Holt v. Loyola University of Chicago

Filing 107

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Blanche M. Manning on 7/3/2012. The court notes that Ms. Holt recently filed a notice of appeal. The court nevertheless may consider her motions to reconsider. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Ms. Holt's motion to vacate May 31, 2012 and June 4, 2012 Decision of Sanction against Defendant, Apology to the Court and Request to Initiate Appeals Process in the Event Plaintiffs' Request for Motion to Vacate is Denied 96 and her motion to reconsider decisi on of Sanction and Sanction against Defendant regarding the Resetting of the Dates of Deposition and Failure to Adequately Facilitate Initial Depositions Date 98 are before the court. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to reconsider the dismissal of this action are denied. Mailed notice (lw, ).

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Blanche M. Manning

CASE NUMBER

10 C 7917

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

July 3, 2012

Holt v. Loyola

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:
The court notes that Ms. Holt recently filed a notice of appeal. The court nevertheless may consider her motions to reconsider.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Ms. Holt’s motion “to vacate May 31, 2012 and June 4, 2012 Decision of Sanction against Defendant,
Apology to the Court and Request to Initiate Appeals Process in the Event Plaintiffs’ Request for Motion to Vacate is Denied” [96]
and her motion “to reconsider decision of Sanction and Sanction against Defendant regarding the Resetting of the Dates of
Deposition and Failure to Adequately Facilitate Initial Depositions Date” [98] are before the court. For the reasons set forth below,
the motions to reconsider the dismissal of this action are denied.

#[ For further details see text below.]

STATEMENT
On May 31, 2012, the court dismissed this pro se employment case based on its determination that Ms. Holt
had engaged in a “clear pattern of delay and contumacious conduct.” On June 4, 2012, based on a series of
emails received by judges and staff over the weekend, the court barred Ms. Holt from sending emails and
faxes to the court and its staff or communicating with the chambers of this court or the magistrate
judge via phone.
On June 21, 2012, Ms. Holt filed two motions to reconsider. Construed liberally, Ms. Holt contends that
counsel for Loyola is to blame for her failure to be deposed last Fall. According to Loyola’s counsel, the
deposition did not proceed because Ms. Holt and her attorney got into a lengthy argument in his firm’s
reception area and the attorney decided not to proceed with the deposition. Ms. Holt asserts that “Mr.
Rubenstein as facilitator did not agree to plaintiffs [sic] request [to proceed with the deposition], nor formally
inquire as to whether or not plaintiff would like to proceed without the assistance of an Attorney, which as
facilitator, Mr. Rubenstein could have done.” Dkt. 98 at 1. The court will not delve into the merits of Ms.
Holt’s interpretation of the ethical rules governing counsel. Suffice it to say that the deposition did not occur
and the first aborted deposition was only one link in a chain of events that led to the dismissal of this case.
Litigants are all bound by the rules, whether they are represented by counsel or not. The fact that by the end
(continued)

Courtroom Deputy
Initials:

JC/c

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STATEMENT
of May of 2012, Ms. Holt’s deposition still had not occurred demonstrates the problems that plagued this case
due to Ms. Holt’s focus on her personal issues (as discussed in detail in prior orders), as opposed to orders from
this court and the magistrate judge, as well as the rules.
Ms. Holt next claims that it is unfair:
[t]o have this case thrown out on a technicality of the Plaintiff being unable to appear at dates
because of hardship, when the rationale of the hardship is in fact the basis of the filing of the
case leads to Plaintiff to believe the Defendant is in fact using the hardship caused by the
Defendant to subsequently be the source of the removal of the case from the docket, a move of
which the Plaintiff is opposed given neither the termination process nor events leading up to the
termination process considering Higher Education policy and procedure nor Title IX relevant
factors were acknowledged or supported by Defendants [sic], e.g., Human Resources took the
supervisors [sic] words at face value because of her degree and dismissed plaintiff without
hesitation or question when in fact the root of all of the supervisor’s lectures and workshops
throughout the nation, inclusive of the City of Chicago, was to “freely share information and
common knowledge”, especially regarding blackboard documentation.
Dkt. 68 at 2. This passage further supports the severe sanction of dismissal. The case was not “thrown out on
a technicality.” It was dismissed after a clear warning that another failure to appear before either this court or
the magistrate judge would lead to an order dismissing the case. Ms. Holt has demonstrated beyond a shadow
of a doubt that she is able to file motions and advise the court ahead of time if a date is inconvenient. If she
could not attend a court hearing, she could and should have sought to reschedule, as opposed to simply failing
to appear. As the plaintiff, Ms. Holt has certain obligations and responsibilities. The court appreciates that she
believes that the defendant wronged her. Nevertheless, this belief does not absolve her from complying with
the court’s directives.
Ms. Holt’s second motion to reconsider again appears to take issue with the court’s findings regarding her
failure to appear for her deposition in the Fall of 2011 and May of 2012. She states that her “absence was not a
result of choosing not to appear but rather an undue hardship resulting from initial termination charge of
plagiarism of a rough draft in an email by a superior who possessed PhD in English and was a non-person of
color, was partial to Plaintiff’s non-person of color department colleague on allowances and affordances in
terms of arrivals, absences’ [sic], admonishments and was allowed to maintain her position whereas the
Plaintiff was relieved of her position and not requested to return given a decision rendered by the State of
Illinois Department of Security.” Dkt. 98 at 2 (emphasis in original). Ms. Holt appears to be contending that
because her underlying claim of employment discrimination is meritorious, she suffered “undue hardship” that
excuses her failure to appear at her deposition. This is incorrect. As Ms. Holt has been advised time and time
again, all litigants must abide by the same procedural rules that apply in all civil cases. A litigant’s belief
regarding the merits of her case is irrelevant when making critical decisions, such as whether to comply with a
deposition subpoena.
The court also rejects Ms. Holt’s argument that Loyola’s counsel used the “hardship of the Plaintiff” against
her. Id. Ms. Holt’s present situation is of her own making. Finally, the court appreciates Ms. Holt’s apology
and statement that she did not intentionally engage in improper litigation conduct. Nevertheless, Ms. Holt
choose to take the court’s admonishments seriously only after this case was dismissed.
(continued)

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STATEMENT
As previously noted, pro se litigants are bound by the same rules applicable to counseled litigants and must
abide by the same rules. See Pearle Vision, Inc. v. Romm, 541 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2008) (pro se litigants
are not “excused from compliance with procedural rules”). Moreover, civil litigants do not have a right, either
constitutional or statutory, to counsel. Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285,288 (7th Cir. 1995). This court and the
magistrate judge are both very familiar with this case. The decision to refrain from appointing counsel was
made after considering, among other things, the relationship that Ms. Holt had with her original retained
counsel. Thus, the fact that Ms. Holt did not have counsel through the entire pendency of this case does not
excuse her delicts.
Ultimately, Ms. Holt’s motions to reconsider must be viewed through the lens of Rule 59 as she asks the court
to set aside the dismissal order. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 59. Rule 59(e) does not permit a party to rehash
previously raised arguments. Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1996). Similarly, it does not permit a party the opportunity to undo its own procedural failures or present
new evidence or arguments “that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to judgment.”
Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1996). Instead, “[t]he only grounds for a Rule 59(e) motion .
. . are newly discovered evidence, an intervening change in the controlling law, and manifest error of law.”
Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Hicks v. Midwest Transit, Inc., 531 F.3d
467 (7th Cir. 2008). Whether to grant a Rule 59 motion “is entrusted to the sound judgment of the district
court.” Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996).
This court and Magistrate Judge Valdez gave Ms. Holt considerable latitude in litigating her case in light of her
pro se status. The dismissal order appears to have been the impetus for Ms. Holt to take the various warnings
given in this case to heart. The court finds, in an exercise of its discretion and based on its intimate familiarity
with the course of the litigation, that Ms. Holt’s promise that things will be different if the court reinstates the
case is simply too little, too late. As the court previously discussed, dismissal is a severe sanction, but can be
warranted in specific situations. This is one such situation. Accordingly, Ms. Holt’s motions to reconsider the
order dismissing this case are denied.

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