Hill v. St. James Hospital and Medical Centers
Filing
47
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 2/15/2013Mailed notice(ca, ).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RUBY A. HILL,
Plaintiff,
v.
ST. JAMES HOSPITAL AND
HEALTH CENTERS,
Defendant.
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10 C 5780
Judge John Z. Lee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Ruby Hill has sued St. James Hospital and Health Centers (“St. James Hospital”)
for race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”), as well as breach of
contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliatory discharge under
Illinois common law. Before the Court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56. For the following reasons, the
Court grants the motion.
Local Rule 56.1
In this district, motions for summary judgment are governed by Local Rule 56.1.
“The obligation set forth in Local Rule 56.1 ‘is not a mere formality.’ Rather, ‘[i]t
follows from the obligation imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) on the party opposing
summary judgment to identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for trial.’”
Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (quoting
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 1994)). The Seventh Circuit
has “routinely held that a district court may strictly enforce compliance with its local
rules regarding summary judgment motions.” Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d
532, 537 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) requires the nonmovant to file a “concise response to
the movant’s statement that shall contain . . . a response to each numbered paragraph in
the moving party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific
references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied
upon.” LR 56.1(b)(3)(B). In addition, Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C) “requires specifically
that a litigant seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment file a response that
contains a separate ‘statement . . . of any additional facts that require the denial of
summary judgment.’” Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809 (7th
Cir. 2005) (quoting LR56.1).
The failure of a nonmoving party to abide by the rule’s requirements has
significant consequences. “All material facts set forth in the statement required of the
moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the
opposing party.” Local Rule 56.1(b)(3); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.
2003) (“We have consistently held that a failure to respond by the nonmovant as
mandated by the local rules results in an admission.”). “This rule may be the most
important litigation rule outside statutes of limitation because the consequences of failing
to satisfy its requirements are so dire.” Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill.
2000).
Plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, failed to file a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B)
statement of facts that responds to each statement of fact in defendant’s Local Rule
2
56.1(a)(3) submission.1
Thus, the Court deems admitted each and every one of
defendant’s statements of fact to the extent that each statement offers admissible evidence
and is supported by the movant’s citation to the record.2 (See Def.’s LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 173.)
In addition, although Hill offers additional facts in her memorandum of law, LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) “provides the only acceptable means of . . . presenting additional facts.”
Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995). “Simply providing
additional facts in one’s responsive memorandum is insufficient to put those facts before
the Court.” Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 584. By failing to submit a statement under Local Rule
56.1(b)(3)(C), plaintiff has also failed to put forth any additional facts before the Court
that would bear on defendant’s summary judgment motion.
Facts
With the exception of a brief period of time during which she was employed
elsewhere, Hill, an African-American female, worked as a nurse for St. James Hospital in
Olympia Fields, Illinois, on either a part-time or full-time basis, from September 1993
until January 2010. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶¶ 5, 8-11, 16, 23, 27, 34, 50; Def.’s Answer &
Affirm. Defenses ¶ 12.) Hill had no contract of employment with St. James Hospital.
(Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 71.) From approximately 2004 to September 2005, Hill was the
Charge Nurse in the catheterization laboratory (“Cath Lab”), where cardiac diagnostic
and therapeutic procedures are performed. (Def.’s Ex. A, Hill Dep. at 42, 45, 50.) From
October 2005 until January 2010, Hill was Chief Cardiac Nurse in the Cath Lab. (Def.’s
1
Although plaintiff’s counsel still seeks to depose several witnesses, discovery in this case closed
on August 19, 2011 pursuant to Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr.’s 6/22/11 Minute Order.
2
Defendant’s fact statement in paragraph 74 is not supported by the citation to paragraph 5 of the
Irons Affidavit and thus is not deemed admitted.
3
LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 27.) During her tenure at St. James Hospital, Hill never registered any
complaints of discrimination based on her race, color, or gender. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 68.)
In 2009, the Cath Lab at Olympia Fields, where Hill was employed, was forced to
absorb the staff of a different Cath Lab located in Chicago Heights, which was closed by
St. James Hospital for financial reasons. (Id. ¶ 31.) That staff included Rita McCune, an
African-American who had twenty more years of tenure at St. James Hospital than Hill
and held the position of Chief Cardiac Nurse at the Chicago Heights Cath Lab. (Id. ¶¶
29-31.) After the two Cath Labs merged, the manager of the now-combined Cath Lab,
Cathy Cox, a white female, allowed Hill to remain as Chief Cardiac Nurse and changed
McCune’s title to Assistant Chief Cardiac Nurse. (Id. ¶ 34.)
In 2009, Midwestern Physician Group, the group of doctors that performed all of
the procedures at the Cath Lab, did not renew its contract with St. James Hospital. (Id. ¶
51.) As a result, the number of Cath Lab procedures performed at St. James Hospital
dropped by 699. (Id. ¶ 52.) At the same time, the cost to St. James Hospital of
performing a Cath Lab procedure increased by approximately $105.00 per procedure.
(Id. ¶ 53.) This combination of circumstances necessitated the elimination of Hill’s Chief
Cardiac Nurse position, McCune’s Assistant Chief Cardiac Nurse position, as well as
other positions in the Cath Lab. (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.) Thereafter, the Cath Lab’s nursing staff
consisted of a registered nurse, McCune, and two rotating daily charge nurses, Alexander
Cobbin, a white male, and Anne-Chelle Brown, an African American female. (Id. ¶ 56.)
As to Hill in particular, on January 15, 2010, Cox told Hill that her position had
been eliminated because of the decline in the number of cases performed in the Cath Lab
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and the increased cost of the procedures. (Id. ¶ 50.)3 Hill was also told that although
there were no available positions in the Cath Lab, there were other open positions for
which she was qualified at St. James Hospital. (Id. ¶ 58.) She was encouraged to speak
with Janet Slaven-Allen, the Vice President of Human Resources, who was waiting to
meet with her so that she could secure other employment within the organization. (Id. ¶
59.) Defendants state that the elimination of Hill’s position was not motivated by race,
color, gender, or retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 65-68.)
On the same day that she received this news, Hill fell in the parking lot of St.
James Hospital while going home and was diagnosed with contusions and placed on bed
rest. (Id. ¶ 61.) Although Hill eventually met with Slaven-Allen, who told Hill that there
were positions for Hill in St. James Hospital’s Intensive Care Unit and Emergency Room,
Hill told Slaven-Allen that she was not interested in those positions. (Id.) Because Hill
was not seeking alternative employment within the organization, St. James Hospital
offered her a severance package, but Hill declined the offer because she wanted to collect
unemployment benefits. (Id. ¶ 63.)
Discussion
“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c)
mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing
3
Hill attempts to refute this fact by citing in her response brief to ¶ 37 of her affidavit, which
states that Midwest Physician Group maintained some of its Cath Lab practice at St. James. But
her affidavit does nothing to refute that the number of procedures being performed in the Cath
Lab had declined by 699 while the cost of the procedures increased. (Compare Def.’s LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 50-55, with Pl.’s Ex. B, Hill Aff. ¶ 37.)
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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986).
I.
Breach of Contract and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In her response brief to St. James Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, Hill
states that she “moves to voluntarily dismiss Count III, Breach of Contract, and Count V,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” (Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.
1.) Because the parties are in agreement that Hill’s breach of contract and intentionally
infliction of emotional distress claims should be dismissed, the Court grants defendant’s
summary judgment motion as to Counts III and V.
II.
Race Discrimination Under Title VII (Count I) and § 1981 (Count II)
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee “because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Section
1981 “affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis
of race.” Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975). “Because
we evaluate § 1981 claims under the same rubric as Title VII claims, we need not address
them separately.” Matthews v. Donahoe, No. 12-1065, 2012 WL 4378272, at *3 (7th Cir.
Sept. 26, 2012).
“[A] plaintiff may prove discrimination either directly or indirectly.” Coleman v.
Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012). “To avoid summary judgment under the
direct approach, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence, either direct or
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circumstantial, to create a triable question of intentional discrimination in the employer’s
decision.” Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir.
2011). Circumstantial evidence under the direct approach must “lead . . . directly to the
conclusion that an employer was illegally motivated, without reliance on speculation.”
Good v. Univ. of Chi. Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 2012). “A plaintiff also may
proceed under the indirect, burden-shifting method adapted from McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Id.
Under the direct approach, Hill has failed to present any direct or circumstantial
evidence to create a triable issue as to whether St. James Hospital intentionally
discriminated against her based on race when it eliminated her position. The record
contains no evidence that leads directly to the conclusion, without reliance on
speculation, that St. James Hospital’s elimination of her position was motivated by racial
animus. Thus, if Hill is to succeed in staving off summary judgment, she must proceed
under the indirect method.
Under the indirect method described in McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff typically
must first establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that “[s]he belongs to a protected
class, was meeting the employer’s legitimate expectations, suffered an adverse action,
and was treated worse than similarly situated employees outside the protected class.”
Lewis v. Caterpillar Inc., 367 Fed. Appx. 683, 685 (7th Cir. 2010). Although plaintiff
states that the typical prima facie elements apply, it is also arguable that the minireduction-in-force (“mini-RIF”) test for establishing a prima facie case may also apply.
See Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 693-94 (7th Cir. 2000).
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In a mini-RIF, as explained in Michas, “a single employee is discharged and his
position is not filled. However, the employee’s responsibilities are assumed by other
members of the corporate workforce.” Id. at 693. Because the “employee’s duties are
absorbed by other workers and the employee was replaced, not eliminated, we [dispense
with the traditional fourth prong of the prima facie case and instead] . . . require that a
plaintiff demonstrate that his duties were absorbed by employees who were not members
of the protected class.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, the mini-RIF test may apply because, Hill’s position was eliminated, and it
may be inferred that the other remaining positions absorbed the duties of her position.
See Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here the
plaintiff’s duties were reabsorbed by [other employees] after [the plaintiff’s] termination .
. . we must apply the indirect burden shifting method for a mini-reduction-in-force
situation.”) (quotation omitted). Thus, the Court analyzes the facts using both the fourth
prong of the typical prima facie case, i.e., that plaintiff was treated worse than similarly
situated employees outside the protected class, as well as the fourth prong of the miniRIF prima facie case, i.e., that plaintiff’s job duties were absorbed by employees who
were not members of her protected class, see Michas, 209 F.3d at 693.
If Hill successfully establishes a prima facie case under either of those standards,
we move to the second step of the indirect method and “the defendant must provide a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action.” Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698
F.3d 598, 609 (7th Cir. 2012). For the third step, “[t]he plaintiff then must show that
there is an issue of fact whether this reason is pretextual.”
Id.
“Pretext may be
established directly with evidence that [the employer] was more likely than not motivated
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by a discriminatory reason, or indirectly by evidence that the employer’s explanation is
not credible.” Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1039 (7th Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted). “Indirect evidence of pretext showing that an employer’s proffered
reasons are not credible may be made by demonstrating that the reasons are factually
baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge, or were insufficient to
motivate the discharge.” Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 983 (7th Cir. 1999).
Here, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas test. Although, it is undisputed that Hill is a member of a protected class, was
performing her job satisfactorily, and was terminated (Def.’s LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 54-55;
Def.’s Answer & Affirm. Defenses ¶ 12.), thereby satisfying the first three elements of
both the typical prima facie and the mini-RIF prima facie standard, plaintiff has failed to
show a triable fact as to the fourth element under either standard.
It is undisputed that after the elimination of Hill’s Chief Cardiac Nurse position,
the only nurses that remained in the Cath Lab were McCune, an African-American
female, who filled the only registered nurse position, as well as Alexander Cobbin, a
Caucasian male, and Anne Chelle-Brown, an African-American female, who rotated as
daily charge nurses. (Def.’s LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 56.) 4 Thus, the only remaining Cath Lab
staff not in Hill’s protected class was Alexander Cobbin, a daily charge nurse. It is
undisputed, however, that the daily charge nurse position was different from the
registered nurse position that Hill had. (Def.’s LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 56.) In addition, Cobbin
4
As discussed above, because Hill has not complied with Local Rule 56.1 and failed to file
either a response to St. James Hospital’s statement of facts or a statement of additional facts, the
Court deems defendant’s statement of facts admitted. Plaintiff does include pages and pages of
additional factual assertions within her response brief, but such tactics violate not only letter but
the spirit of Local Rule 56.1 and will not be considered. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot.
Summ. J. 11-17, 21-23.)
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shared the position with Chelle-Brown, whereas Hill was the only person to hold the
Chief Cardiac Nurse position at the Olympia Fields Cath Lab. (Id.) As such, Cobbin
could not have absorbed all of Hill’s duties. (Id.) Based on all of these undisputed facts,
the Court holds that no reasonable jury could find that the Cobbin was similarly situated
to Hill or that Cobbin, as rotating charge nurse, absorbed most of the duties of the Chief
Cardiac Nurse position.
In addition, even if Hill were able to establish the fourth element of a prima facie
case, defendant would nevertheless be entitled to summary judgment. It undisputed that
the elimination of Hill’s position was due to financial pressure; 699 fewer procedures
were being performed in St. James Hospital’s Cath Lab and the cost per procedure had
increased to $105.00. (Def.’s LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 52-54.)
In her response brief, Hill tries to refute the claim of economic necessity by
averring that Midwestern Physician Group still used St. James Hospital’s Cath Lab to
perform some of its procedures. (Pl.’s Ex. B, Hill Aff. ¶ 37.) But, even if the Court were
to excuse Hill’s noncompliance with LR 56.1 (which it does not) and even if she had
properly laid a foundation to establish personal knowledge of this assertion (which she
has not), the fact that Midwestern Physician Group still used St. James Hospital’s Cath
Lab for some of its procedures simply does not refute the fact that the Cath Lab faced an
overall decrease of 699 procedures and an increase in $105.00 per procedure, factors that
created the economic necessity in the first place.
Hill also attempts to create a triable issue as to pretext by trying to refute
defendant’s fact statement that “Hill did not make a complaint of racial discrimination
about Ms. Cox to Ms. Brassea.” (See Def.’s LR 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff, however,
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offered no testimony at her deposition that she had complained about race discrimination
to Brassea, the Chief Nursing Officer, or anyone else at St. James Hospital. (See Pl.’s Ex.
A, Hill Dep. at 97.)
As discussed above, Hill failed to comply with Local Rule
56.1(b)(3)(B) and (C).5
Accordingly, each properly supported fact statement in
defendant’s LR 56.1(a)(3) statement of facts is deemed admitted, and the Court does not
consider any additional facts raised in, or exhibits attached to, Hill’s responsive
memorandum because such facts are not properly before the Court. As a result, Hill has
not raised a triable issue of fact as to this issue.6
For her part, Hill does state that she began to feel that there was a difference in
how she was being treated because of her race, but such an observation alone without
more does not create a triable issue as to whether defendant’s stated reason for
eliminating Hill’s position was a sham or whether defendant’s actions were motivated by
racial animus. If it did, every plaintiff who claims to have a subjective feeling of being
discriminated against could escape summary judgment, even if those feelings were
entirely unsubstantiated by facts. This is not the case. See Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ.,
667 F.3d 800, 812 (7th Cir. 2011) (“wholly conclusory beliefs” that discrimination
occurred do not create a triable issue of fact); Estate of Davis v. Wells Fargo Bank, 633
F.3d 529, 541 (7th Cir. 2011) (“unsubstantiated belief” of mistreatment based on race is
insufficient to preclude summary judgment).
In sum, Hill has failed to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination under
either the typical prima facie standard or the mini-RIF standard.
Moreover, even
assuming that she were able to meet this initial burden, defendant has asserted a
5
See supra, discussion at 2-3.
Furthermore, Hill made no attempt to deny defendant’s fact statement in paragraph 68 that Hill
“never complained about discrimination during her employment”. (See Pl.’s Resp. Br. 2-4.)
6
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nondiscriminatory basis for its actions, and Hill has failed to create a triable issue that
those reasons are a pretext.
Accordingly, the Court grants defendant’s summary
judgment motion as to Hill’s Title VII and § 1981 race discrimination claims (Counts I
and II).
III.
Retaliatory Discharge Under Illinois Law (Count IV)
Next, defendant moves for summary judgment as to Hill’s retaliatory discharge
claim, which alleges that she was terminated for complaining about race discrimination
(see Am. Verified Compl. ¶ 89). For the following reasons, this claim too cannot survive
summary judgment.
“The general rule in Illinois is that an at-will employee may be discharged by the
employer at any time and for any reason.” Grabs v. Safeway, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 122, 126
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009). “Illinois law carves out narrow exceptions to this rule,” including a
claim for retaliatory discharge. Sherer v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., No. 11–cv–0082–
MJR–PMF, 2011 WL 1326956, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2011).
To prove a retaliatory discharge claim under Illinois law, an at-will employee
must establish that she was “(1) discharged; (2) in retaliation for her activities; and (3)
that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy.” Blount v. Stroud, 904
N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2009) (citations omitted). “Although what counts as a clearly mandated
public policy is not precisely defined, the tort has been narrowly construed in Illinois to
include only discharges in retaliation for certain activities, such as reporting an
employer’s criminal violations, or violations of health and safety standards.” Darchak v.
City of Chi. Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 628-29 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
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Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court “has consistently sought to restrict the common law
tort of retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 629.
Significantly, “Illinois courts have not extended this tort to situations where a
plaintiff alleges that the public policy violated is the policy contained in the Illinois
Human Rights Act.” Blount, 904 N.E.2d at 9. This is because Illinois courts only
“acknowledge[] the need to recognize the tort of retaliatory discharge when there is no
other remedy available to vindicate the public policy involved.” Stoecklein v. Ill. Tool
Works, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 139, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
It is undisputed that Hill was an at-will employee. (Def.’s LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶
71.) Further, the Illinois Human Rights Act specifically prohibits termination of an
employee in retaliation for his or her opposition to unlawful employment practices,
including race discrimination. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/6–101. Because the only public
policy upon which Hill relies to substantiate her tort claim for retaliatory discharge is one
that is expressly embodied in the Illinois Human Rights Act, her common law retaliatory
discharge claim necessarily fails as a matter of law. See Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485
N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ill. 1985) (refusing to recognize a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge where discrimination claim was cognizable under Illinois Human Rights Act).
Therefore, the Court grants defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count IV.
IV.
Breach of Contract
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Conclusion
For the reasons provided herein, the Court grants St. James Hospital and Health
Centers’ summary judgment motion in its entirety [doc. no. 28]. This case is hereby
terminated.
SO ORDERED
ENTER:
2/15/13
____________________________________
JOHN Z. LEE
U.S. District Judge
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