proper. Sigle argues that his proffered evidence shows that the City failed to
investigate or discipline the defendant officers despite their history of misconduct. Pl. Resp., Dkt.
94 at 2. For instance, the plaintiff states that Defendant Stegmiller has a long history of
misconduct similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, but that, in each of those complaint registers, the
allegations against the defendant were either determined to be “unsustained” or “unfounded.” Id.
Moreover, in one instance when an allegation was actually “sustained” against Stegmiller, for
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failing to complete a “Daily Assignment Sheet,” the defendant was never disciplined. See id. at
2-3. Stegmiller was also named in seven lawsuits with similar allegations of false arrest and the
use of excessive force. Id. at 3. And like Stegmiller, the plaintiff argues that the City also failed
to investigate and discipline the other named defendants based on the offered complaint registers
and lawsuits. Sigle further argues that the CPD’s own investigation records, former Chairman
Beaver’s official resolution recognizing that police officers “have ample reason to believe that
they will not be held accountable, even in instances of egregious misconduct,” and the fact that
the sustain rates between the IPRA and OPS were nearly identical, all establish the City’s
“systematic failure to hold officers accountable for their misconduct.” Id. at 4.
The plaintiff has not offered enough evidence, however, that would allow a reasonable
jury to conclude that the City had a widespread custom or practice of deliberate indifference to
the use of excessive force by its officers. “Allegations of isolated acts of unconstitutional
conduct committed by non-policymakers generally fail to demonstrate a widespread practice or
custom.” Richardson, 2011 WL 862249 at *13 (citing Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 543-44
(7th Cir. 1990)). Further, evidence of statistics and complaint register allegations alone are
insufficient to support a Monell claim. See id. (citing Strauss v. City of Chi., 760 F.2d 765, 769
(7th Cir. 1985) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Monell claim where the record was devoid of any
evidence other than statistical summaries of complaints filed with the Police Department and
stating that the number of complaints alone “does not indicate that the policies that [the plaintiff]
alleges do in fact exist and did contribute to his injury”)); Bryant v. Whalen, 759 F. Supp. 410,
412 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (granting summary judgment for the City because “the fact that a low
percentage of cases are ultimately sustained cannot in and of itself be read to establish a policy of
indifference.”)). The plaintiff’s evidence raises no issue as to whether the City was negligent in
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investigating and disciplining its police officers, let alone deliberately indifferent to civilian
complaints of excessive force. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Chi., No. 05 C 06545, 2009 WL
1657547, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2009) (“Deliberate indifference requires more than a mere
failure to eliminate a practice. It requires a deliberate choice to follow a course of action.” (citing
Harris, 489 U.S. at 389)).
It is not uncommon for police officers to be the subject of complaints by those whom
they encounter in the course of their duties. Some complaints turn out to be well founded; others
turn out to be fabrications. That these officers were the subjects of a number of complaints says
nothing at all about whether any of those complaints had merit, and the plaintiff offers no
evidence to suggest that they did. To the extent that any inference can be drawn from the fact
that the complaints were not sustained by internal investigations, conducted by either the OPS or
IPRA, it points in the direction of exoneration, not culpability; that many police investigations
fail to substantiate allegations of officer misconduct may mean only that many allegations of
officer misconduct have no merit. There is no basis to draw the contra-inference that the plaintiff
urges, namely that the low number of misconduct allegations sustained by internal police
investigations shows that the fix was in—at least absent evidence to impeach the integrity of the
investigations, which Sigle has failed to provide.
That failure distinguishes this case from the handful of cases Sigle cites in which
summary judgment on similar Monell claims was denied—namely, Marcinczyk v. Plewa, No. 09
C 1997, 2012 WL 1429448 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2012), Obrycka v. City of Chi., No. 07 C 02372,
2012 WL 601810 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2012), Johnson, 2009 WL 1657547, Arias v. Allegretti, No.
05 C 05940, 2008 WL 191185 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2008), Garcia v. City of Chi., No. 01 C 08945,
2003 WL 1715621 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2003), Kindle, 2002 WL 230779, and Robinson v. City of
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Harvey, No. 99 C 3696, 2001 WL 138901 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2001). In those cases, the plaintiffs
offered the testimony of investigators and expert witnesses who could opine on the integrity of
the defendant municipality’s complaint investigation and discipline procedures. See, e.g.,
Obrycka, 2012 WL 601810, at *7 (summary judgment denied where plaintiff offered testimony
of two experts, one opining on the existence of a code of silence and deficient administrative
investigations and disciplinary procedures within the CPD and that the CPD’s sustained rates for
force-related complaints were statistically significantly lower than the national average over the
eight years prior to 2007, and record evidence that officers helped protect the defendant during
their investigation of the plaintiff’s complaint); Garcia, 2003 WL 1715621, at *7 (summary
judgment denied where the plaintiff offered testimony of an Internal Affairs Division
investigator, evidence that different standards were applied to investigations of force-related
complaints by police officers in order to protect police officers, an expert opinion opining that
OPS investigations were not conducted to determine the truth but to protect police officers, and
record evidence that officers involved in investigating the plaintiff’s allegations were protecting
the defendant); Kindle, 2002 WL 230779, at *3-4 (summary judgment denied where plaintiff
offered evidence that the municipality’s police provisions did not address the proper use of nondeadly force, that there were no written guidelines for determining how a civilian complaint was
handled, that patrol sergeants had discretion to screen complaints referred to Internal Affairs, and
the testimony of an IAD investigator); Robinson, 2001 WL 138901, at *7 (summary judgment
denied where plaintiff offered record evidence that complaints of excessive force were often
unreviewed and undocumented and an expert report that concluded that the municipality had
systemic deficiencies in its administrative investigations of use of force and citizen complaints).
16
Here, by contrast, Sigle offers various complaint registers, lawsuits, and public
documents as evidence, but has not proffered any expert testimony opining on the integrity of the
complaint register investigations, nor has he adduced deposition testimony of OPS or IPRA
investigators familiar with the City’s investigation and discipline process. Without more, the
plaintiff cannot show that there was an obvious need for further discipline, or that the
investigatory and disciplinary procedures in place were plainly inadequate. Without such
evidence, a jury could not reasonably conclude that the City had a widespread policy of
indifference based only on the defendant officer’s complaint register histories, civil rights
lawsuits, and statistics regarding the rate of sustained complaints. See, e.g., Quade, 2008 WL
905187 (deliberate indifference exists when the “need for further discipline is so obvious and
disciplinary procedures so inadequate as to be likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights” (citing Czajkowski, 965 F.2d at 1439) (citing Tapia, 965 F.2d at 338)). Accordingly, the
City’s motion for summary judgment on the Monell claim is granted.
As a final matter, the City seeks to dismiss the claims against the unnamed officers from
this case. The plaintiff resists dismissal because he alleges a failure to intervene claim against the
named defendant police officers. According to the plaintiff, there is a possibility that unnamed
officers falsely arrested him and the named officers failed to intervene. Pl. Resp., Dkt. 94 at 14.
Even if true, however, this does not justify keeping the unnamed officers in this case. As the City
points out, the named officers can be held liable for failing to intervene even if the plaintiff
cannot identify the unnamed officers responsible for the arrest. See Sanchez v. City of Chi., 700
F.3d 919, 926 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that a defendant officer may be liable for his failure to
intervene even if the plaintiff cannot identify the officer who violated his constitutional rights). A
failure to intervene claim is a claim against the named defendants, not the unidentified officers.
17
If the plaintiff wanted to assert a claim against those unidentified officers, he should have
amended the complaint to identify them as individuals. Because the plaintiff had ample time to
identify those officers and amend his complaint, his failure to do so warrants dismissal. See
Strauss, 760 F.2d at 765 (dismissing unidentified defendants who were never served); Horton v.
City of Chi., No. 10 C 03968, 2012 WL 379770, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2012) (dismissing
unnamed officers because plaintiff did not discover and name them individually). Accordingly,
any claims against the unidentified officers are dismissed with prejudice.
*
*
*
Sigle failed to produce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the
City has a widespread practice of inadequately investigating and disciplining its police officers.
In addition, despite ample time to identify any unnamed defendant officers, the plaintiff failed to
do so. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment on the Monell claim and dismisses the
unnamed officers with prejudice.
Entered: April 25, 2013
____________________________________
John J. Tharp, Jr.
United States District Judge
18
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