Crawley v. ED Morse Cadillac

Filing 34

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable James F. Holderman on 7/15/2011: For the reasons explained in the Statement section of this order, defendant Morse Operations, Inc.'s ("Morse Operations") "Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Per sonal Jurisdiction and Venue, and Motion to Quash Service of Process" 15 is granted in part and denied in part. Because the court finds that Morse Operations is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, Morse Operations's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted and Morse Operations's motions to dismiss for improper venue and to quash service of process are denied as moot. Morse Operations's second "Motion to Quash Service of Process" 29 and plaintiff Helen Crawley's "Motion Redoing to Jurisdiction and Venue" 26 are also denied as moot. Signed by the Honorable James F. Holderman on 7/15/2011: Mailed notice (am)

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

James F. Holderman

CASE NUMBER

10 C 7865

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

7/15/2011

Helen Crawley vs. ED Morse Cadillac

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT

For the reasons explained in the Statement section of this order, defendant Morse Operations, Inc.’s (“Morse
Operations”) “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Venue, and Motion to Quash Service
of Process” [15] is granted in part and denied in part. Because the court finds that Morse Operations is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, Morse Operations’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is granted and Morse Operations’s motions to dismiss for improper venue and to quash service of
process are denied as moot. Morse Operations’s second “Motion to Quash Service of Process” [29] and
plaintiff Helen Crawley’s “Motion Redoing to Jurisdiction and Venue” [26] are also denied as moot.
O[ For further details see text below.]

Notices mailed.

STATEMENT
On December 10, 2010, plaintiff Helen Crawley (“Crawley”), pro se, filed a complaint against
defendant Morse Operations, Inc. (“Morse Operations”), improperly sued as ED Morse Cadillac (see Dkt. No.
15 (“Morse Operation’s Mot.”) at 1), based at least in part on the damage done to her vehicle while it was being
repaired. This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 1332 based on diversity of
citizenship. On April 12, 2011, Morse Operations filed its “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and Venue, and Motion to Quash Service of Process” (Dkt. No. 15). While this motion was
pending, Crawley served a subpoena on Dennis MacInnes, an officer of Morse Operations (see Dkt. No. 29 at
Ex. A), and Morse Operations has moved to quash this subpoena (Dkt. No. 29). Crawley also filed a
“Motion Redoing to Jurisdiction and Venue” (Dkt. No. 26), which mirrors the arguments she makes in her
“Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Venue” (Dkt. No. 27
(“Crawley’s Resp.”).)
In its motion, Morse Operations argues that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois, that
venue is improper, and that Crawley failed to effectuate service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h).
For the reasons explained below, the court agrees with Morse Operations that Morse Operations is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois.
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Phencorp Reinsurance Co., 440 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir.
2006). In ruling on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the court can consider affidavits and other written materials submitted by the parties and “must .
.
1

Although Crawley named “Ed Morse Cadillac” as the defendant, the correct defendant apparently is Morse

10C7865 Helen Crawley vs. ED Morse Cadillac

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STATEMENT
Operations.

. resolve all factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor.” GMAC Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Canyonside Realty,
Inc., 2005 WL 1463498, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2005) (citing Softee Mfg., L.L.C. v. Mazner, No. 03 C 3367,
2003 WL 23521295, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2003)).
“A federal district court in Illinois has personal jurisdiction over a party involved in a diversity action
only if Illinois courts would have personal jurisdiction.” Michael J. Neuman & Assocs. v. Florabelle
Flowers, Inc., 15 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 1994). The Illinois long-arm statute authorizes courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction “on any . . . basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the
Constitution of the United States.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c). Because the Seventh Circuit has “yet to find any
‘operative difference between the limits imposed by the Illinois Constitution and the federal limitations on
personal jurisdiction,’” Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hyatt Int’l Corp. v.
Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 715 (7th Cir. 2002)), the court “may collapse the personal jurisdiction analysis under
Illinois law into the constitutional inquiry,” id.
To exercise personal jurisdiction consistent with the federal due process clause, “the defendant must
have minimum contacts with the forum state ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Hyatt Int’l, 302 F.3d at 716 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “[T]he defendant must have ‘purposefully established minimum
contacts within the forum State’ before personal jurisdiction will be found to be reasonable and fair.” Id.
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). The minimum contacts must
demonstrate that the “defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State,” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)), such
that it “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in the forum State, id. at 474 (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
Personal jurisdiction over a defendant is based on either (1) general jurisdiction or (2) specific
jurisdiction. Cent. States, 440 F.3d at 875. In this case, Crawley does not expressly state whether she is
relying on general or specific jurisdiction. Because the complaint does not allege any facts connecting the
underlying action to Illinois and Crawley’s response to Morse Operations’s motion relies on Morse
Operations’s internet website, www.edmorsesawgrass.com, to argue that Illinois has personal jurisdiction
over Morse Operations (Crawley’s Resp. 1), the court assumes that Crawley is relying on general, rather than
specific, jurisdiction. “General jurisdiction . . . is permitted only where the defendant conducts continuous
and systematic general business within the forum state.” GCIU-Employer Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565
F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2009).
When a website is the purported basis for general jurisdiction over the defendant, the Seventh Circuit
has cautioned that “[c]ourts should be careful in resolving questions about personal jurisdiction involving
online contacts to ensure that a defendant is not haled into court simply because the defendant owns or
operates a website that is accessible in the forum state, even if that site is ‘interactive.’” be2 L.L.C. v. Ivanov,
642 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Illinois v. Hemi Group, L.L.C., 622 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir.
2010)). Simply “operating an interactive website that is accessible from the forum state” does not establish
jurisdiction. Id. at 558-59. Instead, “a defendant must in some way target the forum state's market.” Id. at
559. In other words, “[i]f the defendant merely operates a website, even a ‘highly interactive’ website, that is
accessible from, but does not target, the forum state, then the defendant may not be haled into court in that
state without offending the Constitution.” Id.
10C7865 Helen Crawley vs. ED Morse Cadillac

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STATEMENT
Here, Crawley relies solely on the Morse Operations website to establish personal jurisdiction over
Morse Operations, but she does not address how that website targets Illinois. (See Crawley’s Resp. 1.)
Moreover, based on the court’s review of the cited website, the site appears to be targeting Florida, rather
than Illinois, markets. Because the record before the court does not demonstrate that Morse Operations’s
website targets Illinois, the court finds that the website is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over
Morse Operations in Illinois. Morse Operations’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkt.
No. 15), accordingly is granted, and Morse Operation’s motions to dismiss for improper venue and to quash
service of process are denied as moot. Morse Operations’s second “Motion to Quash Service of Process”
(Dkt No. 29) and plaintiff Helen Crawley’s “Motion Redoing to Jurisdiction and Venue” (Dkt. No. 26) are
also denied as moot.

10C7865 Helen Crawley vs. ED Morse Cadillac

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