Pugh v. Chicago Teacher Union et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly on 5/8/2012. (ao,)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

MARY PUGH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION,
MARILYN STEWART, JUNE DAVIS,
and DIANE MYRON,

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Case No. 10 C 7176

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:
Mary Pugh, appearing pro se, has sued the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU),
Marilyn Stewart, June Davis, and Diane Myron. She asserts claims of discrimination
based on color, violation of her constitutional right to equal protection, breach of the
union’s duty of fair representation, and breach of contract. Defendants have moved to
dismiss the claims. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants defendants’ motion.
Background
The Court accepts plaintiff’s allegations as true for purposes of resolving the
motion to dismiss. See Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570
F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009).
Mary Pugh began working at Tilden Career Community Academy, a public high
school in Chicago, in 1999. She worked as a Student Special Service Advocate, a
position that involved working with students who had special needs. In the position, she

was a member of the CTU. Stewart, Davis, and Myron are apparently employees of the
CTU.
Pugh alternatively claims that almost immediately after beginning work, or in
2007, she learned that she had been misclassified as a teacher’s aide, a job with
different salary and duties. Pugh suggests that an administrative worker at Tilden may
have in turn been misclassified as a special service advocate, in effect receiving the
benefits of Pugh’s position without doing the work.
Pugh took her problem to Tilden’s principal, Phylis Hammond. Instead of
ensuring that Pugh’s classification was correct, Pugh alleges, Hammond retaliated
against her. Specifically, Hammond no longer allowed Pugh to coach girl’s basketball,
volleyball, and soccer, even though she was a popular and successful coach. Pugh
also began receiving much lower performance evaluations.
Pugh’s problems with Hammond escalated in 2010. Pugh was disciplined after a
hearing that she did not attend in April 2010. She claims that she did not receive notice
of the hearing until after it had occurred. In June 2010, she received notice of another
disciplinary hearing only two days before it was to occur. Pugh requested that the
meeting be rescheduled, but her request was denied. She did not attend the hearing,
and it is unclear whether any discipline resulted from it. In July 2010, Tilden’s new
principal, Marcey Sorenson, informed Pugh that she did not have a position at Tilden
that summer and ordered a Chicago police officer to escort Pugh from the building. The
Chicago Board of Education (CBE) sent Pugh a notice that she had been laid off at the
end of the month.
From 2007 until the time that she was terminated, Pugh filed at least sixteen
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grievances with the CTU related to her misclassification and the retaliation by
Hammond. She claims that the CTU failed to adequately pursue these grievances with
the CBE. Pugh also filed several charges against both the CTU and the CBE with the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB). See 115 ILCS 5/5. Four of the
charges concerned the CTU, and the IELRB or its executive director dismissed all of
them. See Ill. Admin. Code tit. 80, § 1120.30(b) & (c). It does not appear that Pugh
ever sought review of the IELRB’s decisions in the Illinois Appellate Court. See 115
ILCS 5/16.
Discussion
Defendants have moved to dismiss Pugh’s claims against them for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “When
analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint, [the Court] construe[s] it in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, accept[s] well-pleaded facts as true, and draw[s] all
inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 624 F.3d
834, 837 (7th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff “has stated a claim only if [she] has alleged enough
facts to render the claim facially plausible, not just conceivable.” Id. The Court,
“however, construe[s] pro se complaints liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709,
718 (7th Cir. 2011).
A.

Duty of fair representation
Pugh claims that the union failed to represent her fairly in her conflicts with the

CBE. Defendants argue that this claim is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the IELRB.
Under the Illinois Education Labor Relations Act (IELRA), a union’s violation of its
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duty of fair representation is considered an unfair labor practice. 115 ILCS 5/14(b)(1).
The statute provides that “[a] charge of unfair labor practice may be filed with the
Board.” Id. 5/15 (emphasis added). The statute also allows for review of the decisions
of the board in the Illinois Appellate Court. Id. 5/16.
Despite the IELRA’s use of the word “may,” the Illinois Supreme Court has held
that the IELRB has exclusive initial jurisdiction over charges alleging another type of
unfair labor practice: refusal to comply with a binding arbitration award entered
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Board of Educ. of Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. Compton, 123 Ill. 2d 216, 220–21, 526 N.E.2d 149, 151–52 (1988). The court
recognized that IELRA and its companion statute, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
(IPLRA), “were an attempt to provide a comprehensive regulatory scheme for public
sector bargaining in Illinois.” Id. at 221, 526 N.E.2d at 152 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Two Illinois courts have used the reasoning of the court in Compton to conclude
that a charge that a union has breached its duty of fair representation must be brought
before the appropriate board under the IPLRA. Cessna v. City of Danville, 296 Ill. App.
3d 156, 161–63, 693 N.E.2d 1264, 1267–69 (1998); Foley v. Am. Fed’n of State, County
& Mun. Emps., Council 31, 199 Ill. App. 3d 6, 10, 556 N.E.2d 581, 583–84 (1990).
Although the IPLRA, like the IELRA, does not contain language making the board’s
jurisdiction exclusive, the courts recognized that the comprehensive regulatory scheme
intended by the Illinois legislature required exclusivity. Cessa, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 163,
693 N.E.2d at 1268–69. “Concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit courts would allow
inconsistent decisions and forum shopping, which would undermine the goal of
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uniformity sought to be achieved by the [IPLRA] and IELRA.” Id. at 163, 693 N.E.2d at
1269.
The Court concludes that under the reasoning of the courts in Compton, Cessna,
and Foley, the IELRB has exclusive jurisdiction over Pugh’s duty of fair representation
claim. See Proctor v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. 65, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1031 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (federal court has no jurisdiction over claim that school district breached collective
bargaining agreement because IELRB had exclusive jurisdiction). Pugh has
unsuccessfully brought charges against the CTU before the IELRB and may be
effectively attempting to appeal the Board’s adverse rulings in this suit, but “federal
court would not be the correct forum for such an appeal.” Alexander v. Northeastern Ill.
Univ., 586 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (noting that decisions of the IELRB are
appealable to the Illinois Appellate Court).
The Court dismisses this claim on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction over the
claim.
B.

Discrimination based on color
Pugh asserts a claim that CTU and its employees discriminated against her

because of her color. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a), 2000e-2(c); see Bennett v. Roberts, 295
F.3d 687, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2002) (Title VII and § 1981 claim have same standard and if
plaintiff cannot succeed on one claim she cannot succeed on the other). “Establishing a
prima facie Title VII claim against the Union based on a breach of a duty of fair
representation requires the plaintiff[ ] to show that (1) [the employer] violated the
collective bargaining agreement with respect to the plaintiff[ ], (2) the Union permitted
the breach to go unrepaired, thus breaching its own duty of fair representation, and (3)
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there was some indication that the Union’s actions were motivated by discriminatory
animus.” Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 868 (7th Cir. 1985); accord
Colangelo v. Motion Picture Projectionists, Operators & Video Technicians, Local 110,
No. 01 C 9417, 2004 WL 406770, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2004).
In the materials Pugh has filed as her complaint and response to the motion to
dismiss, there is nothing to indicate plausibly that any of the union’s actions, or those of
its employees, were motivated by discriminatory animus. She alleges only that the
union refused to prosecute any of the grievances that she filed. The only explanation of
the union’s conduct she ever gives is speculation that Davis, who was assigned to
process some of the grievances, was an friend or possibly a relative of Hammond’s.
Pugh has also not alleged that any other similarly situated union member was treated
less favorably; she does not mention any other union member’s experience with
grievances.
Nor does Pugh ever allege that her problems with Hammond and the CBE were
the result of discrimination. Without even an allegation of discrimination on the part of
the union, or even that it was aware of and complicit in discrimination by the CBE,
Pugh’s discrimination claim must be dismissed. Cf. Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 869
(sufficient evidence of discriminatory animus to defeat summary judgment when two job
classifications were entirely sex segregated without objection from union and union
requested that employer lay off more women and not lay off any men).
The Court dismisses this claim.
C.

Violation of equal protection rights
Pugh asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and 1986, alleging that
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the CTU violated her constitutional rights by denying her equal protection of the laws. A
section 1985(3) claim requires a conspiracy, and “[t]he plaintiff must show some racial,
or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators’ actions.” Majeske v. Fraternal Order of Police, Local Lodge No. 7, 94 F.3d
307, 311 (7th Cir. 1996). “Similarly, a claim under [section] 1983 alleging racial
discrimination must allege purposeful discrimination.” Id.
As discussed above, Pugh has not alleged any purposeful racial discrimination or
discriminatory animus on the part of CTU, its employees, or even Hammond and the
CBE. Accordingly, her section 1983 and 1985 claims fail. “And because [plaintiff] has
failed to state a section 1985 claim, h[er] [section] 1986 claim fails as well.” Smith v.
Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Court dismisses this claim.
D.

Breach of contract
Pugh asserts a breach of contract claim. “The elements of a breach of contract

claim are: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the
plaintiff; (3) breach of contract by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff.”
Asset Exch. II, LLC v. First Choice Bank, _ Ill. App. 3d _ 953 N.E.2d 446, 454–55
(2011).
Pugh does not identify what contract she had with the CTU or the other
defendants. Nor does she allege what actions in particular by defendants breached a
contract. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim.
Furthermore, nothing in Pugh’s complaint or response indicates that there is any

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basis to exercise original jurisdiction over this claim; there is only supplemental
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Court has dismissed all claims over which it had
original jurisdiction and this case is still at the pleading stage. Even were Pugh to be
able to state a breach of contract claim, the Court would decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. Id. § 1367(c)(3); see Fields v. Wharrie, 672
F.3d 505, 518–19 (7th Cir. 2012) (in the Seventh Circuit, “the usual practice is to
dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have
been dismissed prior to trial”).
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss
[docket no. 42]. Defendants’ motion to file a second amended memorandum in support
of their motion to dismiss [docket no. 38] is terminated. Unless plaintiff files, by no later
than May 23, 2012, a motion for leave to amend attaching a proposed amended
complaint that states a viable federal claim, the Court will enter judgment against her.

________________________________
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY
United States District Judge

Date: May 8, 2012

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