King v. Goshe et al

Filing 376

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable John Z. Lee on 3/28/17. Mailed notice(ca, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
RAYMOND E. KING,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
PARTHASARATHI GHOSH, M.D., RONALD )
SCHAEFER, M.D., LIPING ZHANG, M.D.,
)
CATALINO BAUTISTA, M.D., ARTHUR A.
)
FUNK, M.D., JOSEPH SHEEHY, SANDIE
)
THOMAS, HUNDLEY A. DAVIS, M.D.,
)
SALEH OBAISI, M.D., IMHOTEP CARTER, )
M.D., SHANNIS STOCK, S.A. GODINEZ, and )
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE, INC.,
)
)
Defendants.
)

10 C 6838
Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Raymond King, an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”), has been
afflicted with a panoply of health ailments; a hernia and a bad knee are the subjects of this lawsuit.
King has sued various physicians and medical technicians at Stateville, as well as Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) officials and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Defendants have filed summary

judgment motions. For the following reasons, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
I. Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1
Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 requires that “[a]ll material facts set forth in
the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by
the statement of the opposing party.” LR 56.1(b)(3); see Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th

Cir. 2003) (“We have consistently held that a failure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by
the local rules results in an admission.”).
For the most part, King complied with Local Rule 56.1 when responding to the statements
of fact filed by the various doctors and Wexford entities. With regard to the IDOC Defendants,
however, King did not respond to their statement of facts, did not file a statement of additional
facts in support of his claims against them, and did not reply to their memorandum of law in
support of their summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the Court deems admitted all properly
supported assertions in the IDOC Defendants’ statement of fact. See, e.g., Friend v. Valley View
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365U, 789 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that district court did not
abuse its discretion by deeming admitted movant’s facts due to nonmovant’s failure to comply
Local Rule 56.1), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 141 (2016). A nonmovant’s failure to comply with
Local Rule 56.1 does not automatically result in a judgment for the movant. See Raymond v.
Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006). Rather, the “ultimate burden of persuasion
remains with [the movant] to show that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
II. Factual Background 1
The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. At all times relevant to this
lawsuit, King has been incarcerated at Stateville and in the custody of the IDOC. Doctor Defs.’
LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 17.

1

King argues in his response brief that gaps in his medical records for reasons outside of his
control should not create any adverse inferences against him. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 12. In ruling
on the summary judgment motions, the Court has relied on the cited portions of King’s deposition
as well as medical records, and there has been no occasion for the Court to make such inferences.
Accordingly the parties’ arguments regarding this issue are moot.
2

In filing their summary judgment motions, Defendants have categorized themselves into
three groups: the IDOC Defendants, the Doctor Defendants, and the Wexford Defendants. The
members of those groups are as follows.
The IDOC Defendants include Joe Sheehy and Sandie Thompson, 2 medical technicians
who are sued in both their individual and official capacities. Also included are Shannis Stock,
IDOC Chief of Programs and Support Services, and Salvador Godinez, IDOC’s Director. Both
are sued only in their official capacity. IDOC Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 2–5.
The Doctor Defendants include Dr. Arthur Funk, Dr. Ronald Schaefer, Dr. Liping Zhang,
Dr. Catalino Bautista, Dr. Imhotep Carter, Dr. Saleh Obaisi, and Dr. Ann Davis. Doctor Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 36 (Dr. Funk); id. ¶ 27 (Dr. Schaefer); id. ¶¶ 21–22 (Dr. Zhang); id. ¶ 37 (Dr.
Bautista); id. ¶¶ 39, 42 (Dr. Carter); id. ¶¶ 45–51, 59, 61, 63–64, 67–70, 78 (Dr. Obaisi); id. ¶¶ 58,
62 (Dr. Davis). Dr. Funk served as the Regional Medical Director of Wexford from 2005 to
present and filled in as a physician on an as-needed basis. Id. ¶ 5. Dr. Zhang was a staff physician
from 2006 to 2010. Id. ¶ 2. Dr. Schaefer served as Medical Director and filled in as a physician
on an as-needed basis in 2010. Id. ¶ 3. Dr. Bautista was a physician and Interim Medical Director
from May 31 to July 24, 2011. Id. ¶ 35. Dr. Carter was Medical Director from July 25, 2011, to
May 13, 2012. Id. ¶ 38. Dr. Obaisi served as a physician and Medical Director from August 2,
2012, to present. Id. ¶ 7. Last, Dr. Davis was a staff physician from 2013 to 2014. Id. ¶ 8. Each
Doctor Defendant is sued in his or her individual and official capacities. 4th Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7–10,
13–15.
The Wexford Defendants include Wexford, a corporation that has contracted with IDOC to
provide medical services to inmates at Stateville. Wexford Defs.’ LR56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 53–54.
2

Sandie Thompson is variably misnamed on the docket and in Fourth Amended Complaint
as both “Sandy Thomas” and “Sandie Thomas.”
3

Also included is Dr. Parthasarathi Ghosh, who is sued in his individual and official capacity. Id. ¶
6. Dr. Ghosh treated King’s conditions and also served as Stateville’s Medical Director from June
2003 to March 2011. Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 7, 17, 39–40; Wexford Defs.’ Ex. B,
Ghosh Dep. of 10/20/15, at 7:22–24; Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 7, 40.
A.

King’s Inguinal Hernia Condition
1.

Injury, Diagnoses, and Treatment

While at Stateville, King first visited the health care unit for his hernia on March 22, 2006.
Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 2; Doctor Defs.’ Reply Ex. 1. During his second visit on January
18, 2008, King was examined by LaTonya Williams, a physician’s assistant, who is not a
Defendant. Id. ¶ 3. King reported having burning pain in his testicle due to a four-year-old
hernia. Id. (citing Pl.’s Ex. Q, 1/18/08 Records); Doctor Defs.’ Reply Ex. 2. Williams noted that
the hernia “can’t be reduced,” 3 and it is disputed whether that notation is based on her own
conclusion upon examination or King’s description. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 3; Doctor
Defs.’ Reply Ex. 2. Nonetheless, Williams referred King to Stateville’s “ER for evaluation.”
Doctor Defs.’ Reply Ex. 2.
As a result of that referral, that same day, King was examined by Dr. Aguinaldo (another
person who had not been named in this lawsuit), who diagnosed King with a right inguinal hernia.
Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 55; 4 Pl.’s Ex. Q. Dr. Aguinaldo told King that his hernia was non-reducible

3

A brief primer on hernias is required. A reducible hernia is one that can be pushed back
inside the body by applying pressure. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 13. A non-reducible or
incarcerated hernia is one that cannot be pushed back into the body. Id. A strangulated hernia is
one that cannot be reduced and lacks adequate blood flow to the tissue that is incarcerated within
the hernia sac. Id. Either a non-reducible or a strangulated hernia requires surgical intervention.
Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 48.
4

King was deposed three times, but none of the transcripts are consecutively paginated. In
an attempt at clarity, the Court cites the first deposition taken on June 3, 2015 (Doctor Defendants’
Ex. I) as “Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 1.” The second deposition, taken on September 14, 2015 (Doctor
4

and that, pursuant to Stateville’s protocol, he would ask Dr. Ghosh, the Medical Director, to refer
King to University of Illinois in Chicago Hospital (“UIC”) for an evaluation. Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at
55; Pl.’s Ex. Q; see Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 48. Despite Dr. Aguinaldo’s diagnosis
and concern, King was never referred to UIC for an evaluation in 2008, 2009, or 2010. Pl.’s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 3.
In August 2008 and January 2009, King filed grievances about the failure of medical
technicians and doctors to examine or treat his hernia despite King’s numerous requests over the
five-month period from March to August 2008. Id. ¶ 33; Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08 Grievance; Pl.’s Ex.
S, 1/7/09 Grievance. King explained that, from March to August 2008, he tried “unsuccessfully to
be seen on the sick call.” Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08 Grievance. He reported that he could not get his
hernia to “go in,” that his hernia was “causing [him] a great deal of pain,” that his hernia made it
“hurt[] to walk and sit down,” and that attempts to reduce his hernia made him feel as though he
was “about to vomit.” Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 34; Pl.’s Ex. S, 1/7/09 Grievance.
The August 2008 grievance mentioned IDOC Defendants Sheehy and Thompson, medical
technicians who made rounds in King’s housing area. Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08 Grievance; IDOC
Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 6–9. King complained that, although he had requested on many
occasions during the five-month period that Sheehy and Thompson put his name on the sick-call
list, he had never been examined. Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08 Grievance. King also alleges that there
were times when Sheehy would come to his cell, but refused to examine him. IDOC Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 26. King further alleges that when he asked Thompson to be seen for his
hernia, he would tell King “you is a writ, so you going to have to wait until you get back to your
institution.” Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 90. Thompson’s statement occurred during a seven-month period
Defendants’ Ex. K) is cited as “Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 2.” The third, taken on October 26, 2015 (Doctor
Defendants’ Ex. L) is cited as “Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3.”
5

from September 2007 to April 2008, when King had been temporarily transferred—or, in jailhouse
slang terms, “writ-ed”—from Menard Correctional Center to Stateville for treatment of a different
health condition. Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 1, at 39–41.
Neither Sheehy nor Thompson has any recollection of any interaction with King. IDOC
Defs.’ Ex. G, Sheehy Aff. ¶ 1; IDOC Defs.’ Ex. F, Thompson Aff. ¶ 1. But they generally assert
that when medical technicians received a complaint from an inmate, they would take the inmate’s
vital signs and determine whether the condition was an emergency. IDOC Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3)
Stmt. ¶ 9. A condition such as a seizure, chest pain, diabetic shock, difficulty breathing, or an
open wound constituted an emergency that warranted immediate medical intervention.

Id.

Sheehy and Thompson’s general practice was to schedule inmates with non-life-threatening
medical conditions for an appointment on the “sick call” in the health care unit. Id. ¶ 10; IDOC
Defs.’ Ex. G, Sheehy Aff. ¶ 4; IDOC Defs.’ Ex. F, Thompson Aff. ¶ 4. Whether an inmate was
actually seen on the sick call on any given day, however, depended on the work schedules of the
doctors in the health care unit. IDOC Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 10.
Dr. Zhang examined King on February 14, 2009. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 4.
According to King, when she attempted to force his hernia into his body, he started “screaming
and hollering” due to the pain. Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 56. The record does not show whether Dr.
Zhang administered pain medication or ice before attempting to reduce King’s hernia. Dr. Zhang
noted in King’s medical record that he “refused to cooperate.” Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt.
¶ 22. Dr. Zhang gave King a support garment called a “hernia belt” designed to keep an inguinal
hernia inside the body, but, according to King, because his hernia was already irreducible, it had
no effect. Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 57. The parties dispute whether King had already told Dr. Zhang
that the prescribed medication had not alleviated his pain. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor

6

Defs.) ¶ 21; Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 24–25, 33, 36, 38. Dr. Zhang did not ask Dr. Ghosh,
as Medical Director, to refer King to UIC for an evaluation. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 4.
In February and April of 2010, King filed more grievances stating that, although he had put
in numerous requests to be seen by a doctor since January 2009, medical staff refused to address
his irreducible hernia, which was “extremely tender to touch.” Id. ¶ 33; Pl.’s Ex. U, 2/4/10
Grievance; Pl.’s Ex. W, 4/8/10 Grievance.
On April 10, 2010, Dr. Zhang once again tried to reduce King’s hernia during an
examination. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 24. Again, the record does not show whether
Dr. Zhang administered pain medication or ice prior to doing so. While she was pushing on his
hernia, King felt excruciating pain to the point of being in tears, and he pushed Dr. Zhang’s hand
away. Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 58. Dr. Zhang again noted that King had been uncooperative and
refused to allow her to attempt to reduce his hernia. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 24. Dr.
Zhang prescribed Toradol for the pain. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 6. Although the parties
dispute why, it is undisputed that King never received Toradol as a result of that prescription.
Doctor Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 6. Furthermore, King states, and Defendants
dispute, that none of the prescription pain medication had alleviated his hernia pain. Pl.’s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 24–25, 33, 36–38.
Three days later, on April 13, 2010, Dr. Ghosh examined King’s hernia. Doctor Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 25. Dr. Ghosh states that he categorized King’s hernia as “reducible, not
incarcerated.” Id. According to King, however, it would have been impossible for Dr. Ghosh to
have known whether the hernia was reducible because Dr. Ghosh did not examine it or try to
manually reduce it. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶ 25.
By August 17, 2010, King states that he was unable to walk due to his hernia pain, and that
a correctional officer noticed and sent him to the health care unit to be evaluated. Pl.’s LR
7

56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 8; see Pl.’s Ex. AA, 8/18/10 Grievance, at 2 (stating he was brought in a
wheelchair to the health care unit). 5 Dr. Schaefer told him to pull his pants down, saw the
swelling, and told King that he did not have a hernia. Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 14–15. Dr. Schaefer
ordered a scrotal ultrasound, but no ultrasound was ever administered. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C)
Stmt. ¶ 9.
On August 18, 2010, King filed a grievance seeking surgical repair of his hernia, or at the
very least, to be seen by Medical Director Dr. Ghosh in order to be referred to a specialist. Pl.’s
Ex. AA, 8/18/10 Grievance. He also requested pain medication that would not have the side effect
of elevating his blood pressure. Id.; Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 43.
On July 5, 2011, King was examined by Dr. Funk, who wrote “ABD reducible (RT) IH”
and “uncomplicated RIH” on King’s chart. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 45. According to Dr. Funk,
this meant that he observed an uncomplicated, reducible, right inguinal hernia. Doctor Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) ¶ 36; Defs.’ Ex. E, Funk Decl. ¶ 6. King counters that, at this point, the pain from his
irreducible hernia was uncontrolled by prescribed medication.

Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt.

(Doctor Defs.) ¶ 36.
Dr. Carter examined King’s knee and jaw (for reasons that will be explained) and renewed
his low-bunk and low-gallery permits on August 18, 2011.

Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 66.

According to King, he also complained to Dr. Carter about his hernia condition, but Dr. Carter
told him that medical staff could address one issue at a time. See Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt.
(Doctor Defs.) ¶ 39.
5

Although the Doctor Defendants attempt to deny this fact by stating that Dr. Schaefer’s notes from
that appointment omit any mention of King’s inability to walk, absence of a notation does not refute King’s
assertion. Also, although the Doctor Defendants state that “Plaintiff refused to answer [Dr. Schaefer’s]
questions about his symptoms,” that statement is unsupported by the cited portion of the record, which
states that when asked about his history of hernia pain, King said, “read my chart and you’ll see.” Doctor
Defs.’ Ex. M, Medical Records, at 11.

8

A year later, in August 2012, King’s hernia was twice examined by Dr. Obaisi. During the
first visit, Dr. Obaisi observed King’s hernia and approved King’s low-bunk and low-gallery
permits. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 45; Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 82. During the second
visit, King told Dr. Obaisi that the hernia belt prescribed by Dr. Zhang had not helped. Doctor
Defs.’ Ex. M, at 83. In King’s view, Dr. Obaisi appeared jocular and indifferent to King’s painful
hernia, and when Dr. Obaisi attempted to reduce his hernia, King walked out angrily. Pl.’s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 13; Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 46.
Dr. Obaisi examined King again on September 10, 2012, and he referred him for surgical
evaluation of his hernia at UIC. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 47; Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at
84. King disputes this fact and states that the only person he saw on September 10, 2012, was a
supply clerk, who measured him for a hernia truss. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶
47.
On September 27, 2012, King was carried on a stretcher to the infirmary. Pl.’s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 14. Dr. Obaisi administered a narcotic pain medicine and applied ice to the
area before attempting to reduce the hernia, but he was unable to reduce it. Doctor Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 49.

Dr. Obaisi sent King to Provena St. Joseph Medical Center’s (“St.

Joseph’s”) emergency room, and King was admitted to the hospital. Id. ¶ 50.
A surgeon at St. Joseph noted that King’s blood pressure was extremely high, and he
recommended hernia surgery once King’s blood pressure was controlled. Id. Consequently, King
was discharged and sent back to Stateville. Id. After King’s blood pressure was lowered with
hypertension medication, Dr. Obaisi sent King to UIC on October 18, 2012. Id. ¶ 52.
King was hospitalized for several days at UIC and underwent hernia repair surgery around
October 21, 2012. Id.; Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 68. King returned to his cell at Stateville on that date,
and he went to the health care unit only for periodic dressing changes of his surgical wound.
9

Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 52; Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 69. King was prescribed a narcotic
pain medicine and antibiotics. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 52. He also received a
temporary medical permit to receive meals in his cell. Id.
On October 24, 2012, King’s hernia surgery site showed acute swelling and discharge.
Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 15. Fearing infection, Dr. Obaisi sent King back to UIC for an
evaluation. Id.; Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 100. The doctor who evaluated King at UIC admitted
him into the hospital for treatment. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 15. Although the record does
not reflect it, presumably King was eventually released and sent back to Stateville.
2.

King’s Inguinal Hernia Site Post-Surgery

About eight months later, during a medical appointment on July 2, 2013, Dr. Anne Davis
examined King after he complained about pain around the surgical site.

Doctor Defs.’ LR

56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 58. Her notes indicate that King was tender in the area of the scar, but there
was no recurring hernia and no palpable fascial defect. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 134. She
indicated that the pain was muscle-related and prescribed analgesic balm to treat the pain. Id.;
Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 58. She instructed King to follow up as scheduled with
Medical Director Dr. Obaisi. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 134.
Dr. Obaisi noted that King’s hernia was “free of swelling and tenderness” and that the
surgery site was in “normal condition” during an examination on November 14, 2013. Doctor
Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 59. Nonetheless, because King complained of knee and hernia pain,
as well as a condition affecting his mouth called “TMJ,” Dr. Obaisi administered an injection of
Toradol, a pain medication, and renewed King’s pain medicine prescription on March 17, 2014.
Id. ¶¶ 59, 64. King contends, however, that the medication did not alleviate his pain. Pl.’s LR
56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶ 64.

10

When King complained about his post-operative pain again on March 17, 2015, Dr. Obaisi
prescribed analgesic balm. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 70. King generally asserts that his
hernia surgical site has been in constant pain and discomfort, no matter what the doctors have
done for him at Stateville. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 16, 36, 38.
B.

King’s Knee Condition

In June 2006, King injured his right knee while incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 11. When he went to pick up a handball, he experienced
pain that “felt like somebody taking a knife and cut[ting] my knee open.” Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C)
Stmt. ¶ 19; Pl.’s Reply Ex., Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 19; Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 1, at 37. The knee was x-rayed, but no
one ever discussed the x-ray results with King. Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 1, at 39. King was prescribed
Tylenol and Ibuprofen. Id.
As he had done with regard to his hernia, in August 2008, King filed a grievance regarding
Sheehy. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 34; Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08 Grievance. King complained
that, from March to August 2008, he had tried “unsuccessfully to be seen on the sick call” for a
“problem with [his] right knee.” Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08 Grievance.
After King filed that grievance, his knee was examined by Williams, a physician’s
assistant who is not a defendant here, on September 16, 2008. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 19.
King asserts that, at that time, his knee pain had increased and the swelling had extended to his
calf. Id. ¶ 22. Williams observed that King walked with a slight limp. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 1.
She prescribed Indocin, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory pain medication (“NSAID”), an
analgesic balm, and an elastic knee brace. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 19. Williams provided
King with a medical permit for the brace, and she ordered an x-ray of his knee. Id. The x-ray
showed “minimal early degenerative joint disease” but was “[o]therwise negative.” Doctor Defs.’
Ex. M, at 3.
11

When Dr. Zhang examined King on October 18, 2008, she noted that his knee had full
range of motion and that King was able to bear weight on it. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 21.
Dr. Zhang instructed King to continue the course of treatment prescribed by physician’s assistant
Williams. Id. King states that the prescribed pain medication did not alleviate his knee pain. Pl.’s
LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 37.
King received a new elastic knee brace and brace permit on August 20, 2009, during an
examination by Williams.

Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) ¶ 23.

She prescribed Tramadol, a

prescription-strength pain medication, and more analgesic balm. Id.
King’s knee was examined on January 30, 2010, by an unspecified medical professional.
Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 19; Doctor Defs.’ Reply Ex. 5. The same person examined King’s
knee again on February 13, 2010. At the second appointment, King complained that he was
unable to climb stairs. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 19; Doctor Defs.’ Reply Ex. 5.
Dr. Ghosh examined King’s knee on April 13, 2010. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt.
¶ 25; Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 15. Dr. Ghosh recommended that King undergo an
MRI. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 25; Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 15.
King underwent an MRI at UIC on June 8, 2010, and Dr. Ghosh met with him to discuss
the results on June 9, 2010. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 26. The MRI results revealed a
“[h]orizontal cleavage tear of the posterior horn and body segment of the medial meniscus,” as
well as “mild, likely chronic, distal ACL sprain with small paracruciate cysts.” Id.; Doctor Defs.’
Ex. M, at 9. In plainer language, King had a torn meniscus and a sprained ACL.
Dr. Schaefer examined King on August 17, 2010, but the examination was limited to
King’s hernia. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 27. Dr. Schaefer did not examine his knee on
that date, and King does not assert that he asked Dr. Schaefer to examine his knee. Pl.’s LR
56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶ 27. See generally Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 1–40.
12

On September 1, 2010, Williams examined King’s knee. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3)
Stmt. ¶ 28. She told King that Dr. Ghosh had approved an orthopedic evaluation of King’s knee at
UIC. Id. On November 1, 2010, Dr. Chmell, an orthopedic surgeon at UIC, evaluated King’s
knee, reviewed the MRI results, and recommended arthroscopic knee surgery. Id. ¶ 29. After
returning to Stateville, on November 5, 2010, King refused his Tramadol and Neurontin pain
medication. Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 20. 6 Three days later, he again refused to take
his medications. Id. at ¶ 21.
Dr. Chmell performed a right knee arthroscopy, diagnostic scope, and partial medial
meniscectomy without complication on November 16, 2010. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt.
¶ 30. After the surgery, King was admitted into Stateville’s infirmary, where he received narcoticstrength pain medication for three days. Id.; Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 1, at 53. On November 18, 2010, King
was discharged to his cell with crutches and a medical permit for a low bunk and low gallery floor
of the prison. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 30.
King returned to UIC on November 22, 2010, for a post-operative evaluation with Dr.
Chmell. Id. ¶ 31. Dr. Chmell stated that King had been given a prescription for Celebrex. Doctor
Defs.’ Ex. M, at 29. Dr. Chmell also prescribed physical therapy to improve King’s range of
motion and to prevent stiffness in his right knee. Id. The parties dispute whether Dr. Ghosh
disregarded Dr. Chmell’s prescribed course of treatment for the following two months. Doctor
Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 31; Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 25; Doctor Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR

6

Although King tries to dispute that he refused pain medication while at Stateville on
November 5, 2010, his response does not constitute a denial. He merely states that the Neurontin
was ineffective and ultimately discontinued by UIC medical staff, see Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt.
(Wexford) ¶ 20, which does not refute the fact that he refused to take both medications while at
Stateville. Accordingly, this fact is deemed admitted. The fact that King refused medication again
on November 8, 2010, is also deemed admitted because King did not support his denial with a
citation to the record, as he was required to do. See id. ¶ 21.
13

56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 25; Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 1, at 53, 55. King contends, and Defendants dispute, that
Dr. Ghosh’s flouting of Dr. Chmell’s prescribed treatment resulted in King’s uncontrolled knee
pain for two months and his reliance on crutches to this day. See Doctor Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s LR
56.1(b)(3)C) Stmt. ¶¶ 16, 18.
Almost two years after King’s arthroscopic surgery, King again complained of right knee
pain. Dr. Obaisi, who was Medical Director at the time, referred King for six months of physical
therapy from February to August 2013. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 57. On November
14, 2013, Dr. Obaisi examined his knee, which was “free from swelling and tenderness.” Id. ¶ 59.
He administered an injection of Toradol for King’s TMJ, hernia, and knee pain and refilled his
prescription for Celebrex pain medication. Id. Although King says he did not receive that
medication afterward, or for that matter, at any time during 2013, he admits receiving Mobic, an
NSAID, beginning in January 2014. Id. ¶¶ 59–60; see Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 36. Then, in
May 2014, Dr. Obaisi again referred King for physical therapy from May to June 2014. Doctor
Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 65–66. At the end of that therapy session, the physical therapist
concluded that King was unlikely to benefit from future physical therapy. Id. ¶ 66.
Dr. Obaisi evaluated King’s knee again on November 19, 2014, at which time he
prescribed a narcotic pain medication and referred him for an orthopedic consultation at UIC. Id.
¶ 68. On January 12, 2015, Dr. Rick Wang, an orthopedic surgeon at UIC, observed that King’s
knee had full range of motion and no swelling. Id. ¶ 69. Dr. Wang administered a Cortisone shot
and recommended the continuation of NSAIDs and physical therapy. Id. Days later, Dr. Obaisi
confirmed that King had a current prescription for NSAIDs and referred King to physical therapy.
Id. After King completed a course of physical therapy in April 2015, the physical therapist noted
that, although King had performed at a high level, he still complained of pain. Id. ¶ 71.

14

At the direction and approval of Dr. Obaisi, King was evaluated by Dr. Chmell at UIC on
July 6, 2015, as a follow-up to Dr. Wang’s evaluation. Id. ¶ 72. Dr. Chmell ordered another xray, and the results revealed “moderate to severe degenerative arthritis . . . increased since
previous exam.” Id. Based on the x-ray results and the fact that conservative treatment had failed,
Dr. Chmell recommended a total right knee arthroplasty, which involves replacing the knee joint
with a prosthesis. Id. Two days later, Dr. Obaisi approved the surgery, and on November 5, 2015,
Dr. Chmell performed the surgery. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 171.
On November 8, 2015, King was discharged from UIC and returned to Stateville, where he
forwent being admitted into the infirmary. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 74. On November
12, 2015, Dr. Obaisi prescribed Neurontin, a pain medication, provided King with a permit to
receive meals in his cell, and referred him immediately to physical therapy, which he attended
twice a week for several months. Id. ¶ 75.
Based on Dr. Obaisi’s approval, King was examined by Dr. Chmell for a post-surgery
evaluation on February 8, 2016. Id. ¶ 79. Dr. Chmell’s impression was that King was “overall
doing okay.” Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 200. Dr. Chmell noted that his range of motion was 0 to
100, and that King had no significant pain or swelling. Id. at 201. Dr. Chmell recommended
physical therapy, which was approved by Dr. Obaisi. Id. at 202.
III. Legal Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The Court gives “the non-moving party the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and
reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it.” Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw,
LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2013). In order to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving
party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
15

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the
nonmovant “must establish some genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict in her favor.” Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2012).
IV. Analysis
Section 1983 provides a private right of action against persons acting under color of state
law who violate constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Eighth Amendment, applied to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2006). Cruel and unusual punishment
includes deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Delaying treatment of a non-life-threatening—but painful—condition for
nonmedical reasons may constitute deliberate indifference. McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636,
640 (7th Cir. 2010). This is true even if the delay in treating does not exacerbate the injury. Smith
v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012). 7
7

As an initial matter, the Doctor Defendants as well as Sheehy and Thompson, the medical
technicians, argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Public-employee prison employees
are protected by qualified immunity. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978). Prison
correctional officers and health care workers employed by private corporations, however, are not.
See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (correctional officers employed by private
corporation); Rasho v. Elyea, ___ F.3d ____, No. 14-1902, 2017 WL 892500, at *7 (7th Cir. Mar.
7, 2017) (Wexford employees).
Drs. Funk, Davis, Obaisi, and Zhang admit that they are employees by Wexford. Doctor
Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 5 (Dr. Funk); Answer ¶ 9, ECF No. 9 (Drs. Davis and Obaisi);
Answer ¶ 8, ECF No. 249 (Dr. Zhang). As employees of Wexford, Drs. Funk, Davis, Obaisi, and
Zhang are not entitled to qualified immunity.

None of the other doctors or the medical technicians has stated whether IDOC employs
him or her. At most, each has asserted that he or she worked at Stateville. See IDOC Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 7, 8; Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 2–4, 6–8; Wexford Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 4. Merely stating that a person works at a particular prison location does not
establish that the person is employed by a public entity. As a result, these Defendants have not
met their burden to show that they are public employees, and the Court is unable to determine on
this record whether they are entitled to qualified immunity.
16

“A plaintiff claiming a constitutional violation under § 1983 for denial of medical care
must meet both an objective and subjective component.” Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cty. of
Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2014). First, he must show that his medical need is
objectively serious.

Id.

Second, “the plaintiff must show that the defendant[s] . . . had a

sufficiently culpable state of mind—that their acts or omissions [were] sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Id. at 775–76 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
A.

Dr. Carter: Statute of Limitations

Dr. Carter correctly argues that the claims against him are time-barred. Illinois’s two-year
statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims. Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 716 (7th Cir.
2016). It is undisputed that Dr. Carter was no longer employed at Stateville after May 13, 2012.
Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 6. King first added Dr. Carter as a Defendant in his Fourth
Amended Complaint on June 6, 2014, after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. 4th
Am. Compl., ECF No. 239. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in Dr. Carter’s
favor as to all claims.
B.

Medical Technicians and Other Doctors

King claims that medical technicians Sheehy and Thompson, as well as Drs. Bautista,
Davis, Funk, Ghosh, Obaisi, Schaefer, and Zhang, were deliberately indifferent to his hernia and
knee. The Court addresses each in turn.
1.

King’s Inguinal Hernia Pre-Surgery

The Seventh Circuit has recognized that a hernia can be an objectively serious medical
condition and that chronic pain alone is a separate, objectively serious condition. Gonzalez v.
Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, the court has noted:

17

According to the National Institutes of Health, “surgery will usually
be used for hernias that are getting larger or are painful” and is the
only treatment that can permanently fix a hernia. See Medline Plus,
Hernia, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000960.htm
(last visited Nov. 29, 2011) . . . . While surgery can be postponed,
delay is recommended only for patients with minimal or no
symptoms, and then only if the hernia can be reduced readily and
completely and will remain in position despite physical activity.
Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, Defendants apparently
concede that, prior to surgery, King’s hernia as well as his hernia-related pain were objectively
serious. See generally Defs.’ Mems. Supp. Summ. J., ECF Nos. 334, 335, 336. But they dispute
whether their response to his hernia rose to the level of deliberate indifference.
“To determine if a prison official acted with deliberate indifference, we look into his or her
subjective state of mind.” Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016). To be liable, the
official must have been “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists” and must also have actually drawn that inference. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Even where a defendant denies having been aware of a substantial risk of serious harm,
however, summary judgment is inappropriate when a reasonable jury could conclude from other
evidence that this was not so. See Petties, 836 F.3d at 726 (reversing district court’s grant of
summary judgment to defendant doctors who denied knowing that failure to immobilize plaintiff’s
ruptured Achilles tendon exacerbated the injury). The decision to persist in a course of treatment
known to be ineffective—when reasonable alternatives are available—constitutes deliberate
indifference. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005); Garvin v Armstrong, 236 F.3d
896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001). “[W]here evidence exists that the defendants knew better than to make
the medical decisions that they did, a jury should decide whether or not the defendants were
actually ignorant to risk of the harm that they caused.” Petties, 836 F.3d at 731.
18

As an initial matter, King has not established that Dr. Bautista had anything to do with his
pre- or post-surgery treatment. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 36; Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C)
Stmt. ¶ 12. See generally Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 1–40. Accordingly, the Court grants
summary judgment in Dr. Bautista’s favor as to his claim based on his hernia condition.
With regard to medical technicians Sheehy and Thompson, as well as Drs. Funk, Ghosh,
Obaisi, Schaefer, and Zhang, however, King has created a triable issue as to whether they were
deliberately indifferent to his hernia and related pain prior to surgery. 8 The Court addresses the
medical technicians and doctors in turn.
Sheehy and Thompson, in effect, acted as gatekeepers regarding whether an inmate was
seen by medical professionals in the health care unit. Although Sheehy and Thompson state that
their general practice was to schedule an inmate complaining of a non-emergency health condition
for the first available appointment on the sick call in the health care unit, they do not states
whether that practice was likely followed with regard to King. IDOC Defs.’ Ex. G, Sheehy Aff.
¶ 4; see id., Ex. F, Thompson Aff. ¶ 4. What is more, King states that, despite asking Sheehy and
Thompson on numerous occasions during a five-month period to be placed on the sick-call list for
his painful hernia, he was never seen during that entire period. Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08 Grievance. A
reasonable jury could infer from these facts that Sheehy and Thompson had not adhered to their
general practice in King’s case. King has thus created a triable issue regarding Sheehy and
Thomson’s deliberate indifference to his painful hernia.
A reasonable jury could also find that Drs. Funk, Ghosh, Obaisi, Schaefer, and Zhang were
deliberately indifferent to King’s hernia and pain prior to surgery. King asserts that Dr. Aguinaldo
had diagnosed his non-reducible inguinal hernia in January 2008. See Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 55; Pl.’s
8

Because Dr. Davis only treated King’s hernia well after his surgery, King has not
established a genuine issue of fact as to her deliberate indifference prior to surgery.
19

Ex. Q. At that time, Dr. Aguinaldo had recommended that Dr. Ghosh refer King to UIC for
surgical evaluation, which is in line with Wexford’s position that non-reducible hernias require
surgical intervention. See Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 48. A jury could therefore
reasonably infer from the facts in the record that King’s hernia was non-reducible and required
surgical intervention in 2008, thereby calling into question how any of the doctors could
subsequently conclude that King’s hernia was reducible and did not require surgical intervention.
See, e.g., Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶ 36 (Funk); id. ¶ 25 (Ghosh); id. ¶¶ 45–49
(Obaisi); id. ¶ 27 (Schaefer); id. ¶ 22 (Zhang); Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 3, 6, 8, 33, 36, 38;
Pl.’s Ex. Q; Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 55–56; Doctor Defs.’ Reply Ex. 2; see also Pl.’s Ex. R, 8/20/08
Grievance; Pl.’s Ex. S, 1/7/09 Grievance; Pl.’s Ex. U, 2/4/10 Grievance; Pl.’s Ex. W, 4/8/10
Grievance.
Moreover, the record contains evidence that King’s hernia pain interfered with his daily
life activities, such as walking and sitting. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 8 (unable to walk due to
hernia); Pl.’s Ex. S, 1/7/09 Grievance (with hernia, it “hurts to walk and sit down”). Yet, rather
than seeking approval of surgical intervention, the doctors persisted for nearly five years in
prescribing ineffective pain medications or treatment that never was actually administered, such as
a scrotal ultrasound. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 9, 13–14, 16, 33, 38. The Court
therefore denies Defendants Sheehy, Thompson, Funk, Ghosh, Obaisi, Schaefer, and Zhang’s
motion for summary judgment as to King’s Eighth Amendment claim based on his hernia and pain
prior to surgery.
2.

King’s Inguinal Hernia Site Post-Surgery

King further claims that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the pain he felt around
the hernia surgical site after surgery. Although King generally states that he has received only
intermittent and ineffective medication for this pain and has filed five grievances about it, he does
20

not provide the grievances themselves or describe any particular instance of deliberate indifference
to support this claim. Id. ¶¶ 16, 33, 38; see Pl.’s Exs. (omitting grievances after 2010); see Pl.’s
LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 1–40. Furthermore, the only evidence in the record with regard to this
pain is limited to Dr. Davis and Dr. Obaisi’s treatment. The facts surrounding their response to
King’s pain fail to create a reasonable inference that it was an objectively serious medical
condition or that their treatment rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
First, Dr. Davis examined King only on July 2, 2013. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶
58. Dr. Davis noted that King felt tenderness in the area, but she did not see any fascial defect or
feel a recurring hernia upon palpation. Id.; Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 134. Dr. Davis diagnosed
King’s pain as being muscle-related, prescribed analgesic balm to rub on the area, and told King to
follow up as scheduled with Medical Director Dr. Obaisi. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 134. Given
these facts, no reasonable jury could find that King’s surgical-site pain was an objectively serious
medical condition or that Dr. Davis’s response to the pain constituted deliberate indifference. See
Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An objectively serious medical condition is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.”).
Second, Dr. Obaisi examined the area around King’s hernia scar on November 14, 2013,
and it did not show any abnormalities. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. G, Obaisi Decl. ¶ 21 (cited in Doctor
Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 59). But because King was complaining of pain due to his hernia
scar area, as well as his knee and TMJ, Dr. Obaisi administered an injection of Toradol, a pain
medication. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 59. When King again complained about this
pain on March 17, 2014, Dr. Obaisi examined his hernia repair site and noted that his inguinal
canal was within normal limits and there were no signs that the hernia had recurred. Id. ¶ 64. In
short, Dr. Obaisi attempted to, but could not, determine the cause of King’s pain around his hernia
21

scar. Nonetheless, Dr. Obaisi renewed King’s prescription for pain medications and directed him
to follow up as needed. Id. Based on this evidence, no reasonable jury could find King’s hernia
site pain was an objectively serious medical condition or that Dr. Obaisi’s response to King’s
complaints of pain rose to the level of deliberate indifference.
These are the only incidents relating to treatment of King’s surgical-site pain in the
summary judgment record, and they do not create a reasonable inference of an objectively serious
medical condition or a conscious disregard of that need. Accordingly, the Court grants summary
judgment in favor of all Defendants with regard to King’s Eighth Amendment claim based on his
surgical-site pain.
3.

King’s Knee Condition

King also claims that the doctors and medical technicians were deliberately indifferent to
his knee condition. As with his hernia condition prior to surgery, Defendants concede that King’s
knee condition prior to both surgeries constituted a serious medical need. They argue, however,
that King has not created an issue for trial regarding the subjective element of his deliberate
indifference claim. To satisfy this element, an inmate must show that the defendants were aware
of his serious medical needs and consciously disregarded a significant risk to his health or safety.
Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 775 (7th Cir. 2008). A showing of a defendant’s mere
negligence or inadvertence is insufficient. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011). With
the exception of Dr. Ghosh, Defendants are correct. The Court addresses the exception first.
For starters, it is clear that no jury could reasonably conclude that Dr. Ghosh was
deliberately indifferent to King’s knee condition prior to King’s first knee surgery. At Dr.
Ghosh’s direction and approval, King had undergone an MRI, seen an orthopedic surgeon, and
obtained arthroscopic surgery at UIC within seven months of Dr. Ghosh’s first examination of

22

King’s knee. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 25–30; Wexford Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶
15.
Dr. Ghosh’s post-operative care of King’s knee condition, however, is another matter.
Viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to King, a jury could find that
Dr. Ghosh disregarded the orthopedic surgeon’s post-operative prescription of Celebrex pain
medication and physical therapy for two months for no apparent reason.

See Pl.’s LR

56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 25, 31; Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶ 31; see Pl.’s Ex. BB,
11/22/10 UIC Medical Record (prescribing Celebrex and physical therapy); Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 52;
Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 1, at 51–53. It is true that “a difference of opinion among physicians on how an
inmate should be treated cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference.” Norfleet v. Webster,
439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006). In this case, however, Dr. Ghosh does not assert that he
disagreed in any way with the orthopedic surgeon’s prescribed course of treatment or that he had
any medical basis for the two-month delay. Accordingly, a jury could reasonably infer that Dr.
Ghosh was deliberately indifferent to King’s knee condition post-surgery. See Arnett v. Webster,
658 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[R]efusal to provide an inmate with prescribed medication or
to follow the advice of a specialist can . . . state an Eighth Amendment claim.”).
That said, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the medical technicians and the
other physicians with respect to King’s knee condition. As for the medical technicians, King has
not established a genuine issue as to whether Sheehy or Thompson was deliberately indifferent to
his knee condition. As a threshold issue, King has not sued Thompson for deliberate indifference
in this regard. See 4th Am. Compl., Count II. His claim against Sheehy also falters because it is
solely based on a list of dates on which King filed grievances. Although King provides the dates
on which he filed grievances purportedly regarding his knee condition, he does not include any of
the listed grievances as exhibits or otherwise describe the listed grievances.
23

See Pl.’s LR

56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 34. He has therefore failed to establish that Sheehy was the subject of any of
the grievances filed on those dates. The Court thus grants summary judgment as to Sheehy and
Thompson on King’s Eighth Amendment claim based on his knee condition.
Turning to the doctors, King admits he has no claim against Dr. Funk regarding his knee.
See Pl.’s Dep. Pt. 3, at 22. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in Dr. Funk’s favor
as to this claim.
Next, no jury could find that Dr. Zhang’s treatment of King’s knee constituted deliberate
indifference. Dr. Zhang examined his knee on a single occasion on October 18, 2008. Doctor
Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 21. At that point, an x-ray showed minimal early degenerative joint
disease for which King had been prescribed an NSAID, an analgesic balm, and a knee brace. Pl.’s
LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 19; Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 3. Dr. Zhang noted that King’s knee showed
full range of motion and that he was able to bear weight on his right leg. Doctor Defs.’ LR
56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 21. Given these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Zhang’s
decision to continue King’s course of treatment constituted deliberate indifference to King’s knee
condition. See id. Although King asserts that the pain medication had been ineffective, see Pl.’s
LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶ 21, there is no evidence suggesting that King ever
communicated that fact to Dr. Zhang. Accordingly, the Court grants Dr. Zhang’s motion for
summary judgment on this claim.
Furthermore, King has not created a factual issue as to whether Drs. Bautista, Davis, and
Schaefer were deliberately indifferent to his knee condition. First, King agrees that on the one
occasion that Dr. Bautista treated his knee, he approved King’s request to refill his medications,
including Celebrex, for his knee pain. Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 35. Dr. Bautista also
obtained Wexford’s approval of an orthopedic evaluation of his knee at UIC. Id. ¶ 37. Second,
King also agrees that, on the one occasion he was examined by Dr. Davis, she scheduled a follow24

up appointment for him to see the Medical Director. Id. ¶ 62. Third, it is undisputed that Dr.
Schaefer’s sole examination of King related to his hernia, not his knee. Id. ¶ 27. Moreover, King
has omitted any facts about Drs. Bautista, Davis, and Schaefer’s treatment of his knee from his
statement of additional facts. See generally Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 1–40. Based on the
paucity of facts in the record regarding these doctors’ treatment of King’s knee, no reasonable jury
could find in King’s favor. The Court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of Drs.
Bautista, Davis, and Schaefer as to King’s claim based on his knee condition.
In addition, the Court concludes that there is no disputed issue of material fact regarding
whether Dr. Obaisi was deliberately indifferent to King’s knee condition. Two years after King’s
arthroscopic surgery, when Dr. Obaisi was the Medical Director, King complained of right knee
pain. Dr. Obaisi treated King’s condition with NSAIDs and two rounds of physical therapy.
Doctor Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 57, 59–60, 65–66; see Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 36.
And when the physical therapist indicated that King was unlikely to benefit from future physical
therapy, Dr. Obaisi sought an orthopedic surgeon’s opinion. Id. ¶¶ 66, 68. Dr. Wang, the
orthopedic surgeon, however, recommended that King continue the course of treatment of
NSAIDs and physical therapy, and Dr. Obaisi then followed Dr. Wang’s advice. Id. ¶ 69. When
it became clear that neither of the methods that Dr. Wang had recommended had improved King’s
knee condition, Dr. Obaisi again sought the guidance of an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Chmell. Id. ¶¶
71–72.

Because the x-ray showed that the condition of King’s knee joint had deteriorated

dramatically since Dr. Wang’s evaluation, Dr. Chmell recommended surgery, which Dr. Obaisi
quickly approved. Id. ¶ 72; Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 171. On the heels of King’s surgery, Dr.
Obaisi prescribed pain medication and referred him for physical therapy. Id. ¶ 75. Three months
after the surgery, Dr. Obaisi directed that King be evaluated by Dr. Chmell, who noted that King
moved his knee without significant pain or swelling and who recommended physical therapy,
25

which Dr. Obaisi approved. Id. ¶ 79. All in all, Dr. Obaisi’s response to King’s knee condition
shows a conservative, yet progressive, method of treatment. Viewing all of the disputed and
undisputed facts in King’s favor, the Court grants Dr. Obaisi’s summary judgment motion as to
this claim.
The Court therefore grants summary judgment on this claim in favor of Defendants
Sheehy, Thompson, Bautista, Davis, Funk, Obaisi, Schaefer, and Zhang.

The Court grants

summary judgment in Dr. Ghosh’s favor with regard to his treatment of King’s knee prior to
surgery and denies summary judgment with regard to Dr. Ghosh’s post-operative care of King’s
knee.
C.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

Next, Wexford has moved for summary judgment as to all claims. “To recover against
Wexford . . . [a plaintiff] must offer evidence that his injury was caused by a Wexford policy,
custom, or practice of deliberate indifference to medical needs, or a series of bad acts that together
raise the inference of such a policy.” Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 796 (7th Cir.
2014) (citing Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004)).
“[I]solated incidents do not add up to a pattern of behavior that would support an inference of a
custom or policy, as required to find that Wexford as an institution/corporation was deliberately
indifferent to [a plaintiff’s] needs.” Id.
King’s claim against Wexford is limited to one unwritten policy. King states that he “has
often been forced to choose between treatments of issues during medical evaluations, being told
that a ‘one issue at a time’ policy precluded having all of his issues treated in a single
appointment.” Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 35. In support of this assertion, King cites his own
declaration, which simply echoes this exact statement. Pl.’s Reply Ex., Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 35.

26

To fend off Wexford’s summary judgment motion, it is King’s burden to create an
inference that the unwritten policy existed and that it caused him injury. King supports this claim
by arguing that Dr. Carter told him on August 18, 2011, that the medical staff had a “one issue at a
time” policy. See Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Doctor Defs.) ¶ 39. King’s reliance on a single
incident is insufficient to sustain his burden of establishing a pattern of behavior. Furthermore,
that same day, Dr. Carter examined King’s knee condition, ulcer condition, and TMJ condition
during the same appointment. Doctor Defs.’ Ex. M, at 66.
Additionally, King has not established that he was harmed by the purported policy. King
does not argue that he could not have scheduled another appointment to address other medical
conditions.

Nor does he argue that he was somehow injured by having to make multiple

appointments. Having failed to create a triable issue of fact regarding his claim against Wexford,
the Court grants Wexford’s summary judgment motion.
D.

Defendants Shannis Stock and Salvador Godinez

Finally, Shannis Stock, IDOC Chief of Programs and Support Services, and Salvador
Godinez, IDOC’s Director, who have been sued in their official capacity, have moved for
summary judgment as to any and all claims against them. A suit against state officers in their
official capacity is, in effect, a suit against the state. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
Shannis and Godinez argue that King is precluded from seeking compensatory or punitive
damages from them. They are correct. The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions against
state officers. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169–70 (1985); Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701,
706 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Eleventh Amendment, however, does not bar King’s request for injunctive relief
against Stock and Godinez in their official capacity. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60
(1908). Nevertheless, summary judgment is appropriate here, because “in an official-capacity suit
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the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Graham,
473 U.S. at 166. As mentioned above, King claims that, during examinations by medical staff,
there was a “one issue at a time” policy that precluded his issues from all being treated in a single
appointment. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 35. King agrees that Wexford is contracted to
provide medical services to inmates at Stateville. Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3)(B) Stmt. (Wexford) ¶ 54.
Because the only alleged policy at issue is Wexford’s, not IDOC’s, the Court grants Stock and
Godinez’s summary judgment motion with regard to King’s request for injunctive relief.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’
motions for summary judgment [333] [335] [344].

Summary judgment is granted as to

Defendants Bautista, Carter, and Davis, in their individual and official capacities, as well as
Shannis Stock, S.A. Godinez, and Wexford Health Source, Inc., and they are dismissed as
Defendants. The motions are denied as to Defendants Funk, Ghosh, Obaisi, Schaefer, Sheehy,
Thomas, and Zhang with regard to King’s deliberate indifference claim based on his hernia and
hernia pain prior to surgery, but the motions are granted as to his claim against all Defendants
based on the pain around his hernia surgical site well after surgery. The motions are granted as to
Defendants Funk, Obaisi, Schaefer, Sheehy, Thomas, and Zhang with regard to King’s deliberate
indifference claim based on his knee condition. Summary judgment is granted as to Defendant
Ghosh with regard to his pre-surgery treatment of King’s knee condition but denied as to Dr.
Ghosh’s post-operative care of King’s knee.

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A status hearing will be held on April 13, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. The parties should be
prepared to set deadlines for pretrial filings and a date for the final pretrial conference and trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED 3/28/17

__________________________________
John Z. Lee
United States District Judge

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