Lopez v. Ram Shirdi Inc., d/b/a Motel 6 of Calumet Park, IL #4501

Filing 140

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John W. Darrah on 6/19/2013:(lp, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSE LOPEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAM SHIRDI, INC. d/b/a MOTEL 6 OF
CALUMET PARK, IL #4501 and
AMERICAN HOTEL PARTNERS, INC.
d/b/a MOTEL 6,

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Case No. 10 C 6590
Judge John W. Darrah

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jose Lopez (“Lopez”) sued Defendants Ram Shirdi, Inc. (“Shirdi”) and
American Hotel Partners, Inc. (“AHP”) (collectively, the “Defendants”), alleging
retaliation and violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
(“Title VII”), the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/6-101, et seq. (“IHRA”), the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), and the
Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 105/1, et seq. (“IMWL”), for
failure to pay overtime wages. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
BACKGROUND
Local Rule 56.1
Defendants have failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 for the Northern District
of Illinois (“Local Rule”), in filing their Motion for Summary Judgment and in opposing
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the
party moving for summary judgment to provide “a statement of material facts as to which

the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Defendants failed to file a Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement
of facts with their Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants have attached exhibits to
their Motion. (See Dkt. No. 124.)
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) requires the nonmoving party to admit or deny each
factual statement proffered by the moving party and to concisely designate any material
facts that establish a genuine dispute for trial. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,
403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005). In filing their “response” to Plaintiff’s statement of
facts, Defendants inexplicably restate each of Plaintiff’s statements of fact. (See Dkt. No.
125-2.) Accordingly, because Defendants have failed to dispute Plaintiff’s statements of
fact and, instead, have adopted them as their own, Plaintiff’s statements of fact are
deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment.
Plaintiff’s Allegations
Lopez worked at a Motel 6 in Calumet Park, Illinois (“Motel 6”); the Motel 6 was
operated and owned by Shirdi and AHP. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff was terminated from his
employment at Motel 6 in March 2010, after speaking out against the alleged sexual
harassment of female employees at Motel 6. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-63.)
In Count I, Plaintiff brings a claim for retaliation under Title VII and the IHRA.
In Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of the overtime provisions of the FLSA.
In Count III, Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of the overtime provisions of the
IMWL.

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Factual Background
Plaintiff appeared on Defendants’ payroll records from October 10, 2009 to
February 28, 2010. (Pl.’s 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 1.) Shirdi and AHP were responsible for the
supervision and enforcement of personnel policies working at the Motel 6. (Id. ¶ 4.) In
2009, Shirdi and AHP filed separate federal income tax returns. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Defendants employed fifteen or more employees in at least 34 weeks in 2009.
(Id. ¶ 6.) Defendants employed fifteen or more employees in at least 48 weeks in 2010.
(Id.) Defendants’ payroll records demonstrate that from July 24, 2009, to December 4,
2011, Defendants employed over fifteen employees during each calendar week. (Id. ¶ 8.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the
court of the basis for its motion and identifying the evidence it believes demonstrates the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32324 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on
conclusory pleadings but “must present sufficient evidence to show the existence of each
element of its case on which it will bear the burden at trial.” Serfecz v.
Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). A mere scintilla of evidence is not
sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment, nor is a metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts. Robin v. Espo Eng. Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 2000)
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(internal citation omitted). Rather, the evidence must be such “that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Pugh v. City of Attica, Ind., 259 F.3d
619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)).
ANALYSIS
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants move for summary judgment as to all counts of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint. Defendants argue that “there is simply no credible evidence in the
record that supports [P]laintiff’s allegations as true. To the contrary, deposition
testimony given by witnesses and the relevant documents produced by both parties
establish that [P]laintiff’s allegations are contrived.” (Dkt. No. 124 at 4.) However,
Defendants’ Motion fails.
Defendants have failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1(a)(3), which requires a
party moving for summary judgment to submit “a statement of material facts as to which
the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) further provides that, “Failure to
submit such a statement constitutes grounds for denial of the motion.” Importantly, the
court is “entitled to expect strict compliance” with Local Rule 56.1. Cichon v.
Exelon Generation Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809–10 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ammons
v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004)). Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion could be denied on this ground alone. See
Iron Workers Tri State Welfare Plan v. Jaraczewski, No. 02-cv-2586, 2002 WL
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31854972, *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2002) (denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment for failure to submit a statement of facts).
But even if Defendants’ failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1 were
overlooked, Defendants’ Motion fails on the merits. At summary judgment, the
Defendants must present evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Defendants have
not presented such evidence. Defendants only cite the depositions of Motel 6 employees
Lydia Soto and Brandon Franklin, in which they testify that they did not know why
Plaintiff stopped working at Motel 6. This evidence alone fails to establish that there is
no genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s claims. For these reasons, Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment as to Count I of his Second
Amended Complaint that Defendants are subject to Title VII. Plaintiff contends that
Defendants refuse to amend their Answer and Request to Admit, in which Defendants
deny that there is Title VII jurisdiction. Rule 56(a) provides that “A party may move for
summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense – or the part of each claim or
defense – on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphasis
added).
Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
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The phrase “current calendar year” refers to the year in which the alleged discrimination
occurred. Komorowski v. Townline Mini-Mart and Restaurant, 162 F.3d 962, 965 (7th
Cir. 1998). The “payroll method” is used to “determine whether an employment
relationship exists between an individual and the alleged employer.” Mizwicki v.
Helwig, 196 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc.,
519 U.S. 202, 205-207 (1997)). “[T]o establish that the defendant is a Title VII
employer, the plaintiff must introduce evidence of defendant’s payroll records to prove
that fifteen or more employees appeared on the employer’s payroll for twenty or more
calendar weeks in either the year of the alleged violation or the preceding year.” Id.
Defendants have admitted that they employed at least fifteen employees during
more than twenty weeks in both 2009 and 2010. Accordingly, because there is no
genuine issue of fact that there is Title VII jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to Count I is granted.
Plaintiff raises the issue of an award of fees to the Plaintiff because of
Defendant’s conduct regarding Plaintiff’s claim for the first time in his reply brief in
support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Accordingly, it was not
considered in ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion. See Gonzales v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373, 382 (7th
Cir. 2009) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived).

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [124] is
denied. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [121] is granted.

Date: June 19, 2013

______________________________
JOHN W. DARRAH
United States District Court Judge

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