Garza v. Kenney et al
Filing
39
MEMORANDUM OPINION signed by the Honorable Charles P. Kocoras on 12/5/2011.Mailed notice(sct, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
HENRY GARZA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER KENNEY, in his official,
personal, and individual capacity,
OFFICER LATINI in his official,
personal, and individual capacity,
Defendants.
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11 C 695
MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
This case comes before the Court on Defendant Officer Kenney’s (“Officer
Kenney”) unopposed motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff Henry Garza (“Garza”), at all relevant times, was a pre-trial detainee at
Cook County Jail. On November 5, 2010, Garza and six or seven additional detainees
1
Garza did not oppose Officer Kenney’s statement of material facts. Accordingly, all facts
set forth in Officer Kenney’s statement of material facts are deemed admitted. N.D. Ill. L.R.
56.1(b)(3)(C). The Court notes that the material facts are supported by Garza’s deposition testimony.
were standing uncuffed in two parallel single file lines while returning to their jail cells
from court. Officer Kenney and an unidentified officer accompanied the inmates.
Dennis Rushing (“Rushing”), the detainee standing behind Garza, twice bumped
into Garza and stepped on the back of Garza’s shoes. When Garza turned around,
Rushing coughed in his face. After Rushing swung at Garza with a closed fist, Rushing
and Garza began fighting. Officer Kenney unsuccessfully tried to separate them and
then immediately called for backup by placing a “10-10” call. Approximately two
minutes after Officer Kenney called for backup, six or seven officers arrived and
stopped the fight. Because Rushing had bitten Garza on the chin and cheek and
scratched Garza’s face, the officers took Garza to the hospital where he received
treatment.
Prior to the attack, Garza had never met or seen Rushing and never informed
Officer Kenney or any other officer that he feared for his safety because of Rushing or
any other detainee.
Garza asserts a claim against Officer Kenney under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that Officer Kenney failed to protect him from Rushing. Officer Kenney now moves
for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery materials,
disclosures, and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact, such that the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Protective Life
Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 632 F.3d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 2011). A genuine issue of material
fact exists when, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the
non-moving party. Van Antwerp v. City of Peoria, Ill., 627 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir.
2010). A court construes all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party. Smith v. Hope Sch., 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
A prison official cannot act with deliberate indifference to the safety and welfare
of a pre-trial detainee. Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 856-57 (7th Cir. 2007)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). A prison official is deliberately
indifferent to the safety of a pre-trial detainee if the official was aware of a substantial
risk of serious injury to the detainee and failed to take appropriate steps to protect the
detainee from the known danger. Id. at 857. Officer Kenney argues that this Court
should grant summary judgment in his favor because the undisputed facts prove that he
was not deliberately indifferent to Garza’s safety.
Officer Kenney first argues that he was not aware of a substantial risk of injury
to Garza. A prison official must have actual knowledge of the risk of injury to the
detainee. Guzman, 495 F.3d at 858 (citing Washington v. LaPorte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
306 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2002)). A prison official lacks sufficient notice that an
inmate poses a substantial risk of injury to another inmate where the two inmates had
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no previous interaction, the plaintiff never notified prison officials that he feared for his
safety around the other inmate, and the prison officials had no knowledge of the
inmate’s proclivity for violence. Guzman, 495 F.3d at 857-58. Here, Garza had never
met or seen Rushing before the attack, Garza never informed prison officials that
Rushing threatened his safety, and prison officials had no reason to believe that Rushing
would attack Garza. Thus, no reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Kenney was
actually aware of a substantial risk of injury to Garza.
Even assuming that Officer Kenney was aware of a substantial risk of injury to
Garza, Officer Kenney argues that he was not deliberately indifferent because he
responded reasonably. A prison official who immediately responds to an inmate fight
by calling for backup does not exhibit deliberate indifference to the safety of the
inmates. Id. (affirming summary judgment where prison official responded reasonably
by immediately placing a “10-10” call for backup); Eddmonds v. Walker, 317 F. App’x
556, 558 (7th Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment where prison official
immediately called for backup and verbally commanded the inmates to stop fighting).
Here, Officer Kenney immediately placed a “10-10” call for backup and, within
approximately two minutes, additional officers arrived on the scene and stopped the
fight. Further, Officer Kenney had no obligation to assume the unreasonable risk of
attempting to break up the fight if such action would jeopardize his safety. See
Guzman, 495 F.3d at 858.
Nevertheless, Officer Kenney initially attempted to
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physically intervene which endangered his safety because the inmates continued
fighting and approximately six other uncuffed detainees were standing nearby. Based
on the undisputed facts, a jury could not reasonably conclude that Officer Kenney failed
to appropriately respond when Rushing attacked Garza.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court grants Officer Kenney’s motion for
summary judgment.
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge
Dated: December 5, 2011
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