Peerless Industries, Inc. v. Crimson AV, LLC
Filing
235
WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Susan E. Cox on 5/8/13:Defendants Crimson AV, LLC and Vladimire Gleyzer raises two related matters in its Motion for Sanctions [dkt. 212] and its Supplement to Motion for Sanctions [dkt. 215]. The first motio n for sanctions is based on the allegedly improper instructions given by plaintiff Peerless Industries, Inc. ("Peerless") to its designated Rule 30(b)(6) witness Nicholas Belacore. The second, supplement to its motion for sanctions, is base d on Peerless' failure to produce certain documents relating to Peerless' trade secrets claim until after Mr. Belacore's deposition. For the reasons stated below, both motions are granted in part. We agree that Peerless improperly inst ructed its witness not to answer questions relating to its trade secrets claims and should have produced the documents relating to that claim prior to that deposition. The court's remedy for both discovery violations is the same: reconvene Mr. Belacore's deposition at Peerless' expense so that questions concerning Peerless' claims for trade secrets violations can be answered. (For further detail see minute order). Mailed notice(vkd, )
Order Form (01/2005)
United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge
Joan H. Lefkow
CASE NUMBER
11 C 1768
CASE
TITLE
Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge
DATE
Susan E. Cox
5/8/2013
Peerless Industries, Inc. vs. Crimson AV, LLC
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT
Defendants Crimson AV, LLC and Vladimire Gleyzer raises two related matters in its Motion for Sanctions
[dkt. 212] and its Supplement to Motion for Sanctions [dkt. 215]. The first motion for sanctions is based on
the allegedly improper instructions given by plaintiff Peerless Industries, Inc. (“Peerless”) to its designated
Rule 30(b)(6) witness Nicholas Belacore. The second, supplement to its motion for sanctions, is based on
Peerless’ failure to produce certain documents relating to Peerless’ trade secrets claim until after Mr.
Belacore’s deposition. For the reasons stated below, both motions are granted in part. We agree that Peerless
improperly instructed its witness not to answer questions relating to its trade secrets claims and should have
produced the documents relating to that claim prior to that deposition. The court’s remedy for both discovery
violations is the same: reconvene Mr. Belacore’s deposition at Peerless’ expense so that questions
concerning Peerless’ claims for trade secrets violations can be answered.
O[ For further details see text below.]
Docketing to mail notices.
*Copy to judge/magistrate judge.
STATEMENT
Defendants Crimson AV, LLC and Vladimire Gleyzer (“Crimson”) raises two related matters in its
Motion for Sanctions (dkt. 212) and its Supplement to Motion for Sanctions (dkt. 215). The first motion for
sanctions is based on the allegedly improper instructions given by plaintiff Peerless Industries, Inc. (“Peerless”)
to its designated Rule 30(b)(6) witness Nicholas Belacore. The second, supplement to its motion for sanctions,
is based on Peerless’ failure to produce certain documents relating to Peerless’ trade secrets claim until after Mr.
Belacore’s deposition. For the reasons stated below, we agree that Peerless improperly instructed its witness not
to answer questions relating to its trade secrets claims and should have produced the documents relating to that
claim prior to that deposition. The court’s remedy for both discovery violations is the same: reconvene Mr.
Belacore’s deposition at Peerless’ expense so that questions concerning Peerless’ claims for trade secrets
violations can be answered.
With respect to the first motion, Peerless has made claims in this case that Crimson has misappropriated
its trade secrets. Peerless asked for the basis for this claim in interrogatories it served, which the Court ordered
that Peerless fully answer, and to the extent that it was relying on specific documents, that it identify those
documents by bates number so that Crimson would fully be aware of the scope and extent of Peerless’ claims
(dkt. 201). In conjunction with its effort to learn more about the basis of Peerless’ claim, Crimson also served
a Rule 30(b)(6) notice. Topic 12 of that notice stated that the identified witness should be prepared to testify
about “[a]ll trade secrets that Plaintiff contends were misappropriated, including all information supporting
Peerless’ claims for trade secret misappropriation contained in the Third Amended Complaint.” Although
Peerless did not object to this topic prior to the deposition, its counsel repeatedly objected to questions such as
“are you contending that every piece of electronic information that was transmitted to Sycamore was
11C1768 Peerless Industries, Inc. vs. Crimson AV, LLC
Page 1 of 2
STATEMENT
misappropriated,”1 and “why do you contend that the blueprints constitute a trade secret”2 and “which blueprints
does Peerless contend Crimson and Mr. Gleyzer used to their advantage.”3 At this point in the deposition,
Peerless’ counsel instructed his witness not to answer any more topics concerning Topic 12 because the questions
called for a legal conclusion. (The parties unsuccessfully tried to reach the Court about this disagreement, but
were advised to file a motion as the Court was not available.)
Counsel’s instructions to his witness not to answer questions were improper. Rule 30(c)(2) makes it plain
that “[a] person may instruct a deponent not to answer a question only when necessary to preserve a privilege,
to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).”4 None of these
circumstances were present in the instant case. Counsel’s objection notwithstanding, the witness should have
been instructed to answer the question to the best of his ability, particularly when he was the witness designated
by Peerless on this very topic. Any objection to the scope of the notice was waived when Peerless failed to make
it to Crimson prior to the deposition or to seek a protective order from the Court prior to the deposition. In
addition, the objection is not well-taken. As the Court has noted on the record many times, Crimson is entitled
to know the factual basis for the trade secrets contention. Although it is up to the Court to determine whether
the information is legally entitled to trade secret protection under the applicable legal standards, it is not improper
for Crimson to inquire what the factual basis for the contention is. The use of the word “contend” does not render
the question off-limits in discovery if the witness can factually answer it, or there would no basis for contention
interrogatories, which are routinely allowed.5 If the witness did not know the answer, or could not answer the
question completely, he could have so stated.
To make matters worse, it appears that Peerless did not fully answer the Interrogatories concerning trade
secrets until two days after the deposition of Mr. Belacore. Therefore, Crimson did not have this information
when it deposed Mr. Belacore, the witness identified as having knowledge about this object matter. Peerless
really has no explanation why this is so.
Accordingly, the Court directs the parties to reconvene Mr. Belacore’s deposition so that Crimson can
fully explore Topic 12 with the benefit of the documents which have been produced. That deposition is limited
to three hours. Peerless is to pay for the court reporter and for three hours of one of Crimson’s attorney’s time
as a sanction for its conduct outlined above.
1
Belacore Dep. p.11.
2
Id. at 21.
3
Id. at 28.
4
See also Sprecht v. Google, Inc., 268 F.R.D. 596 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
5
See Howell v. Standard Motor Products, 2001 WL 456241, *3 (N.D. Tex, April 27, 2001)(stating that there is no
basis for the objection “calls for a legal conclusion” in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which would justify a
failure of the witness to answer the question).
11C1768 Peerless Industries, Inc. vs. Crimson AV, LLC
Page 2 of 2
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?