Conner v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

Filing 29

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 8/10/2011: (vkd, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
KAREN J. CONNER,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
) Case No. 10-cv-5312
)
) Magistrate Judge Cox
)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff, Karen J. Conner (“Conner”), seeks judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her application for a period
of disability and for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the
Social Security Act (“Act”).2 Conner has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 24], seeking
a judgment reversing or remanding the Commissioner’s final decision. For the reasons set forth
below, Conner’s motion is granted.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 10, 2008, Conner filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of

September 24, 2007.3 The SSA denied her application initially, and again upon reconsideration.4
Thereafter, Conner filed a timely written request for a hearing, which was granted.5 On September
14, 2009, a hearing was conducted before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Lovert F. Bassett in

1

On January 12, 2011, by the consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1,
this case was assigned to this Court for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment (dkts. 10, 12).
2
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423.
3
R. at 147.
4
R. at 91, 96.
5
R. at 100.

Evanston, Illinois.6 During the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Conner, as well as vocational
expert (“VE”), William Newman, and medical expert (“ME”), Mark Overlander, Ph. D.7
On September 28, 2009, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding that Conner was not
disabled under the Act.8 On September 25, 2009, Conner appealed the ALJ’s determination to the
Appeals Council of the SSA, who denied Conner’s request on June 22, 2010,9 making the ALJ’s
ruling the final decision of the Commissioner.10 Conner filed this action on August 23, 2010.11
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We now summarize the administrative record. We set forth the background evidence of

Conner’s history and medical complaints, followed by the objective medical evidence considered
by the ALJ. We then discuss the hearing testimony, before addressing the ALJ’s written opinion.
A.

Introduction and Medical Evidence
Conner was born on September 26, 1950, making her fifty-nine years old on the date that the

ALJ issued his decision.12 After graduating from high school, she worked at Underwriters
Laboratory (“UL”) for 37 years, where she attained the position of senior engineering assistant.13

Conner was terminated from UL in August 2008, after taking an extended medical leave of absence

6

R. at 19-55.
Id.
8
R. at 76-90.
9
R. at 10-11.
10
R. at 1-3; 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2007).
11
Pl.’s Compl. (dkt. 6).
12
R. at 147.
13
R. at 23, 48, 59, 164, 167.
7

2

due to her emotional breakdowns at work.14 Conner claims she can no longer work due to anxiety,
depression, a stress disorder, high blood pressure, and gastroesophageal reflux disease (“GERD”).15
Conner has been divorced three times and has three grown children.16 At the time of the hearing, she
was living alone in Lakemoor, Illinois.17
We begin our review of Conner’s relevant medical history on October 24, 2007, one month
after the alleged disability onset date. Conner, who was then on medical leave for depression,18
received an initial evaluation from psychiatrist Steven J. Resis, M.D on that date.19 She related
crying frequently and being unable work under her current stress level.20 Conner reported that her
regular physician, Mackie Snebold, M.D., had prescribed her increasing dosages of Fluoxetine, and
that she had experienced two remote nervous breakdowns and one remote hospitalization.21 Dr.
Resis described Conner as “an anxious, tearful, slightly overweight white female” who experienced
some difficulties with memory, concentration, and focusing on a topic, but whose speech was
“generally clear and coherent.”22 Dr. Resis noted that Conner’s judgment and insight appeared fair,
and that her motor exam was normal.23 He diagnosed Conner with “Major Depression, recurrent of
moderate to severe severity” and ruled out “Bipolar Disorder NOS” and “Anxiety Disorder NOS.”24
Dr. Resis increased Conner’s dosage of Prozac from 60 mg to 80 mg and continued her on

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

R. at 48, 163.
Id.
R. at 24-31.
R. at 37.
Id.
R. at 232-233.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 233

3

Lorazepam for her anxiety.25 Dr. Resis also assigned Conner a Global Assessment of Functioning
(“GAF”) score of 5526 and referred her to Nancy Peterson Walz LCSW, ACSW, for counseling.27
On November 27, 2007, Dr. Resis noted that, although Conner was crying somewhat less
on her increased dosage of Prozac, she was still crying fairly often and having ongoing issues with
memory, concentration, and getting things done.28 Conner reported waking and feeling very anxious
and worried about the things she needed to do.29 Dr. Resis anticipated that Conner would return to
work by mid-December 2007.30 On November 21, 2007, Dr. Resis noted Conner’s report of “intense
anxiety” since “working on some important issues” in counseling which troubled her.31
On December 12, 2007, Dr. Resis noted that, while Conner was doing “somewhat better,”
she was “quite terrified” of returning to work “due to sleep disturbance and anxiety and fears.”32
On January 9, 2008, Dr. Resis noted Conner’s report that she could return to work, “but was not
particularly optimistic that she can do well in the current environment,” was tolerating her current
medication, and had found counseling helpful.33 On January 30, 2008, Dr. Resis noted that Conner
was struggling intensely with interpersonal issues at work, feared being “pushed out of [UL] due to
their being very negative towards her,” was doing fairly well on 80mg of Prozac and in counseling.34
Dr. Resis also noted that Conner’s energy was okay outside of work and she was generally sleeping
25

Id.
For reference, the GAF scale is used by mental health professionals to convey a person’s psychological,
social, and occupational functioning on a spectrum in which scores between 41-50 indicate serious, 51-60 indicate
moderate, and 61-70 indicate mild symptoms.
27
Id.
28
R. at 231.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
26

4

alright, other than when worrying excessively about work.35
On February 11, 2008, Dr. Resis noted his report to a Cigna doctor that Conner was doing
fairly well with her activities of daily living, but would not do well if she returned to work under her
current supervisor.36 Dr. Resis futher noted his report that, “if there are no changes in the situation,”
Conner may be able to return to work in the next two months.37 On February 15, 2008, Dr. Resis
noted that Ms. Walz had informed him that Conner did not have a suicidal plan, but was “very
distressed about the possibility of having to return to work.”38 On February 19, 2008, Conner was
seen by Dr. Resis on an emergency basis due her struggling with suicidal ideation.39 After she
reported a remote suicide attempt, Dr. Resis reviewed coping strategies with Conner and continued
her on 80 mg of Paxil, with a trial pack of Lamictal augmentation.40 On February 27, 2008, Dr.
Resis noted that Conner was highly anxious, especially when discussing returning to work under her
previous supervisor.41 She denied any suicidal ideation and showed some slight improvement with
Lamictal.42 Dr. Resis continued Conner on Prozac and Lamictal in the morning.43
On March 12, 2008, Dr. Resis noted that Conner was “intensely dysphoric and tearful
throughout the session,” had significant difficulties with day to day functioning, and reported feeling
more agitated since taking the Lamictal.44 Dr. Resis continued Conner on Prozac and advised her

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Id.
R. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.

5

to discontinue Lamictal and take Seroquel at night.45 On March 19, 2008, Dr. Resis noted Conner’s
report that the Seroquel was helping her sleep without nightmares, and that she was agitated and
distraught at times, but doing better.46 Dr. Resis also noted Conner’s statements that she would be
unable to return to work at UL, and would be seeking an independent psychiatric evaluation for
long-term disability.47 On May 7, 2008, Dr. Resis noted that Conner was struggling with significant
anxiety, and had reported “some periodic nightmares about working at UL.48 On June 4, 2008, Dr.
Resis noted that Conner’s mood had stabilized without any active suicidal ideation, and she was
sleeping well Prozac.49 During the past four visits, Conner was continued on her medication.50
On August 6, 2008, Dr. Resis noted Conner’s report of financial difficulties and concerns
about her job at UT, and that she was crying on daily, with clear impairments.51 Due to financial
concerns, Dr. Resis lowered Conner’s Prozac dosage from 80mg to 40mg, and gave her a one month
supply of 30 mg of Cymbalta.52 On October 1, 2008, Dr. Resis noted Conner’s report of several
incidents of significant difficulties with stress and functioning.53 Dr. Resis also noted that Conner
had stopped seeking counseling for financial reasons.54 Conner agreed to continue on 30mg of
Cymbalta, and switch it from the evening to the morning, and also lower her Prozac to 20mg.55

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 227.
R. at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

6

In notes from October 2007, Dr. Resis listed Conner’s symptoms as frequent crying, anxiety,
mood instability, sleep disturbance, insomnia / impaired memory and concentration.56 He further
noted that examinations revealed fatigue, sad behavior, blunted affect, sad/angry thought content,
and decreased memory and recall problems, and that Conner had decreased her interaction with
friends.57 However, he also noted that Conner’s language comprehension and expression were good
and her activities of daily living were normal.58 Dr. Resis assigned a current GAF score of 55,
noting that Conner’s highest score in the past year had been 80, and her baseline score – denoting
her usual ability to function – was 85.59 Dr. Resis opined that Conner “needs to improve
significantly before returning to work.”60 In notes from November and December 2008, Dr. Resis
described Conner similarly, but assigned her a current GAF score of 60, with her highest and
baseline score for the past year being 75.61 He noted that her activities of daily living were “ok,”
and that she was unable to “work in current work environment,” but exclaimed that performing
Conner’s job duties in an alternative work setting was “possible!”62
Conner saw Ms. Walz on a weekly to bi-monthly rate from November 2007 through April
2008.63 The notations of Ms. Walz show that Conner reported poor sleep, appetite, memory and
concentration, depressed mood and anxiety, and a history of suicide attempts.64 Ms. Walz noted
greatly diminished capacity and assessed a severe major depressive disorder.65 Mental examinations

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

R. at 295 -296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 297.
R. at 298.
R. at 299-300.
R. at 324-41.
Id.
Id,

7

revealed blunted, flat and anxious affect, and little improvement in her depression and instability.66
On April 16, 2008, Ms. Walz completed a mental residual functional capacity assessment
(“RFC”), listing Conner’s diagnosis as “Major Depressive Affective Disorder, Moderate to Severe,
with a GAF of 45-50.”67 Ms. Walz described Conner’s symptoms as depression, feeling hopeless
and overwhelmed, experiencing anxiety, suicidal thoughts, crying, poor sleep, difficulty structuring
and organizing daily activities, inconsistent stability, decreased energy, mood disturbance, difficulty
concentrating, bipolar syndrome, irrational fears, intense and unstable relationships, and manic
syndrome.68 She also noted that Conner had “issues with her current supervisor” and assessed
Conner as unable to meet competitive standards in maintaining regular attendance, complete a
normal workday or workweek without interruptions due to her symptoms, deal with normal work
stress, deal with stress of semiskilled and skilled work, travel in unfamiliar places and use public
transportation.69 Ms. Walz also reported that Conner was seriously limited – but not precluded – in
several other areas, including understanding and remembering simple instructions, performing at
a consistent pace and responding appropriately to work changes.70 She opined that Conner would
miss two to four work days per month because of her symptoms.71
On June 18, 2008, Dr. Snebold, who had seen Conner two to three times yearly since 1989,
completed a psychiatric report.72 Dr. Snebold noted a September 25, 2007 phone call from Connor
complaining of extreme anxiety and being unable to work, tearful, and emotional.73 Dr. Snebold
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
R. at 307-311.
R. at 308.
R. at 309-310.
Id.
R. at 311.
R. at 242-248.
R. at 242.

8

further noted Conner’s daily activities as driving once per week to go shopping, watching one movie
per day, reading with a short attention span, and becoming very tense when going out to the
mailbox.74 Dr. Snebold also noted Conner’s personal problems with coworkers who continued to
send her letters from work.75 Dr. Snebold opined that Conner’s work led to increased symptoms and
diagnosed her with depression and anxiety, noting that she has few coping mechanisms.76
Dr. Snebold also completed an Arthritic Report, which also noted depression and anxiety
with an onset date of 2001 and exacerbation during September 2007.77 Dr. Snebold noted tenderness
in Conner’s right medial knee after extensive walking, and pain in her great right toe secondary to
trauma.78 Dr. Snebold opined that Conner is able to stand, walk, or sit for one hour at a time.79 He
also noted that she must be able to walk around during an eight-hour day, and a job which permits
shifting positions at will from sitting, standing, and walking would be “preferred.”80
On June 23, 2008, State agency non-examining reviewer, Dr. Campa, completed a form
indicating the presence of a “Major Depressive Disorder.”81 Dr. Campa also indicated that Conner
had no restrictions in activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning,
moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and no episodes of
decompensation of extended duration.82 In his RFC assessment, Dr. Campa indicated that Conner
is moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions,

74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id.
R. at 243, 245.
R. at 246-48.
R. at 246.
R. at 247.
R. at 248.
R. at 252.
Id.

9

maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule,
maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances.83 Dr. Campa also noted
moderate limitations in Conner’s ability to: complete a normal workday and workweek without
interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general public; get
along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and
respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.84
On July 17, 2008, Conner underwent a consultative examination with Gurbax Saini, M.D.,
regarding her anxiety and depression.85 Dr. Saini reported that Conner was crying throughout the
entire interview and had related being picked on by her coworkers.86 Conner denied any history of
nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, chest pain, shortness of breath, loss of consciousness, fever or chills.87
Dr. Saini assessed Conner with hypertension, dyspepsia, anxiety and depression.88
On July 31, 2008, Conner received an independent medical evaluation from Thomas Rebori,
M.D.89 After reviewing Conner’s medical history, Dr. Rebori opined that Conner’s affect was
tearful but appropriate, her mood was depressed and her thought process was tangential and
circumferential at times.90 In Dr. Rebori’s accompanying letter dated September 12, 2008, he listed
Conner’s diagnosis as Major Depression, Recurrent, Severe (296.33) and Anxiety Disorder NOS.91

83

R. at 263-64.
R. at 264.
85
R. at 267-68.
86
R. at 267.
87
Id.
88
R. at 267-268.
89
R. at 272-84.
90
R. at 272-77.
91
R. at 284.
84

10

Dr. Rebori stated that Conner has poor concentration and ability to maintain an appropriate affect
or interact appropriately in a work environment.92 He further opined that Conner’s illness had not
responded to treatment despite initial attempts to augment her medication, but that she might benefit
from more aggressive medication trials.93 Dr. Rebori concluded that Conner was disabled “as her
mood disorder interferes with her ability to function in all spheres of her life including personal
social interactions much less in a work environment with even minimal stress or expectations.”94 He
also cautioned that Conner “is at risk for her mood disorder worsening with potentially severe
consequences” and urged her to continue to attempt additional treatment modalities.95
On January 6, 2009, Conner saw Dr. Snebold for a follow-up, where he noted she was
tearful, upset, and suffering from depression.96 Her blood pressure was elevated, recording at
152/106.97 Dr. Snebold’s records also noted some edema.98 In a letter to Conner’s attorney dated
May 18, 2009, Dr. Resis stated that much of Conner’s disability was related to her interpersonal
sensitivity, that her depression appears to be sufficiently treated with medication, and that, without
ongoing counseling, Conner would likely have issues with other supervisors in the future.99 Dr.
Resis also opined that Conner would not likely “meet the full criteria for psychiatric disability.”100
B.

The September 14, 2009 Hearing
Conner’s hearing before the ALJ occurred on September 14, 2009, in Evanston, Illinois.
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
R. at 336.
99
R. at 233.
100
Id.
93

11

Conner appeared in person and was represented by attorney, Kimberley A. Jones. The ALJ heard
testimony from Conner, as well as vocational expert (“VE”), William Newman, and medical expert
(“ME”), Mark Overlander, Ph.D.
Conner testified first. She stated that she went to work for UL after graduating from high
school in 1968.101 During her 37 years there, Conner acquired her job skills and upgraded through
several different positions to become a senior engineering associate. 102 Conner described her duties
at UL as “project handling, working with clients, and setting up [the clients’] project or product.”103
She stated that, after setting up a project, she would submit a lab request, and then review and report
on any results.104
Conner also testified at length about her three failed marriages and a previous relationship.
She explained that her first marriage, which began in 1968 and produced one son, ended because
she “[m]arried too young” and her ex-husband, who was physically abusive,105 had treated her like
a servant.106 Conner stated that her second marriage, which began in 1978 and produced two
daughters, ended in 1989 because she and her former spouse – who was verbally and physically
abusive107 – had “drifted in different directions.”108 Conner then related that she married again in
1992, but her third husband withdrew into himself and began using marijuana after his eleven-yearold son from a previous relationship developed cancer.109 Conner explained that, after her third and

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

R. at 22-23.
R. at 23, 48.
R. at 23.
Id.
R. at 40-42.
R. at 25.
R. at 42-43.
R. at 29.
R. at 33.

12

final marriage ended in 1998,110 she dated a “bipolar” gentleman for several years, whom she
described as verbally and physically abusive.111 Conner stated that, while this gentleman initially
made threatening phone calls to Conner after their relationship ended, she had not heard from him
in many years.112 Conner stated that her unsuccessful romantic relationships have given her a
negative feeling toward men.
With respect to her job, Conner testified that she began crying frequently at work, having
frequent absences, and one day “called [her] boss and told them [she] was having a meltdown and
wouldn’t be in [to work].”113 Conner explained that she initially intended to make up for her
absences, but her supervisor did not allow it.114 According to Conner, another supervisor told her
she “was lucky [she] was still there with the work [she] was doing.”115 These statements made
Conner feel as though her status at the company was shaky.116 When asked whether her crying
spells were caused by her own self-appraisal, Conner responded: “I think a lot of it probably would
be that. I think I’m not living up to my own standards.”117
The ME, a clinical psychologist, then questioned Conner.118 When asked why she was
unable to work, Conner responded:
I don’t like to focus, being worried about not having a job. I was doing a lot of crying at my
desk. And when I sit there in front of the computer and I get like unfocused, I’d start
thinking about the train that I took to and from work. And instead of getting on it, walking
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

R. at 31.
R. at 45-45.
R. at 46.
R. at 38-39.
R. at 39.
Id.
Id.
R. at 40.
R. at 47.

13

in front of it.119
The ME then asked Conner to tell the ALJ how she spends a typical day.120 Conner explained that
she will get up before noon, lay in bed “with thoughts rushing through [her] mind,” let the two dogs
outside, clean the house, do yard work during nice weather, and watch television. Conner added that
she likes to read but has a problem focusing.121 When asked, Conner stated that she likes to read
“[p]retty much everything,” but especially mysteries and ghost stories on her Kindle.122
The ME then asked Conner if she would be able to work in a “very routine central office type
job” away from UL.123 Conner responded that she might be able to if the work was independent, and
she would not have to interface with too many other people.124 When asked, Conner stated that UL
had terminated her in August 2008, and her long term disability ended in March 2009, causing her
to stop seeing Ms. Walz in either 2008 or the summer of 2009.125 After the ME referenced a March
13, 2009 letter from Ms. Walz stating that Conner last saw her on February 15, 2008, Conner’s
counsel stated that Conner’s had also visited Ms. Walz on November 19, 2008.126
The ME then summarized the objective evidence, noting that Conner had two psychiatric
treating sources, Dr. Resis and Ms. Walz, as well as a consultative source, Dr. Rebori, who identified
Listings 12.04 and 12.06, and assigned a GAF score of 45, indicating a “moderately severe level of
functional impairment.”127 The ME noted that the record also contained objective evidence from

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
Id.
R. at 47-48.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 52.
R. at 53.

14

Conner’s primary care provider, Dr. Snebold.128 The ME futher noted that Dr. Snebold’s most recent
report observed that Conner was “not tearful but [] upset over insurance issues, otherwise feels
okay,” denoting mostly non-psychiatric issues.129
The ME observed a “ variance” between Dr. Resis’s reports and those of Ms. Walz.130 The
ME noted that, in the beginning of 2008, Ms. Walz frequently reported “no improvement, continued
depressed mood, minimum improvement, very depressed, some suicidal thoughts,” and by spring
2008, Ms. Walz reported improved sleep, but high anxiety.131 The ME noted that Dr. Resis, by
contrast, assigned a current GAF score of 55 in October 2007, with the highest score in the past year
of 80 and a baseline score of 85, then in December of 2008, assigned a current GAF score of 60,
with the highest score in the past year being 75.132 The ME stated that “this is in sharp contrast”
with what Ms. Walz provides in her summary statement,” namely that Conner’s current GAF score
was 55, with her highest GAF score in the past year being 45 to 50.133 The ME observed that this
“actually doesn’t make sense.”134
Then, based on Ms. Walz’s checklist noting manic syndrome, the ME asked Conner to
describe her manic periods; who replied that there were none.135 The ME then referenced Ms.
Walz’s RFC assessment, in which Ms. Walz included notations indicating that Conner had issues
with her current supervisor and was not properly trained for her job.136 Next, the ME read from Dr.

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id.
R. at 54.
Id.
R. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 55-56.
R. at 56.

15

Resis’s May 15, 2009 letter stating: “I do not feel that [Conner] would likely meet the full criteria
for psychiatric disability on the basis of a diagnosis of a major depression, but I would expect that
without ongoing individual counseling, she would not be successful taking feedback from any
supervisors in various worksettings.”137 The ME noted Dr. Resis’s statement in the letter that
Conner’s current disability was related to her “interpersonal sensitivity generally” and “not
particularly responsive to medication.”138
In his assessment, the ME identified Listings 12.04 (major depressive disorder) and 12.06
(anxiety related disorder).139 In a combined Paragraph B analysis, the ME opined that Conner had
moderate restriction in her activities of daily living and moderate difficulties in maintaining social
functioning, as well as concentration, persistence, or pace.140 The ME found no documented
episodes of decompensation of extended duration.141 The ME opined that Conner “does retain the
cognitive, mental capacity to engage in less than extremely stressful simple work activities which
do not involve extensive interaction with co-workers or male supervisors.”142 The ME also
concluded that no special allowance needs to be made for contact with the public.143
Finally, the ME stated that Conner did not meet the Paragraph C criteria, as she“continues
to live independently,” and the ME did not believe a change in environment would cause Conner
to become displaced or require a highly supportive living environment.144

137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
R. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 57-58.
R. at 58.

16

The VE testified next.145 He classified Conner’s engineering job as that of a project manager
within the Dictionary of Occupational Titled (“DOT”), which is skilled, sedentary work.146 The VE
stated that Conner’s job required a high level of communication with co-workers and supervisors.147
The ALJ then sought the VE’s opinion on a hypothetical individual. In this hypothetical, the
ALJ described a 59-year-old woman with a high school education and “a skilled work history but
nothing transferrable to other skilled occupations, who has no exertional limitations but should not
be placed in a position where there would be high levels of interaction with co-workers and
supervisors, although dealing with the general public would be permissible, and preferable “if the
general public customer base did not have a lot of people of the male gender in it.”148
The VE stated that unskilled jobs exist for this hypothetical individual, which generally do
not involve a high level of interaction with coworkers or supervisors.149 The VE noted, however,
that there was nothing statistically to refer to exclude contact with a male supervisor.150 The VE
stated that the individual could perform, as portrayed in the DOT, the 38,000 Illinois jobs of, dining
room attendant (DOT 311.667-018), 36,700 jobs of laundry laborer (DOT 316.687), and 26, 800
jobs of order filler (DOT 922-687-058).151 The VE testified that all three representative jobs
required only limited interaction with supervisors and co-workers.152
The ME then clarified that Conner can work with male co-workers, but less than extensive

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
R. at 59.
Id.
R. at 60.
Id.
Id.
R at 62-63.
R. at 65.

17

contact with male co-workers would be preferable.153 The ME testified, however, that Conner
would be able to perform the proffered jobs, even if all co-workers and supervisors were male.154
Conner’s counsel then asked the VE to explain what the proffered jobs entail.155 The VE
replied that the unskilled jobs all involved simple, routine tasks and had a specific vocational
preparation (“SVP”) time of two; a dining room attendant, for example, would only have to bus
tables and place the dishes in a dishwasher.156 The VE testified that someone who would be off task
for ten to fifteen minutes per hour due to moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace
could not perform the proffered jobs.157 In response to counsel’s questions, the VE also stated that
someone who cried twice every hour, to the extent that they were off task from five to ten minutes
per hour, could not perform the jobs, and neither could someone who left one hour early every
week.158 The VE also added, however, that the jobs involved minimal stress.159

The VE and the ALJ then established that Conner had no transferrable skills from her work
at UL for the proffered jobs.160 The ALJ observed that, as a woman of advanced age with a high
school education, Conner would be disabled under the guidelines if she were exertionally limited
to light work.161 However, this would not apply if Conner could perform medium work.162

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id.
R. at 66.
Id.
R. at 66-67.
R. at 67.
R. at 68-69.
R. at 67.
R. at 70.
R. at 72.
Id.

18

III.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

In his September 28, 2009 opinion, the ALJ applied the Act’s sequential five-step analysis
and found that Conner was not disabled within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, was not
entitled to DIB or a period of disability.163 To establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must
show an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.”164
Substantial gainful activity includes work that a claimant did before the impairment and any other
kind of gainful work generally available in significant numbers within the national economy.165
The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled.166 During this process, the ALJ must determine: (1)
whether the claimant is currently engaged in any substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the
claimant’s alleged impairment or combination of impairments is severe; (3) whether any of the
claimant’s impairments meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as being so severe
as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) whether the claimant is unable to perform her past
relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy.167 A finding of disability requires an affirmative
answer at either step three or step five, while a negative finding at any step other than step three

163
164
165
166
167

R. at 79-90.
42 U.S .C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Id.

19

precludes a finding of disability.168
As an initial matter, the ALJ determined that Conner met the insured status requirements of
the Act through December 31, 2012.169 At step one, the ALJ found that Conner had not engaged in
any substantial gainful activity since September 24, 2007, the alleged disability onset date.170 At
step two, the ALJ found that Conner suffered from the following severe impairments: major
depression disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified.171 The ALJ concluded
that Conner’s hypertension and GERD were not severe because Conner was never hospitalized or
forced to undergo invasive treatment for these ailments and Dr. Saini, a consultative examining
internist, had not noted any abnormalities in this regard.172
The ALJ then concluded at step three that Conner lacked any impairment or combination of
impairments meeting or medically equaling those listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1.173 The ALJ observed that the paragraph B criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 could only be
satisfied if Conner’s mental impairment resulted in at least two of the following four limitations: “(1)
marked restriction in the activities of daily living, (2) marked difficulties in maintaining social
functioning, (3) marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4)
repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.”174
While relying on treatment notes from Ms. Walz and Dr. Resis, the ALJ found that Conner
had “no more than moderate restriction” in her activities of daily living and “no more than moderate
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008).
R. at 81.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 82.
Id.

20

difficulties” in social functioning.175 The ALJ also found that Conner had “no more than moderate”
difficulties with concentration, persistence, and pace, based on Dr. Resis’s notations that Conner had
difficulty concentrating, but was also able to care for herself, manage her own finances, and play
scrabble and crossword games.176 Finally, the ALJ found that the record did not establish that
Conner had experienced any documented episodes of decompensation of extended duration.177 As
a result, the ALJ concluded that the paragraph B criteria were not satisfied.
The ALJ also determined that the paragraph C criteria were not met. For Listing 12.04, he
concluded that the evidence failed to show that Conner had a medically documented affective
disorder of at least two years’ duration that caused more than minimal limitation in her ability to do
basic work activities, with signs of symptoms currently attenuated by medication or psychosocial
support, and at least one of the enumerated 12.04(c) critera.178 For Listing 12.06, the ALJ concluded
that the objective medical evidence did not establish decompensation of an extended duration or “a
complete inability to function outside of the claimant’s home.”179
Next, the ALJ assessed Conner’s RFC.180 The ALJ concluded that Conner could perform
a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following non-exertional limitations:
“[Conner] is able to understand, remember, and execute only simple instructions and also able to
interact with co-workers and supervisors, but on no more than a moderate level.”181 In reaching this
conclusion, the ALJ noted that he had considered all of Conner’s symptoms and the extent to which

175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21

they comported with the objective medical evidence and other medical evidence,182 as well as the
opinion evidence.183
The ALJ noted Conner’s testimony that: her symptoms “affect her concentration, cause her
to cry when feeling overwhelmed, triggered a suicide attempt, and make it difficult for her to sleep;”
her inability to work causes financial stress so that “she bathes, cares for her hair, and makes meals
less frequently to conserve money,” and “her low self-esteem, past abuses from her ex-husbands,
and stress at work all contributed to her impairments.”184
The ALJ also noted that Conner’s activities of daily living included caring for her dogs,
doing chores, paying bills, and driving to run errands, shop, or see her doctors.185 The ALJ noted
Conner’s report that she could play with her dogs, watch television, and “read and walk when her
‘depression and anxiety are minimal,” as well as manage her personal needs and finances.186 The
ALJ also noted that Conner could talk on the telephone, spend time with others, and travel places
alone.187 The ALJ further noted Conner’s testimony that she does not get along with others and does
not handle stress or adjusting to change well, but may be able to perform work independently
without close interaction with others.188 The ALJ observed that Conner’s “attention span varies
according to her activities and she follows simple spoken instructions fairly well.”189 The ALJ also
noted a letter from Conner’s daughter which described her past suicide attempt, inability to sleep,

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id.; see 20 C.F.R. 404.1529 and SSRs 96–4p and 96–7p.
Id.; see 20 C.F.R. 404.1527 and SSRs 96–2p, 96–5p, 96–6p and 06–3p.
R. at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

22

frequent crying spells, migraines, high blood pressure, impaired memory, and avoidance of others.190
The ALJ then addressed the medical evidence.191 He noted that Dr. Resis treated Conner
from fall 2007 through fall 2009 due to “predominant work related stress.”192 The ALJ observed that
Conner had reported crying spells and difficulty with supervisors, was anxious and tearful during
examination, and had exhibited difficulty with memory, concentration, and focusing on a topic.193
He also noted Dr. Resis’s diagnosis of “major depression, recurrent of moderate to severe,” and
GAF score of 55, indicating moderate symptoms.194 The ALJ further noted Dr. Resis’s prescriptions
of Lorazepam and increasing dosages of Prozac, and his referral to Ms. Walz. The ALJ noted that
Conner described these treatments as helpful, and her overall mental status “‘appear[ed] good except
when she [was] discussing returning to work with her previous supervisor.’”195 However, after later
expressing suicidal thoughts, and feeling “‘intensely dysphoric,’” Conner reported that she was still
extremely stressed out, though the medication was improving her sleep.196 The ALJ noted that, by
2009, Conner was reasonably stable on her medications and reported to Dr. Resis that she had been
playing Scrabble and doing crossword puzzles at home.197
The ALJ noted that Conner’s sessions with Ms. Walz indicated that Conner was depressed
and anxious, with a regressed level of functioning and a GAF score of 50, indicating serious
symptoms.198 The ALJ further noted that Ms. Walz indicated “either fair or no progress toward

190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id.
R. at 85.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

23

Conner’s goals.”199 The ALJ also observed that Dr. Rebori had diagnosed Conner with “recurrent
depression, not in remission” and assigned a GAF score of 40, “indicating some impairment in
reality testing or communication, or a major impairment in several areas . . . .” The ALJ further
noted Dr. Rebori's suggestion that Conner would benefit from “‘more aggressive medication trials.’”
The ALJ concluded that the medical evidence did not show limitations greater than those
determined in the RFC, and that Conner’s subjective complaints of disabling symptoms were not
entirely credible.200 The ALJ found that Conner’s symptoms were predominantly work related, and
that her abilities would allow her to perform low stress jobs that did not require a great deal of
interaction with co-workers or supervisors.201 In doing so, the ALJ pointed to Conner’s various daily
activities, which the ALJ found “demonstrate that she is cognitively intact and able to live
independently.202 He further noted that Conner had also admitted that she may be able to perform
work independently from others, “making[ing] her allegations of total disability less persuasive.”203
With respect to the opinion evidence, the ALJ noted that a May 18, 2009 letter from Dr.
Resis stated that Conner did not likely meet the criteria for disability, but she would be unsuccessful
in taking feedback from supervisors without ongoing counseling.204 The ALJ also noted that Ms.
Walz had completed a mental RFC questionnaire in April 2008, which concluded that Conner was
unable to maintain regular attendance and be punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances;
could not complete a normal work day or week without interruptions from psychologically based

199
200
201
202
203
204

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 87.

24

symptoms; could not deal with work stresses of unskilled, semi-skilled, or skilled work; and could
not travel to unfamiliar places or use public transportation.205 The ALJ also observed Ms. Walz’s
opinion that Conner’s impairment and treatment would cause her to miss two to four days per
month.206 The ALJ found that the conclusions drawn by Ms. Walz were not consistent with the
record as a whole and, because Ms. Walz was not a physician and had not stopped treating Conner
in 2008, the ALJ found the contrary RFC determination of Dr. Resis more persuasive.207
The ALJ accorded significant weight to the opinion of Conner’s long-time primary care
physician, Dr. Snebold, who noted Conner’s complaints of extreme anxiety and inability to work,
but that Conner is also able to understand, carry-out, and remember instructions.208 The ALJ noted
that Dr. Snebold opinion that Conner is able to withstand usual work pressures and supervision,
however, her past job caused her excessive stress and significant depression.209

The ALJ did not afford great weight to the opinion Dr. Ribori, an independent medical
examiner hired by Conner’s attorney, who concluded that Conner was unable to work because of
interference from her mood disorder.210 The ALJ observed that Dr. Ribori, who only examined
Conner once, did not have a treatment relationship with her and also did not have the benefit of
reviewing the other medical reports contained in the record at the time of decision.211

205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 86.
Id.

25

The ALJ afforded great weight, however, to the testimony of the ME, who opined that
Conner suffered from a major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety, NOS, but that her
impairments were not severe enough to meet or equal a listing.212 The ALJ noted the ME’s
testimony that Conner retained the RFC to engage in less stressful work that did not require
extensive employee interaction.213 The ALJ noted that the ME reviewed theentire record, as well
as Conner’s testimony, and that his opinion was consistent with the record as a whole.214
Finally, the ALJ accorded significant weight to the opinion of the state agency medical
consultant who found that Conner was “able to understand, remember, and carry out detailed but not
complex instructions, make basic decisions, attend and concentrate for extended periods, interact
with others, accept instructions, and respond to changes in a routine work setting.215
Based on the RFC and the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Conner was unable to perform
any of her past relevant work as a senior engineering associate or project manager.216 The ALJ then
noted that Conner was 56 years old on the alleged disability onset date, making her an individual
of advanced age under 20 C.F.R. 404.1563, and that Conner had at least a high school education and
could communicate in English.217 Considering Conner’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
the ALJ concluded that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Conner can perform.218 Specifically, Conner could perform the representative jobs of dining room
attendant, laundry laborer, or order filler, and thus was not disabled under the Act.219
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219

Id.
Id.
Id.
R. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

26

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court performs a de novo review of the ALJ’s conclusions of law, but the ALJ’s

factual determinations are entitled to deference.220 The District Court will uphold the ALJ’s
decision if substantial evidence supports the findings of the decision and if the findings are free
from legal error.221 Where reasonable minds differ, it is for the ALJ, not this Court, to make the
ultimate findings as to disability.222 However, the ALJ must build an accurate and logical
connection from the evidence to his or her ultimate conclusion.223 While the ALJ is not required
to discuss every piece of evidence, the ALJ must minimally articulate his reasons for crediting or
discrediting evidence of disability.224
V.

ANALYSIS
Conner argues that the Court should reverse or remand the ALJ’s decision because the ALJ

committed legal error in: (1) failing to address evidence of Conner’s exertional limitation, and (2)
improperly assessing Conner’s mental impairment. We address each argument in turn.
A.

Conner’s Exertional Limitations
Conner contends that the ALJ did not adequately consider the June 2008 arthritic report of

treating physician, Dr. Snebold, which noted tenderness in Conner’s right medial knee after
extensive walking and pain in her great right toe secondary to trauma, and found that Conner was

220
221
222
223
224

Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2006).
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).
Cass v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1993).
Dixon v. Massanori, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001).
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 2000).

27

only able to walk, stand, or sit for one hour at a time.225 Conner further contends that the ALJ failed
to consider how Conner’s excess weight and edema (swelling) might also affect her ability to meet
the demands of medium work.226 As Conner points out, the ALJ’s evaluation of Conner’s exertional
capabilities is particularly important, given that the medical-vocational guidelines direct a decision
of disability if Conner is unable to sustain the physical demands of medium work and is otherwise
limited to unskilled work (as the ALJ found here).227 In response, the Commissioner argues that “the
record does not evince physical functional limitations” because Dr. Snebold’s report nevertheless
characterizes Conner’s ambulation as normal and indicates that she would not need an assistive
device.228 The Commissioner also points to a July 2008 consultative exam conducted by Dr. Saini,
which found that Conner had no abnormalities of the extremities, normal gait, normal ability to bear
weight, and a normal range of motion in her spine and extremities.229
Although the ALJ was not required to adopt the arthritic findings of Dr. Snebold, there is no
indication in the record that the ALJ was even aware of them, much less that the ALJ accorded them
the proper consideration. When an ALJ denies benefits, he must build an “accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to [his] conclusion,”230 and may not attempt to “play doctor” by using his
own lay opinion to make medical determinations.231 The Commissioner highlights Dr. Sanai’s
notation that plaintiff’s ambulation was normal, but can point to no instance where the ALJ relied
on it – or anything else – in concluding that Conner had no exertional limitations. As the Seventh
225

Dkt. 25 at 13.
Id.
227
Pursuant to the Commissioner's medical-vocational guidelines, an individual of advanced age like Conner,
who has only a high school education, cannot perform past relevant work, and has no transferable work skills will be
found disabled if they are limited to performing light or sedentary work (Grid Rule 202.06).
228
Dkt. 26 at 6-7; R. at 246-47.
229
Id. at 7; R. at 267-268.
230
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
231
See Blakes v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir.2003).
226

28

Circuit has observed, “regardless of whether there is enough evidence in the record to support the
ALJ's decision, principles of administrative law require the ALJ to rationally articulate the grounds
for [his] decision and [for the court to] confine [its] review” to those grounds.232 Conner contends
that the Commissioner’s argument is nothing more than a post-hoc rationalization of the ALJ’s
determination.233 We agree, and find that the ALJ plainly erred in failing to consider the arthritic
report of treating physician, Dr. Snebold, in assessing Conner’s exertional capabilities.
The analysis, however, does not end there. The Court “will not remand a case to the ALJ
for further specification where [it is] convinced that the ALJ will reach the same result.”234 As the
Seventh Circuit has observed, to do so “would be a waste of time and resources for both the
Commissioner and the claimant.”235 Thus, the Court reviews the record of evidence to see if it “can
predict with great confidence” what the result will be on remand.236
Several factors militate against a determination that the ALJ’s failure to consider Dr.
Snebold’s arthritic report was harmless error. Chief among those factors is Dr. Snebold’s status as
Conner’s long-time primary care physician. By the time he completed the arthritic report, Dr.
Snebold had seen Conner two to three times yearly for almost twenty years. A treating physician’s
opinion regarding the nature and severity of a medical condition “is entitled to controlling weight
if it is (1) supported by medical findings; and (2) consistent with substantial evidence in the
record.”237 Exactly how much weight the ALJ affords depends on a number of factors, including

232
233
234
235
236
237

Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002).
Dkt. 27at 1.
Spiva v. Astrue, 628 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir.2010).
McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2004).

29

“the length, nature, and extent” of the treatment relationship.238 Here, the ALJ had already accorded
significant weight to Dr. Snebold’s opinion of Conner’s mental impairments, based on the extensive
treatment history.239 It is not unreasonable to assume that the ALJ would have favored the June 2008
arthritic findings of Dr. Snebold over any contrary findings of Dr. Saini, a consultative medical
examiner who only saw Conner once.240
Further, the Court notes that Dr. Saini’s findings are not necessarily at odds with Dr.
Snebold’s. Dr. Saini never completed an arthritic report, or opined on the number of consecutive
hours that Conner could remain seated, standing, or walking. Thus, the only findings which directly
address the issue of Conner’s ability for prolonged walking, sitting, or standing are Dr. Snebold’s.
Finally, SSA guidance suggests that Dr. Snebold’s opinion – if accorded controlling weight
– could alter the outcome of the ALJ’s decision. Dr. Snebold found that Conner could stand or walk
for one hour at a time; sit or stand at a stretch for one hour; that she must include periods of walking
around during an 8-hour workday; and that a job which permits shifting from sitting, standing, and
walking was “preferred.”241 As mentioned above, the guidelines will direct a finding of disability
for Conner if she is unable to perform medium work, which requires a “good deal of walking or
standing,”242 such that a claimant “be able to stand or walk, off and on, for a total of approximately
6 hours of an 8-hour workday” as well as lift “no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.”243 The same walking and standing requirements

238

See McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 892; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(I)-(ii).
See R. at 87.
240
See McKinzey, 641 F.3d at 892 (evaluating the relative weight customarily accorded to experts in
determining whether the ALJ’s oversight of an expert’s opinion was harmful error).
241
R. at 247-48.
242
20 CFR §404.1567(c).
243
Peterson v. Chater, 96 F.3d 1015, 1016 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5-6).
239

30

apply for light work (though light work requires a claimant to lift and carry less weight).244 While
the parties do not cite it, Social Security Ruling 83-12 provides the following guidance regarding
claimants who must alternate sitting and standing:
The individual may be able to sit for a time, but must then get up and stand or walk for a
while before returning to sitting. Such an individual is not functionally capable of doing
either the prolonged sitting contemplated in the definition of sedentary work (and for the
relatively few light jobs which are performed primarily in a seated position) or the prolonged
standing or walking contemplated for most light work. (Persons who can adjust to any need
to vary sitting and standing by doing so at breaks, lunch periods, etc., would still be able to
perform a defined range of work.) . . . .Unskilled types of jobs are particularly structured so
that a person cannot ordinarily sit or stand at will. In cases of unusual limitation of ability
to sit or stand, a [vocational specialist] should be consulted to clarify the implications for the
occupational base.245
This guidance indicates that an individual who could only walk, stand, or sit for one hour at
a time would be limited from performing light work – much less medium work – in the unskilled
jobs proffered by the VE. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged the potential for such
limitation.246 However, as the guidance suggests, a VE is needed to clarify this issue. If the VE
concludes that Conner is unable to meet the demands of medium work due to an exertional limitation
requiring her to alternate sitting and standing, a decision of disability will be directed for Conner.
Consequently, we cannot say with confidence that no reasonable ALJ would find that Conner is
disabled under the rules after considering the evidence contained in Dr. Snebold’s arthritic report.
We thus remand to the ALJ for consideration of the evidence bearing on exertional limitation.
B.

Conner’s Mental Impairment

244

See SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5-6.
SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *4.
246
See id. (consistent with SSR 83-12, claimant who could only sit, stand, or walk for one hour at a time would
not be capable of doing light or sedentary work because of the prolonged sitting, standing, or walking that it requires).
245

31

Conner also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing her mental impairment, arguing that the
ALJ failed to consider that her chronic crying would take her off task from 5-10 minutes per hour,
leaving Conner unable to sustain employment.247 In response, the Commissioner contends that the
record does not support Conner’s assertion of being off task due to chronic crying, as “no doctor
rendered such an opinion.”248 The Commissioner also argues that the overwhelming majority of
opinion evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that, despite Conner’s mental impairment, she is able
to perform simple tasks and interact with others in a work setting.249
After carefully reviewing the medical evidence, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that
Conner’s claim of greater mental impairment is unsubstantiated. While Conner can point to various
notations from her treating sources that she was crying during examination,250 this documentation
does not translate into a medical opinion from any doctor that Conner would be off task from work
for 5-10 minutes per hour due to chronic crying spells. Instead, taken together, the opinions of Drs.
Snebold,251 Overlander,252 and Campa253 all suggest that Conner is able to perform simple tasks,
understand, remember and carry out instructions, and interact with other employees. To the extent
that the opinions of Ms. Walz or Dr. Rebori were not consistent with this conclusion, the ALJ was
entitled to accord them reduced weight for the reasons stated in his opinion.254 Because the ALJ’s
assessment of Conner’s mental impairment is both supported by substantial evidence and free from
legal error, it must be upheld by the district court.255 Thus, the Court declines Conner’s request to
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255

Dkt. 25 at 14-15.
Dkt. 26 at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
Dkt. 27 at 3; see, e.g., R. at 307, 228, 242, 274, 277.
See R. at 87, 245.
See R. at 57-58, 64-66, 87.
See R. at 88, 265, 285-87.
See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870 (the ALJ need only minimally articulate reasons for discrediting evidence).
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

32

reverse or remand based on the ALJ’s assessment of her mental impairment.
VI.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Conner’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 24] is

granted. We, therefore, remand the case to the Social Security Administration for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

_______________________
Honorable Susan E. Cox
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: August 10, 2011

33