Fitzgerald v. Schaumburg et al

Filing 63

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 1/31/2012. (ao,)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

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Karen Fitzgerald
Plaintiff,
v.
Officer M. Santoro, et. al,
Defendants.

No. 11 C 388

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff has sued the Village of Schaumburg, two individually
identified

police

officers,

and

one

individually

identified

paramedic asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful
entry, unlawful seizure, and excessive force, and state law claims
for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Now

before me is defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of these
claims, which I grant for the reasons that follow.
I.
In the early morning hours of February 6, 2010, the individual
defendants responded separately to dispatch calls stating that an
intoxicated

female

caller

had

contacted

the

Palatine

Police

Department, and, in what plaintiff herself characterizes as an
“unfocused and rambling” call, made statements that the desk officer
interpreted as suggesting that she was “very depressed” and possibly

1

suicidal. After ascertaining plaintiff’s identity and home address
based on information she provided during the call, the Palatine desk
officer contacted dispatch to request that officers be sent to
plaintiff’s home for a well-being check.1
Santoro

and

Cram

and

defendant

paramedic

Defendant Officers
Ashcraft

were

then

dispatched to plaintiff’s building, where they entered without a
warrant, and, I will assume, without her consent.2

Both officers

were familiar with plaintiff at the time, having responded to
several previous calls to her residence, including on one occasion
in which plaintiff had injured herself--apparently without realizing
it--and had required hospitalization.3

1

The parties sought, and were granted, leave to file compact
discs containing recordings of plaintiff’s call to the Palatine
Police (which also includes the Palatine Desk Officer’s call to
dispatch) (Exh. 8 to Pl.’s Stmt. Of Facts), and radio dispatch
transmissions between the defendant officers and Northwest
Central Dispatch (Exh. E to Def.’s Stmt. Of Facts). I have
listened to both cds.
2

Defendants claim that they rang the door bell for
plaintiff’s unit at the entrance to her building and were “buzzed
in,” but plaintiff disputes that she either heard the door bell
or granted the officers entry. According to plaintiff, when the
officers reached her unit, they forced their way in as she was
turning the doorknob. Exhibit E to defendants’ L.R. 56.1
Statement supports their assertion that the officers rang
plaintiff’s doorbell, but I nevertheless accept plaintiff’s
version of their entry into her residence.
3

The parties do not include details of the previous occasion
in their L.R. 56.1 factual statements, but both parties cite to
the testimony of Officer Cram, who responded to the previous
call, in which he stated that on that occasion, plaintiff had
called the police to report that someone had broken into her
residence and left muddy footprints. Officer Cram explained that
upon his arrival at plaintiff’s residence on that occasion, he
2

At the time defendants entered plaintiff’s home on the night
in question, her speech was slurred and her gait unsteady, and a
glass of wine was on the table nearby, all of which led defendants
to

conclude

that

plaintiff

was,

indeed,

heavily

intoxicated.

Plaintiff admits that she had drunk at least two glasses of wine in
the hour-and-a-half preceding defendants’ arrival; that she had
eaten nothing for the previous twenty-four hours; and that she had
not slept in three days.

Defendants spent approximately thirty

minutes talking to plaintiff about her condition and how she was
feeling.

Asked about her call to the Palatine Police Department,

plaintiff denied that she had said she was suicidal, but she
admitted that she had been “very aggravated by a number of things,”
including that her ex-boyfriend had obtained an order of protection
against her, and wanted to talk to someone about her problems.
Confronted with plaintiff’s denial of suicidal thoughts or
statements, Officer Santoro stepped out of plaintiff’s home and
called

dispatch

statements

to

to
the

confirm
Palatine

that
desk

she

had,

officer.

indeed,
After

made

such

receiving

confirmation, Officer Santoro returned to plaintiff’s residence,

determined that the footprints were, in fact, plaintiff’s own,
bloody, footprints, which she had left throughout her home after
stepping in glass. Officer Cram further testified that
plaintiff’s degree of intoxication on that occasion–-which he
characterized as “extreme[]”–-appeared to be “pretty comparable”
to her degree of intoxication on February 6, 2010. Cram Dep.,
Exh. D to Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., 14:11-15, 12:21-13:18.
3

conferred with Officer Cram and the paramedics,4 and decided that
plaintiff should be taken to a hospital for evaluation.
refused to accompany them voluntarily.

Plaintiff

Defendants suggested that,

alternatively, plaintiff could call a friend to stay with her at
home, but plaintiff was unable to reach anyone.
Ultimately, defendants forced plaintiff to accompany them to
the

hospital.

Officers

Santoro

and

Cram

each

took

one

of

plaintiff’s arms and escorted her to, then placed her on, a gurney.
Plaintiff resisted these efforts by pulling away from the officers
and screaming at the top of her lungs.

Officer Santoro used a

“wrist lock” to control plaintiff’s right arm, while Officer Cram
held plaintiff in an “arm bar escort” position.5

Plaintiff’s right

wrist was then handcuffed to the gurney, and her body was secured
with straps for transport by ambulance to the hospital.
Once inside the ambulance, plaintiff attempted to free her
right hand from the handcuff and to unstrap the security straps,
then sat up in an effort to get off the gurney.6

Officer Cram moved

4

Two paramedics were present, but only one is a defendant in
this action.
5

Officer Cram explained, and plaintiff does not dispute,
that in a “wrist lock,” the officer holds the subject’s wrist and
bends her hand downwards in a ninety-degree angle towards the
palm. In an “arm bar,” the officer takes the subject’s wrist in
one hand and places the other hand above the subject’s elbow.
The arm is then rotated forward and pulled back to prevent the
subject from bending the elbow and shoulder joints.
6

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to
plaintiff, there is a dispute over whether plaintiff was
4

to secure plaintiff, who continued to struggle, by placing her right
hand in a wrist lock with his right hand while reaching back for his
handcuff key with his left. According to defendants’ uncontroverted
evidence, plaintiff then placed her left hand on her right forearm
and forcefully jerked or “torqued” her body away in attempt to free
herself from Officer Cram’s grasp. Cram Dep., Exh. D to Def.’s L.R.
56.1 Stmt., 32:3-6. At that point, a “popping,” or “snapping” sound
could be heard in plaintiff’s wrist.

Id., 32:6; Fitzgerald Dep.,

Exh. 2 to Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., 163:4-5.

Plaintiff claims to have

no recollection of jerking her hand away in the manner defendants
describe, but she agrees that she “probably” did so.

Fitzgerald

Dep., Exh. 2 to Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., 160:21-161:2.
After the “popping” sound was heard, plaintiff calmed down, was
given an ice pack for her wrist, and was transported to the
emergency room at St. Alexius Hospital.

A hospital report that

plaintiff

submissions

includes

in

her

L.R.

56.1

identifies

“depression” as her “chief complaint” on admission but states that
plaintiff “denies any suicidal or homicidal ideation.”

Exh. 3 to

Pl.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt.

successful in freeing herself from the handcuff. Plaintiff
testified that although she “wriggled” and “pulled” in attempt to
free her hand from the cuff, she was not able to do so, while
Officer Cram testified that she had, indeed, removed her hand
from the cuff. This dispute is not material to defendants’
motion, however, since, as discussed below, plaintiff does not
controvert defendants’ evidence that the only force applied by
the officers at that point was Officer Cram’s use of a wrist
lock.
5

II.
Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

A genuine issue

of material fact exists if “there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
Turning first to plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, I conclude that
plaintiff has not raised a triable issue as to whether defendants
violated the constitutional rights she asserts because they had
probable cause both to enter her residence and to commit her
involuntarily, and because, on the undisputed evidence, the force
they used to seize her was no greater than was necessary. Moreover,
I conclude that even if probable cause for defendants’ entry and
seizure were lacking, they are entitled to qualified immunity on
plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
Although, as a general rule, warrantless entry into a home is
per se unreasonable, an “exigent circumstances” exception exists
when law enforcement officers “reasonably believe a person within
is in need of immediate aid.” U.S. v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629
(7th Cir. 2000).

To ascertain whether the exigent circumstances

doctrine applies, I must “analyze the situation from the perspective

6

of

the

officers

at

the

scene”

and

ask

whether

they

had

“an

objectively reasonable belief that exigent circumstances existed.”
United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir. 1998).
At

the

information

time
they

defendants
possessed

entered

included

plaintiff’s

dispatch

home,

reports

the

that

an

intoxicated, “very depressed” individual residing at plaintiff’s
address

had

called

the

Palatine

Police

Department

and

made

statements that the desk officer interpreted as suicidal. Moreover,
the officers were familiar with plaintiff from previous contacts
with her while she was intoxicated, and Officer Cram, in particular,
knew

that

unwittingly.

she

had,

on

one

such

occasion,

injured

herself

Plaintiff does not deny that the dispatcher to whom

Officer Santoro spoke stated, “Per the Palatine desk they said that
she was very difficult to understand, but they heard the word
‘suicide’ several times and when they asked her if she was thinking
about suicide she said she’s been very depressed.”

She also does

not dispute that the dispatcher advised Officer Santoro, as he
attempted to gain access to plaintiff’s building, that plaintiff
“just hung up on the desk clerk.”

Def.’s L.R. 56.1 Stmt., Exh. E.

Indeed, my own review of the audio recordings confirms these
statements, and further confirms that the Palatine desk officer had
indeed told the dispatcher that plaintiff “sounded like she made
suicidal comments,” Pl.’s Exh. 8 at 11:14-15, and specifically that
she had said, “sometimes I think about suicide.”

7

Id. at 11:45-47.

While I agree that plaintiff did not, in fact, use those words
in her call to the Palatine Police, there is no dispute that the
officers were told by dispatch that she had done so, or that she had
abruptly terminated her call to the police.

“An officer may

reasonably rely on information provided by other officers” in
assessing whether probable cause for an arrest exists.

Duran v.

Sirgegas, 240 Fed. Appx. 104, 114 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Martinez
v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2nd Cir. 2000)).
officers

had

an

objectively

reasonable

Accordingly, the

belief

based

on

the

dispatcher’s statements that she was in immediate danger at the time
they entered her home.
Moreover, while it is true that in their ensuing conversation,
plaintiff

denied

an

intent

to

harm

herself,

the

overall

circumstances in which defendants found plaintiff confirmed much of
the information defendants had received from dispatch, and, coupled
with that information, supported a reasonable belief that she
required involuntary mental health commitment.

Although plaintiff

claims not to have been intoxicated, she does not dispute that
defendants believed her to be so based not only on the dispatch
report, but also on their observation of her and of her environment.
Plaintiff also does not dispute that she told defendants that she
wanted to talk to her social worker, nor does she controvert
evidence that told them she was upset about a range of other issues,

8

including the order of protection her ex-boyfriend had obtained
against her.
“[P]robable cause to hospitalize a person against that person’s
will exists where the facts and circumstances within the police
officers’ knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant an individual
of reasonable caution in the belief that an immediate danger exists
of the person hurting herself or others.” Threlkeld v. White Castle
Systems, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citation
omitted).

Furthermore, “the probable cause inquiry ‘does not

require that [an] officer’s belief be correct or even more likely
true than false, so long as it is reasonable.’” Id. at 843 (quoting
Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999)).

Other than

plaintiff’s denial of an intent to hurt herself, which defendants
had reason to question based on conflicting information they had
received
reasonable

from

dispatch,

belief

that

the

undisputed

plaintiff

was

evidence

depressed

supports

and

posed

a
an

immediate threat to herself and could not safely be left alone in
her home.

When plaintiff was unable to reach anyone to stay with

her, defendants reasonably concluded that they had probable cause
to have her involuntarily committed.
But even if I were to conclude, notwithstanding the foregoing,
that defendants lacked probable cause, either for the warrantless
entry into plaintiff’s home or the seizure of her person, I would

9

nevertheless conclude that they are entitled to qualified immunity
for these actions.

The qualified immunity analysis requires me to

ascertain not whether defendants in fact had probable cause, but
whether they had “arguable probable cause,” which is to say, whether
“a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and with the
same knowledge...as the officer in question could have reasonably
believed that probable cause existed in light of well-established
law.”

Williams

2001)(emphasis

v.

and

Jaglowski,
ellipses

269

in

F.3d

778,

781

original)(quoting

Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998)).

(7th

Cir.

Humphrey

v.

Plaintiff does not

dispute that the “exigent circumstances” exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless entries and seizures is
well-established. Even if I concluded that defendants’ belief that
the doctrine applied in this case were mistaken, it cannot be said
that the belief was objectively unreasonable in light of the
information defendants had at the time.
725

(“Officers

are

entitled

to

See Humphrey, 148 F.3d at

summary

judgment

on

qualified

immunity grounds if their actions were not objectively unreasonable
at the time they were taken.”). See also Holzman v. City of South
Bend, No. 05 CV 316, 2006 WL 2788587, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 25,
2006) (“The officers were placed in the difficult position of being
told

by

their

dispatcher

that

Mr.

Holzman

was

‘contemplating

suicide,’ versus believing his statements that he had no intention
of hurting himself. The doctrine of qualified immunity allows

10

officers the ability to make such difficult decisions as part of
effectively performing their duties.”) (Citation omitted)
As for plaintiff’s excessive force claim, which is analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard and
looks to the particular facts and circumstances of the case, Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 396 (1989), defendants argue that the
force they used was de minimis and no more than reasonably required,
citing Beshears v. Winters, No. 09 C 2017, 2011 WL 165188, at *7
(C.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2011) (McCuskey, CJ.) (use of arm-bar control
technique “inherently de minimis in nature”), and Jones v. Charter
Township of Genesee, No. 09 C 11211, 2010 WL 3905374, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. July 28, 2010) (Majzoub, MJ) (use of wrist lock to restrain
resisting subject not unreasonable), report and rec. rejected in
part on other grounds, 2010 WL 3906366 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2010).
I agree that this is the only conclusion reasonably supported by the
record.
Plaintiff concedes that the reasonableness of the force used
is a legal issue where no material facts are in dispute.
case,

there

is

no

dispute

that

plaintiff

fiercely

In this
resisted

defendants’ efforts to place her on the gurney, or that she
continued to resist until her arm was broken.

Moreover, there is

no evidence that defendants used any force greater than an “armbar,” a “wrist lock,” or a handcuff on plaintiff’s right wrist to
secure her.

Plaintiff insists that any force the officers used was

11

unreasonable because they lacked probable cause to remove her from
her home in the first place, but this argument falls with my
conclusion that the officers had probable cause (or, alternatively,
a reasonable belief that they had probable cause), to hospitalize
plaintiff involuntarily.
Plaintiff does not meaningfully argue that the officers’ use
of force was excessive even assuming that they had probable cause
to seize her. While it is true that a seizure supported by probable
cause

may

nevertheless

be

unreasonable

if,

“judging

from

the

totality of circumstances at the time...the officer used greater
force than was reasonably necessary,” Brooks v. City of Aurora,
Ill., 653 F.3d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 2011), plaintiff admits, on the
one hand, that she resisted the officers’ efforts to seize her, and
fails, on the other, to identify any competent evidence to suggest
that the officers applied any specific, unreasonable force to
restrain her.
The severity of plaintiff’s injury alone, while significant,
does not preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff acknowledges that she
does not recall how her injury was sustained, and her testimony
about

the

moments

inconsistencies.

leading

up

to

the

injury

is

riddled

with

Plaintiff first testified that she attempted to

free herself from the handcuff on her wrist, responding to the
question, “[a]t any point in time did you ever try and pull out of
that handcuff, pull your wrists out, pull your hand out?” with the

12

answer, “[o]f course I did.”
56.1 Stmt., 156:13-16.

Fitzgerald Dep., Exh. 2 to Pl.’s L.R.

She went on to explain that she continued

to try and wriggle free from the handcuff while the officers (or
perhaps one officer and one paramedic) secured her by the wrist and
elbow.

Id., 156:18-157:9, 157:22-158:8.

Moments later, however,

plaintiff contradicted that testimony, insisting that she did not
try to pull her arm away from the officers at that time. Id.,
160:10-20.

But she reversed course yet again in answer to the very

next question, stating that she had “probably” taken her left hand,
placed it on her right wrist, and tried to pull her right arm away
from the officer or paramedic who was securing it.

Id., 160:21-

161:2.
However these inconsistencies are resolved, however, nothing
in plaintiff’s testimony, or in the remainder of the record,
controverts defendants’ theory that it was plaintiff’s forceful
“jerking” of her arm in an effort to free herself from Officer
Cram’s grasp that precipitated the “popping” sound in her wrist, or
provides a factual basis for concluding that her arm was broken in
some other manner.7

Plaintiff’s reliance on Abdullahi v. City of

7

At one point in her deposition, plaintiff alludes to
officers grabbing her wrist and elbow and “snapping” her arm in
half. She does not, however, identify this statement in her L.R.
56.1 submissions as evidence of how her injury occurred. In
fact, plaintiff affirmatively states that she does not recall how
her injury occurred, and, as noted, does not controvert
defendants’ explanation. Accordingly, I interpret this testimony
as a description of the injury itself, rather than as factual
support for any theory of causation.
13

Madison, 423 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2005), is thus misplaced.

In that

case, the court acknowledged that “the mere fact that an injury
occurred while an individual was in police custody is not sufficient
to avoid summary judgment-a plaintiff must identify the specific
unreasonable conduct that caused his or her injuries.”

Id. at 770-

71. The court concluded that the plaintiff had carried that burden,
citing undisputed evidence that the defendant officer had knelt on
the deceased plaintiff’s back with chest-crushing force, coupled
with competent medical evidence that the decedent died of injuries
consistent with a crushing or squashing type trauma.

Id. at 771.

By contrast, plaintiff’s citation to the testimony of her treating
physician, Dr. Paul Orland--even assuming it were admissible as
evidence of causation–-comes nowhere near identifying “the specific
unreasonable

conduct

Accordingly,

defendants

that
are

caused”
entitled

plaintiff’s
to

summary

injuries.8
judgment

on

plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

8

Defendants argue that Dr. Orland’s testimony is
inadmissible because, among other reasons, Dr. Orland was not
disclosed as an expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2)). But even
setting the admissibility issue aside, the cited testimony does
not address any specific conduct by Officer Cram (indeed, it
appears that he was addressing the theory that plaintiff’s injury
was caused by her attempts to wriggle out of the handcuff), but
merely responded, in answer to the question, “was there any way
to tell whether this was a force that involved a blunt trauma or
a twisting trauma?” that the nature of plaintiff’s injury
suggested that it “could have been a blunt or more significant
type of trauma.” This is simply too slim a reed, standing alone,
to support the inference that plaintiff’s injury was caused by
any specific unreasonable conduct by defendants.
14

I now turn briefly to plaintiff’s claims under Illinois state
law

for

battery

distress.

and

for

intentional

inflection

of

emotional

Defendants argue that Officers Santoro and Cram are

immune from liability for these claims under Section 2-201 of the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act, and that paramedic Ashcraft is immune
pursuant to the Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) Systems Act.
Both arguments have merit.
As plaintiff acknowledges, section 2-201 of the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act protects officials from liability for discretionary
decisions.

Reddick v. Bloomingdale Police Officers, No. 96 C 1109,

1997 WL 441328, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1997)(Coar, J.).
“Decisions to transport someone for medical evaluation and the
proper method to transport patients to a hospital for evaluation are
discretionary.” Id.

Plaintiff claims an “exception” from this

provision by invoking section 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act, which
recognizes that public employees may be liable for “willful and
wanton conduct” when acting “in the execution or enforcement of any
law.” 745 ILCS 10/2-202.

This argument fails for at least the

reason that defendants were acting in the capacity of community
caretakers, not in the execution or enforcement of any law.
Moreover, it is far from clear that the evidence taken as a whole
could reasonably persuade a jury that the officers’ actions amounted
to willful or wanton misconduct.
As for paramedic Ashcraft, plaintiff acknowledges that he is

15

immune from liability under the EMS Systems unless his actions
constitute

willful

or

wanton

misconduct.

Plaintiff

has

not

attributed a single act to this defendant that she claims evidences
such misconduct.
Finally, plaintiff does not dispute defendants’ argument that
the Village of Schaumburg cannot be held liable for plaintiff’s
state law claims since, pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/2-109, “[a] local
public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or
omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.”
III.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted.
ENTER ORDER:

________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: January 31, 2012

16