Smith et al v. Hardy et al

Filing 80

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Amy J. St. Eve on 6/12/2012: The Court denies Defendants' motion to strike 72 and motion for summary judgment 57 . The case remains set for status on 6/18/12 at 8:30 a.m. Defense counsel is instructed to make arrangements for Plaintiff to appear at the 6/18/12 status via telephone and should provide the contact information to the courtroom deputy. [For further details see minute order.] Mailed notice(kef, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Amy J. St. Eve

CASE NUMBER

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

10 C 6436

DATE

6/12/2012

Smith vs. Hardy

CASE
TITLE
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

The Court denies Defendants' motion to strike [72] and motion for summary judgment [57]. The case
remains set for status on 6/18/12 at 8:30 a.m. Defense counsel is instructed to make arrangements for
Plaintiff to appear at the 6/18/12 status via telephone and should provide the contact information to the
courtroom deputy.
O[ For further details see text below.]

Notices mailed by Judicial staff.

STATEMENT
Pro se prisoner Plaintiff Terrance L. Smith brought this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
deliberate indifference to his objectively serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment against
certain medical personnel at the Illinois Department of Corrections’ Northern Reception and Classification
Center at the Stateville Correctional Center. Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) and motion to strike Plaintiff’s Northern District
of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 materials. For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motions.
BACKGROUND
I.

Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 assists the Court by “organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and
demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.”
Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000). On December 14, 2011,
Plaintiff provided his Local Rule 56.1(b) materials in response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
and Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) submissions. In the January 18, 2012 reply, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s
Rule 56.1 materials were deficient and that the Court should deem Defendants’ facts as admitted. Following
Defendants’ reply on February 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed a new set of Local Rule 56.1 materials to address the
concerns raised by Defendants’ reply. Thereafter, Defendants brought the present motion to strike arguing
that these materials were filed outside the Court’s briefing schedule and without leave of Court. On February
13, 2012, the Court issued a minute order explaining that Plaintiff’s supplemental filings were made in direct
response to Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Local Rules. The Court then
instructed Defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s supplemental Local Rule materials. To date, Defendants have
failed to respond as ordered.
Courtroom Deputy
Initials:

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The parties’ Local Rule 56.1 submissions and dispute have become a collateral matter diverting the Court
and the parties from the central issue of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. “The Rule is designed, in part,
to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the advantage of the parties’ familiarity with the record and often
cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,’ in determining whether a
trial is necessary.” Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The parties’
Local Rule 56.1 submissions and resultant dispute have not aided the Court, but instead, have only complicated
matters. As such, the Court reviews the record as a whole drawing directly from the evidence instead of the
parties’ Local Rule 56.1 materials. The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to strike.
II.

Relevant Facts

In deciding summary judgment motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127
S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Construing the facts and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor,
Plaintiff maintains that he was shot and partially paralyzed in 2000, and thus he is required to catheterize himself
four times a day to empty his bladder. (R. 60, Ex. A, Smith 8/26/11 Dep., at 8, 10). To do so, he uses a sixteen
inch clear plastic straight catheter, sterile lubricant, rubber gloves, and iodine. (Id. at 10-11). Plaintiff requires
fresh supplies on a regular basis because he can only use an individual catheter for two days at the most. (Id. at
17). Plaintiff also takes medication to relax his muscles and address his pain. (Id. at 11-12).
On March 1, 2010, Plaintiff was transferred from the Cook County Jail to the Illinois Department of
Corrections’ Northern Reception and Classification Center at the Stateville Correctional Center (“NRC”). (Id. at
11). He was sent to the NRC for violating his mandatory supervise release term. (Id.). Plaintiff stayed at the
NRC for four months and then was transferred back to the Cook County Jail. (Id. at 9-10).
Plaintiff arrived at the NRC with a small amount of supplies, including one catheter, two tubes of sterile
gel, and one latex glove that he brought with him from the Cook County Jail. (Id. at 11). Initially, he met with
Defendant Nurse Jessica Smith and informed her of his needed supplies. (Id. at 19). Plaintiff testified that Smith
told him that she would order the necessary supplies for him. (Id. at 20). Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that he
never received fresh supplies and that he had to use the dirty catheter that he had brought with him from the Cook
County Jail. (Id. at 13). Due to the lack of fresh supplies, Plaintiff contends that he used only one catheter for the
entire four months he was at the NRC. (Id. at 18, 25). This use resulted in a severe bladder infection, boils,
mucous leakage from his penis, and loss of urine control. (Id. at 26). Plaintiff testified that he now wears
diapers. (Id.).
As to Defendant Dr. Sylvia Mahone, Plaintiff testified that Dr. Mahone never participated in his treatment,
although Dr. Mahone avers that she examined Plaintiff during his entrance to the NRC on March 1, 2010, at
which time she determined his medical supply needs and ordered the supplies. (Id.; R. 60, Ex. F, Mahone Aff. ¶¶
4, 5). Further, Dr. Mahone maintains that she saw Plaintiff receive the ordered supplies. (Mahone Aff. ¶ 5). Dr.
Mahone’s affidavit also includes a March 10, 2010 form and Defendants argue that this form establishes that
Plaintiff received the ordered supplies. (Ex. G, 3/10/10 Form). After reading the form, however, it is not
apparent on its face and without Dr. Mahone’s accompanying explanation whether Plaintiff actually received any
such supplies. As to Defendant Sarah Mays, Plaintiff contends that he complained to her about the lack of
supplies during his stay at the NRC. (Smith Dep., at 20). Plaintiff asserts that Mays stated she would look into
the situation, but nothing ever happened. (Id. at 21).
Furthermore, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was kept in his cell at the NRC for 24 hours a day
and would only leave it once a week for a shower and exercise. (Id. at 57-58). He maintains that he was taken to
the health care unit in July 2010 by a sergeant who found him in pain due to the infection. (Id. at 30-31).
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Plaintiff testified that when the sergeant took him to the healthcare unit, the shift was changing, so the sergeant
had to take Plaintiff back to his cell. (Id.).
Meanwhile, Defendants contacted the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) to determine if
Plaintiff had exhausted his claim through the required grievance process. (R. 60, Ex. C, Haven Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4).
The IDOC responded that it had no record of Plaintiff submitting a grievance concerning the lack of medical
supplies while he was at the NRC in 2010. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff counters that he did submit three grievances for the
lack of medical supplies while at the NRC, but that he never received any response. (Smith Dep., at 36, 37).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment under Rule 56(a) is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). In deciding summary judgment motions, “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. The party seeking
summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After “a properly supported
motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quotation omitted). “[D]istrict courts presiding over
summary judgment proceedings may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, both of
which are the province of the jury.” Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704-05 (7th Cir.
2011) (internal citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.

Exhaustion Defense

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under [S]ection 1983 of this [T]itle, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined to any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006); Maddox v.
Love, 655 F.3d 709, 720 (7th Cir. 2011). In other words, the PLRA requires that an inmate “file a timely
grievance utilizing the procedures and rules of the state’s prison grievance process.” Maddox, 655 F.3d at 72021. “Exhaustion is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof is on [D]efendants.” Dole v. Chandler, 438
F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
The first step in Illinois’ grievance process is to submit an informal grievance to the prisoner’s counselor.
See Dole, 438 F.3d at 807 (citing Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810(a)). “If the prisoner is not satisfied with the
counselor’s resolution of the complaint, he may then submit a formal grievance to the prison’s grievance officer.”
See Dole, 438 F.3d at 807; see also Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 955 (7th Cir. 2011). The grievance officer
has the authority to investigate the grievance, including interviewing the prisoner and witnesses and reviewing the
relevant documents. See Dole, 438 F.3d at 807 (citing Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.810). The grievance officer
then submits a recommendation to the warden who makes a final decision at the institution level. See id.
Thereafter, a prisoner may appeal a warden’s determination to the Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections through the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). See id. (citing Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, §
504.850(a)); see also Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 2005). The regulatory scheme refers all
appeals to the ARB, which makes a recommendation to the Director who in turn has the final decision in the
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appeals process. See Dole, 438 F.3d at 807 (citing Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504.870(a)(3)).
Plaintiff concedes that he did not exhaust his claim through all of the required levels of the grievance
process in Illinois. Instead, he argues that it was impossible for him because the process was effectively
unavailable. See Brengettcy v. Horton, 423 F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (“prison official’s failure to respond to
a prisoner’s claim can render administrative remedies unavailable.”). In short, a prisoner is not held accountable
when he follows the proper grievance procedures and prison officials nevertheless mishandle the grievance. See
Dole, 438 F.3d at 811; Brengettcy, 423 F.3d at 682.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff – as the Court is required to do at this procedure
posture – Defendants have not established that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his deliberate indifference claim. To
clarify, Plaintiff testified that he submitted a grievance three separate times, but received no response. The
Seventh Circuit in Brengettcy, when considering the failure to exhaust a grievance at the Cook County Jail,
concluded that a detainee cannot be faulted when correctional officials failed to respond to his grievance. See
Brengettcy, 423 F.3d at 682. Here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Plaintiff should have taken
additional steps or contacted another correctional official once he filed his three unanswered grievances. Thus,
the record presents a genuine dispute as to the material fact of whether Plaintiff submitted the grievances as he
alleged, and if so, whether the grievances went unanswered. This factual dispute must be addressed through a
hearing before the Court prior to trial under the procedures set forth in Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th
Cir. 2008).
II.

Deliberate Indifference Claim

“The Eighth Amendment safeguards the prisoner against a lack of medical care that ‘may result in pain
and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.’” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 829 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d
251 (1976)). To succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants were
intentionally indifferent to an objectively serious medical need or condition – negligence, gross negligence or
medical malpractice is insufficient. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811
(1994); Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir. 2011). To establish an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim, Plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) he has an objectively serious medical condition; and
(2) a prison official was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Defendants do
not dispute that Plaintiff has an objectively serious medical condition. See Ortiz v. Webster, 655 F.3d 731, 734
(7th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the Court turns to the second element of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.
Under the second element, a “medical professional’s deliberate indifference may be inferred when ‘the
medical professional’s decision is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment.’” See King
v. Kramer, ___F.3d ___, 2012 WL 1889765, at *4 (7th Cir. May 25, 2012) (citation omitted). Thus, although
negligence or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, deliberate indifference can be
inferred from actions that are “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to
seriously aggravate” Plaintiff’s condition. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
In short, although the deliberate indifference standard for medical staff is high, Plaintiff is not required to show
that he was “literally ignored.” See King, 2012 WL 1889765, at *4 (quoting Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653).
Construing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has set forth evidence
raising a genuine dispute as to the material fact that Defendants did not attend to his serious medical needs and
ignored his repeated requests for medical supplies. According to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, Defendants
Smith and Dr. Mahone allegedly failed in their initial responsibility of obtaining the required medical supplies,
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and Mays ignored Plaintiff’s repeated requests for help. Plaintiff maintains that he was able to successfully
address his medical condition for ten years prior to entering the NRC in 2010. Yet, after his four month stay at
the NRC, his bladder control was damaged and he now must wear diapers.
In sum, Plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to defeat Defendants’ summary judgment motion. See Oritz, 655
F.3d at 734-35. The Court appreciates that Defendants claim that they provided Plaintiff the necessary supplies,
but at this procedural posture, the Court must view the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor and cannot make credibility
determinations. Therefore, Defendants have failed to established that there are no genuine disputes as to the
material facts and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

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